One more Treasury OIA about RB spending

Michael Reddell Adrian Orr, Funding agreements, Reserve Bank Board, Treasury

All the interest in the Orr-departure story – the background, and the subsequent and ongoing efforts to mislead the public by the Board and the temporary Governor – seems to now centre on the Ombudsman. Various people, including me, have appealed the Bank’s OIA obstructionism on specific requests and the Ombudsman seems to be pursuing the issue reasonably expeditiously. I received a draft of a provisional opinion the other day for comment (which I have now provided extensive comments on) but I’m guessing it might be a couple of weeks before we get a final decision. I’m going to be away for a while so I don’t expect to write anything more after this post for at least a couple of weeks.

For the record, the Herald has an article today on the Reserve Bank staff cuts. Most of it is ground covered in my post last Friday. But the one bit that caught my eye was this

To which there are so many possible thoughts in response:

  • Surely no serious external observer ever thought they needed what they had bid for to do their statutory duties effectively,
  • But if the Board is now confident that everything can be done with 20 per cent fewer staff than they had in January, why did they ever bid for so much more money?  (And it was the Board’s bid, perhaps championed by the then Governor but he was their agent and they had responsibility for governance, budgets etc),
  • And if “no work programmes have been cut” [“out altogether” appears from context to be the intended interpretation] a) what were all those people previously doing? and b) given all the non-core stuff the Bank got into under Orr, why on earth not?
  • It seems like further evidence that the modest cuts Willis imposed relative to what Grant Robertson had allowed the Bank to spend did not go anywhere near deep enough.

And it remains extraordinary that none of the Board members has had the decency to resign and that the Minister continues to express confidence in the chair, whose signature had been on that egregious bid late last year for so much more money, in which he and the Governor stated that that increased funding was what was appropriate “to deliver on our mandate and agreed outcomes”.

So many puzzles and so few explanations when it comes to explaining the last 10 months or so of the Orr tenure, that all ended so ignominiously on 5 March, coverups and all.

But another OIA response came in from The Treasury yesterday (having taken the best part of two months to provide two pages of information (and not withhold or redact anything)). Another of the puzzles around that final year or so is why Treasury appears to have been doing its monitoring role of the Bank so poorly (and this is a formal monitoring role, for which resources are formally allocated, established under the overhauled Reserve Bank Act in 2021).

This had been the request, lodged on 16 June

Some of this had already been overtaken by events because the Reserve Bank had already released to me Treasury’s comments on the draft 2024/25 Statement of Performance Expectations (SPE), and then had released the draft SPE and covering note the Bank had sent to the Minister of Finance.

The mystery, you will recall, was that the Bank had chosen to spend about 23 per cent more in 24/25 on matters covered by its Funding Agreement than the variation approved by Grant Robertson just before the 2023 election had allowed. Surely, it seemed, Treasury and the Minister of Finance would have pushed back strongly on this? But it emerged – all documented in previous posts – that the Bank simply chose to leave out the planned budget numbers from the draft SPE they consulted the Minister on. She simply wasn’t told about this planned excess, and Treasury had not flagged any concerns to her (they’d noted that the draft SPE didn’t have the budget figures in, but raised no particular concerns and simply noted that the numbers would have to be in the final version). They were, but there was no particular reason for the Minister or her office to look closely at the final version because they’d not been alerted to any particular areas of concern, or requested any major changes to the draft. As I’ve noted before, perhaps the Minister and her advisers should have been more suspicious – Willis had scarcely been on record as an Orr fan – but the real fault seemed to lie with Treasury. They are, after all, supposd to be the guardians of the public purse.

So what new do we learn from yesterday’s release? Mostly, it is about gaps – and not in what they released, but in what work never seems to have been done.

There were four limbs to my request.

On the first, it seems that there was no additional analysis or advice internally, and certainly nothing documented outlining any concerns as to what the Bank might be up to or suggesting (say) that they should insist that the Minister was alerted to the planned budget for 24/25. There is no sign in any of the material that Treasury was even aware of the scale of the planned spending blow-out, let alone suspicious of how such a blowout might be used to try and leverage more resources in the forthcoming Funding Agreement bid.

The third limb related to something I’d spotted in this year’s government Budget documents.

A not inconsiderable chunk of the “savings” in this year’s Budget ($144 million in fact) was this item. We were told, reasonably enough, that the figures now included in the 2025 government Budget reflected the new Funding Agreement that had been signed and released in mid-April. But why had figures so much higher ever been included by Treasury in the HYEFU last year? After all, much higher numbers had no warrant in any document any minister had ever seen (eg the draft SPE – see above) or signed (eg the Funding Agreement then still in place covering the period to 24/25). Why, in an environment of fiscal stringency, had Treasury included levels of Reserve Bank spending for the next few years far higher than anything authorised from the centre to that point?

The answer, it appears, is that no one bothered to look or check or think. Treasury told me that “there is no material in scope of the third part of your request”. And went on to tell me that “we note that the RBNZ provides the Treasury with operating expenditure forecasts which are used in the Treasury’s Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update (HYEFU)”. Which seems almost beyond belief. The Bank isn’t a tiny entity (say the Walking Access Commission), but one spending a couple of hundred million dollars a year, and one which had been increasing its spending substantially, and yet Treasury staff simply took whatever the Bank told them it planned to spend for the following few years and stuck it in the formal fiscal forecasts without apparently raising any questions at all. Not exactly a fearsome (or effective) watchdog.

One reason I’d asked about those HYEFU numbers is because I knew that the Bank had lodged its egregious bid for the following five years with the (acting) Secretary to the Treasury on 13 September. I’d assumed that between then and when the HYEFU fiscal numbers were finalised (27 November) somebody at Treasury would have (a) looked even a little closely at the Funding Agreement bid, and b) raised some red flags about a bid that used as a baseline spending levels so far ABOVE what was allowed in the still-current Funding Agreement, and c) perhaps (optimistically) gone back and looked at how the 24/25 budget had been set relative to those Funding Agreement limits. They might even have alerted the Minister.

And that was the gist of the second limb of my request. In fact, it appears that none of this happened. Treasury never actually responds directly to that bit of the request but (a) does not say it is withholding anything, and b) notes that two documents are in scope and soon to be released (as part of the long-delayed pro-active release of papers relating to the 2025 Budget). The first of those is “T2025/3027 Aide Memoire: Preliminary assessment of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s funding proposal for the 2025-30 Five Year Funding Agreement”, and is dated 13 February. That appears to be the first time anyone at The Treasury had put anything in writing on an egregious funding bid they’d received five months earlier (from an agency with a chief executive who was well known for his aggression etc). It seems almost unbelievable, but there it is.

I am loathe to accuse Treasury officials of playing fast and loose with the Official Information Act, but in this case it is hard to believe I have been given a straight answer. Why? Because we have the written words of the former Governor to his senior leadership team, cc’ed to the Board chair and deputy chair. This, from 5 February, is from the Bank’s 11 June release

You don’t tell people to “cease and desist negotiating with various Treasury Officials” if there had been no discussions and negotiations. And you don’t pull down your initial bid (see second to last line) if there’d been no prior reaction from Treasury or the Minister, and it is hard to believe that Treasury had put nothing at all in writing prior to then (and had not let the Minister know there was a looming issue).

But I guess it is plausible that no one much at Treasury had turned their minds to Funding Agreement issues for months after receiving the bid. Which doesn’t reflect well on them at all.

The fourth limb of my request covered any material of substance relating to Funding Agreement negotiations from 1 December until the date the Cabinet paper was lodged (1 April as it turns out). I’d narrowed the timeframe because I’d assumed there’d have been initial reactions earlier (after 13 September) but what I was interested in was the stuff that had led to the blow-up with the Governor). Treasury does not directly respond to this limb of my request either, but lists another paper soon to be released, dated 13 March (ie post Orr), a formal Treasury Report on funding agreement issues. And that is all. If Treasury’s responses are at least approximately truthful, it seems that they were very late in getting onto this set of issues (either future Funding Agreement bid, with its artificially high purported baseline, or the 24/25 budget itself, which had blasted through the then Funding Agreement limits).

If so, one might – just possibly, and in a mood of charity – be marginally less unsympathetic to the Governor. Perhaps he really thought he was going to get away with a) the massive 2024/25 overspend, and b) the artificial baseline for the new Funding Agreement. After all, it seems there had been no Treasury challenge or scrutiny at all, and his numbers even seemed to have found their way into the official fiscal forecasts with no challenge or question. It is astonishing that for months – dating all the way back to that draft SPE – there seems to have been no serious pushback, from the Minister or from Treasury. What sort of job were top Treasury officials doing in monitoring this powerful Crown agency? Not much of one it appears. Deputy Secretaries (both now out of the jobs they held then) are recorded as having turned up for chats at Board meetings, but what of it if excess of this sort was allowed to roll on for months unchallenged?

It is always possible that the way my OIA requests were drafted means something of significance has been able to be withheld as not quite falling within the specific scope of those requests. It is certainly difficult – nay impossible – to believe that there was nothing at all prior to 13 February. But it certainly doesn’t look as though Treasury was doing its job in a way citizens, let alone the Minister, might have reasonably expected that they would be.

One in five roles could go at the Reserve Bank

Michael Reddell Funding agreements, Reserve Bank, Reserve Bank Board

That is the headline in a story in The Post this morning. After inquiries from Post journalists a Reserve Bank spokesperson said that final decisions on organisational change, advised to staff last week, would mean a net loss of 142 jobs (35 of which were currently vacant; presumably the Bank has had some sort of hiring freeze in place for some months now).

The last public number we had for Reserve Bank staff numbers was in the Minister’s Funding Agreement Cabinet committee paper: 660 FTEs as at 31 January. Presumably a) there were some vacancies even then, and b) the number of jobs was greater than the number of FTEs, but even if there were 700 filled or unfilled jobs in January the recent decisions would still be a cut in excess of 20 per cent. That is brutal in any organisation, especially when its statutory roles and functions haven’t changed a jot. It is hard to imagine morale is particularly high in the Bank at present, and we might even sympathise with the more junior of the staff losing their jobs, especially those hired in the last year or two, really on what amounts to false pretences. Even those (probably a minority) doing useless jobs far beyond the scope of the Bank’s actual statutory functions.

