Labour on financing new housing infrastructure

The parliamentary Labour Party has been showing signs of being serious about proposing steps that would, as they see it, unwind the structural impediments that keep urban land prices high and slow down the construction of new housing. Their housing spokesman (and campaign chairman) Phil Twyford has indicated that Labour wants to get rid of the artificial urban limits around cities, especially Auckland, and even managed a joint op-ed with the New Zealand Initiative on that.

Welcome –  and no doubt genuine –  as it all is, I’m still somewhat sceptical about what it will mean in practice.  Any Labour government is near-certain to require the support of the Greens, not known for their support for such flexibility.   And Labour or Labour-associated mayors lead our three largest cities, but there has been little sign of those Councils or mayors leading the way in freeing up urban land supply.  There is a great deal councils could do if they wanted to.  And even if they ran into legal challenges under current legislation, they could still be laying down markers as to the likely direction of reform when Labour returns to national office.

Last week Phil Twyford was out with another interesting idea in the same broad area –  very long-term infrastructure bonds paid back by targeted rates – which again garnered public support from the New Zealand Initiative.  Twyford sketched out his idea in an op-ed in the Herald, and also gave a substantive interview on it to interest.co.nz, who covered it in an article here.  A reader with ties to the Labour Party suggested that I might like to write about it.  My interest in the details of local authority finance is, sadly, quite limited, but I’ve been mulling over what to make of the proposal for the last few days.  Is it really a proposal that, if adopted, might make a useful difference?

One difficulty in reaching a strong view is that the idea is no more than sketched out at the moment, and many of the details could matter quite a lot.

Some have argued that New Zealand should introduce, or allow, the sort of model used in many parts of Texas –  Municipal Utility Districts –  where developers of new residential areas outside existing city limits can form an incorporation, with its own governance structure, which in turn borrows to finance infrastructure developments and the provision of utilities such as water, sewerage and even parks.  The bonds are then serviced by user charges and property taxes on the properties within the specific district.    The New Zealand Initiative has written favourably about them (reported here), and I found an interesting recent Texan newspaper article that captured some of the colour/flavour of these sorts of vehicles.    Whatever the merits of these schemes –  and there seem to be some downsides too –  they aren’t what Twyford and the Labour Party are proposing.

There are some real issues they are trying to address.  As Twyford notes

The council is up against its debt ceiling and last week put the brakes on large-scale housing projects in Kumeu, Huapai and Riverhead until more progress is made on roads, stormwater and the like.

When the population of a city is growing as rapidly as Auckland’s, the existing debt ceilings are almost certainly flawed.  There is a huge difference in the amount of debt, relative to (say) current revenue, that should prudently be taken on in a local authority region  with no population growth than in a region that is seeing 2 or 3 per cent population growth per annum.  We saw this at a national level when New Zealand and Australia were rapidly developing prior to World War One.  Overall government spending as a share of GDP was much lower than it is today, but debt levels (again as a share of GDP) were much higher –  in excess of 100 per cent.  It wasn’t a problem, and markets didn’t see it as a problem.

Some of the current problem then seems to arise from a reluctance to use targeted rates, to ensure that purchasers of the new properties bear the cost of the infrastructure involved in developing those properties.  Development contribution levies presumably go only part of the way.  If owners – present or future –  of the newly-developed sections bore the full cost of the infrastructure it isn’t clear what (economic) reason the Council could have for standing in the way of future residential developments. Planners’, bureaucrats’, and politicians’ visions as to what the city “should” look like are quite another problem –  and not one that Twyford’s proposal seems to address at all.

Twyford describes the problem this way

Developers under current rules have to finance infrastructure within a subdivision and are levied by the council for a share of the cost of connecting to the wider roading and water systems as well as parks.

Many developers struggle with the sums of money involved and it adds cost and delay to projects.

But it isn’t clear that the issue here is really infrastructure finance.  Developers need to finance all the costs of bringing properties to market, including covering both the delays that are perhaps inevitable in complex projects, and those brought on by the regulatory approvals processes.  The largest chunk of those costs typically wouldn’t be the infrastructure (I’d have thought) but the unimproved value of the land  (recall that urban and peripheral urban land prices are really what are sky-high).  And property development is risky –  even though the Reserve Bank’s LVR restrictions weirdly exclude new construction, new developments are where far and away the greatest risks lie.  Lend on an existing house in Mt Eden and the risks are far lower than lending on a new development in Huapai.  Sections might sit unsold, or undeveloped for years.  New houses might do so too –  there was plenty of that in Dublin after the boom ended.

There has been talk recently of banks becoming more cautious about lending for new construction –  perhaps partly from their own reassessments of risks, and partly at the prompting of parents, in response to APRA’s nudges.  Broadly speaking, that seems to me quite welcome.  Banks make their own credit judgements and sometimes they will be less willing to lend than the authorities might like.  It is, of course, the money of their shareholders they are putting at risk.

But Labour talks of central government becoming a fairly large scale provider of finance.

Labour’s plan is for infrastructure within a development, as well as the connections to the wider networks, to be financed by 50-year bonds.

Instead of the developer picking up these costs and loading them on to the price tag of a new home, the bonds could be issued by a government agency – perhaps a specialist infrastructure unit within the Treasury.

Bonds issued in this way would be the cheapest finance available, taking advantage of the Government’s ability to borrow more cheaply than anyone else.

The plan seems to be for the government to issue long-term bonds, with the government standing behind the bonds, and then to on-lend the proceeds to developers, tied to specific projects.  The bonds, in turn, would be serviced by targeted rates levied by local councils on properties within that development.

It all sounds fine when everything goes well (most things do), but here are a few of my problems/concerns:

  • should we be comfortable with Treasury officials making loans to individual developers, with all the risks of political cronyism in the allocation of credit over time?  At very least, lending would need to be done at much more of an arms-length from elected politicians (as, say, when the government provided loans through the Housing Corporation or the Rural Bank),
  • on what basis would we think that Treasury officials –  or even those of a more independent agency –  are better placed to evaluate and monitor residential property development projects than banks and other private providers of development finance?  Who has the stronger incentive to get it right?
  • isn’t there a high risk that the weakest projects will tend to gravitate towards the government provider of finance (strong projects, strong developers, will typically be able to get on-market finance?).  Isn’t that incentive greatest towards the peak of housing booms, when more conservative private lenders might start to pull back from the funding market?
  • how is cost-control ensured?  If developers can simply shift any cost blow-outs into mandatory targeted rates over the next 50 years, doesn’t that materially weaken incentives to bring projects in on time on budget?
  • what is the proposed legal structure?  Only Councils can levy and collect rates, targeted or otherwise.   Are they, or the developer, legally liable for the borrowing from the government?  Developers can and do go out of business quite quickly.  Councils don’t –  but then don’t the debt ceiling concerns cut in again? And can councils credibly (or legally) commit to maintaining a whole series of specific targeted rate for the next 50 years?    (And what are the protections for the property owners against arbitrary changes in these localised targeted rates?)
  • and what happens if the project fails?  If, for example, population growth slows up and a half-completed development lies idle for the next couple of decades.  Will the owners of the land have to pay the targeted rate anyway and, if so, how resilient is this likely to prove politically?

It seems to me that the proposal is meant to have two main attractions:

  • part of the development cost –  infrastructure costs –  are financed at a lower (government) interest rate, and
  • the headline cost of a new house would probably be reduced.

But in substantive terms, neither is really that much of a gain.   The cheaper government financing cost is only available –  in Twyford’s own words –  because the government’s credit risk is protected by the use of targeted rates.  But money that the government has first claim on isn’t available to service other obligations. The infrastructure bonds might well be rock solid, but the rest of any borrowing people had taken out to finance a new property would be just that much riskier.  Incomes don’t rise, and servicing the infrastructure bonds would have first call on what income there was.  Banks would presumably take that into account (including in deciding how much, and at what margin, they will be willing to lend).

And if the headline cost of a new house is reduced, so what?  If I have a choice between paying $700000 for a new house, or paying $600000 for the house and then having to service $100000 of infrastructure bonds issued by the government to cover the development costs of the house, it doesn’t make much difference to me.  If the infrastructure bonds really were 50 year ones, the annual servicing burden might be a little lower than otherwise.  Then again, New Zealand already has the highest real interest rates in the advanced world, so the notion of paying those high rates for that long might not be overly attractive.

And thus I suspect Twyford is wrong about a possible third benefit.  He argues

Reduce the infrastructure component of the price of a new home, and you’ll reduce not only new house prices but eventually prices across the whole market.

That’s unlikely.  If I’m looking at a $700000 house (with no targeted rates), and comparing it to that new house in the previous  paragraph, changing the financing pattern for the new house isn’t likely to change much about what I’d be willing to pay for the existing house.   Of course, if the policy really did increase the flow of new supply of houses and developed land, there would be benefit in lowering the prices of existing properties.  But simply lowering the headline cost of a new house (while loading an equivalent amount into infrastructure bonds) won’t change that.

In many respects, I’m sorry to reach a negative conclusion.  It is great that the Labour Party is looking for ways to make a difference to the housing market, not just for a few months but permanently  (and it is a disgrace that we’ve had 15 years of increasingly unaffordable house prices under both Labour and National-led governments).  And, of course, this isn’t the only (or probably even the main) component of their housing plan

Fixing the housing crisis and managing Auckland’s growth needs sustained reform on many fronts. Labour will build 100,000 affordable homes, tax speculators, and set minimum standards to make rentals warm and dry. We will free up the planning rules by relaxing height and density rules around town centres and on transport routes, as well as replacing the urban growth boundary with more intensive spatial planning.

But I’m sceptical that the infrastructure bond proposal is a suitable response to a serious constraint or that, even if the governance and monitoring concerns could be overcome, that it would make much difference to house and urban land prices.

If they wanted to consider a bold initiative, how about promising that any private land within 100 kms of Queen St could be built on to, say, two storeys without further resource consents?  With a similar policy –  perhaps 50 kms circles  –  for Hamilton and Tauranga, it would seem much more likely to make a real difference in lowering land prices –  the biggest financing issues not just for developers, but for ultimate purchasers.    There are other pieces of the jigsaw, but changing the rules that underpin expectations of future potential land values is probably the biggest component of the problem.

Throw in a sharp cut in the immigration residence approvals target –  not mostly to solve the housing problem, but because there is no evidence New Zealanders are gaining from the large scale non-citizen immigration  – and properties in or near Auckland would be much more affordable really rather quickly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

New Zealand Initiative on immigration: Part 9 The case for open arms

I’m getting a little tired of writing about the New Zealand Initiative’s immigration report, and readers may be getting a little tired of reading about it.   But when the best-funded pro-immigration advocacy group in New Zealand –  Treasury and MBIE aside –  produces a major report on the subject, then as a sceptic of New Zealand’s modern immigration programmes I feel a certain obligation to keep on to the end.  But I’m now down to the last five pages of the report.

Chapter 5 is headed “The Case for Open Arms”, which sounded a lot as if it was going to be making the case for open borders –  that libertarian idyll, not adopted anywhere, in which anyone who wants to can come, in any numbers.   Because the Initiative seems torn between the practical  (simply defending current policy –  which, liberal as it is, is not remotely “open borders”), and the idealistic  (let them come, let them come, in whatever numbers they choose, a policy that they know will never be adopted), the rhetoric and arguments often also aren’t that consistent in tone.

They start by making a fair point

To the original tribes that inhabited New Zealand, European settlers would have seemed more foreign than today’s migrants are to modern New Zealanders.

Different religion, different technologies, different governing institutions, and immensely richer and more productive.    As the Maori did, apparently, so should we, for in the next sentence we are asked

Can New Zealand keep on accepting people who want to make this country their home?

Which seems to have rather lost sight of the hugely expensive wars, and mass (subsidised) migration, that were required to secure the European position in New Zealand.  It was a power grab.   I’m not sure it is a precedent I’d be wanting to invoke.   And, as I keep pointing out, it isn’t as if there are cultures that are (a) immensely more economically productive than the existing New Zealand culture/institutions, and (b) people from those (largely non-existent) countries/cultures clamouring to come to New Zealand.  Recall that paper I mentioned last week suggesting that if there are economic gains from increased diversity, they mostly arise when people come to your country from richer countries.

I’d be inclined to simply dismiss much of this as content-free rhetoric, but so much of the case for large scale non-citizen immigration policy seems to be made at that level.  It certainly doesn’t seem to engage with the actual specifics of New Zealand’s economic underperformance, despite our fairly good institutions and talented skilled people.

The next piece of rhetoric is that “we are all immigrants anyway” line, as if it offers any insights on the current policy choices.

No matter how you slice it, few New Zealanders can trace their lineage to many generations before counting someone foreign-born. We are part of the New World. And we are a nation of migrants.