You don’t really expect junior hires to a core government agency to have to do due diligence on whether that agency was running spending levels – and hiring plans – far in excess of what had been approved for them by the Minister of Finance. But that is what had happened: Board approved spending last year was 23 per cent higher than what the previous Minister of Finance had approved for 24/25 when he increased the Funding Agreement amounts just before the last election. Treasury didn’t seem to have noticed, or done anything to call it out, so one can only sympathise with new hires now being thrown back onto the job market.

And you can see how last year’s excess created today’s problems. The number of FTEs increased from 601 to 660 between 30 June last year and 31 January this year. Had they not gone on that last hiring binge, adjustment now would be much less painful all round. This table, showing FTE numbers, is from the 2023/24 Annual Report published last September.

It is a reminder of how rapidly Orr and Quigley had been ramping up staff numbers, with no substantial change in functions. Cut FTEs by 20 per cent from that 31 January level (660) and it would take the Bank down to 528 FTEs, at which point it would still be larger than it had been on 30 June 2023, the final balance date under the previous Labour government (under whose term almost all agencies had seen rapid growth in staff numbers). It makes the point that the cuts the current Minister of Finance approved have not been deep at all relative to what was going on (spending allowances, staffing) on Labour’s watch. (I reckon the Bank’s core functions could probably be done professionally with 350 staff, but save that debate for another day.)

One way of seeing this is to look at the Bank’s total operating expenses. In the final budget approved during Labour’s term, the Bank budgeted to spend $212 million in total operating expenses in 2023/24. For 2025/26. the recently published budget for total operating expenses is $204 million, 3.8% lower than in 2023/24. Add in, say, 5 per cent inflation over the two years and you are still looking at a real cut of under 10 per cent. Not easy to adjust to perhaps, but not very different from what a lot of other government agencies have experienced. The wild card of course was the budget for 24/25: $231 million. This year’s budget is about 14 per cent lower than that in real terms. But that 2024/25 budget never had any ministerial authorisation at all.

Another, but murkier, way of looking at it is to look at approvals under the Funding Agreement (which cover a – changing – subset of total operating expenses, but which are where the Minister of Finance is supposed to have control).

In the August 2023 update to the last Funding Agreement, Grant Robertson approved the Bank spending $149.44 million on in-scope operating expenses. In addition, they were explicitly allowed to spend on these items about $5 million of the amount that had been allowed for currency issuance expenses but which wasn’t needed for that purpose. So, say, $154,5m on in-scope operating expenses.

In the new Funding Agreement approved by the Minister in April this year, total in-scope operating expenses allowed for this year is $155 million (dropping away to $145 million next year, for reasons not made clear in the documents published so far, but maybe reflecting upfront restructuring costs – redundancy payments now for all those losing their jobs, already some weeks into 25/26?).

But you can’t just compare and contrast $155 million with $154.5 million because in the new Funding Agreement more spending items have been moved out of scope, not required to be covered within that $155 million limit. There are some smallish items (eg costs associated with the Bank’s legacy superannuation scheme, totalling probably less than half a million this year). But there is also this

Remember, these are business case costs, not some full cost of a project but you’d think they might easily total another million or two (consultants don’t come cheap).

And there is this explicit carveout, with some numbers

ie $5 million a year

Add those three items back in and the appropriate comparison to last year’s Funding Agreement level (the $154.5 million) is perhaps more like $161.5 million ($155 + 5 + 1.25 + 0.25). It drops away next year, but taking $10 million off that total still doesn’t leave them much less than the $154.5 million they were allowed for 24/25. The big problem – for them – is that they simply ignored that 24/25 limit and went for broke, hoping they could trick the Minister into setting them a permanently higher new baseline level of spending. It didn’t work fortunately. In a decent world they’d all (Orr, Quigley, the rest of last year’s board) apologise to the Minister, to the public, and to their own staff. In our world, staff lose their jobs and Quigley and the board keep theirs.

It is still interesting that they are needing to make such deep staff cuts to meet the budget and stay within the new Funding Agreement limits. Perhaps one partial reason might be the big new commitment they made to office space in Auckland – in what is apparently one of the fanciest new buildings in Auckland, with a five star green rating as well – on a scale which to have been anything like justified would have required even more growth in staff numbers. They signed up to that 4800 square metres last November, with no idea where the Funding Agreement would land and knowing they’d already well-overreached the previous Funding Agreement limits. According to last year’s Annual Report they spent $1 million on Rental and Lease Expenses (presumably mostly/wholly on their existing office space in a 40 year old building in Queen St). Not exactly a source I’d rely on for much but Google’s AI overview suggested that annual lease costs on the space in the new building could be $3.5 million (and their lease there runs from 1 August, while the existing lease doesn’t expire until 31 December).

In concluding I want to come back very briefly to the Post article. It is right to say that the Bank got much less than it had had the gall to ask for (unlike Oliver Twist, in asking for more they were already bloated), but what they are allowed to spend this year and next isn’t much different in real terms than what Grant Robertson had allowed them when he’d set the spending limit for 24/25. It is just a shame – actually, it should be scandalous – that they chose to ignore that limit so egregiously. Taxpayers and their own staff now pay the price.

Thinking about the MPC

Michael Reddell MPC, Reserve Bank Act reforms

I wrote earlier in the week about the as-yet unfilled vacancy in the office of Governor of the Reserve Bank. But there is also another significant vacancy that needs to be filled in the coming weeks, as the oft-extended MPC term of Bob Buckle finally comes to an end.

Buckle appears to be older than Donald Trump and has been on the MPC since it began 6.5 years ago. That means he’s been fully part of all the very costly bad calls ($11 billion of taxpayers losses when the MPC authorised the Bank to punt big in the bond market, and the worst outbreak of inflation in many decades, the consequences of which – notably in the labour market – we are still living with). And in his 6.5 years on the committee we’ve learned nothing at all of any distinctive contribution he may have made, we’ve heard nothing of his views (was he cheerleader, did he ever express any doubts etc?), there have been no speeches or interviews, he’s never apologised for or even acknowledged the bad calls (and their consequences) he’s been fully part of. And yet he has twice had his term extended (first reappointed by Robertson and was then extended again by Willis). He isn’t uniquely bad, and of the three externals first appointed back in 2019, when active expertise was deliberately excluded by Quigley and Orr, he was the least unqualified. But he is representative of all that is unsatisfactory with the Reserve Bank monetary policy governance reforms put in place in 2019. There is no accountability whatever, despite exercising huge amounts of delegated power.

Thinking about the vacancy, and the fact that it is now just over a year since Willis appointed two new, and apparently more capable, external MPC members prompted me to dig out the paper (“The Governance of Monetary Policy – Process, Structure, and International Experience”) that one of those new MPC members, (Prasanna Gai an academic at the University of Auckland but who’d spent a lot of time earlier in his career at the Bank of England), wrote in January 2023 as a consultant to the external panel reviewing the Reserve Bank of Australia. That review process that led to amended legislation and the creation this year of a distinct RBA Monetary Policy Board. It is a useful paper, easy to read and not long (28 pages), surveying experiences in a number of countries (including a quite sceptical treatment of the New Zealand MPC experience) and concluding with a couple of pages headed “Towards an ideal set-up” with six specific recommendations for the design of an MPC.

These were the recommendations

Recommendation 1: External members should be appointed through a merit based competitive process run at “double arms-length”, by a bi-partisan hiring committee appointed by the Treasurer that is diverse, experienced, and representative of society. Treasury Officials should be excluded from the MPC.

Recommendation 2: The threshold for economic expertise and policy acumen should be high. Members should be professional economists, with backgrounds in macroeconomics and financial economics, or offer broader experiences relevant to monetary policy. Gender, ethnicity, and industry diversity should be
important considerations in deciding the MPC make-up. Membership should be part-time with a commitment of around 3 days per week on average. Overseas members should be considered, subject to this time commitment.

Recommendation 3: The MPC should be relatively small (six). There should be two internal members and four externals. The role of Chair of the committee should rotate periodically and external members should be chosen for their capacity to serve in this regard. Pre-deliberation opinions should be sought, recorded (e.g. “dot plots”), and released to the public at an appropriate time. The chair should speak last and members invited to speak randomly. MPC members should be encouraged to interact with RBA staff between meetings.

Recommendation 4: The term of office be a single, non-renewable term of no more than five years.

Recommendation 5: To optimise information production and processing and to ensure democratic accountability, each member of the committee should “own” their decision and regularly explain their thinking to stakeholders at parliament and other fora. Members should have the freedom to dissent and MPC processes should be designed to diminish cacophony. Transcripts of the deliberation meeting should be released after a suitable lag so that stakeholders have a complete picture of the reasoning and debate behind the policy decision.

Recommendation 6: The MPC should be exposed to a regular schedule of external review by experts in monetary policy at 5-7 year intervals. These experts should be independently commissioned by the Treasury without consultation from the RBA, to avoid claims of partiality. The Treasury should take the lead in ensuring that review recommendations and insights are taken on board by the RBA and MPC.

Interesting food for thought, but anyone with any familiarity with the New Zealand system will recognise that list bears almost no relationship to what we have here (in law or in practice), except perhaps that odd “gender diversity” priority, which is pretty clearly what led Grant Robertson to appoint Caroline Saunders to the initial MPC (OIAed papers support that conclusion) and is probably why Orr appointed the otherwise utterly unqualified Karen Silk as the deputy chief executive responsible for macroeconomics and monetary policy, complete with a voting seat on the MPC. And, to be fair, there are some elements of Gai’s recommendations that I don’t agree with (including rotating the chair, bipartisan selection, and non-renewable terms).

One of the reasons I don’t like the idea of non-renewable terms is that serious accountability (ie with real and personal consequences at stake) is hard enough generally, but that the possibility of non-renewal is the most plausible point at which a monetary policy decisionmaker might face paying a price if they’d done poorly. Under the 1989 Act, the Bank’s Board was transformed into a body designed almost solely to hold the Governor to account, and they could recommend dismissal at any point if they concluded he was doing monetary policy poorly. The Board ended up so close to management (and for long periods was chaired by former senior managers), and had no resources of its own and limited economic expertise, that challenge was difficult. But, in principle, reappointment offered a chance, without too much awkwardness, to suggest that it was time for an incumbent to move on. The current Board still has some such role in respect of non-executive MPC members.

(The system was finally discredited in 2022 when, with all of Orr’s personal and policy failings already on display, the outgoing old board still recommended to their successors that Orr be reappointed, one of the worst public appointment decisions in New Zealand in quite some time, culminating in the engineered exit this year, barely two years into his second term.)

In formulating his recommendations, Prasanna Gai explicitly drew on a 2018 conference paper, (“Robust Design Principles for Monetary Policy Committees”) prepared for an RBA Conference, and written by David Archer (then a senior manager at the BIS) and Andrew Levin, a US academic but former Fed staffer. Archer, of course, had previously been chief economist and head of financial markets at the Reserve Bank until about 2004. It is another fairly accessible not-overly-long (16 pages) piece and they conclude with eleven principles, grouped as seven “governance principles” and four “transparency principles” (although I’m not sure I really buy the distinction). But like the Gai paper, it is very technocratic and rather weak on the place of a powerful central bank in a democratic society.

Reading the two documents together the thing I found most striking was that there was lots of talk (and they seemed to mean it seriously) about the importance of “accountability” (most explicitly in Gai’s recommendation 5 but strongly implicit in 3 and 6 as well). Archer and Levin are very much in the same vein (“Principle 6: Each MPC member should be individually accountable to elected officials and the public”). And yet, none of it seemed to involve any consequences whatever for the individuals. Both favour non-renewable terms so there is no potential discipline there, and Gai never ever seems to mention the possibility of removing an MPC member who had done monetary policy poorly. Archer and Levin are only slightly better, suggesting – in just a very brief reference not elaborated – that there should be “removal only in cases of malfeasance or grossly inadequate performance”.

I was a bit puzzled. One might expect serving central bankers to recite empty mantras about accountability that boil down in substance to not much more than having to publish a few documents and the Governor fronting up every so often to rather soft questioning at a parliamentary committee (in essence, the New Zealand model). But although each of these three authors had been central bankers none were at the time of writing.

It was, perhaps, particularly surprising in Gai’s case. After all, he was writing in January 2023 when central bankers in a wide range of countries were revealed as having stuffed up badly (no doubt with the best will in the world) and Phil Lowe was under fire in Australia. I wondered if perhaps one factor for Archer and Levin had been that were writing in 2018 when we were several decades into inflation targeting and in most countries if there had been monetary policy errors in the grand scheme of things they were relatively small.

And so I asked David Archer (now retired) why their paper had not dealt in any detail with options for serious personal accountability. He gave me permission to quote from his response (prefaced by a “joint papers are a compromise”)

On making accountability real, I favour the ability to remove for policy failure reasons
(a) where it is possible to define the objective with some clarity, and 
(b) where the procedure and protocols for assessing the bank’s/individual’s contributions to failure are fairly robust and shielded from political intervention.
 
I think (a) is possible, since maintaining medium term price stability — a single objective, able to be stated numerically — is clear enough.
 
I think (b) is more difficult. A previous NZ construction, involving a monitoring group that comprises outsiders who owe their duty to the public but that is able to peer inside the operation — that is, a board with independent chair and no management responsibilities — was a pretty good, though not perfect design. The imperfections were less in the construction than the execution, but the construction could still have been better — eg a requirement for an annual assessment report that requires a ministerial response and FEC examination.
 
It is noteworthy that the ability to remove for policy failures is almost vanishingly rare internationally. 

I agree with the spirit although not entirely with the details. In the end, I think that – in a democracy – decisions to appoint or to remove MPC members (executive or not) should be made by people who are elected (ie politicians) and thus themselves directly accountable. But it might be a reasonable balance to say that people could only be removed (for policy failure causes) on the recommendation of an independent assessment panel.

Unlike David, I think the old Reserve Bank Board model (while well-intentioned) was never likely to be an adequate approach. Operating within the Bank, with the Governor as a member, with a senior Bank manager as secretary, with no analytical or consulting resource of their own (to which one could add that they were required to review each MPS and see if it did the statutory job, which made it hard to stand back later and hold the Governor to serious account) it was never likely to succeed. Things got too cosy, the Board was more interested in having the Governor’s back, they held cocktail functions to help spread the Bank’s story, and to the extent there was challenge or questioning it was often on rather technical points rather than seriously attempting accountability. It might have been different if something like the Macroeconomic Advisory Council I used to champion had been set up, fully independent of the Bank and Treasury, and with serious analytical grunt itself.

Central bank monetary policymakers wield a great deal of power. There is no review or appeal process embedded. Being human, the best central bankers will make mistakes (just like the best corporate managers or corporate boards) and there needs to be a personal price to failure, otherwise we have given great power with little or no responsibility. If really big mistakes are not going to lead to those responsible being fired – or not even lead to them being not reappointed – we should rethink whether operational autonomy over monetary policy is appropriate at all. We still need expertise on these issues – as in so many other areas of public life – but there is no necessary reason why the decisionmaking power should be delegated. When politicians wield power we have the satisfaction of being able to toss them out when they do poorly. (And for those who worry about possible pro-inflation biases among politicians, a) for the decade pre-Covid we had the opposite problem (inflation a bit too low relative to target) from central bankers, and b) it is salutary to see how much “cost of living” now features among public concerns, here and elsewhere, even a couple of years after the worst of the inflation.)

To be clear, I am not suggesting that independent MPCs should be able to be second-guessed when they make their initial decisions (even if there had been a consensus in March/April 2020 that the MPC was going astray, Orr and company shouldn’t have been able to be tossed out then). But when outcomes go so badly off track, people should be removable and should not be reappointed. It can’t be a mechanical or formulaic thing – outcomes are always a mixture of specific policy judgements and unforeseeable shocks – but there is nothing particular unique about monetary policy in that (see the ousting of corporate chieftains when things go badly astray; sometimes it is just because there needs to be a scapegoat, somone seen to take the fall). But it does heighten the importance of making people individually responsible – speeches, interviews, proper minutes, attributed votes, FEC hearings and so on. It is hard to dismiss an entire committee – one of the 1989 government’s reasons then for choosing a single decisionmaker – but if a committee is doing its job at all well, some members will inevitably emerge looking better (or worse) than others. (Unlike our experts – above – I think there is a particular responsibility on the Governor, who controls staff analysis etc and is full time, but that isn’t an excuse for free-riding externals).

There is one area where we deliberately make it all but impossible to remove someone for bad substantive decisions: the judiciary. And that is probably as it has to be. But in the case of lower courts there are (layers of) appeal processes, and in higher courts finality is often the point (there may not be objectively right or wrong legal interpretations, but what the courts provide – subject to parliamentary override – is finality. And unlike most central banks, courts are unshamed about having majority and dissenting opinions, the latter often lengthy and thoughtful. There is no good reason for putting our central bankers on such a protected pedestal – mess up badly and face no personal consequences, no matter how much damage those bad choices have done to the country.

But to come back to the mundane, you have to wonder what Prasanna Gai makes of being an MPC member, operating in a model so much at odds with the analysis and recommendations he gave to the RBA review panel not much more than a couple of years ago:

  • He was selected last year by a panel, appointed entirely by the previous Labour government, led by Orr and Quigley, who would have spurned his expertise when the MPC was first set up in 2019,
  • The Secretary to the Treasury (or his nominee) is a non-voting member of the committee,
  • The MPC is numerically dominated by internals, one of whom has no economics background at all,
  • Not only is the chair not rotated, but it was held by a domineering personality, long observed to be intolerant of challenge and dissent, whose governorship finally flamed out when he completely lost his cool in meetings with, first, Treasury and then the Minister,
  • MPC members have renewable terms (although I guess Gai could decline to seek a second term)
  • There is no disclosure of individual member views, either in minutes or subsequently in speeches, interviews, or hearings (and in his paper Gai makes much of the free-rider problem/risk), and
  • Despite having been in place for 6.5 years now, through some of the most turbulent times for decades, the only “review process” was run by the Bank itself.

To which, we might add, that Gai himself made a little history recently by actually doing a speech on matters relevant to New Zealand monetary policy to an outside audience. Which was good. Except that no text of that speech was made available, no recording of the question time was made available, and only those who happened to be in Auckland on the day could get one of the limited number of tickets. He and the Bank appear to have allowed the event to be advertised as offering exclusive access. Gai refused to entertain media questions either. Since the MPC Charter actually does allow members to make speeches, which are supposed to be readily available, he cannot even blame those choices on “the rules”. It doesn’t really seem like walking the talk.

It is a shame in someone who appeared to have a lot to offer that he seems to have adapted to the cage Orr. Quigley, and Robertson built, and which so far Willis has done nothing to overhaul. I strongly suspect he adds more value than Peter Harris or Caroline Saunders – and I valued my engagement with him in those pre MPC years – but for the time being they are observationally equivalent. For those who initially talked him up as a potential Governor – and noting slim pickings – it isn’t a great display of leadership in action.

Meanwhile it will be interesting to see what sort of person Quigley and Willis find for the Buckle vacancy. Recall that, like the Governor’s position, the Board proposes, but the Minister of Finance is quite free to knock back a nomination and insist that the Board comes back with someone better.

Labour market data, and silly comparisons

Michael Reddell labour market

The quarterly suite of labour market data came out yesterday, and it wasn’t a case of senior ministers at their most edifying (sadly, it is difficult to imagine things would be any different if the current government and Opposition parties swapped places, but….today’s ministers hold office today).