I presume the aggregate numbers are right, but my ancestors came in the 1850s and 1860s.  It might be a different relationship with “New Zealand” than some Maori may have, but it is also very different than that of people who have come in the last five or ten years.  This is “our place”, and it is a matter for the voters of New Zealand to decide whether, and to what extent, we continue to take lots more immigrants.  And there is nothing historically inevitable about it.  Thus  the observation that “we are part of the New World” is true enough, but meaningless for these purposes.  Australia and Canada also have pretty liberal immigration policies – although even Canada is bit less open than we are.  But the United States takes only about as third as many legal migrants (per capita) as we do.   And the countries of colonial settlement in Latin America are not now known for their extensive immigration inflows.  Perhaps the less said about South Africa – once often grouped with New Zealand, Australia, and Canada –  the better.    Newfoundland, once independent, was one of the first British colonies of settlement: these days, something less than 2 per cent of the population is foreign-born.  It is a choice.

The rhetoric then gets stranger still –  indeed, they invoke the Golden Rule (“do unto others as you would have them do unto you”).

It doesn’t often get brought up in debate but the golden rule applies well to immigration.  Treating immigrants the same way we would like New Zealand emigrants to be treated overseas is fair and sensible. Many New Zealanders benefit from travelling overseas to live and work. Some end up staying but many return, and there is value to New Zealand from both.

Which is a really strange argument to run when New Zealand has among the more open approaches to immigration of any country in the world.  We all know how difficult it can be for New Zealanders to get migration access to, say, the United Kingdom.   The number of permanent resident foreigners in China –  now a middle income country –  is staggeringly small.  And even relative to Australia –  where we have loosely reciprocal arrangements involving the ability of citizens of each country to live and work in the other –  we treat Auatralians moving here far more generously than they treat the (many more) New Zealanders moving there.    And OECD data cited by people like the Productivity Commission tell us that we have more short-term foreign workers living here than any other OECD country.

More generally, it has never occurrred to me that I should have pretty free immigration access to any country I choose.  There are plenty of fine countries out there, but I’ve never assumed I should have a right to live in them.  So how is this argument remotely relevant to discussions of immigration policy in New Zealand?   We could choose to be even more liberal than we are, or we can wind back immigration access quite a bit, and we would still be no less open than most other advanced countries –  and much more open than most middle income and poorer countries.

The Initiative then devotes half a page to what we might call non-GDP benefits from “diversity”.  I’ve made the point before that we don’t need lots of immigration to enjoy Danish butter, French wine, Iranian dates, British books, American i-phones or movies, or Bangladesh or Vietnam-made clothes.  We just don’t.  There are some products that are probably sold here only because immigrant communities are here, but if the rest of us had a taste for those products, New Zealanders could import and distribute them too.   I’m not going to quibble with the taste for ethnic food New Zealanders have developed –  especially as even the Initiative concedes that chefs (one of the more common skilled migrants categories) aren’t exactly “critical economic enablers” (MBIE’s description of our immigration programme).  And perhaps the number of foreign-born players in the All Blacks is a gain to New Zealand, at least for some.  Of their other sports stories, I don’t begrudge Lydia Ko her success, but in what way is it a gain to (native) New Zealanders?  And at least one of the other star cases they cite –  Scott Dixon – was born overseas to New Zealand parents who returned to New Zealand when Dixon was very young.  Two of my kids were also born abroad and came back very young –  but whatever they might one day achieve, I won’t be ascribing that to our immigration programme.

But about this point, they change tack again, with a sub-section headed “A Radical Idea”.

And what is their “radical idea”?

Often forgotten in the immigration debate is a consideration of the migrant as a human being. To borrow a phrase from the feminist movement, the strongest case for a liberal immigration regime is the radical notion that migrants are people.

I’m not sure who ever doubted it.  The Initiative don’t tell us. Rather there is the implied superior tone “only we care about the people”.

No one ever doubted (or at least not that I’m aware of) that immigration usually benefits the immigrant.  After all, they make a voluntary choice to move, and presumably do so because they think doing so will benefit themselves and their descendants.  The hundreds of thousands of New Zealanders who have moved to Australia made that sort of assessment.  (Of course, it doesn’t always work out as planned  –  100 years ago or more Latin America used to offer much higher living standards than Spain or Italy, and migrants flocked to South America.  They might, with hindsight, have been better to have stayed.   For that matter, GDP per capita in New Zealand is now less than that in the UK.)

And I’m also quite comfortable with the proposition that immigration is more effective than foreign aid as a way of raising living standards of people in poor countries.  Since, foreign aid is almost totally useless in that regard, it isn’t much of a comparison.  Immigration can help people in poor countries in two main ways.  The first is transplanting people into richer countries in which their skills can earn more than they would at home.  And the second is remittances –  migrants sending money back to families at home.    The Initiative seems quite keen on remittance flows (a big issue in some small countries).  I’m not.  They help individual families in the short-run, but they also tend to overvalue real exchange rates in recipient countries, and make it harder for those countries to develop themselves, including developing internationally competitive industries.

The Initiative quote one libertarian economist as saying

“Immigration is the greatest anti-poverty programme ever devised”.

I think that is a distinctly questionable claim.   In the short-term, and for relatively small numbers of people, it is probably the quickest such way.

In fact, that greatest anti-poverty programme ever devised is (a) for governments to stop doing stupid and evil stuff (one could think of the self-destruction of Chinese living standards for much of the 20th century), or the current Yemen war, and (b) developing market-friendly institutions and cultures that enable prosperity to take hold for the many, not just the lucky few.  It isn’t easy, it isn’t quick.  But it works.  If the pro-immigration advocates want to argue that these countries/cultures can’t do it for themselves, it is like some sort of 19th century case for enlightened imperialism/colonalism.  I lived and worked in two such countries for a while.  There is little real doubt that British control and administration did raise living standards, and improve prospects for future economic development, in Zambia.    It wasn’t a perfect regime by any means, but the story was often told that in the early 1960s GDP per capita in Zambia was around (or ahead) of that in South Korea or Taiwan.  But most Zambians chose independence, and never showed any signs of regretting that choice, even through 20 pretty disastrous years from the 1970s to the 1990s.    Very little about the prosperity of a society as a whole is down to luck, most of it is down to choices (conscious and unconscious) about how to organise society, what to value, what is taboo and so on.

Decades ago, while he was at the Reserve Bank, Don Brash used to get frustrated at various church leaders’ comments on economics, many of which seemed to reduce to (sometimes quite explicitly) “the rich are rich because the poor are poor”.  We ended up setting up a dialogue with a group from some of the churches to at least better understand where each other were coming from.   I’m not sure it ever achieved much, but it came to mind recently in thinking about immigration.  From pro-immigration people we often hear the suggestion that the relative wealth of our society and the relative poverty of, say, India is down to good luck.  It was a line run in The Economist just the other day

Americans and Europeans are not more deserving of high incomes than Ethiopians or Haitians.

But no one “deserves” a high income.  Rather societies develop in ways which enable many of their citizens/residents to generate high incomes.   European societies have achieved that to a remarkable extent over the last few hundred years, joined so far by a relatively small number of countries from other cultures.  It is a precious achievement, that needs to be nurtured and safeguarded (and no doubt evangelised too).   There is no suggestion that it is somehow genetic –  other cultures held the technological (and material living standards) lead in earlier millenia.  Does nature play a role?  Well, no doubt.  It seems unlikely that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman would have their current living standards without the good fortune of abundant oil.  Navigable rivers, animals that can be domesticated, and so on all helped in the past.  But Haiti’s problems aren’t rooted in natural resources, but in Haitian society.  The comparisons are particularly obvious in those pairs of countries that started not long ago with very similar backgrounds: China (no better than middle income) and Taiwan, or North and South Korea.  Again, a common line is that individuals are “lucky” to be born in New Zealand rather than (say) China.  But luck doesn’t come into it.  People are born into a culture and society, and fostered and nurtured in the values, institutions of that society.  That is how successful societies maintain themselves.  Sadly, it is how unsuccessful societies (at least judged in material terms) replicate themselves.   There is little random, or “lucky”, about it.

As they come to the conclusion of the chapter, the Initiative observes

If one accepts the notion that birth circumstance should not impose limitations on where people are  allowed to live, then the burden of proof should fall on those arguing against immigration to show a detrimental effect.

That is a very big “if”.  Very few people ever have.  Very few do today.  Humans are born within societies –  small, but vital, ones like families, but also neighbourhoods, religious communities, cities, nations and so on.  Often people can leave, but in view few cases is there any automatic right to join.   Some of the boundaries are quintessentially natural and others somewhat arbitrary.  My kids aren’t your kids and vice versa.  Each face advantages and disadvantages in their particular birth and upbringing.  But except in rare circumstances your kids can’t become mine, or mine yours.  In older or more primitive communities much the same limitations applied to tribal or village groupings.  No one thought that outsiders had an automatic right to make themselves part of that established grouping.  Boundaries of countries are perhaps somewhat arbitrary, but even if at times they are drawn in somewhat arbitrary places –  which isn’t the case for New Zealand –  groups of people within those borders tend to develop (or have had for centuries) a sense of a common identity, shared interests, and a willingness to undertake mutual support and protection.  We might choose to invite people in, but it is a choice.  We recognise that, for the most part, being born in New Zealand gives you the right to be here and move about here, and being born somewhere else does not give you that right.

In that world –  the real world –  where people do think that birth circumstances can, and should, influence where one can choose to live, when governments are thinking of running large scale immigration programmes, the burden of proof should really be on our governments (and those who advocate) such programmes to show that natives will be better off if the outsiders come in.  “Better off” doesn’t just have to mean in “economic” terms. It might be something as simple as responding to the compassion of natives, in the face of a natural or political disaster elsewhere.     But for an economics-focused programme, as the New Zealand immigration programme has been for decades, the case made is that natives are made better off by large-scale non-citizen immigration.   Sadly, in their report, the Initiative made little effort to show that, asa  group, we are indeed made better off or even that, if there are such gains, they are maximised at around the sort of current scale and composition of inflows.  If they really believe the story –  as distinct from just the ideology of something like “open borders” – applies to New Zealand here and now surely that is a missed opportunity?

 

 

 

 

Thinking about senior central bank appointments

The Bank of England lost a Deputy Governor the other day.  The Hon. Charlotte Hogg had been chief operating officer of the Bank of England for the last few years, and was recently appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as Deputy Governor (with responsibility for banking and markets).    She was apparently quite highly-regarded, as well as being a scion of the British establishment (both her father and mother are peers in their own right, her mother was head of John Major’s Downing St policy unit, and her father, grandfather, and great-grandfather were all viscounts and Cabinet ministers).

Senior appointees to Bank of England roles (both top executive positions and the non-executive appointees to the decisionmaking committees on monetary policy and regulatory matters) are subject to confirmation hearings before a parliamentary select committee.     The select committee doesn’t get to decide whether the appointees get the job –  so it isn’t like the US system –  but they can ask hard questions, and can write and publish reports on the suitability of a candidate.  The House of Commons is large enough that there are plenty of MPs who either never will be ministers, or have already had a term as a minister,  That seems to make them  –  even those from the governing party – more willing to ask hard questions than one might expect.

In the course of her confirmation hearings, it became apparent that Hogg had not declared and disclosed to the Bank of England that her brother was head of group strategy for Barclays –  holding a senior position (including involvement in regulatory matters) in one of the largest UK banks, and one for which the Bank of England has supervisory responsibility.    Worse still, earlier in the hearings she suggested to MPs that she had in fact done so.

It is a strange story.  At one point in this episode, Hogg had declared that she was totally confident she had complied with all the Bank’s codes of conduct because “I wrote them”.   Even if so, how it never occurred to her to ensure she disclosed her brother’s position –  erring on the safe side if nothing else –  is a bit of a puzzle.  I’m also quite surprised that it wasn’t known and recognised within the Bank anyway –  they are hands-on supervisors, Barclays is a big and important bank, and the brother’s name would be familiar to anyone with a modicum of knowledge of modern British political history.

The Treasury select committee published a fairly forthrightly critical report, and shortly before it was published Hogg announced that she will resign.  The Guardian has is a nice summary of the story.

There is no suggestion of any substantive inappropriate conduct (whether information being passed, or behaviour influenced) beyond the non-disclosure itself.  But the resignation is the sort of standard we should expect from holders of high, and powerful, public offices.  As Hogg herself put it

“We as public servants should not merely meet but exceed the standards we expect of others.”

Regulatory agencies require punctilious adherence to the rules by those they regulate.  They weaken their own moral position if their own people aren’t held to at least those sorts of standards.

But as I read and thought about the Hogg story, it got me thinking again about our own Reserve Bank, and holders of senior positions there.