The one that first caught my eye was this from the Minister of Health

And in the newspaper this morning I see the Minister of Finance running the same line, suggesting that it was “of particular note” that the number of people unemployed was 8000 less than Treasury had forecast in the PREFU (the same source Brown appeared to be drawing from).

One assumes these senior ministers are smart enough not to take these lines substantively seriously. Macroeconomic forecasting two years ahead has always been something of a mug’s game. Some numbers might be needed to drop into spreadsheets – eg for budgeting purposes – but no serious observer ever expresses a great deal of confidence in any specific set of numbers forecast that far ahead. If Treasury got the current unemployment rate right to with 0.2 percentage points two years out one could say “well done them” but it might also suggest a reasonable element of luck. As it happens, on this occasion and this particular variable, the Reserve Bank was even closer, having predicted in its August 2023 MPS that the June 2025 unemployment rate would be 5.3 per cent. It was, in fact, 5.2 per cent.

I responded to Brown’s tweet yesterday afternoon thus

Treasury didn’t publish lots of detailed quarterly tables in the PREFU, but the Reserve Bank did in their August 2023 projections (completed a week or so later than Treasury’s numbers).

How are things looking?

We only have national accounts data to March. In August 2023 the Reserve Bank predicted that real production GDP would rise by 2 per cent (apc) in the year to March 2025. On current SNZ estimates, it actually fell 0.7 per cent. Private consumption was forecast to grow by 2.8 per cent and it actually rose by only 1 per cent.

What of the labour market data? The Bank had the unemployment rate forecast to be 0.1 percentage points higher than it turned out to be. But they thought the employment rate by now would be 68.2 per cent of the labour force, but it proved to be only 66.8 per cent (and they expected numbers employed would have risen by 1.1 per cent in the year to June 2025, when they actually fell by 0.9 per cent).

As for wages, the private sector Labour Cost Index measure was forecast to rise by 3.8 per cent in the year to June 2025 and actually rose by 2.3 per cent (and the difference isn’t inflation (non-tradables inflation in the year to June 2025 was actually a bit higher than the Bank had forecast a couple of years ago)).

And, finally, the OCR was forecast to be 5.12 per cent in the June quarter 2025, but ended up averaging 3.44 per cent (as it happens, Treasury’s short-term interest rate forecast was materially less wrong than the Bank’s).

None of which is really intended to have a go at the Bank (although those OCR projections always looked odd), because (a) this stuff is hard, and b) relatedly, there are big margins of uncertainty around all sets of economic forecasts, especially those two years ahead. Senior Cabinet minister deserve to be called out when they cherry pick one single datapoint and claim outcomes are better than (some forecasters thought -a couple of years previously – that they’d be) under the other lot. Calling them out won’t stop them – politicians will politik – but in doing so they (further) discredit themselves.

As for some of the recent labour market data, here are a few charts I used on Twitter yesterday.

First, hours worked

Second, (my preferred measure of) wage increases (although note that productivity growth is probably weaker now than last decade)

Third, jobs

And here is the monthly version of the filled jobs series (which is drawn directly from tax data), noting that this is the most frequent and the most timely series (NB: a monthly HLFS would be great…)

And as bank economists remind us each month, most recent estimates have been tending to be revised down as fuller information comes to hand.

And finally, the SNZ experimental weekly jobs data, this time (because the data aren’t seasonally adjusted) shown by comparison to the same weeks in previous years.

There doesn’t seem to be anything very positive in the labour market data. At best, perhaps, the drop in the number of job ads seems to have levelled out.

UPDATE: I just saw a journalist claiming the real wage increases had gone negative again. That is not so if one uses the appropriate wage measure (ie the analytical unadjusted measure of wages, which does not attempt to correct – reduce – for productivity growth), whether one then uses either the CPI or the Reserve Bank’s core inflation measure to deflate wage increases.

Reserve Bank bits and pieces

Michael Reddell Funding agreements, Reserve Bank Board

Various bits and pieces have emerged from the Reserve Bank in the last couple of days; two in the form of other people’s OIA requests, and one in a partial response from the Bank to one of mine lodged with Treasury.

First, bullying. Someone, who must have had some knowledge of what was going on, had lodged a request for this information

Perhaps the Bank is turning over a new leaf on OIAs, as the request had only been lodged on 17 July and not only did the response go back to the requester on Monday (4 August) but they put it on their website that day (the Bank is quite selective about which responses they post, and there are often quite long lags). In fact, I just noticed there is another response – to a request lodged on 24 July – sent today and posted on the website today. If this really is a change of heart it is excellent news.

Anyway, the answers were interesting, to say the least

In the words of one former colleague, those payouts were “startling”. The 20 staff being spoken to seems a lot too, but who knows quite what standard they were using. Perhaps someone had spoken disrespectfully of the tree god, or suggested that the Bank really should have stayed within its allowed Funding Agreement spending limits? But to actually write cheques, hand over money, things must have been quite serious, even in an organisation not recently known for its budgetary discipline.

We know nothing more at this stage (amounts, specific reasons, who was responsible for the behaviour for which the ex gratia payments were made). To be entirely literal it isn’t 100 per cent clear that all the payouts were for bullying (the request covers any ex gratia payments to staff), but they probably were, given that the Bank headlines the entire response “Information about Bullying” and would have had an incentive to minimise the bullying dimension if there really were other reasons for some of the payments. Were the payments made before or after Orr left, and were any of them on account of his behaviour? I gather from Twitter that someone has lodged a further OIA so perhaps we will learn a bit more in time. But it doesn’t look good – and cases rising to level of payout must only be the tip of an iceberg, as some people are likely to be reluctant to lodge complaints, and others may simply have left the organisation.

The second OIA was about the new Auckland office (also only lodged on 24 July). You may recall that my source had indicated that the Bank had signed up to a fancy new Auckland office of a size probably inconsistent with the looming budget cuts. The Bank’s response seems to broadly back that story. The new lease agreement was signed on 4 November 2024. By that time (and as far as we can tell at present) the Bank did not know that its approved spending levels would be cut a long way back from what they had bid for when they lodged their next five year Funding Agreement bid in September. However, they were well aware that they had gone out on a limb, adopting a budget for 24/25 that was 23 per cent in excess of what they were allowed by Grant Robertson for that year under the Funding Agreement then in place, and had sought to persuade the Minister and Treasury that any (modest) cuts should be only from that unauthorised high “baseline”.

And while they may have needed a new Auckland office, this was the new space

and this was what it was to replace

In other words, they committed to more than twice the floorspace, in a more up-market building, at a time of general fiscal stringency and when they had no particular reason to suppose that they’d be allowed to keep growing. I’m not a property person but it seems that 10-15 square metres per head is about normal for typical open plan office

So it looks as though the Bank had gone lavish on the per capita floor space even if the new office was to be fully occupied at some point in future (which would have been a lot larger scale than the 164 staff and contractors they had in the Auckland office as at 30 June).

It seems a lot like a cavalier use of public money, made even worse (than their general budget excess) by the no-doubt multi-year nature of the property lease. But perhaps they’ll be able to sublet some of it?

And that spilled over into the third OIA response, that turned up this afternoon. It was part of a request I’d lodged with Treasury a couple of months ago which they’d transferred (that part of) to the Bank, and covers some late-in-the-piece material from the Bank to and from the Minister on Funding Agreement matters, after Orr had left. To be honest, I didn’t even think this material was in scope, as I’d been looking for Treasury material. As it happens, when I read what came in, parts seemed familiar, and I realised they’d already released these particular documents to someone else a month or so ago and I’d used a couple of bits of it last month (end of that post). But I hadn’t looked that closely then, and the significance of other aspects is also more apparent now.

First, last Friday I highlighted the way the temporary Governor Christian Hawkesby appeared to have actively misled FEC on where the initiative lay for the review the Bank now has underway of bank capital requirements. He played down any ministerial involvement claiming it had been just a Bank decision to do the review. That it clearly wasn’t was pretty evident from the Treasury filenote of that 24 February meeting between the Bank, Treasury and the Minister.

But to reinforce the point, here is Neil Quigley writing to the Minister on 16 March basically pleading (successfully) that she not accept Treasury’s view of how deep the cuts to operating expenses should be. This was the paper in which he pleaded that the Bank’s “culture” had evolved in light of the fiscal excess of recent years and that it would take time to change the culture and save lots of money. But he also said this

Hawkesby actively misled FEC. Once upon a time that sort of thing mattered.

Where Quigley was largely unsuccessful at this stage was around the capital budget (not something I’d previously paid any attention to). The initial bid last September had been for $50 million over five years. At this point Treasury was proposing $26 million (which, assuming the numbers in the Minister’s Cabinet paper are comparable, was 12 per cent less than total expected capex for 2020-2025). Here was Quigley’s plea

Note that first item. If you’ve just rashly signed up to big new offices in a fancy building the fit out costs (for a lease that commenced on 1 August 2025) were likely to be large.

Quigley’s capex plea failed, and the Minister ended up agreeing to allow them only $26.3 million of capex over the full five year period. This is the annual phasing.

Which might suggest that they will be spending something close to $10 million on the fit-out of a new office that they simply shouldn’t have signed up to before they had any clear steer about the future. The 25/26 number ended up a bit higher even than the $13m Quigley had sought on 16 March – new estimates of fit out costs? – with the capex allowances for future years being slashed. (If Quigley’s plea is even roughly accurate you might wonder how sustainable all this proves – presumably the Bank will spend all its opex allowance, and perhaps they reckon they’ll come back cap in hand in a few years’ time, or degrade the existing capital and wait for the next Funding Agreement negotiations. Or Treasury might be right about what they need.)

The final observation from these papers is perhaps not of any great moment, but it is puzzling nonetheless. You’ll recall that the Bank had gone ahead and set a budget for 24/25 far in excess of what the Funding Agreement had allowed. There was never any serious suggestion that the Bank was allowed to carry forward earlier year underspends, use it all for a last year splurge, and then try to use that new level as a baseline against which any modest cuts should be set. But that is how Orr, Quigley and the rest of the board had operated (quite explicitly – it is in the Board minutes and the September 2024 Funding Agreement bid).