The Governor of the Reserve Bank exercises an enormous amount of power –  far more, personally, albeit in a smaller economy and financial system –  than the Governor of the Bank of England.  In that institution, most of the policymaking powers are spread across committees in which the Governor has only a single vote, and where most of the members are either executives not appointed by him or are non-executives.  And yet there is nothing like the confirmation hearings process here.  Most of the appointment power doesn’t even rest with the Minister of Finance –  who can be grilled in Parliament – but with the barely-visible Board members, who themselves face no parliamentary scrutiny.  Like the Bank of England, our Reserve Bank has a couple of deputy governors –  statutory positions.   Holders of those roles don’t have formal voting power –  unlike at the Bank of England –  but there is also no parliamentary scrutiny.  (There were suggestions that a former Deputy Governor was allowed to keep share options in an institution whose New Zealand subsidiary he was responsible for regulating.  If so,  external scrutiny at the time of appointment might have challenged that.)

Compared to the British system, in particular, our system is riddled with democratic deficits:  too much power in one person’s hands, the appointment of that person largely in the hands of non-elected appointees, and no parliamentary scrutiny on appointment of any of these statutory positions (Governor, Board, deputy governors).

In the aftermath of the Charlotte Hogg affair there were curious suggestions of unequal treatment.  Former Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, is quoted as saying

“Would she have gone if she had been an older man whose sister worked at a bank? I wonder,”

One can only respond “well, I certainly hope so”.

But again, contrast the position at the Bank of England with that at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.  Hogg was the third female Deputy Governor of the Bank of England.    On the Bank’s statutory decision-making committees, two of the nine members of the Monetary Policy Committee are women, as are two of the members of the Prudential Regulatory Committe, and one member of the Financial Stability Committee. (Hogg serves on all three.)

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has never had a female Governor or Deputy Governor.  Looking at the current organisation chart, two senior management roles are held by women, but they are both third tier internal corporate positions.    There has never been a more senior woman in the Bank, and thus none of the core statutory policy areas (monetary policy, financial regulation and stability, financial markets) has ever been headed by a woman.  There is no woman on the Governing Committee, and unless things have changed markedly in the last two years, there aren’t (m)any women managers in those core areas either. In fact, it is only about five or six years since the most senior woman in the core policy areas was made redundant.  There are plenty of able women further down the organisation, and I still recall –  35 years on –  the fearsome grilling I got from one smart woman in an interview when I applied to join the Bank, but none in the core senior positions.    (There are women on the Bank’s Board, but it of course has no role in policymaking.)

Quite why this is so is a bit of a mystery.  I doubt it is a result of direct or conscious discrimination –  although decades ago, women had to retire from the career staff if they got married.   And while macroeconomics and markets tend to be areas more men gravitate to than women, Janet Yellen chairs the Fed, and the Bank of England has managed three female deputy governors in the last 15 years.   And even across the Tasman, two of three Assistant Governors in the core policy areas  of the Reserve Bank of Australia are female.

But, whatever explains the patterns up till now, it must surely become a bit of an issue sometimes soon; perhaps one for the Minister and the Board in considering future appointments, and perhaps too for MPs and lobby groups wondering quite how the Reserve Bank appears to have remained so male-dominated for so long.

If one runs through the standard sorts of list of people who might be possibilities to become Governor next March, there are no female names  (Bascand, Orr, Carr, Sherwin, Archer and so on).  And if one restricts the field to that sort of background, I don’t think it is just because people have inadvertently overlooked the female names.   There are no women I’m aware of in New Zealand who hold, or have held, senior-level macro or banking regulatory roles –  eg one could look around the Reserve Bank or the Treasury, or the more prominent of the market economists and commentators and find none.

But perhaps it is time to cast the net wider?  That might be sensible anyway.  It seems likely that the next Governor will lead and preside over some potentially quite significant governance changes, and in many ways the organisation needs revitalising and opening up.  One could make a pretty compelling case for the appointment of a person with strong change management capabilities, rather than a more traditional economist.  Character and judgement would still always be vitally important, but they might be less important than the specific technical expertise.  In this case, after all, we know that there will be not just a new Governor but also at least one, and possibly two, new deputy governors –  and in any top team, there is a need for a complementary set of skills, not just clones of each other.    I’m not that familiar with many senior business figures but, for example, one of our major commercial banks is already, apparently very ably, led by a woman.

I could add that, to the extent that this surprising under-representation of women does concern those in power, my proposal to reform Reserve Bank governance to establish a couple of statutory decisionmaking committees (a Monetary Policy Committee and a Prudential Policy Committee) would also more quickly up more roles to which the Minister of Finance could appoint able women.  There shouldn’t be any real shortage of suitable candidates to be considered.

On the topic of gubernatorial appointments, readers might recall that when the Minister of Finance last month deferred the appointment of a new Governor until well after the election, giving deputy governor, Grant Spencer, a six month term as acting Governor, I raised questions as to whether this appointment was strictly lawfully permissible.  As I stressed then, I had no particular concerns about Grant himself, and had actually been suggesting for some time a variant of the same solution –  giving Graeme Wheeler a short extension, if he had been willing to accept it.  But the Act doesn’t seem to be written in a way that allows a new person to be appointed, with no Policy Targets Agreement, for such a short period.

Because there were no clear answers from the government, and no pro-active release of the relevant papers, I asked for copies of the relevant papers from (a) the Minister, (b) the Treasury, and (c) the Reserve Bank Board.  I didn’t really envisage it as a burdensome request, and although I was sure they would withhold any formal legal advice they had, I was interested in the advice the various agencies had provided to the Minister and Cabinet on the point.

So far, it looks a lot like typical bureaucratic delay and obstruction.  The Minister of Finance didn’t respond until well after the 20 working days (and was thus in breach of the Act).  When he finally did respond it was to say that he was giving himself another month to respond

“the extension is required because your request necessitates a search through a large quantity of information and consultations are needed before a decision can be made on your request”

Frankly, it would be surprising if the Minister of Finance held very many documents at all on this issue, but time will tell.   A week earlier I had had the same postponement, and same justification, from the Treasury – and again it would be a little surprising (especially as when they asked, I made clear that I wasn’t after working level email exchanges on the issue).  Curiously, the Reserve Bank Board itself –  the people primarily responsible for appointing a Governor –  didn’t claim to have lots of documents they needed to search, only that delay was needed

because consultations necessary to make a decision on the request are such that a proper response to the request cannot reasonably be made within the original time limit.

It isn’t an urgent issue, and in substance I don’t really have much of a problem with the Spencer appointment, but it is hardly the sort of open government, or commitment to the spirit of the Official Information  Act one might wistfully, foolishly, hope for.

Still no better than middling

The Minister of Finance greeted yesterday’s GDP numbers with the claim that

“While growth has softened in this latest quarter, the continuing trend is [with] consistent ongoing growth ahead of most other developed countries.

In the case of total GDP, that is no doubt true.  It is what happens when your country has had population growth of 2.1  per cent in the previous year.

But where do we sit in terms of growth in real GDP per capita?

The OECD doesn’t have data yet for all member countries, but here is how our GDP per capita growth compares, focusing on the December 2016 quarter over the December 2015 quarter, for the countries there are data for.

real GDP pc 12 mths to dec 16

And here is the same data for the full year to December 2016 over the full year to December 2015.

real gdp pc ann ave to Dec 16

Neither comparison is intrinsically better than the other.  Between them, really the best one can say is that New Zealand has been no better than the median country over the last year or so.  That’s nothing to write home about…….especially as our data suggest we’ve had negative productivity growth over the last year (whether one uses the point to point or annual average measure).   That means all our pretty modest per capita GDP growth over the last year has resulted from throwing more labour and more capital at the economy, and (less than) none at all by using resources smarter and better.

But according to the Minister

“This week’s statistics on economic growth and our external accounts show the benefit of the Government’s sensible, consistent economic management,” Mr Joyce says.

Productivity growth: still missing in action

We get some annual multi-factor productivity data from Statistics New Zealand next week, but for more a more timely read on productivity what we have is data on real GDP per hour worked.   This chart compares New Zealand and Australian real GDP per hour worked since just prior to the recession of 2008/09.   As previously, for New Zealand, I’ve average the two GDP series, and used the HLFS hours worked series.  There is a break in the series in June last year, on account of changes in the HLFS methodology.  That lifted hours worked (as measured) by about 2 per cent, and in this chart I’ve silently adjusted for that (while still hankering for an offical SNZ series that corrected for the break).

real gdp phw dec 16 release

Still going nowhere – perhaps even backwards – after five years.     Diverging ever further below Australia over that five years.  And for the full nine years, less than 5 per cent productivity growth in total.

You’d like to think this sort of gross underperformance would be getting some attention in the run-up to the election.  But there isn’t much sign of that.

Perhaps we are just supposed to think of it as some sort of “quality problem”, or a “problem of success”?  Mark me down as unconvinced.

 

 

 

 

 

Defenders of the NZSF

After the flurry of coverage a couple of weeks ago over the remuneration of Adrian Orr, chief executive of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, debate seems to have turned towards the more substantive issues around the role of the Fund.   The chief executive has been out, in his usual feisty and rather opportunistic style, defending the Fund, advocating for it to be given more money to invest and so on.   One could reasonably question whether the latter in particular is the role of a public servant.  His job, surely, is to invest the money the government has chosen, under the terms of the legislation, to place with NZSF.    Wisely, in my view, no more money has been placed with Fund since 2009 (although even then I thought it was shame the government didn’t simply wind up the Fund).  But this is now an election campaign issue, with the Labour Party vocally calling for an immediate restart of contributions.   That is perhaps understandable from a party which now, once again, favours keeping the NZS age at 65 indefinitely –  which was pretty much their position back when the Fund was first set up.   But it is a debate senior public servants shouldn’t be participating in in public.  Whatever one’s view of the NZSF itself, there are simply fewer grounds for it if one thinks the age of NZS eligibility should be increased over time, as life expectancy improves.

What has also interested me is the vocal support Orr has had from various journalists. In the Orr interview I listened to, on Radio New Zealand’s Nine to Noon on Monday, Kathryn Ryan seemed to see her role as being to help Orr get “the truth” across, cheering him on as he went, rather than asking any searching or challenging questions.  And this morning, in the Dominion-Post, Vernon Small is channelling the Orr lines, but in even more strident tones.  He concludes that we’d be “barking mad” not to be putting more money into the NZSF each and every year.

Well, perhaps. But Orr in particular was guilty of downplaying quite a lot of important considerations.

First, for all the breathless excitement about the NZSF’s investment returns (around 10 per cent per annum, pre-tax, over the life of the Fund), there has been no hint from chief executive, or his media supporters, of the rather more disciplined approach official NZSF documents, presumably adopted by the Board, take:

It is our expectation, given our long-term mandate and risk appetite, that we will return at least the Treasury Bill return + 2.7% p.a. over any 20-year moving average period.

By design, it is a highly risky Fund (“high octane” was Orr’s description) and performance can only seriously evaluated over quite long periods of time –  20 year periods in the organisation’s own telling.  But Orr (or Ryan or Small) didn’t make that point.

Kathryn Ryan’s breathless praise of the investment performance included, a couple of times, “even over the global financial crisis”.     That period was certainly pretty dramatic, but for equity markets it just doesn’t look that unusual in the longer sweep of history.  Here is a chart of the S&P500, in real terms and on a log scale.

sp-500-historical-chart-data-2017-03-15-macrotrends (1)

The fall in equity prices over 2008/09 looks like the sort of fall one might expect every 15 or 20 years –  and that one was shorter-lived than most.  If you take lots of risk in equity and bond markets, the last 15 years haven’t been a hard time to make money.  As far as I can see, the NZSF has more or less been compensated for those risks (it has forced us citizens to bear) but no more than that.  (I was however amused by the shameless attempt of the Fund’s head of asset allocation, in response to a recent OIA request, to suggest that returns from January 2009 –  near the trough of global markets –  was a meaningful number to use in evaluating the Fund’s performance.)

So the problem with the Fund isn’t that its investment management choices (both those they would loosely classify as “passive” and those equally loosely classified as “active” –  the distinction is pretty arbitrary) have been particularly bad, or good.  They’ve probably been about what one might reasonably expect over that period.  And if we closed the Fund now, or shifted all the money back to low-risk assets, we could crystallise the gains and be thankful that, despite all the risk run, we made money rather than lost money.     But nothing in the Fund’s investment strategy will protect taxpayers if, and when, markets turn bad again.

Orr continues to misrepresents the NZSF as a “sovereign wealth fund”.  It simply isn’t.  We aren’t Norway or Abu Dhabi, managing for an intergenerational perspective, oil wealth that has been turned into cash.   All the money put into the NZSF has either been raised from taxes or borrowed.     There isn’t a pool of money that naturally needs investing.  Rather, the government has established a high-risk investment management subsidiary to punt on world markets.     That simply isn’t –  and never has been –  a natural business of government.

The Fund itself doesn’t have to worry where its money comes from.  But citizens do.   Who knows what governments would have done with the money if the NZSF had never been established.  I suspect much of it would have been wasted on increased government spending.  But it would have been possible to have cut the most distortionary taxes –  those on business income –  quite heavily, which would probably have given risen to a lot more business investment in New Zealand.  None of the analyses of the returns of the Fund ever seem to take into account, for example, the deadweight costs of taxes.  On mightn’t expect NZSF to do so –  they are just investment managers –  but if they don’t they aren’t really in a legitimate position to be calling for more public money to be steered their way.

Orr cites a number of other advantages for the Fund.   He argues that it has contributed to developing New Zealand capital markets.  I’d be interested to see the evidence for that claim.  Most of the Fund’s assets are invested abroad, by intentional design.   What would New Zealanders have done with money if they’d had it as individuals?   And I don’t quite see how sweetheart inside deals, whereby ACC and NZSF  – neither with any particular expertise in retail banking –  take chunks of Kiwibank from NZ Post, enhance New Zealand capital markets.  No doubt having a hulking behemoth (by New Zealand standards) like NZSF generates more activity –  NZDMO got to issue more bonds than otherwise, and then NZSF buys more (mostly overseas) assets –  but are the capital markets really better –  and by what standards – for the presence of the Fund?

I also heard him argue that the NZSF somehow reduces risk and improves certainty. I wasn’t quite sure what he was referring to, but it seemed to be about the future of NZS itself.    But again, he is really talking beyond his pay grade.  The future of NZS is a political issue that really has little or nothing to do with the NZSF size/performance.   It isn’t like a contractural funded defined benefit pension scheme.  Presumably the overall state of government finances, overall tax burdens, and a community consensus on what is fair and reasonable are more likely to shape the future of NZS than the presence (and investment returns) of NZSF.    And in thinking about the overall government balance sheet –  something Orr doesn’t seem to, and isn’t paid to, think much about –  NZSF is currently only about 10 per cent of total assets.

He is on similarly shaky ground when he talks about save as you go approaches beating out pay as you go approaches.  I’m sure we can all agree that saving for the future typically makes sense –  the power of compound interest and all that  –  but that insight doesn’t help at all in deciding what, if any, role NZSF should have.   After all, we could wind NZSF up today, use the proceeds to repay government debt, and nothing would change about accumulated public sector savings.  Higher public sector savings is mostly a choice between taxing more and spending less.   As it is, I’d probably be happier if overall government net debt (including NZSF assets) was quite a bit lower than it is (ie build up government savings a bit more), but at least until all the gross government debt is repaid the government simply doesn’t have to be in the financial investment management business –  it is a pure discretionary choice.    We haven’t been there so far in the 14 year life of the Fund, and it doesn’t look likely that we will be in the next few decades either.  And Orr gives no weight at all to the failures of government, which often see additional Crown revenues wasted rather than saved.

Orr, and his defenders, have also been keen to scoff at any analogies with how a household might approach decisions.  I heard him say something along the lines of “if governments could act like households, we wouldn’t need governments”, which is true, but irrelevant in this context.  One role governments play, on behalf of households collectively, is to absorb collectively some of residual risks that individuals aren’t well-placed to handle.  That might tell you that often governments can’t, or won’t or shouldn’t cut spending in severe downturns, because some of their obligations increase then (and they are willing to let automatic stabilisers work).  For that reason, governments should be wary of revenue sources, or investment returns, that are very highly positively correlated with the economic cycle.  For example, one reason to be wary of capital gains taxes is that they tend to flatter government finances in good times, only for the revenue to dry up just when governments need it most (see Ireland last decade for a classic case study).    The same might well be said of highly risky asset portfolios –  even if they do quite well over the very long haul, they will look particularly poorly at just the times when government finances are under most pressure for other reasons.  In fact, if the pressures get serious enough, governments might come under pressure to liquidate those risky holdings right at the bottom of the cycle.  Those aren’t issues Orr has worry about –  he is simply paid to maximise returns on his little chunk of government resources, subject to acceptable risk –  but citizens, and people worry about overall government finances through time should do.

After all, it is not as if governments don’t already have other income and investment returns that are quite tied to the economic cycle.  Even on the investment front, for good or ill the government has quite large commercial holdings (those SOE stakes), and on the revenue front the tax system effectively makes the government an equity stakeholder in every business in New Zealand.

Orr and his defenders also scoff at household comparisons because, so they note, the government can borrow more cheaply than households.  More flamboyantly, here is Vernon Small’s take

As a comparison it may be politically effective but it is about as useful as a chocolate teapot.

Show me the household that can tax, has a central bank to set interest rates and biff around the exchange rate paid at the corner dairy, can borrow more cheaply than any business at rates below any mortgage offered by banks – and can live on for decades past the final days of its family members – and I’ll show you the household that has much to learn from a central government or vice versa.

Actually, the typical government (as distinct from the idealised one no one has ever seen) has operated with a horizon considerably shorter than that of most households.  And that is understandable:  I care about my kids and potential future grandchildren, who will still be there in decades to come.  Politicians –  who run governments –  face elections quite frequently, and in the course of a single lifetime successions of them run policy all over the show.

And quite how do people think that governments borrow so cheaply?  Because they have the power to tax, and that power is mostly exercised not over random stateless aliens, but over New Zealand households.  Every debt the New Zealand government takes on involves risks for New Zealand households – risks that at times of stress, governments will disrupt household and business plans by unexpectedly making a grab for a larger share of our incomes/wealth.  That risk limits the other risks households can afford to take, and is why I keep stressing that an accountable government can’t think of the cost of funds as simply the government bond rate; it has to price the implicit equity, bearing in mind that the coercion involved in the power to tax is more costly and distortionary than (say) a large company having to issue new debt if times get tough.    People like to say that governments can’t (usually) go bust, and so are subject to fewer “bankruptcy constraints” in thinking about undertaking possible long-term activities –  but that is typically true only to the extent that they ignore the perspectives and finances or their citizens, who ultimately bear the risks.  Ignoring citizens isn’t what governments are supposed to do.

My bottom line remains that NZSF hasn’t done badly what it has been asked to do (if you want a high risk fund that is).  Equally, it hasn’t really been put to the test.  They probably made some quite good calls at times, but the risks they assume for the taxpayer are very considerable.  In that OIA response I referred to earlier, they attempt to rebut some of my arguments, by suggesting that the appropriate hurdle rate of return should depend on the riskiness of the project.  I read that and thought: “yes, and that is really to concede my point”.    Over the life of the Fund, the standard deviation of annual returns has been almost 13 per cent.  Those are really large fluctuations –  by design –  and in considering establishing (or retaining) a government leveraged investment fund –  effectively a business subsidiary of the government – taxpayers need a lot of compensation for that risk.    Especially as that risk –  in the extremes, which are what matter –  is pretty correlated with other risks to government finances directly, and those of household sector finances indirectly, so there isn’t much –  if any –  overall risk reduction taking place.   When typical Australian companies uses hurdle rates in excess of 10 per cent, we shouldn’t be that comfortable  in our government running such a risky investment management operation for returns that, over a good 14 years, have only just matched 10 per cent.  I’m not suggesting anyone could have done much better than NZSF managers have, just that it wasn’t worth doing at all, evaluated by the sort of standards firms and households apply to their own finances.     And all that on a Fund that at present is only around 13 per cent of GDP.   The risk dimensions of the Fund become even more important if contributions are resumed and we envisage a Fund that could become a much larger component in the overall Crown balance sheet.

There is a political debate that should be had about NZSF.  There is a debate to be had about the future parameters of NZS.  But the two aren’t really very logically connected –  despite the words in the legislation.  If speculative investment management is a natural function of government, it is so regardless of baby boomers ageing, life expectancy or the parameters of any element of the welfare system.  Short of New Zealand discovering Norwegian quantities of oil and gas, I suspect it is no appropriate business of government.

 

 

 

 

 

New Zealand Initiative on immigration: Part 8 Labour market

The New Zealand Initiative’s chapter four, on economic issues, includes most of their treatment of the labour market.   This isn’t going to be a long post, and in a number of key areas we agree.

In particular, they are quite right to push back against the suggestion that immigration “takes jobs” from natives: there is no fixed pool of jobs, and if anything in the short-run immigration has tended to boost demand more than supply, so that in the shorter-term, it acts as a boost to (net) demand, and something that lowers the unemployment rate a bit.  That is why, typically, the Reserve Bank is raising interest rates –  or lowering them less than otherwise – when immigration surprises on the upside.  In the medium-term, there is likely to be little or no impact on the unemployment rate, one way or the other.    Labour market and welfare system regulatory rules play a key role in influencing the normal, sustainable, rate of unemployment.

And the Initiative doesn’t seem to have signed on to the silly nonsense that we need lots of immigrants to ease “skill shortages” – a line touted by Business New Zealand and their affiliates, and by their predecessor organisations for many decades.   I’ve dealt with this issue in various posts (including here and here).  You have to wonder how other countries manage –  including the many richer and more productive countries than New Zealand that haven’t had anywhere near as much immigration over the years.  Here is some of how I responded to that argument in one of those earlier posts

Business sector advocates often try to have us believe that key sectors just couldn’t survive without reliance on large scale immigration.  Set aside the inherent implausibility of the argument –  how do firms in the rest of the world manage –  and think about some specifics.  Sure, it is probably hard to get New Zealanders with alternative options to work in rest homes at present.  So, absent the immigration channel, wage rates in that sector would have to rise.  Were they to do so, I can see no reason why in time plenty of New Zealanders would not gravitate to the sector.  It was New Zealanders who staffed the old people’s home my grandparents and great aunts were in 30 years ago.  Same goes for the dairy sector, or the tourism sector.

…..

Of course, none of this is obvious to an individual employer.  They probably can’t raise their wages to attract New Zealand workers instead, even if they wanted to.  To do so would undermine that particular firm’s competitive position.  But again, this is the difference between an individual firm’s perspective, and a whole of economy perspective –  and the latter should be what shapes national policy.  Cut back the immigration target, along the lines I’ve suggested, and we’d see materially fewer resources needing to be spent on simply building to keep up with the infrastructure needs of a rising population.   We’d see materially low real interest rates, and with them a materially lower exchange rate.  The lower exchange rate would enable New Zealand dairy farmers, and tourism operators, to pay the higher wages that might be needed to recruit New Zealanders into their industries, and probably still be more competitive than they are now.  And plenty of New Zealanders now working in sectors totally reliant on an ever-growing population would, in any case, be looking for opportunities in other sectors.

The Initiative mostly stays away from this line of argument, and they are right to do so.  Markets take care of incipient “shortages”, whether of labour, tomatoes or whatever –  prices adjust and, if necessary, over time production and/or structures and patterns adjust.  The Initiative are generally supportive of letting markets work.

A lot of the empirical literature focuses on wages, and in particular on wages for those relatively more lowly-skilled natives who are, to some extent or other, in competition with relatively lowly-skilled migrants.  As even the Initiative notes, a big influx of migrants looking for work in one particular sector will probably lower wages in that sector in New Zealand.  They use “fruit pickers” as an example in their report.  But one could probably use aged-care workers as another concrete example.

The Initiative’s reaction to this, reasonably self-evident, proposition is to be (perhaps unconsciously) in two minds.  On the one hand, they like to cite what is probably the consensus of the international literature, that if there are adverse effects of immigration on lower-skilled natives they are, in aggregate, relatively small.  Perhaps that is true, although it probably isn’t much comfort to someone at the bottom end for whom every dollar in the weekly pay packet really counts.  And recall that survey of US academic economists I mentioned the other day.  Quite a few respondents were uncertain, but there wasn’t much dissent from the proposition that in the US context (one of the strongest and most productive economies around).

Question B: Unless they were compensated by others, many low-skilled American workers would be substantially worse off if a larger number of low-skilled foreign workers were legally allowed to enter the US each year.

But on the other hand, the Initiative seems to want to celebrate how helpful even low-skilled immigration can be, even though almost the only way –  even in theory – it can be helpful is by lowering domestic wages, at least for those who are near-substitutes for the migrants.

Here is what they say

Arguing for immigration restrictions to protect the incomes of New Zealand fruit pickers is as misguided as arguing for tariffs on fruit to serve the same purpose.

We cannot manipulate wages by distorting the market in the long run. Virtually anything can be imported today if there’s the will. Cheap foreign labour already competes with New Zealand labour even if workers don’t land on our shores. If wages in New Zealand for similar output rise much higher than foreign wages, we can only expect more outsourcing and exit of New Zealand firms.