There are problems with the Funding Agreement model, which involves setting annual spending limits five years ahead. Sometimes it is hard to know when a particular cost might arise. So it probably does make sense – if this model is stuck to – to allow scope for some flexibility. It is there anyway – no one gets fired for going a bit under or over in any year (and isn’t formalised like a parliamentary appropriation), and there is always scope for a renegotiation mid-stream (as there’d been in 2023). But the Bank was keen to formalise something. I noted in a post last month that in that 16 March paper the version of the draft agreement the Bank submitted involved a model in which Treasury could agree to modest variations (up to about 10 per cent) and anything more required the Minister.

I’d noticed that the Minister must have said no to that as the final document on the Bank’s website provided only (and appropriately) for this

I included the signature block because what I hadn’t noticed before – hadn’t read to the end of the set of documents, which looked like they were just repetitions and admin paperwork – is that she seemed to agree to this only after she’d already signed up to something like what the Bank wanted.

In that OIA response there was this

All signed and dated and a scanned version sent back to Bank by one of the advisers in the Minister’s office, in a email of 10:14am on 8 April.

We are left wondering what happened. Quigley’s memo of 16 March did not touch on the variation issue at all. Was the Minister not made aware of it, including by Treasury, until the very last minute, or was she aware all along and very belatedly chose to take a harder line? Fortunately she did finally land on the best approach, but how? The original OIA to Treasury, lodged back in June but due shortly, may shed some light, but it just doesn’t look like a particularly smooth or adept end to the Funding Agreement process. And I wonder what Quigley, Finlay, and Hawkesby made of the latest, last, loss………..which couldn’t have happened to a more deserving bunch given their egregious bid six months earlier.

As for me, I guess I should read OIA responses – even other people’s – a bit more closely.

Still waiting for a Governor

Michael Reddell Reserve Bank, Reserve Bank Board, Rodger Finlay

Today, 5 August, is five months since the shock resignation – or, as now seems much the most likely, engineered exit – of the then Governor of the Reserve Bank, who disappeared from office that very day, getting generously paid for several more weeks but not working until the official date his resignation became legally effective, 31 March. Since then we’ve heard not a word of explanation from him and (more importantly, since they are still public officials) have been deliberately, actively, repeatedly, and still to this day obstructed and mislead by the Reserve Bank Board, notably the chair Neil Quigley, enabled by the Minister of Finance, and implemented (in respect of OIAs) by the temporary Governor, Christian Hawkesby.

Applications for the position of Governor closed a couple of months ago, so I guess we must assume that the selection and recommendation process is now fairly well advanced. The Board established a Governor Search Committee

Being chaired by Rodger Finlay – who has no background in macroeconomics or regulatory policy, and who had a questionable start to his time with the Bank (still chairing the board of the company that owned the country’s fifth largest bank) – doesn’t inspire much confidence. And if Finlay appears like a decent general corporate governance type of person, recall that he has been deputy chair through a) the reappointment of Orr, b) the Board approving the Bank running spending levels last year far beyond what the Funding Agreement had envisaged or allowed, and c) (and so we learned yesterday) was part of the Board that allowed management to sign a new lease on Auckland offices last November, massively larger than the current office, with space for many more staff than they currently had, when i) the Bank was already spending more than their Funding Agreement had allowed, and ii) they (presumably) still had no real steer from the Minister of Finance as to what approved spending for 25/26 and beyond was going to be. [Oh, and he’s been party to the cover-up of the last five months.]

Quite a team he and Quigley must make. Not exactly a team to inspire any confidence in the wisdom of whoever they end up putting forward as a first nominee to the Minister of Finance, or a team that might assure a good potential Governor that he or she was going into a well-led governance structure. Responsibility for that is shared by those Board members and by the Minister of Finance who has continued to express confidence in Quigley (for reasons not comprehensible to anyone outside her bubble) and refused to proactively ensure vacancies were quickly filled by new able people.

We had a Governor resign once before. Don Brash announced his resignation and left office on 26 April 2002. Just under four months later, Alan Bollard was announced as the new Governor.

Defenders of the Board and Minister might point out that things are a little more complicated this time. By law, the Minister now has to consult with the other political parties in Parliament (in practice the Opposition parties, since the coalition parties will already have been involved through the Cabinet appointments process).

The law does not require the Minister to change her mind if the other parties (some or all) disagree (perhaps strongly) with a nomination, although the statutory provision would be empty if she did not pay at least some heed to concerns expressed. (There is no sign Grant Robertson did – and it was his new provision – when he went ahead and reappointed Orr, over objections from both ACT and National in late 2022, but if the provision is to have any meaning at all, you’d hope there would be some serious reflection on any objections, especially when an incumbent is not involved.)

However, if the paper work is a bit more time-consuming now than it was in 2002, bear in mind that the appointment of Bollard was accomplished in less than four months even though Michael Cullen had rejected the Board’s initial nomination.

By law (see above) the Minister and government can only appoint someone the Board recommends. But that does not mean that the Minister has to accept any particular recommendation. That isn’t the empty provision people sometimes suggest. There have only been three new Governor appointments since the legislative model came into effect (in 1990) and Michael Cullen recorded in his autobiography that he rejected the then Board’s nomination of Rod Carr (deputy and at the time acting Governor).

As was his perfect right to do. (The Board must have at least half-expected their nomination to be rejected as it was understood among senior management at the time that Helen Clark had made clear that she wasn’t going have any “Brash-clones” appointed.) I’ve long championed the much more conventional model in which the Minister gets to appoint their own preferred person as Governor directly (perhaps accompanied by scrutiny hearings by FEC before the person actually takes up the office).

But it was all done in less than four months, and it is now five months and counting since Orr left (and the Bank in 2002 was in nothing like the mess, or urgent need of new strong capable respected leadership that it is now). I hope the Minister is drumming her fingers and urging the Board to get on with it.

Quite who they might come up with remains a mystery, or whether the couple of new Board members this year might persuade their colleagues that whatever the Board has once seen in Orr he should be almost a benchmark antithesis of the sort of person who should be chosen.

I wrote a post a couple of months ago, shortly before applications closed, prompted by the advert for the job and what it suggested the Board might be after. As I have noted throughout, I don’t believe there is any obvious ideal candidate, and so inevitably compromises will have to be made (and in recruiting a person, the Board and Minister need then to have regard to the willingness and ability of the person to clean house and build a new and more capable second tier – we cannot for long be in a position where the deputy chief executive responsible for macroeconomics and monetary policy has (a) no background in the subject, and b) can’t intelligently comment on anything of substance other than from a script she has been given).

That said, straws in the wind aren’t terribly encouraging.

I’ve heard that a couple of very able applicants didn’t even get an interview (there is such an abundance of talent? Really?). And then there was media report (that I’d heard via markets people earlier) that a Bank of Canada Deputy Governor (they have many) was a strong possibility, perhaps even a frontrunner.

This would seem an ill-advised choice if it was really a direction the Board was considering taking. Gravelle seems to have no particular connections to New Zealand (other than a couple of conferences, one by Zoom), and comes from an organisation that – unlike the Reserve Bank of New Zealand – does not do banking (and non-banking) financial regulation and supervision, these days a big part of the Bank’s job. For all its undoubted analytical strengths, the Bank of Canada also has a quite different sort of monetary policy governance model (entirely internal) than New Zealand’s. And then there is the adverse selection issue: a person who was good enough to be a serious contender for Governor in his/her own country (G7 country and all that) would not be very likely to put themselves forward to be Governor of a much smaller, poorer, remote country’s central bank, a country with which they’ve had no particular ties. As a couple of people have put it to me, it is a bit reminiscent of the old imperial days – someone not quite up to being appointed Governor-General of Canada or Australia might still be handed down to New Zealand. And it is not as if parachuting in foreign appointees to top economic roles here has been a particular success story (see last two Treasury secretaries), nor in many ways was bringing back an expat after 15 years away to the Reserve Bank (even if Orr’s record makes Wheeler look less bad). Can we really have fallen so far that we can’t find a credible respected appointee at home?

Always possible I guess. Compelling choices certainly aren’t thick on the ground.

What of the temporary Governor, Christian Hawkesby? These were my comments a couple of months ago

Much of which I would repeat today. But unfortunately since early June we’ve seen not just that Hawkesby has been a part of the obstruction effort re Orr’s departure (and if he is working to Board direction the fact that he has not been willing/able to insist on a more open approach is a poor reflection on any claim he has to be thought a worthy occupant of the permanent role. And then of course there was that last sentence. We now know that not only did he repeatedly sit alongside Orr while he (Orr) mislead Parliament, but that Hawkesby himself misled them just three months ago. He proved unable to even pass that low bar I mentioned in June.

I ended that earlier post speculating on some possible sorts of names I hadn’t seen mentioned in any of the media articles (bearing in mind that the advert had talked of the importance of both financial markets knowledge and CEO experience)

Since Stobo is (a) an economist by training, b) has CEO experience, c) has financial markets expertise, and has been appointed to his current public sector role (chair of the FMA) by this government, and is a thoughtful and reflective person .you could see why he might be a strong contender if he wanted it (and was willing to give up his portfolio of directorships etc and media commentary). If one can’t have much confidence in the FMA, there’d definitely be worse people for the job.

But it is time to get on with it and get a new Governor in place. And then get on and refresh the Board, with a new chair to work with and oversee the Governor.

That 24 February meeting again

Michael Reddell Adrian Orr, bank capital requirements, Prudential regulation

After The Treasury released their file note of that 24 February meeting between the Reserve Bank, Treasury, and the Minister of Finance (full copy here) a few people got in touch directly about a couple of aspects of what was written there, and what I’d made of it.

The file note indicated at one point that in the middle of the Funding Agreement discussion “The Governor left the meeting”. A couple of charitable people (not typically Orr allies) suggested that perhaps I was overinterpreting things to suggest that he’d walked out. I think they were pretty readily convinced that this was a very unlikely interpretation (in a meeting of which the Minister of Finance had already said that it had been clear to her that “emotions were running high”).