Ultimately, wages are determined by the value of a worker’s production at the margin and the willingness of the worker to forgo leisure for consumption. Bringing in productive migrants more willing to work than New Zealanders may lower wages for some in the short run, but it also means New Zealand can produce more goods and services cheaper.

For a start, it is simply incorrect that “virtually anything can be imported today” –  try it for a hair cut, a cafe meal or coffee, aged care for your mother, or the bus trip home tonight.  The boundaries between tradables and non-tradables are fuzzy, but it doesn’t make the distinction economically irrelevant.

But what really staggered me was the starkness of the way they put it –  we should be competing internationally on the basis of lots of migrants lowering wage costs.     They really can’t have it both ways: lower-skilled immigration might be largely harmless (if it doesn’t have any obvious effects on wages for natives), or there might be gains from trade from bringing lots of these people in, but if so only through a mechanism that involves lower wages (than otherwise) for the natives they are competing with.  It surely has to be one or the other?  No one pretends these people are where all the ideas and productivity spillovers are coming from.

Despite the literature they cite, the Initiative seems to be in the latter camp.  Here was another comment on lower-skilled migrants, and why we shouldn’t just focus on highly-skilled migrants.

Hiring migrant workers in the service industry, especially home production (childcare, cleaning, gardening), can free up time for workers in other sectors of the economy. This way, they can be an important complement to highly skilled workers.

It does that by lowering the relative cost of that type of work.

Earlier in the year, I wrote about an op-ed by a British economics academic that had run in the local papers, where she argued that low-skilled immigrants had been a great boon for professional women and their husbands.  I summed up my reaction to that this way

Perhaps this wouldn’t be (as) morally offensive if there was an entirely separable class of temporary guest workers, who didn’t substitute at all for low-skilled domestic workers.   The temporary workers would gain from the trade, and so would those employing them. But that (separability) isn’t how labour markets operate.  What Bateman is in fact arguing for is a policy designed to explicitly help people like her, at the expense of poorer less highly-skilled Britons (in fact, in the roles she talks of typically poorer relatively unskilled British women).  No one person is ever an exact substitute for another, but there is a great deal of overlap.    Even though she never says it, what Bateman is arguing for is a policy designed to increase the differences in incomes between the highly-skilled and the less-skilled –  for the comfort of the highly-skilled (women and their spouses).

I don’t see any gap between Bateman’s stance and that of the Initiative.

In their conclusion to their economics chapter, the Initiative try to sum up.  They begin

The overall impact of immigration on the labour market is small, but with a multitude of individual effects. Some individuals may experience wage reduction, some wage growth, and some may remain unaffected. The effect for each individual will depend on their own skills, the skills of the migrants, and the demands from the migrants.

I suspect that isn’t too far wrong, especially when we recognise that much of the immigration to New Zealand isn’t very skilled at all, and that those at the lower end of skill spectrum are those mostly likely to be losing.

But here’s the thing.  That summary really gives the game away.  If even the key advocates of large-scale immigration can only end up arguing that the impact on the labour market is small, what happened to those large gains they were citing a few pages earlier in their report.  Recall the recent IMF study they cited

The study finds that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of migrants in the adult population can raise GDP per capita by up to 2% in the longer run

If that was even remotely true, we’d have seen a massive increase in productivity, GDP per capita, and almost certainly wages as a result of the scale of immigration New Zealand has had over the last 25 years.    Perhaps the lower-skilled would still have done relatively less well, but  pretty much everyone’s incomes should have lifted, and by quite a lot.  The differences really should be quite easily discernible.  As it is, even the advocates haven’t been able to show those sorts of gains.  In New Zealand’s case –  and recall that that is my focus –  they just don’t seem to be there, and there is a plausible case –  weak productivity growth, high interest and exchange rates, weak business investment, weak exports, and a remote island location as personal connections have become more important –  that we might mostly be worse off.   Some people  –  some natives –  are better off (anyone, for example, holding regulatorily-restricted land in Auckland 25 years ago), but a best guess –  a best read of the New Zealand experience –  is that the country as a whole isn’t better off, and quite probably is worse off.

The economics chapter of the report ends with a line I quoted in one of the earlier of this series of posts

Free movement of labour is a fundamental driver of the creative destruction
process, just like free movement of goods and capital. It can be painful for some but it improves outcomes for many. And if managed well, the pain can be short-lived and the benefits perpetual.

It is a statement of faith at best.    We haven’t had “free movement of labour” but we’ve had a lot more of an inflow of non-citizens –  all policy controlled –  than almost any other advanced country.   And the perpetual benefits still seem, to put it mildly, very hard to spot.  Perhaps they are there in theory, in particular specifications (models), of how economies work generally, but the challenge for the Initiative should surely to have been to demonstrate that those gains are actually there for New Zealanders, amid the specifics  of how this economy has actually worked in recent decades.

 

 

 

Reforming the Reserve Bank

A couple of weeks ago I wrote a post on where the Labour Party seemed to be going on monetary policy, informed by Alex Tarrant’s interest.co.nz article on his conversations with Grant Robertson.  It all seemed to amount to not very much –  wording changes to make explicit an interest in the labour market (employment/unemployment), but without much reason to think it would make much difference to anything of substance.  My suggestion was that there was a distinct whiff of virtue-signalling about it.   And the sort of change Robertson seemed interested in on the governance front  –  legislating the position of in-house technocrats –  seemed unlikely to be much of a step forward at all.

Last week, interest.co.nz had a piece on the same issues by former Herald economics editor Brian Fallow, also benefiting from an interview with Robertson.   Fallow pushes a bit harder.  His summary is that

The changes Labour proposes to make to the monetary policy framework sit somewhere between cosmetic and perilous, but closer to the former.

Cosmetic for the sorts of reasons I’ve outlined.  On the one hand, the Bank has always taken the labour market into account as one indicator of excess capacity.  And on the other hand, plenty of pieces of overseas central banking legislation refer to employment/unemployment somewhere, but there is little evidence that the central banks in those countries have run monetary policy much differently, on average over time, than the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has.

Robertson’s response is pretty underwhelming.

Asked how much difference the regime he advocates would have made, had it been in place in the past, he said, “In the very immediate past, not that much, truthfully. But there have been other times in our history, and there have been other examples around the world, when lower interest rates could have helped to reduce unemployment.”

If he was serious about this making a difference, he’d surely be able to quote chapter and verse.  When, where and how does he think it would have made a difference?

He is, however, clearly tantalised by the current situation

Even now, “Are we satisfied as a country that with 3.5% growth 5.2% unemployment is okay?”

Given that the Treasury thinks our NAIRU is nearer 4 per cent, I don’t think we should be content.  But Robertson has spent so long over the last few years defending Graeme Wheeler that he can’t quite bring himself, even now, to suggest that monetary policy could have been conducted better in the last five years, whether on the current mandate or something a little different.

If the proposed change isn’t cosmetic, Fallow worries that it could be perilous.  Why?  Because when he pushes Robertson he gets a more explicit –  and more concerning –  answer than the one Alex Tarrant got.

He has told interest.co.nz’s Alex Tarrant that he was not going to tell the Reserve Bank whether one objective is more important than the other.

Talking to me, however, he said that ultimately the bank would remain independent. “But if unemployment starts to get out of control I would expect in that environment it says ‘At this time we are preferencing that and we are going to lower rates by a greater percentage than we might have’.”

In the event of a stagflation scenario he would expect it to focus more on the falling output and employment side of the dilemma and to ease.

“I think the setting of a clear direction here is what is important.”

In short Robertson seems to be saying that if Parliament were to change the statute, the message to the bank would be when in doubt err on the side of stimulus.

If unemployment is prioritised by the Reserve Bank in such circumstances, it is a recipe for inflation getting away.  In the medium-term, monetary policy can really only affect nominal variables (inflation, price level, nominal GDP or whatever), it simply can’t affect real variables.  Using monetary policy to pursue such goals directly is a risky prescription.  I wouldn’t want to overstate the issue –  New Zealand isn’t heading for hyperinflation – but part of reason we and other countries ended up with persistently high inflation in the 1970s is that too much weight was placed on unemployment in setting monetary policy.  Getting inflation back down again was costly –  including in terms of increased unemployment.  On a smaller scale, as Fallow highlights, the desire to “give growth a chance” was part of what was behind the monetary policy misjudgements of 2003 to 2006, when monetary policy wasn’t tight enough.

Robertson’s words suggest he still hasn’t thought the issues through very deeply or carefully.  For now, I’m sticking with the “cosmetic” or virtue-signalling interpretation of what Labour is on about.   And I’m still uncomfortable at the lack of command of the issues and experience in someone who aspires to be Minister of Finance later this year.

But yesterday, a mainstream economist came out in support of more or less the direction Robertson is proposing.  In his youth Peter Redward spent a few years at the Reserve Bank, and then spent time in various roles, including at Barclays and Deutsche Bank, before returning to New Zealand and establishing his own economic and financial markets advisory firm.  He focuses on emerging Asian foreign exchange markets, but keeps a keen eye on monetary policy developments in New Zealand.

In his short piece at Newsroom, Peter Redward says It’s time for a Reserve Bank change.  He notes of the last few years that

Whether Governor Wheeler consciously aimed for a hawkish interpretation of the Act, or not, we may never know. But hawkish he’s been, leading to tighter monetary conditions than were necessary, boosting the New Zealand dollar and confining thousands of New Zealanders to needless unemployment.

And argues that

…maybe it’s time to adopt a dual mandate in the Act. One possibility is the dual mandate of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve has a two percent inflation target but it also targets ‘maximum employment’. Economists have differing interpretations of ‘maximum employment’ so it acts as a constraint, and that’s the point.

While no one knows exactly where ‘maximum employment’ in New Zealand is, I believe most economists would agree that it’s likely to be consistent with an unemployment rate somewhere around 4.5 percent (give or take 0.25 percent). If the Reserve Bank had a dual mandate, its elevated level would have acted to constrain the bank’s aborted tightening of policy in 2009 and 2014.

I’m very sympathetic to his critique of Graeme Wheeler’s stewardship of monetary policy, and highlighted in numerous of my own commentaries, after it became apparent that the 2014 OCR increases had been an unnecessary mistake, the Governor’s apparent indifference to an unemployment rate that remained well above any estimates of a NAIRU.

But I remain a bit more sceptical than Peter appears to be about how much difference a re-specified mandate might have made.  As I’ve argued before, past Reserve Bank research suggests that faced with the sorts of shocks New Zealand experienced, policymakers at the Fed, the RBA and the Bank of Canada would have responded much the same way as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand did.  That work was done for periods prior to 2008/09 –  for most of the time since then the Fed was at or very near the lower bound on interest rates, so the game was a bit different –  but it isn’t clear that the specification of the target has been the problem in New Zealand in the last few years.  After all, simply on inflation grounds alone the Reserve Bank hasn’t done well.

Here is a chart of the Reserve Bank’s unemployment rate projections from the March 2014 MPS, the occasion when they started raising the OCR.

2014 U projections.png

The second observation is the last actual data they had –  the unemployment rate for the December 2013 quarter.  So when they started the tightening cycle they thought the unemployment would be falling quite considerably that year, before levelling out around what they thought of as something near what they must have thought of as the practical NAIRU  (this was before last year’s revisions to the HLFS which lowered unemployment rates, and NAIRU estimates, for the last few years).    The problem then wasn’t that they didn’t care about unemployment, it is that they got their forecasts –  particular as regards inflation –  badly wrong.  It isn’t clear why a different target specification would have altered the policy judgement at the time.

Perhaps it would have done so once it became apparent that the OCR increases hadn’t really been necessary, but a stubborn refusal by the Governor to concede mistakes, even with hindsight, plus a mindset firmly focused on how “extraordinarily stimulatory” monetary policy allegedly was –  when no one had any real idea what a neutral interest rate might be in the current environment, and when inflation stubbornly didn’t rise much if at all –  seem more likely explanations.    The Bank kept forecasting that inflation would rise and unemployment would fall –  the jointly desired outcomes.

(And if one looks at the Bank’s forecasts in mid 2010, when they made the previous unnecessary start on tightening, one gets much the same picture –  forecasts of falling unemployment and rising inflation, that simply didn’t happen.)

So why should we supposed that a different specification of the target would have made much difference to how policy was set?  We had an institution that was misreading things, in a political climate where no one seemed much bothered by the unemployment rate holding up, and where for a long time financial markets endorsed the approach taken by the Reserve Bank (often more enthusiastic for future tightenings than even the Governor and his advisers were).   Getting something closer to the right model of the world (for the times), and quickly learning from one’s mis-steps, seem likely to matter more than the words of the Act in this area.