Former academic and now consultant economist Martin Lally then sent me this rather neat piece. Some of the non-economists among you might roll your eyes and suggest ‘that’s economists for you”, but I thought it was a nice example of the use of the technique to help discipline thinking.

Seems like a great opportunity to apply Bayesian analysis. 

The hypothesis (H) is that Orr stormed out of this meeting.  Your background data concerns his type of behaviour on other occasions.  Suppose this alone leads you to the view that H has a 10% chance of being true.  This is likely to be too low.  The odds on H being true are then at least 1/9. 

The next piece of evidence is the anonymous information about Orr’s behaviour at the meeting.  I sense that you think this evidence would be much more likely to arise if H were true than if H were not true; maybe five times as likely?  So, the Likelihood ratio for this evidence is 5.  The odds on H being true now rise from 1/9 to 5/9. 

The next piece of evidence is the meeting at Treasury a few days before the meeting in question here, on the same funding issue, after which Quigley apologised on Orr’s behalf for Orr’s behaviour.  Since it was on the same contentious topic, this evidence seems much more likely to arise if H were true than if H were not true; maybe five times as likely.  So, the Likelihood ratio for this evidence is 5.  The odds on H being true now rise from 5/9 to 25/9. 

The last piece of evidence is the minutes of the meeting in question, which reveal that Orr left during discussion about the funding issue, which Orr had very strong feelings on.  If H were true, this evidence or something even more damning would be almost certain to arise because the minute taker would be most unlikely not to have recorded that Orr left.  Say a prob of 0.95.  If H were not true, the minutes could still have recorded him leaving at the time he did but in that case it would have to be due to quite extraordinary information he had just received that demanded his immediate departure from a discussion he would otherwise have strongly desired to be present for.  It could be news of his house burning down or a serious injury to a loved one.  These things happen but it would be extremely unlikely to have occurred in the 45 minute time slot in question.  So, if H were not true, the prob of his departure from the meeting at this time is close to zero.  Suppose events like his house burning down etc happen once every 6 months, so 1/180 chance of it happening on that day and, if on that day, 1/10 of it happening during the 45 minute duration of the meeting on that day, so 1/1,800 of it happening during the meeting, which is 0.0005.  So, the Likelihood ratio for this evidence is about 0.95/0.0005 = 1900.  The odds on H being true now rise from 25/9 to 47,500/9, so the prob that H is true is now 47,500/(47,500 + 9) = 0.9998, i.e., 99.98%. 

So, with all this evidence, it is virtually certain that Orr stormed out of the meeting. This nicely illustrates the power of Bayesian analysis.

A few other people got in touch about the earlier part of the meeting, on banking regulation and competition matters. This part of the meeting was attended by Reserve Bank Deputy Governor Christian Hawkesby, whose day job at the time was financial stability, supervisory and regulatory etc issues (and he left the meeting when his item ended, thus missing the – apparent – fireworks).

The relevant bit of the file note was this

It is pretty clear from that that the Minister of Finance wanted a review. Perhaps she didn’t say it directly, but it is the clear implication of what is recorded in those first two paragraphs, and Quigley clearly recognised it as such, noting (folllowing the Minister’s remarks) that he “was open to bringing forward such a review….and discussing further what a review could look like”.

Why raise this now? Because Hawkesby is currently the temporary Governor, and supposed in some circles to be keen on getting the permanent job. Even if he doesn’t want to be permanent Governor, he is the deputy chief executive of a major government agency and a statutory appointee to the Monetary Policy Committee. Those who got in touch earlier this week reminded me that a few months ago (8 May) Hawkesby had been asked at Parliament’s Finance and Expenditure Committee about this meeting. Radio New Zealand’s report is here.

The first part of Hawkesby’s remarks seem fine

But then FEC was told this

The meeting had been only two months previously, it had been only a 45 minute meeting (of which he was only there for half an hour or so), on matters he had direct responsibility for, and the meeting itself has to have stuck in his mind given the role it seems to have played, within days, in the Governor’s departure. What’s more, surely you’d normally expect that coming out of a meeting like that there’d have been some sort of file note (especially when his boss and the board chair had appeared to be singing from different song sheets) or even an email to his direct reports in that area, and if he was really in doubt as to what went on I guess he could have asked Treasury for their file note. And yet we are supposed to believe that whether or not the Minister had requested (or only strongly implied) that a review should be undertaken was “not something that I sort of generally get into”. It reads a lot like misleading Parliament – in much the same way Orr had done repeatedly, often with Hawkesby in the room.

To be clear, I’m sure he is quite correct that “the decision to do a capital review was the Reserve Bank’s”, but in much the same way that the Governor’s decision to resign was a “personal decision” – at one level it was, but he was clearly prevailed on, pressured to go. Under the law as it stands Willis couldn’t directly compel the Bank to undertake such a review, but it will have been the less bad choice for them (she could have changed the legislation or commissioned her own review for example). And it was also a time – the end of March when the final decision to do a capital setting review was announced – where it probably will have suited Quigley and Hawkesby not to have been difficult; Quigley wanted his medical school, and Hawkesby may well have wanted to be made permanent Governor. The review would not have happened when it did without the Minister’s lead.

(And, to be clear, I don’t think that is a problem. As I’ve noted repeatedly, I think the law should be changed so that big picture prudential policy choices are made by ministers, with the Bank acting as (a) expert advisers, and b) implementing agents. I don’t think the Minister’s involvement here is inappropriate – whatever one’s view of actual capital settings – but really senior officials should not be misleading Parliament. And when they do, and when they sit silent while their bosses mislead Parliament, they really should not be serious contenders for high and very powerful office. Misleading Parliament is supposed to be a serious matter, and if MPs seem to have given up bothering over much (except when it suits), the rest of us should still insist on higher standards of integrity.

It is, in addition, supposedly one of the Reserve Bank’s own values

But perhaps those are just words. The actions at the top certainly haven’t aligning with the words for some time.

Orr, Quigley, and Willis: 31 July edition

Michael Reddell Adrian Orr, Reserve Bank Board, Treasury

I have other things to do with my time, but feel some obligation to my source – the (anonymous and unknown to me) person who seemed to take quite a personal risk, to help reopen the Orr departure story – to keep on making sense of developments, inch by inch as it often seems, in this story.

There are three things I wanted to comment on this morning, all prompted by yesterday’s release by Treasury of their internal file note of the 24 February meeting between the Bank, Treasury, and Willis.

  • an article in The Post this morning,
  • one on the Herald website last night, with further comments from Quigley, and
  • my own reflections on yesterday’s release.

The relevant section of the record of that 45 minute meeting is this

Post article

The Post article really isn’t worth linking to (you can no doubt find it if you want). It is noteworthy only for this extraordinary line:

“Hawkesby, and then Orr, left the 45-minute meeting shortly before it ended, but there is no evidence in the minutes that the discussion became heated.”

Which seems to ignore several things. First, the Deputy Governor is recorded as having left the meeting, but at the end of his item. He was the Bank’s senior manager responsible for financial stability and the first two items on the agenda (Prudential Regulation and Competition) were in his bailiwick, and he left when that discussion ended. He wasn’t a member of the Bank’s Board, and the Funding Agreement is between the Board and the Minister. He also wouldn’t have been one of the senior managers (CFOs and the like) providing technical/operational support on budgetary details.

Orr, by contrast, left in the middle of the Funding Agreement item. Moreover, Nicola Willis has confirmed (it is in the Herald piece – see below) that Orr “chose to leave the meeting early” (and she is likely to be phrasing that diplomatically). And Willis told Heather du Plessis-Allan several days ago that it was clear to her that emotions were running high in that meeting.

And, finally, I guess the journalist has never been a bureaucrat. Writing down that the Governor “expressed frustration” about the Bank/Treasury relationship is likely to be a very muted and diplomatic rendering of the summary of the actual words and the tone around them. An official writing up such meetings isn’t, say, a Bob Woodward looking to capture all the drama for publication. (Note that my source last week suggested that the account was still not muted enough for Quigley, who reportedly was very upset to learn that such a record existed at all and allegedly rang Treasury to complain in no uncertain terms – an OIA may shed light on whether that was so.)

It might not be going too far to suggest that a more accurate account might involve words like “stormed out”, walking out not only on the Minister but on his own board chair, having (so the account suggests) sought to undermine his own board by making a direct play to the Minister for his personal view of what the Funding Agreement level should be (recall that Orr was both a board member, and working under board delegations of authority etc on management and budgetary issues).

Herald article

The Herald article appears to have been prompted by yesterday’s Treasury release (they, like me, have had long running OIAs in with Treasury – theirs longer than mine – and this release was a partial response, while we wait for the rest of the issues to be addressed). But the article also contains quite a few comments from Quigley, apparently from an interview Tibshraeny did with him late last week after the Minister’s meeting with the Reserve Bank Board, as well as a fresh report that Willis had again expressed confidence in Quigley.

(It is to Treasury’s credit that they released both last week’s Quigley email (apologising for Orr’s conduct at a meeting with Treasury) and this file note. Either Rennie has decided that Treasury wants to be no part of the ongoing coverup and attempts to mislead by the Bank/Quigley, or (perhaps in addition) he has been encouraged in that direction by Willis, who seems to want more openness (and to be frustrated with the Board). If there are gag orders that Quigley signed the Bank up to they won’t bind Treasury.)

The article is behind a paywall so I’m not going to quote at length.

On Quigley, Willis is quoted as suggesting he is the right person for the job right now, including selecting a nominee for new Governor, and that at this “critical juncture” what matters is stability. It is pretty unbelievable, and utterly unconvincing stuff. The Bank is an embattled mess, and much of the mess is of Quigley’s own doing – spinning out the obstruction and misleading for months, overseeing the budget-busting spend up last year (that they’d not told the Minister about), and of course the appointment and reappointment of Orr in the first place. How can anyone have any confidence in a nominee out of a process led by Quigley? How could a good potential new Governor have any confidence in his chair? How can staff have any confidence in the board chair, when he is responsible for actively misleading them (as well as us) and for the big dislocations, layoffs etc the place is now going through? Rebuilding from here really demands a clean slate, led by someone commanding widespread respect and confidence.

But if the Minister’s line was perhaps predictable (you have to back someone until you fire them I suppose), Quigley’s comments were more interesting. He noted that the rest of the board had (we are told) expressed confidence in him – which perhaps isn’t unduly surprising as all but Spencer (new appointment) are as implicated as him in the events of recent months – but then must have been asked about the OIA obstructionism.

There has never ever been any sign that Quigley has any sort of commitment to openness or public scrutiny. The obstructionism, and reported quotes along the lines that he didn’t think the public had a right or need to know what went on (with one of the most powerful controversial officials in New Zealand), has to some extent been par for the course. But you did get the sense here that he feels the ground slipping away from under him. Most likely his staff gave him the sort of advice he wanted to hear on the law, but even if he got cover to hide there so far, it was a spectacularly bad call – in governance and public trust terms – to (a) be as obstructive as they’ve been (multiple OIAs have never been responded to directly, let alone completely) and b) to actively mislead the public repeatedly. No law required that. And any adviser who advised him that it was a good course of action shouldn’t be working there much longer.

In his final comments, Quigley seems to grudgingly acknowledge that his role included providing feedback to the Governor on his performance, but it is – on his telling – none of our business. He acts as if either Orr was some low level employee (say a junior accountant at Waikato University), or as if his responsibility is to the Bank and its management, rather than to the Minister and the public. And again, nothing warrants the calculated deceit of recent months, or attempts to substitute his judgement for the spirit and principles of the Official Information Act.

My thoughts prompted by yesterday’s Treasury release

A couple of additional thoughts occurred to me after reflecting further on yesterday’s release. The first (and probably not central) was this from their covering note.

The Bank had submitted its Funding Agreement bid to Treasury back in September 2024. Can it really only have been in early February that officials did even a preliminary assessment of what levels of spending they thought the Bank should be allowed? It seems odd, and yet in the papers the Bank released on 11 June in which an Orr email records him stating on 14 February “We have not heard from Treasury as to a preferred number”. It seems puzzling, but perhaps some of the outstanding OIAs will eventually shed some light.

But the bigger question is what we make of this episode of Orr’s extraordinary behaviour on Monday afternoon 24 February, in light of all else we know (or suspect). It must have been critical because, as I highlighted yesterday drawing from the Bank’s own 11 June selective release, within 24 hours various members of senior management were (a) aware an exit was a possibility, and b) putting together a working group to manage things at the Bank’s end. But, equally, it cannot have been final and determinative – except perhaps that Quigley and Willis may have concluded to themselves that Orr had to go (after undermining his board chair in front of the Minister and then walking out of the meeting, all only a couple of days after Quigley had had to apologise to Treasury for Orr’s conduct, because Orr himself wouldn’t).

I had a useful exchange yesterday afternoon with someone whose views always force me to think. This person argued that Orr’s behaviour in that meeting was tantamount to a resignation. I certainly agree that, on what we know, it was the sort of behaviour that shouldn’t be tolerated from any public sector chief executive, and there was no obvious way back from it (especially given the track record of Orr’s behavioural issues in the job, recent and past). But did Orr see it that way? Over the years he’d held the job he’d already gotten away with so much, and perhaps it is unlikely (to say the least) that it was the first time his undisciplined side had been on display in a Minister of Finance’s office. The Bank’s statement of 11 June may at one level have been accurate (if misleading)

“Distress” sounds like a reasonable description for what we now know of the 20 and 24 February meetings, and “necessary working relationships” must have been quite deeply impaired – but not just with the Board, but with the Minister and Treasury too – and Orr did finally come to a decision to go.

But there is still no sign that on 24 February he thought he was resigning, and every indication that his decision to go came only after quite a bit of pressure applied in the following few days. After all, recall my source’s story (and that person’s general account of what went on seems to have been vindicated so far where independent details have since emerged) that it wasn’t until 27 February that Quigley sent that Statement of Concerns to Orr, seeking a response (this wasn’t a quiet private chat, but something formal in writing by email), which seems to have been the final straw [UPDATE: Quigley probably also needed to get the rest of the Board squared away, who hadn’t witnessed Monday’s debacle]. And even then, if perhaps Orr wasn’t fighting too hard – it was clear he was going to lose the funding battle, and it clearly was close to his heart, and surely even he must have had some self-knowledge reflecting on his conduct over the past week – it was still a case of “senior counsel” called in by each side to negotiate, not a simple resort to standard resignation provisions in Orr’s contract, and getting him out of the office the very hour the resignation was announced.

Both Orr and Quigley will have known that it was most unlikely the Minister would sack him, and so he held leverage – I’ll go, but only if you sign up to a gag order (the limits of which, or the authority for which – did the Minister really not know? – are still not clear). He was clearly pushed, and there is no way by this point that the Board chair can have had confidence in Orr continuing (despite what he claimed on 5 March). Perhaps it was one thing to pledge that precise details of behaviour would not be disclosed, except as required by law (you can’t contract out of the OIA), but Quigley and Willis should have insisted on something like “After discussions initiated by the Board, the Governor has chosen to resign and left office today”. Except that – unless we see clear evidence to the contrary – perhaps they then preferred that we not know (and no one else on the Board seems to have objected). And so the obstructionism and repeated active deception of the public began, and continues to this day.

The Treasury file note of the 24 February meeting

Michael Reddell Adrian Orr, Reserve Bank Board, Treasury

A few minutes ago I had this email from The Treasury

This is the document that my source last week claimed Quigley went ballistic about when he learned of its existence,

Taking Treasury’s caveats re the views expressed by anyone including Orr, can we conclude at least from the description of events that Orr walked out of the meeting in the middle of the Funding Agreement discussion, having undercut his own governing board’s views in front of the minister and his chair?

Oh, and credit to The Treasury for releasing this in full now.

UPDATE: I just wanted to put the record out there rather than write much commentary. However, I’ve had a few people get in touch suggesting that the record is capable of a more benign (for Orr) interpretation, noting that the Deputy Governor, Christian Hawkesby is also shown as having left the meeting part way through. However, I don’t think this alternative interpretation is correct. Hawkesby is shown leaving at a natural break point, where the banking regulation and supervision discussion ends. His main role at the Bank at the time was responsibility for those functions. He was not on the Board and Funding Agreement issues were mainly a matter for the Board and chief executive (supported by other DCEs on the financial management side of the Bank), so it seems quite natural that he would have left at that point.

By contrast, Orr is recorded as having highlighted differences between himself (and management more generally) and his board, and then to have sounded off at Treasury (“expressed frustration” is an official’s record, not that of a fly on the wall biographer, so likely to be understated), and then is recorded as leaving the meeting while the Funding Agreement discussion is still going on. It has also been suggested that perhaps the Minister had simply asked Quigley to stay behind. That interpretation seems unlikely given that the Treasury team (and MoF’s office advisers) were all still there (a later one-on-one might not be a surprise, but Treasury officials would not have been there to record that).

In the end, we do not know with certainty, although either Willis or Quigley (or Orr for that matter) could give us straight answers (so could Rennie, but it isn’t his role to).

Rereading the material

Michael Reddell Adrian Orr, Reserve Bank Board

As I outlined in my post on Friday, it now seems that much the most likely explanation for the sudden no-notice departure of the Governor of the Reserve Bank is that he was ousted; not formally sacked by the Minister of Finance (as she might well have had grounds to do, but it could have got messy), but – having left himself vulnerable by his record of questionable conduct – engineered out by the Bank’s Board (more specifically its chair), almost certainly with the foreknowledge and acquiescence, and possibly the direct encouragement, of the Minister of Finance herself. If so, well done them on that count. But the subsequent and ongoing active deception of the public (and of the Bank’s own staff), and the apparent defiance of the Official Information Act, is simply inexcusable, and it would seem that the Board (especially the chair), the Minister, and the temporary Governor share responsibility, to one degree or another, for that.

Looking back now, it is puzzling that this hadn’t seemed the most likely explanation pretty much ever since Orr left on 5 March, or at very least since the Bank’s big release, and statement, on 11 June. I guess that is what comes of treating words out of the mouth of the Bank, and especially its chair, as having any degree of trustworthiness whatsoever. More fool me.

Recall that the first set of statements and Board chair comments on 5 March was clearly intended to lead us to believe there was nothing to see here. It was just a “personal decision”, there were no conduct, performance or policy issues at the heart of it, and really….when a big job was done, why wouldn’t an impressive leader take the opportunity to hand over the reigns. I won’t repeat all the things Quigley said that day, but this statement, issued by the Bank mid-afternoon on 5 March, after many questions had already arisen, rather captures the tone

Cincinnatus and all that. A couple of hours later he told the hastily-called press conference that he personally had still had confidence in Orr, and answered a direct question thus

The Bank spent the next three months blocking OIA requests and refusing to add anything, until the great reveal on 11 June. There was a set of carefully selected papers released (while avoiding anything on whole chunks of what must have gone on) and an official statement, presumably owned by both the Board and the temporary Governor and probably carefully vetted by lawyers (including ones for Orr?).

Having abandoned the 5 March story, this was all now carefully crafted to focus us on (a) that board meeting on 27 February, and b) a policy difference between the Board and the Governor which Orr, somewhat oddly, took so strongly to heart (“caused distress”) that he felt it would be better for him to simply go.

If you go back and read my posts when this release came out, you’ll see I never really bought the framing (which the Bank must have been pleased that much of the media followed) that this was a dispute over the Funding Agreement per se. As I have noted several times, many or most public service chief executives have suffered budgetary disappointment in the last couple of years, and none of them stormed off with no notice. But we were still clearly supposed to believe that whatever really happened, Orr had real agency (it was he who decided to leave, of his own accord, with no notice).