As I’ve said repeatedly here, I’m not firmly opposed to amending the relevant clauses of the Reserve Bank Act to mention the desirability of things like a low unemployment rate.  But even the Federal Reserve Act makes clear that good monetary policy focused on a nominal target creates a climate consistent with high employment.  High employment isn’t a goal for the Federal Reserve is supposed to pursue directly, even if –  all else equal –  a high unemployment rate relative to an (uncertain) NAIRU is a useful indicator that something might be wrong with monetary policy settings. It isn’t clear there is anything much to gain from such amendments –  or that they are where the real issues regarding the Reserve Bank are – but sometimes perhaps virtue needs to be signalled?    My own concrete suggestion in this area would be to require the Reserve Bank to publish, every six months, its own estimates of the NAIRU and to explain the reasons for the deviations of actual unemployment from the NAIRU, how quickly that gap could be expected to close, and the contribution of monetary policy to the evolution of the gap.

Brian Fallow’s article suggested that Labour still hasn’t settled on how to reform the governance of the Reserve Bank.

Robertson is non-committal at this stage on the composition of a monetary policy committee to take interest rate decisions, including to what extent it should include members from outside the bank.

Peter Redward has a more specific proposal for him.

What’s needed is a formal Monetary Board complete with published minutes and, released after a grace period, transcripts of the meeting and the voting record of members. In a recent speech, U.S. Federal Reserve Vice Chair, Stanley Fischer, argued that this arrangement is superior to the sole responsibility model in achieving outcomes and accountability. Changes to the role and responsibility of the Governor will necessitate changes to the structure of the Reserve Bank Board. Best practice would suggest that a Monetary Board should be created to set monetary policy with the Reserve Bank Board selecting candidates for the committee while maintaining oversight of the bank. To ensure that external board members are not simply captured by the bank it may be necessary to provide a secretariat similar to the Fonterra Shareholder’s Council, operated at arms-length from bank management.

It isn’t my favoured model, but it would be a considerable step in the right direction, and far superior – in terms of heightened accountability and good governance of a powerful government agency –  to Graeme Wheeler’s preference to legislate his own internal committee.  The biggest problem I see with the Redward proposal, is that it has too much of a democratic deficit.  Monetary policy decisionmakers shouldn’t be appointed by other unelected people –  the Reserve Bank Board –  but by people (the Minister of Finance and his Cabinet colleagues) whom we the voters can toss out. That is how it is pretty much everywhere else.

Peter’s proposal focuses on monetary policy.  But, of course, the Reserve Bank has much wider policy responsibilities, including a lot of discretionary power –  not constrained by anything like the PTA –  in the area of financial regulation.  I presume he would also favour committee decisionmaking for those functions.  I’ve proposed two committees –  a Monetary Policy Committee and a Prudential Policy Committee, each appointed by the Minister of Finance, with a majority of non-executive members, and with each member subject to parliamentary confirmation hearings (although not parliamentary veto).  It is a very similar model to that put in place in the United Kingdom in the last few years.  It puts much less reliance on one person –  who will sometimes be exceptional, and occasionally really bad, but on average will be about average –  and would be more in step with the way in which other countries govern these sorts of functions, and with the way we govern other New Zealand public sector agencies.  I hope the Labour Party is giving serious thought to these sorts of options, and while the headline interest is often in monetary policy, the governance of the financial regulatory powers is at least as important to get right.

And then of course, getting a good Governor will always matter a lot.  The Governor, as chief executive, will set the tone within the organisation, and determine what behaviours are rewarded and which are frowned on or penalised.  If the Reserve Bank failed over the last few years, it wasn’t just because Graeme Wheeler was the sole monetary policy decisionmaker –  his advisers mostly seemed to agree with him –  but because of the sort of organisation he fostered, where “getting with the agenda” seemed more important and more valued than dissent or challenge, in area where few people know anything much with a very high degree of confidence.    Character and judgement are probably, at the margin, more important than high level technical expertise.

And while people are thinking about reforms to the Reserve Bank Act don’t lose sight of how little accountability and control there is over the Reserve Bank’s use of public money, or about the provisions it has carved out for itself from the Official Information Act which allow it to keep secret submissions on major policy proposals even –  perhaps even especially –  when they come from parties who would be affected by those proposals.

Revising the Reserve Bank Act was the first legislative priority for the first Labour government that took office in 1935.    I’m not suggesting the same priority if there is a new Labour-led government later in the year, but there is a real and substantial agenda of reforms to address, which will take time to get right, and which take on some added urgency in view of the vacancy in the office of the Governor that needs to be filled by next March.   That appointment –  a key step in the reform and revitalisation of the Reserve Bank –  should be led by whoever is Minister of Finance, not by the faceless (and unaccountable) men and women of the Reserve Bank’s Board, the people who have presided complacently over the mis-steps of the last few years.

 

 

 

New Zealand Initiative on immigration: Part 7 Productivity and all that

Today I’m continuing on with the New Zealand Initiative’s chapter four, on the (claimed) economic benefits to New Zealanders of large scale non-citizen immigration. I don’t have the appetite to try to comment on every questionable claim in the report, so I start with a section headed “Agglomeration –  Bigger is Better?” in which (despite the question mark) the Initiative appears to position itself firmly behind not just the proposition that immigration is good for us, but also the proposition that a bigger population is good for us.

There is no good evidence I’m aware of for the latter proposition.  At a more informal level, I illustrated in this post that large countries (by population) haven’t grown faster (per capita income or productivity) than small countries.  And, of course, consistent with this impression, we have seen many more small countries emerge in the last few decades.

What there is little doubt about is that within countries people and economic activity tend to organise themselves in ways in which the higher productivity activities are increasingly more often found in larger cities.  Cities exist in substantial part because it was found economically advantageous for them to do so.  But it isn’t all that way, by any means.  Natural resource based production tends to occur where the natural resources are –  be it farming, oil and gas extraction, mining, or whatever.   And the observation that within countries an increasing share of high value economic activity is undertaken in cities, tells us little or nothing useful about comparative national economic performance, given the successful co-existence of highly productive large and small countries.

The Initiative seems keen to take the other view

Places, cities in particular, with large, dense populations face lower transport costs in goods, people and ideas. It is cheaper to supply capital or consumer goods and find good workers; there is a better network for knowledge exchange across people.  All vital components of economic growth. The existence of ‘agglomeration economies’ has been established in a number of studies. A meta-analysis of 34 studies found that the positive effects of spatial concentration on productivity remain even after controlling for reverse causality.  Another meta-analysis highlights the importance of considering the various mechanisms through which agglomeration can produce benefits.  New Zealand’s low economic productivity is partly explained by our small population, says Phillip McCann based on economic geography and urban economics.

But, as they acknowledge, I’ve pointed out what appears to be a pitfall in the argument in the New Zealand context, at least when it is used to back encouraging large numbers of new people into Auckland –  what I’ve termed, the 21st century Think Big strategy.

Reddell contends that Auckland’s failure to produce significantly higher growth
compared to the rest of the country contradicts this explanation.

Recall that Auckland’s GDP per capita has been falling relative to that of the rest of the country for the last 15 years, and is quite low relative to that in the rest of the country when compared with other main cities in other advanced countries.  Not only hasn’t Auckland outperformed, it appears to have quite badly underperformed.  One could throw into the mix another point I’ve made previously: there is no major outward-oriented industry (exporting or import-competing) based in Auckland.  It has the feel of a disproportionately non-tradables economy, servicing (a) the rest of the country, and (b) the physical needs of its own policy-driven growth.

How does the Initiative respond to this point?

However, a recent report highlights how standard measures can understate urban productivity differentials and estimates that Auckland’s firms have labour productivity 13.5% higher than firms in other urban areas.

This is, frankly, rather naughty.  The Motu study in question produces revised estimates of labour productivity in Auckland relative to the rest of the country that are not dissimilar to the estimates of the ratio of nominal GDP per capita in Auckland relative to the rest of the country.  No one has questioned that GDP per capita in Auckland is higher than that, on average, in the rest of New Zealand.  But, by international standards, the margin is quite small.  And, more importantly for this debate, the margin has been shrinking, even though the theoretical literature the Initiative seeks to rely on suggests it should have been widening.  More people, from increasingly diverse places, generating more ideas, and as a result selling more stuff here and abroad, and investing to support those sales prospects.  But it just hasn’t been happening.  Instead, immigration policy has been putting more and more people in a place that doesn’t seem to have been producing the expected returns.  And we know that New Zealanders, who presumably are best-placed to assess opportunities and prospects here, have (net) been leaving Auckland.

Frankly I was a bit surprised the Initiative didn’t have a more effective response to these indicators of Auckland’s underperformance and the troubling questions they appear to raise about the economics of New Zealand’s immigration programme.

The next section in the chapter is headed “Macro impact and how we measure it”.  As they note

As a measure of living standards, GDP is not without its faults, but it does indicate how much a nation can produce and, ultimately, consume.  The effect of immigration on GDP can be difficult to disentangle. There is little contention GDP increases with more immigration – that countries produce more with more people is a no-brainer.
Of more interest to economists is GDP per capita – how much the pie is growing relative to the number of people taking slices.

I’d add that the impact on the GDP per capita of natives is, or should be, of particular interest when it comes to considering immigration policy.

There is a surprisingly limited empirical literature on this point.  There is a variety of papers which set up (calibrate) models for how the authors think the economy works, add an immigration shock, and then  –  surprise surprise –  find that the model produces much the answer one expects.    Papers in this class cover the range of results.  Some are set up in ways that produce gains to natives of recipient countries, through some of the sorts of channels Initiative authors cite.  But others, allowing for say fixed natural resources or sluggishly adjusting capital stocks, find that emigration tends to benefit the natives left behind, and slightly dampen the prospects of those in the recipient countries (the modelling the Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions used a few years ago in their review of the trans-Tasman relationship worked that way).  In the recent Australian Productivity Commission report on immigration, the modelling work assumed that productivity growth in Australia would be mildly adversely affected by continuing relatively large immigration inflows (there is a somewhat jaundiced, but not inaccurate, summary here).

But in terms of straightforward empirical analysis of effects on GDP per capita or productivity, there isn’t a large pool of relevant papers (and none at all focused on New Zealand, even though we’ve had one of the largest planned immigration programmes anywhere, over a long period of time).

The Initiative authors refers to two papers.   The first they summarise thus

A study of 22 OECD countries from 1987 to 2009 found migrants are not just attracted to countries with higher prosperity, they also help bring it about.

That sounds promising.    The actual results don’t quite match the promise.

The authors estimates four different version of their model. In each case, they show results for how GDP per capita respond to net migration, net migration responds to GDP per capita, and how the unemployment rate and net migration respond to each other.

Here is the impulse response function chart from the first version of the model

boubtane etc model 1

The solid line is the central estimate, and the dotted lines are the confidence bands.

There is a statistically significant response of GDP per capita to a change in the migration rate in the first year after the shock, but everything beyond that is (a) statistically insignificant, and (b) slightly negative –  ie below the zero line.   No one would be surprised by a positive effect in the first period, since in the short-term demand effects from unexpected immigration inflows will typically exceed the supply effects.  But over the medium-term, there is no evidence here of a sustained boost to per capita income.  The pictures from the other three versions of the model all look much the same.

Before moving on, I should briefly highlight two other points about this paper:

  • it uses net migration, whereas most of the theoretical arguments for possible gains from immigration relate to inflows of non-natives (new ideas, new skills etc).  For most countries, the difference isn’t that important, but for New Zealand it is very important.
  • one of the key things the paper sets out to show is that immigration does not materially affect the unemployment rate.  This is a point that the Initiative and I are at one on, and  –  for what it is worth –  the results of the paper suggest, as we would expect, no statistically significant effect.

The Initiative then moves on to some recent empirical work (Number 8, October 2016) by several IMF staff researchers, which built on another recent paper, by Ortega and Peri, but focused only on advanced countries.

The study finds that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of migrants
in the adult population can raise GDP per capita by up to 2% in the longer run and that the benefits from immigration are broadly shared across the income distribution.

As it happens, I wrote about this paper , somewhat sceptically, when it was first released, in conjunction with the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, late last year.

Here is the summary version of why the results simply don’t ring true.

This chart is from the paper (here “migrants” is the foreign-born share of the adult population)
stock-of-migrants

And this was my comment last year.

Think about France and Britain for a moment.  Both of them in 2010 had migrant populations of just over 10 per cent of the (over 25) population.  If this model was truly well-specified and catching something structural it seems to be saying that if 20 per cent of France’s population moved to Britain and 20 per cent of Britain’s population moved to France (which would give both countries migrant population shares similar to Australia’s), real GDP per capita in both countries would rise by around 40 per cent in the long term.  Denmark and Finland could close most of the GDP per capita gap to oil-rich Norway simply by making the same sort of swap.    It simply doesn’t ring true –  and these for hypothetical migrations involving populations that are more educated, and more attuned to market economies and their institutions, than the typical migrant to advanced countries.

Or, we could turn it around, and think about New Zealand’s actual experience.  Let’s say that the foreign-born share of New Zealand’s adult population increased by 10 percentage points since 1990 –  I can’t quickly find the exact numbers, but it is likely to have been in that order of magnitude.  If this model is correctly specificied – and recall that New Zealand is included in its sample –  that should have given us a huge lift in productivity and GDP per capita, say by around 20 percentage points.  In fact, of course, despite having had probably the largest non-citizen immigration programme of any of these countries in that period (Israel, for example, isn’t in their sample), our productivity (GDP per hour worked –  the metric the IMF authors use) has slipped further behind that of other advanced countries.   Yes, perhaps there were lots of other particularly bad offsetting policies undermining New Zealand’s prospects –  but over this period international agencies, including both the IMF and OECD, repeatedly stated that they thought we had pretty good policies in place.

Of course, as I noted on Friday, my main interest is New Zealand.  If immigration to and among other countries has been productivity-positive, that is something to celebrate, but there is little evidence that it has been so for New Zealand.

One could take the critique and questions a bit broader.  For example, note how the gains arise in this study.  It is from having a large (increased) share of foreign-born people in one’s population.  But immigrants age, have children etc.  Without a continuing inflow of non-citizen migrants, any initial boost to the foreign-born share will erode quite steadily over time.

The US offers an interesting case study.  Around the time of World War One, about 15 per cent of the US population was foreign-born.  Immigration restrictions imposed in the 1920s, and in place for the following forty years, saw the foreign-born share of the US population fall to around 5 per cent by around 1970.  There was nothing comparable in other large migrant recipient countries (eg Australia, New Zealand, Canada).  All else equal, if the IMF model was correctly-specificied, this huge reduction in the foreign-born share should have resulted in a substantial deterioration in the absolute and relative producitivity position of the United States.  There is simply no evidence I’m aware of to support such a proposition (and, in fact, historical estimates suggest that the US had some of its strongest productivity growth in history during these decades).

In my earlier write-up of the IMF paper I noted that

There are other reasons to be skeptical of the results in this IMF paper.  Among them is  that there is a fairly strong relationship between the economic performance of countries today and the performance of those countries a long time ago.  GDP per capita in 1910 was a pretty good predictor of a country’s relative GDP per capita ranking in 2010, suggesting reason to doubt that the current migrant share of population can be a big part of explaining the current level of GDP per capita (and some of the bigger outliers over the last 100 years have been low immigration Korea and Japan and high immigration New Zealand).    In fact, I’ve pointed readers previously to robust papers suggesting that much about a country’s economic performance today can be explained by its relative performance 3000 year ago.  How plausible is it that so much of today’s differences in level of GDP per capita among advanced countries can be explained simply by the current migrant share of the population?

If this is the strongest empirical support advocates of New Zealand’s approach to immigration can adduce, those who have been inclined simply to go along should surely be rethinking their unquestioning support for the policy approach –  whatever merits it may or may not have for some other countries.  I’m aware of a tendency for New Zealand Initiative people to think that the onus of proof isn’t, or shouldn’t, be on them, so obvious and “morally right” is the case for immigration.  Quite where the burden of proof lies is probably more a political one than an economic one, but one might hope that the advocates could produce more evidence, or sustained analysis of the New Zealand case, than is evident in the New Zealand Initiative’s economics chapter.  Especially when the policy approach they support has been tried for more than 25 years, and when even they concede some puzzles about New Zealand’s economic performance in that time.

The authors of the IMF paper, and the earlier Ortega and Peri, paper, hypothesise that the gains from immigration come largely through a total factor productivity (TFP) channel.  Although they never explicitly say so, The Initiative seem to share this perspective, with all their talk of ideas, innovation, alternative perspectives etc.  The IMF researchers didn’t test the connection between immigration and TFP.     But in my earlier post I included this chart, using the same foreign-born population share data the IMF did.

imf-mfp

If anything, over the period they looked at, the relationship was negative –  a larger increase in the foreign-born population share was associated with weaker TFP/MFP growth.  New Zealand is the red dot in the chart.  The outlier –  in the top right hand corner –  was Ireland, which looks more positive for the IMF/Initiative story, except that as I also showed in that earlier post, it is quite clear that the surge of migrants into Ireland came several years after the surge in TFP growth.

And, on the topic of TFP growth, in a post last week I illustrated again just how weak New Zealand’s TFP growth has been relative to that in other advanced economies.    Surely, serious think-tank advocates of New Zealand’s large scale non-citizen immigration policy would want to engage with this sort of record, and the apparent inconsistency with the connections they have hypothesised?

Sadly, simply ignoring the actual record in New Zealand seems to be par for course in the economic chapter of the Initiative’s report.

To their credit, they devote a couple of pages of the report to my hypothesis around the contribution of immigration policy to New Zealand’s longer-term economic underperformance (pp 39 and 40 for anyone interested).  As they note, I have argued that

  • “given New Zealand’s continued heavy dependence on natural resource based exports, New Zealand might not be a natural place to locate many more people, while still generating really high incomes for them all”, and that
  • high levels of non-citizen immigration have helpd explain persistently high real interest and exchange rates, in turn deterring business investment, especially that in the tradables sector, and thus tending to undermine productivity growth.

But they don’t really know what to do with these ideas, and so end up largely ignoring them.  There is simply nothing more, in this section or in the rest of the report, on the issues around a natural resource based economy, that is very distant for major markets/suppliers/networks etc.   New Zealand may have many things in common with other advanced economies, but this is one probably very important difference.

And when it comes to New Zealand’s dismal long-term productivity record, the limit of their comment is this

New Zealand productivity has been less than stellar for a long time – a concern to many economists and policymakers.

And that’s it.  There is no attempt at all to engage with the data, or to tell some alternative story of economic management and prospects over the last 25 years or so, in which for example, non-citizen immigration has played a more favourable role.

There is a little bit more on real interest rates –  why they’ve been so persistently high relative to the rest of the world.

The hypothesis also cannot fully explain why the real interest rate has not converged to the rest of the world. Reddell says competing theories explaining the high real interest rate, such as a risk premium associated with New Zealand investment, do not fit with the evidence either, in particular with the persistent strength of the real exchange rate. He contends that the only explanation currently on offer is that the repeated shocks to domestic demand – not fully recognised in advance by market participants – must have been a big part of the story.

Clearly, the Initiative don’t find my story persuasive, but there is simply no attempt to explain why, or to pose a credible alternative hypothesis for one of the most striking features of New Zealand macro data in recent decades.

The best they seem able to come up with is to point out that any sustained demand pressures will tend to put upward pressure on real interest rates.  And that is quite correct of course.  An economy with very strong productivity growth, and the associated investment in support of it and consumption in anticipation of the future income gains, will tend to have high real interest rates (relative to those abroad).    And no one much will regard that as problematic –  rather it is a mark of the success of the economy.

But that hasn’t been the New Zealand story. Business investment has been quite low as a share of GDP (especially given our population growth) and productivity growth (labour or total factor) has been low.  There is little, or nothing, to suggest that the high relative interest rates we’ve experienced in New Zealand over the last 25 years have been a desirable market-led phenomenon.  They look anomalous not just relative to other countries, but also relative to our own underwhelming economic performance.

Here is the Initiative’s attempt to fend off my analysis

The concerns raised by Reddell would apply more broadly than just on immigration. For example, tourists are foreigners who come to New Zealand, purchase our currency and goods, and use infrastructure (they require accommodation, drive on the roads, may require police assistance, add waste to landfills. etc.). Hence, tourism also puts pressure on the real interest rate and real exchange rate.

As I’ve already noted, any persistent demand pressure –  whether from exports or the domestic economy – will, all else equal, tend to put upward pressure on local interest rates.

But except for population-driven pressures (in a country with a modest savings rate) we just haven’t had such pressures.  As I noted just before, business investment has been lower than we might have hoped, exports as a share of GDP have been sideways or backwards, and the consumption share of GDP has been flat for decades.  What hasn’t been flat has been the population, and particularly the foreign-born population, the direct consequence of government immigration policy.    Take their tourism example.  SNZ has data on the average daily stock of foreign travellers in New Zealand(boosting domestic demand) and the average stock of New Zealand travellers abroad (easing domestic demand), going back to 1999.     There are more foreign travellers here than New Zealanders abroad, on average, but the numbers aren’t large.  In 1999, there were on  the average day  16000 more foreign travellers here than New Zealanders abroad.  Last year, that number was 54000.    38000 (net) more travellers here is a helpful addition to net exports, and some pressure on demand.   But

  • the overall export share of GDP is less now than it was in 1999
  • from 1999 to 2016, there was a net inflow of 759000 non-citizen migrants to New Zealand.

That is both a very large number, and a direct government economic policy choice.  It has had consequences, and there seems a reasonable prima facie case, which the New Zealand Initiative has not attempted to seriously rebut, that that government-controlled influx has not been economically beneficial to New Zealanders as a whole.

This post has already got rather long, so just two final thoughts.

First, it is striking how little attention the Initiative gives to the large sustained outflow of New Zealanders over recent decades.  That outflow is certainly at a low ebb at the moment, but there seems little reason to assume that the exodus has come to any sort of permanent end –  as even the Initiative recognises, our productivity performance languishes.   Whatever one thinks of immigration policy in the abstract, surely it is a somewhat relevant consideration to look at what New Zealanders themselves are doing –  people best placed to assess opportunities and prospects here?   There is, among some policymakers, a weird approach to this issue, in which immigration policy is substantially about replacing those who leave.  I don’t think the Initiative subscribes to that silliness, but neither does it call it out.  When individuals are making rational choices to move – to leave New Zealand –  the burden of proof should really be on those who want the government to try to second-guess those judgements and choices.  When people left Ireland, Italy, Sweden or wherever for the US in the 19th century, it benefited those who left and those who stayed.  It would have daft for the authorities in those places to have responded “woe is me, we need to find some poorer people from other places to bring in to replace those who’ve left”.  A quite different approach would be to respect and respond to the market signals – movements of their own people –  and try to fix up their own economies in ways that might make it no longer attractive for  their own people to leave.  It would have been a much better lesson for the New Zealand authorities to take.  Residents of Taihape and Invercargill should be grateful governments didn’t/couldn’t respond to outflows of people from those towns by suggesting a presssing need to get other people from elsewhere in the world to move to Taihape and Invercargill, even though the economic opportunities had moved on from those places.

And second, in the IMF paper that the Initiative cite there are references to a new paper by various Harvard researchers on the economic effects of diversity (so recent that the references have been added since the version of the IMF piece that I commented on last year).  The authors note that typically in studies to date “the negative effects of diversity seem to dominate empirically”.  In this paper, they find more positive results, but they also look at what sort of diversity might produce benefits (p 26)

 we extend our index of birthplace diversity and account for cultural and economic distance between immigrants and natives. The productive effects of birthplace diversity appear to be largest for immigrants originating from richer countries and from countries at intermediate levels of cultural proximity.

and

This suggests that a combination of culturally closer immigrants and richer origins (potentially a proxy for higher skills) can be particularly valuable.

If this model is robust, then it is perhaps unfortunate for the economic case for the immigration programme that very little of New Zealand’s immigration is from countries richer than our own, and most of it isn’t from countries with close or intermediate levels of “cultural proximity”.  By contrast –  and uncomfortable as it is to point it out again –  all New Zealand’s immigration in the mid 19th century was from countries richer than us.  As such, there is little doubt that if lifted economic performance and productivity for all New Zealanders.    Whether the results are robust is something for others to look at, but it is the sort of specific results, that recognise that some immigration can be beneficial, but not all needs to be –  it depends on various things, including time, place, and people –  that the New Zealand Initiative should be engaging with rather than merrily asserting, with no New Zealand specific evidence –  that the gains to natives are there simply because people have come among us from another country, any country.

New Zealand Initiative on immigration: Part 6 The economists

Chapter 4 of the New Zealand Initiative’s immigration advocacy report is headed “It’s the Economy, Stupid”.   In opening it, they note

While the effects of immigration are broad, the economic impacts often receive the most focus.

That is certainly true of economists, although I’m less sure it is generally true.  But my background is in economics, and I came to thinking about immigration, and immigration policy, in the context of thinking about New Zealand’s disappointing long-term economic performance.