But there were still plenty of clues that it wasn’t the real story. There was, for example, the strident and repeated insistence by the Minister of Finance that it was all nothing to do with her, she knew little or nothing etc (even though she was the person responsible for the Governor, and to whom any resignation actually had to be addressed).

And there was the near-final version of the 11 June statement, which they’d sent out in error to OIA requesters shortly before the official general release time.

The shift from one (near-final) to the other (final) being clearly designed to remove any references to a meeting with the Minister and Treasury, and to draw attention away from them generally (and the earlier wording wasn’t going to have got into a near-final document of this magnitude by accident or the whims and failings of a junior staffer).

And there was the exit agreement itself, and negotiations being undertaken by “senior counsel” – interesting that that term was explicitly chosen by the Bank when they could easily just have used “lawyers” – for both sides. For an amicable departure, surely a quick chat with HR could have sorted out the application of Orr’s standard resignation terms, and any waivers of notice that might be sought or granted? And there was this summary (from the 11 June statement) of the exit agreement

Who typically has negotiated exit agreements? People being forced out (but not specifically fired). And Quigley has repeatedly referred to legal constraints on his ability to explain things, which can really only have arisen from the terms of this exit agreement, where Orr will have had some negotiating leverage (and were it all Cincinnatus-like there would be nothing for either side to want to hide – and no reason for Orr to have left the office the very day of the resignation, and yet be paid for several more weeks).

But things hung in limbo – hamstrung in part by the Bank’s obstructiveness over various OIA requests now having been appealed to the Ombudsman – until the account provided to me by someone who was clearly fairly close to events, and reported here. That person’s account was that (a) Orr’s behaviour had been very bad in a meeting with The Treasury on the Funding Agreement issues and then on 24 February in a meeting with both Treasury and the Minister of Finance, and that b) on the 27th, the day of the Bank’s board meeting, Quigley had emailed Orr a Statement of Concerns raising conduct issues stretching back several years and inviting a response. So the story went, at that point Orr decided to resign.

Treasury then disclosed an email sent by Quigley to a mid-level Treasury staffer after a meeting on 20 February apologising to that person that Orr had lost his cool in the meeting, in response to a perfectly reasonable question that Quigley acknowledged should have been anticipated and for which Bank management should have had a dispassionate answer. At a time when negotiations on the Bank’s future five-year funding were approaching climax Orr, in the presence of his chair, had (a) lost it with Treasury, and b) neither then nor later been willing to apologise himself (why otherwise was Quigley doing so, and not even on Orr’s behalf).

Then the Minister confirmed that “emotions were running high” in that meeting on 24 February too (around Funding Agreement disputes), while seeming to confirm that “employment negotiations” had been underway between Orr and the board in the days leading up to the resignation. And while the Bank has refused any further comment, they have also not chosen to deny any of it (including the alleged 27 February email, for which there is still no independent confirmation of its existence). Had there been no substance to any of this, they’d surely have owed it to both Orr and Quigley to (however briefly and tersely) set the record straight. They seem now to be hoping to wait out the Ombudsman.

And so the “engineered” ousting came to seem like the best working hypothesis for what had gone on. Perhaps on the spur of the moment, or perhaps lying in wait for some months, Orr’s conduct seems to have crossed the line (again – perhaps he’d been warned) and they had the leverage to get him to go. No doubt he was disheartened that he was going to lose the Funding Agreement fight and perhaps that made him readier than otherwise to go without much of a fight?

Anyway, having got to that point I decided to go back and reread that package of material the Bank had put out on 11 June, and see if any of it read differently in light of what we had since come to know.

I’d assumed – I think understandably enough – that the Bank’s Board meeting of Thursday 27 February might have been decisive. The 11 June statement seemed to point that way, as did my source’s report that the (apparently) decisive email had been sent to Orr on 27 February, and the fact that the only indications of advice to Treasury or the Minister had dated from then (I’ve now asked the Ombudsman to review the extensive withholdings in that release).

And perhaps there was some sort of final showdown then and a final decision made (to call in the “senior counsel” to negotiate exit terms). But the Bank’s information release pack included this (read from the bottom)

Who are the characters here? Hawkesby was (then) the Deputy Governor, McBride was (and is) the Bank’s General Counsel (but a third tier person, under an Assistant Governor who was also a lawyer), John McDermott was the Assistant Governor responsible for HR matters, and Naomi Mitchell was the (third tier) Director of Communications. And before 4:46pm on Tuesday 25 February [UPDATE: as it turns out, less than 24 hours after Quigley got out of that 24 Feb meeting] they already knew that something was afoot and agreed to the establishment of an “ad hoc committee” to help manage the situation. It seems clear that decisions had not yet been made (“If not just yet, maybe if events escalate.”) but this was two days before the Board meeting and just the day after that (“emotions were running high”) meeting with the Minister and Treasury. Was it Orr who told this group of his managers, or was it Quigley (Board chair)? We don’t know, but whatever had already unfolded – a serious risk of the Governor going presumably – was material enough for a range of key managers, not all direct reports to the CE, to have been brought into the picture (apparently separately/individually) this early. (This group then meets or exchanges messages over the remaining period pre and post resignation that was covered by the release.)

We don’t know what events were on the Statement of Concerns list Quigley is claimed to have sent Orr. As I noted last week, it isn’t as if he would have been short of examples just from material that had found its way into the public domain by then. But I wondered what other events might have been salient for the Minister and/or the Board.

I noted last week that when (with spectacularly poor judgement) Quigley and the Board had recommended Orr’s reappointment in late 2022 there had been this.

When this was first released some time back it seemed like little more than make-believe stuff. But perhaps it had been the basis for conversations with Orr at the time? After all, the Board (and Quigley) can hardly have been oblivious to the long list of concerns and issues, so perhaps there was some attempt at insistence on better behaviour in a second term?

If so, it didn’t go well. Even externally, Orr continued to mislead (or worse) FEC and media. As the Minister noted last week, she’d last year passed a complaint about Orr’s behaviour to a New Zealand Initiative employee to the board to address.

And we learned just yesterday that it seems that the Bank never told the Minister of Finance that they were going to budget in 24/25 for operational spending far in excess of even what Grant Robertson had allowed them for that year (although, to be clear, responsibility for that must lie with both Quigley – as board chair – and Orr, as CEO). Perhaps when Willis finally realised she had been had, she was (and I would hope she was) really annoyed and perhaps, as regards Orr, steel entered her soul (belatedly) at that point. Of itself, not quite dismissal material perhaps (after all, Quigley was responsible too and she’d just reappointed him) but enough to put you on watch.

Who knows if Orr’s conduct at and after those two February meetings was itself enough to lay him open to pressure to go. As yet, we have only quite sanitised comments on how those meetings went down (including the Orr/Wood exchange, where they were both trying to settle things down after the event) but it was repeated behaviour from a very senior figure within days, at a time when the Bank really need to maintain good relationships. If it wasn’t enough in itself, there was other stuff going on at the very same time.

Going back to that period, I realised that it had been on the very morning of 20 February – the day of that unapologetic blow up at Treasury – that Orr had been telling demonstrable untruths again to Parliament’s Finance and Expenditure Committee (at his appearance on the February Monetary Policy Statement). I wrote about it in a post on 21 February, “Orr at it again”. I went back through that post the other day, and listened again to the video of the hearing to check that I’d heard and recorded things correctly. It was, as it turned out, probably his last public appearance as Governor and I counted five outright misrepresentations (two I would go so far as to call worse than that), all on matters where the Governor was either well aware of the truth, or should reasonably have been expected to have known the truth. (And just to be clear that responsibility is shared: at the table with him were his deputy responsible for monetary policy, Karen Silk, and the chief economist Paul Conway. In the row behind Orr you can see Christian Hawkesby, MPC member and Deputy Governor, Naomi Mitchell (Director of Communications), and one of the external MPC members. Not one of them made any attempt to correct Orr on any of these points.

The most egregious of Orr’s claims that day – although not necessarily particularly consequential, just the easiest to unambiguously refute – was the (repeated) claim that the Reserve Bank had been among the first central banks to tighten (when inflation took off a few years previously) and the new, and even more out of step with reality, claim that the Reserve Bank had then been among the first central banks to cut rates.

In my post that day I observed

As I noted, he’d done this sort of thing often enough before, but when I checked my records it seemed to have been the first time since the change of government that he’d been caught in such flagrant attempts to mislead a parliamentary committee (there are plenty documented in the years previously). Had he been less bad for a while, or had I not been paying so much attention? I ended up raising this episode with the Finance and Expenditure Committee the following week (before Orr’s resignation), in time with full chapter and verse – as I recall, I thought it was pointless to raise it with Willis, but the FEC chair was new.

I don’t suppose this particular episode of egregious behaviour – which his senior team seemed to walk by – had anything particularly to do with Orr’s ouster, underway just a few days later. My point is only that if for whatever reason you think what we know of those two private meetings mightn’t really have been serious enough to use as a lever to oust Orr, there was plenty more behaviour that could have, this one visible to anyone who chose to watch/read. If Willis helped engineer the ousting of the Governor, she did us – and standards of public life in New Zealand – a service.

None of which – not NDAs, not nothing – warrants participation in active and repeated, ongoing now, attempts to mislead New Zealanders and obstruct scrutiny. And if – as the Minister suggests – she isn’t overly happy with how the Bank is now handing things, the Board chair serves at her pleasure. If she wants different standards, a good way to signal that would be to replace the chair, now.

If something like what I’ve hypothesised here is what happened back in late February and early March, perhaps the Board and Minister should have insisted on a terse statement along the lines of “Following discussions initiated by the Board, the Governor has resigned and has left office today” and said nothing more that day. It wouldn’t have stopped the questions, or the OIAs. Perhaps it wouldn’t have proved tenable, or Orr wouldn’t have agreed. But there is just no excuse for the deliberate repeated ongoing effort to mislead us.

Or their staff. This was from the package of Q&As sent out by Naomi Mitchell to the entire Bank second and third tier mamagement group first thing in the morning the day after the resignation, for use with staff.

Yeah right.