In my previous couple of posts I’ve touched on the Initiative’s treatment of the impact of immigration on government finances and house prices.  But chapter 4 gets to what many economists will think of as the most important economic dimensions of immigration: what it does for productivity and for material living standards.  Economists often get queasy about distributional questions, but since we are talking about policies made by national policymakers I have no problem in narrowing down these questions mostly to the impact on the people already in the country (“natives”), rather than to the latest/next wave of migrants.    As an economic matter,in any particular country policy-controlled immigration of non-citizens should benefit “natives” as a group.  If it doesn’t, the policy should be reconsidered. But answering that question, in any specific country or even more generally, isn’t easy.  There aren’t that many countries that have had significant inward non-citizen immigration, and of course some of the most successful emergent economies of the last century have had very little immigration at all – Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea.   Sample sizes get very small very quickly.  Time and place probably matter quite a bit too.  Most economic research suggests that emigration from Ireland in the 19th century materially benefited those left behind.  But the dominant economists’ argument today would assert that the Irish are now benefiting from substantial inward migration.

As the Initiative notes

By and large, economists favour immigration….

The Initiative’s interpretation on this is that

…as migrants benefit the countries they move to through knowledge spill-overs and global connectedness. Growing the population through immigration also produces ‘economies of agglomeration’ (i.e. the abilities of larger, denser populations to support more commerce and knowledge exchange).

Their prior seems to be not only that non-citizen immigration will benefit natives, but that a growing population –  whether from immigration or natural increase – will also raise productivity.  And the impression I’ve taken is that they seem to believe this is necessarily (or at least almost certainly) true wherever the immigration occurs.

As a descriptive statement, I think there is little doubt that economists generally do favour a fairly open approach to immigration.  But not all the evidence the Initiative adduces even on this point is quite as persuasive as it might first appear.  For example,

An open letter emphasising the benefits of immigration to the US president and Congress in 2006 had no difficulty amassing more than 500 signatures, the majority from practising economists.

Which sounds quite a lot, but the US is a country of around 320 million people.  In New Zealand –  with 4.7 million people –  the equivalent of that 500 signature open letter would be one signed by seven people.    In the New Zealand Initiative’s own offices they just about muster that number, “the majority from practising economists”.   I could probably find seven people, mostly practising economists, in New Zealand to sign letters for or  against free trade, for or against capital gains taxes, for or against almost anything.

But there is better data than that.

The IGM Economics Experts Panel regularly surveys economists on policy questions. Almost all experts agree that high-skilled immigration benefits existing residents, and the majority agree unskilled immigration would benefit existing residents.

It is worth remembering that these surveys are of economists at US universities, answering in a US context.  Looking through the list, many of the respondents are themselves immigrants, likely predisposed to believe their own migration was mutually-beneficial.    And, in the US, of course the overall rate of legal non-citizen immigration is much smaller than that in New Zealand, and the selection criteria are strongly skewed towards family reunification, rather than emphasising skills.

I’ve seen three IGM questions about immigration.

The average US citizen would be better off if a larger number of highly educated foreign workers were legally allowed to immigrate to the US each year.

Of the respondents, 89 per cent agreed, and none disagreed.  Of course, even sceptics of immigration might be inclined to favour more highly educated immigrants, if it were at the expense of the current family focus.

In asking about low-skilled immigrants, there were two questions.  The first was

Question A: The average US citizen would be better off if a larger number of low-skilled foreign workers were legally allowed to enter the US each year.

52 per cent of respondents agreed (and most of the other responses were “uncertain”)

Question B: Unless they were compensated by others, many low-skilled American workers would be substantially worse off if a larger number of low-skilled foreign workers were legally allowed to enter the US each year.

Note that the phrasing is “substantially worse”, not just “slightly” worse.   50 per cent respondents agreed with this proposition, and against most of the other responses were “uncertain”.

There was a more recent poll specifically about the immigration of people with advanced degrees in science and engineering, again a two-parter.

Question A: Allowing US-based employers to hire many more immigrants with advanced degrees in science or engineering would lower (at least temporarily) the premium earned by current American workers with similar degrees.

71 per cent agreed with that proposition.

Question B: Allowing US-based employers to hire many more immigrants with advanced degrees in science or engineering would raise per capita income in the US over time.

86 per cent agreed with that proposition.

So that even among this panel of economists, who believe that US natives generally benefit from immigration to the US, there is quite clear recognition that low-skilled immigration would be likely to disadvantage substantially many low-skilled American workers.   Consistent with this, they also appear to believe that importing lots of any particular type of worker will lower the relative returns of Americans working in that field (if it is true of people with advanced degrees in engineering and science, it is no doubt true to a greater or lesser extent in other specialities –  including perhaps chefs and aged care workers?)

My point here is not to dispute that most economists are quite sympathetic to immigration.  And even most sceptics of immigration won’t have much problem with genuinely highly-skilled migrants.  But when the reality is that the average migrants (and perhaps more importantly the marginal migrant) isn’t that skilled at all, then even in the US context, the views of economists suggest that distributional considerations matter.  As Professor George Borgas, a leading researcher on the economics of immigration, at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, put it in a recent New York Times op-ed, in thinking about immigration policy a key  question for policymakers is “who are you rooting for?”  Borgas reckons there are small overall gains to natives as a whole from immigration to the US, but that the distribution of those gains is such that people at the bottom of the skill distribution are clearly worse off.

In typically flamboyant style, the Initiative talk of economists “loving” immigration, and pose the question “Why do they love it so much?”.      New Zealand doesn’t get much specific attention in the Initiative’s report, but it is as well to remember that in this country there was a long tradition of leading economists being really quite sceptical of the economic gains from immigration to New Zealand –  I wrote about one prominent example here.

But lets stick with the current overseas perspective for now.  The Initiative seek to explain:

To understand why economists generally favour immigration, think of the opposite. If immigration was not generally beneficial, why stop at the national level? Migration flows occur far more significantly within than across nations. Would stemming these domestic flows improve outcomes? Would Wellington’s economy improve if we prevent Christchurchians and Aucklanders flooding in?

And, of course, there is an important element of truth in this argument.  The ability of people to leave Taihape or Invercargill as the economic opportunities declined in those places, relative to other places in New Zealand, has been an important part of internal adjustment.    There is no actual evidence that natives of Wellington or Christchurch benefited from people migrating from Taihape or Invercargill, but we can be pretty sure the migrants themselves benefited (or they wouldn’t have moved), and there are reasonable grounds to suppose that the people who stayed behind in those declining towns also benefited.  One of the other basic insights of economics –  not, I think, mentioned in the Initiative report at all, but strongly backed by empirical research on, say, pre World War One migration –  is that mobility of resources encourages what economists call “factor price equalisation”.   In other words, wages in Wellington or Christchurch might actually be a bit lower than otherwise as a result of the internal migration.

Of course, we don’t stop internal migration, because that is what being a country (or at least a free country) means.  We share some sense of common identity across Auckland, Dunedin, Kawerau and Westport, that we mostly don’t share with people in other countries.  It is the similarities that matter –  we are ‘New Zealanders’, whatever that means when one digs down –  and in particular it is the right to dwell in this land that is common to us all.    It is an arbitrary line to some extent, but little different in concept to the notion, practised by us all, surely, in which we treat family differently than we do outsiders.

As the Initiative notes, economists (rightly) emphasise the potential gains from trade.   Winding up the rhetoric they argue

Larger and more diverse markets of potential traders have more opportunity for specialisation and greater advantages from trade.  These insights lead economists to broadly favour free movement of goods, capital and money – so why not labour, too?

Indeed, the arguments are similar – immigration improves economic performance for much the same reason international trade improves economic performance. Individuals vary in their capabilities, and freedom of movement allows people to move to where their skills are needed most. The fewer the constraints on labour mobility, the more countries prosper. So large is the potential prosperity gain that open borders are estimated to double world GDP.  The implications of economic theory are clear: New Zealand can benefit from those who are like us and those who are not. Those  who have skills similar to those of New Zealanders can help sectors that hold comparative advantage to reach efficient scale. Those with different skills can improve the market at the micro level by creating new industries or rejuvenating old ones with new ideas.

New Zealand benefits by embracing those who can offer new and challenging ideas and perspectives.  Simply by being from another country, migrants help bridge the gap between New Zealand and the rest of the world. Global connectedness is vital for
prosperity, and welcoming migrants can help New Zealand improve those connections.

There is a lot one could unpick here.  Even if they won’t actually call for it as policy, the New Zealand Initiative want us to think of “open borders” as the natural default, which only fear, racism, selfishness or whatever holds us back from.

But note that the exercise in which open borders –  no immigration restrictions anywhere –  could double world GDP assumes that massive numbers of people (hundreds and hundreds of million) migrate, and yet in doing so they do not change what it was  –  the culture/institutions etc –  that made the country they migrate to rich and successful.  No one takes that very seriously.  People bring their cultures with them –  which isn’t just tastes in food, but views about how things are and should be done.  That the ancestors of today’s European citizens of New Zealand did so is a big part of why New Zealand is a fairly wealthy country today.  But that migration involved people moving from the then-richest, and most economically successful, culture/country to lightly-populated temperate New Zealand.   In small numbers, there is little doubt that migrants from poor countries to rich countries benefit, often very considerably, and in doing so they don’t change the recipient country/culture much.  In large numbers, one simply can’t make the assumptions the authors of that exercise did.

Note too that there is no sense in any of this that fixed factors of production might matter.  Land and natural resources are the most obvious example.    They may not be overly important in some places –  one might think of Singapore or Hong Kong as examples, or at a city level somewhere like London.  On the other hand, no one doubts that natural resources are hugely important to the prosperity of Norway or Australia –  not the only factor of course (the human capital to exploit the resources matters a lot), but hugely important nonetheless.  From memory, Norway had about twice as much North Sea oil and gas reserves as the United Kingdom, but with less than a tenth of the population of the UK, that natural resource might much more difference to the living standards of the average Norwegian, than it did to the average Briton.   The economics of adding lots more people to a particular place depend a lot on what that place has going for it.    And yet the New Zealand Initiative pay no attention to this consideration at all –  barely mentioning that New Zealand is the most remote significant economy in the world, and demonstrably still heavily dependent on fixed natural resources.  There is simply no obvious reason why the economics of immigration should look quite the same for the United Kingdom or the Netherlands as for Kuwait or New Zealand.

Perhaps large-scale immigration to New Zealand –  of the sort the Initiative champions – has been, and will be, beneficial to New Zealanders, but you can’t just get away with asserting it, while largely ignoring key facets of the New Zealand economy.

Should alternative perspectives be welcome?   Well, mostly yes.  And so to that extent I’ll agree with the Initiative when they claim that

New Zealand benefits by embracing those who can offer new and challenging ideas and perspectives

But the proportion of migrants who will actually offer “new and challenging ideas and perspectives” is inevitably pretty small –  as no doubt it is for natives –  and most ideas and knowledge simply aren’t transmitted primarily by immigration.  I’d be happy to see us welcome leading researchers as migrants, but mostly you’d have to ask yourself –  what no doubt they’ve already asked themselves –  why would they come (to a small, remote, not-overly-prosperous corner of the world), rather than staying nearer global centres of knowledge-generation and dissemination.  Typically they won’t.

The Initiative goes on

Simply by being from another country, migrants help bridge the gap between New Zealand and the rest of the world. Global connectedness is vital for prosperity, and welcoming migrants can help New Zealand improve those connections.

Silly extreme examples illustrate how empty this rhetoric is.  Half a million Syrian immigrants or Turkmen, Bolivian or Zambian immigrants would be exceptionally unlikely to strengthen our “global connections” in ways that enhance our national prosperity (they’d happily come, to a much richer country).   In considering national policy, you simply can’t –  or shouldn’t –  operate at this sort of high level of generality.  Evidence abour New Zealand, and analysis of New Zealand, illuminated by perspectives from other similar countries is surely critical to reaching robust policy perspectives on what immigration policy we should adopt.

I should stress, as I have noted for many years, that my main interest is New Zealand (as I hope the New Zealand Initiative’s is).  So my main interest is not whether immigration is sometimes good for natives, or even generally good for natives, in some or most other countries. My interests is in whether modern (say, post-war) immigration to New Zealand has been, and is likely to be, good for New Zealanders.  Since places differ, and location oftenr matters in economics, one cannot simply assume that what is good in some places (even most places) is good in all places.  As I noted, the number of countries with large scale immigration programmes (and hence the effective sample size in any study) is small.   In an age when personal connections seem to matter more than ever, particular on the production of things other than natural resources,  and when more and more production is done through global supply chains, there is at least a reasonable prima facie case for why conclusions one might reach about immigration to the Netherlands or Singapore might be different from those for New Zealand.

And all that is even before considering New Zealand’s actual economic experiences over the decades of high non-citizen immigration, including the (barely mentioned in the Initiative report) huge exodus of our own citizens over recent decades.  In my next post, I’ll look at some of the papers the Initiative cites in their report, and look at their response to my own arguments,  but it is worth remembering that in no other country I’m aware of has there been both a huge exodus of natives, and a huge policy-controlled influx of non-citizens.  A diagnostician would usually pay some attention to the voluntary market-driven outflow of natives in considering the prospect that government-led large inflows would benefit the natives who remained.