Advertising for a Governor

I was settling in for an afternoon of watching the gripping UK election results, when someone sent me a copy of a job advert that had appeared in Australia this morning.  The advert was for the job of Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.  (It is also on the Reserve Bank’s website.)

It seems pretty extraordinary for the Reserve Bank’s Board to be proceeding with this process now.  They were just getting underway with the search late last year, seemingly oblivious to the election, when the Minister of Finance told them to stop, and to nominate someone as an acting Governor.   One of the conventions under which our system of government operates is that major appointments are not made close to an election.   As the Minister of Finance noted, in announcing the acting Governor appointment

This will give the next Government time to make a decision on the appointment of a permanent Governor for the next five year term.

Since then we’ve learned that the current government has commissioned a report on possible statutory changes to the governance of the Bank.  And the main oppositions parties have also confirmed that they favour changes, both to the governance and to the mandate of the Reserve Bank.  Who knows which side will win, and what changes they would each make if they did.

But, clearly champing at the bit, the Board is already out with its advert.  In fact, applications close on 8 July, which is a whole 10 or 11 weeks before the election.   So the people who are brave or ambitious enough to apply actually have relatively little idea what they will be applying for.  Will they be the single decisionmaker –  a key dimension of the current model/job –  or not?  And even if not, will they just be presiding over a group of people they appoint, or something more Bank of England-like.  Will they be charged with low unemployment or not?  And so on.

Of course recruitment processes take time.  But with an acting Governor appointed through to late March next year, it isn’t obvious why the Board couldn’t have put their advert out in late August, looking for applications or expressions of interest by the end of September.   At least people considering applying might have a bit more a sense of quite what the role, as one part of overall New Zealand economic and financial management, might be.

The Board holds the whip-hand in the appointment process.  The Minister of Finance can only appoint as Governor someone the Board has recommended (a candidate the Board proposes can be rejected, but then it is up to the Board to find another candidate).    That is a very unusual model.  In most advanced countries, the Governor is appointed directly by the Minister of Finance or the Cabinet.  They can take advice from anyone they like, but aren’t bound by any recommendations.  It is the way things work in Australia and the United Kingdom for example.  In the US, the President nominates, and the Senate confirms (or not).  In those countries, such mechanisms provide a high level of democratic control over an appointment which is hugely influential, over the short to medium term performance of the economy, and over the financial system.  In New Zealand, the Governor is even more powerful –  single legal decisionmaker –  but there is very little democratic control over who wields that power.   (The situation is even worse here if the government changes –  the current Board were all appointed by the current government, and on average will tend to reflect that government’s interests/preferences/biases).

And so I’ve argued that the Opposition should quite simply state that one of the first pieces of legislation they would pass would be a short amendment to the Reserve Bank Act to remove the formal role of the Board in the process of appointing a Governor.  It might be hard for them to do so –  it could look like a power grab –  but when our model is so out of line with international practice,  any competent Opposition should easily be able to make the case.  Promise to consult and take advice, for sure, but we should ensure that the elected Minister of Finance (and Cabinet) can do as their overseas peers can, and appoint as Governor someone in whom they have full confidence, not just someone the company directors appointed by the previous government wheel up.

What about substance of the Board’s advert?   No doubt a person who fitted the profile might well be a good Governor, but there is a “walk on water” feel to it.  Perhaps that isn’t uncommon with job adverts.   What are they after?

  • The ideal candidate will be a person of outstanding intellectual ability,
  • who is a leader in the national and international financial community.
  • The person will have substantial and proven organisational leadership skills in a high-performing entity,
  • a proven ability to manage governance relationships,
  • a sound understanding of public policy decision-making regimes, and
  • the ability to make decisions in the context of complex and sensitive environments.
  • Personal style will be consistent with the national importance and gravitas of the role.
  • The successful candidate will also demonstrate an appreciation of the significance of the Bank’s independence and the behaviours required for ensuring long-term sustainability of that independence.

It is hard to argue too much with any of the individual items, although if I did I might wonder about:

  • the emphasis on “outstanding intellectual ability”, but no mention at all of character or judgement.  In tough times, and crises –  a big part of what we have a Reserve Bank for –  the latter seem likely to be more important than the former.
  • they have clearly chosen to emphasise financial experience/standing rather than policy experience.  It isn’t clear why an ideal candidate for this role –  a New Zealand public policy and communications role –  really would be a “leader in the international financial community”.   That was, after all, what they thought they were getting last time.
  • The explicit comment about personal style and gravitas was interesting.   Are they suggesting that the new Governor might be more open to scrutiny and debate?  If so, that would be welcome.

I was inclined to agree with the comment made by the person who sent me the advert that it wasn’t clear that any of the various names mentioned as potential candidates really fitted this description.  Geoff Bascand, for example, would get a significant mark against him if they really want “a leader in the national and international financial community”.  There would be other marks against Adrian Orr, David Archer, Murray Sherwin.  Perhaps they are, after all, looking for an experienced banker?  One thing that is striking is that there is nothing in the profile stressing knowledge of, understanding of, or relationships in, the New Zealand economy or financial system.  That looks like quite a gap –  and I reiterate my view that an overseas appointment, of a non New Zealander, would be untenable especially while the single decisionmaker system remains.

The final item on the profile list was particularly interesting.

The successful candidate will also demonstrate an appreciation of the significance of the Bank’s independence and the behaviours required for ensuring long-term sustainability of that independence.

It sparked my interest on several counts:

  • first, I’ve never seen wording like it previously in an advert for the Governor’s position,
  • second, it sounds really quite embattled as if the Board think that the Bank’s independence might soon be under threat, but
  • third, and most importantly, just how appropriate is this?  Parliament decides how independent or otherwise, in some or all areas of its responsibility, and it is the role of the Governor, and the Board for that matter, to work within the parameters that Parliament lays down. It isn’t the role of the Board to be seeking a chief executive who will advocate for a particular model of how the Bank should be run.   After all, even if everyone agreed (as most do) that the Bank should have operational independence around monetary policy, and on the detailed implementation of prudential policy, there is a lot of room in between, where views and international practices differ.   Should fx intervention be decided by the Governor?  In some countries it is, and others not.  Should regulatory policy  parameters (eg DTI limits) be set by the Governor, or the Bank, or by the Minister?  Again, practices differ, and so can reasonable people.    It is quite inappropriate for the Board to looking to employ someone to defend all the powers Parliament happens for the time being to have assigned to the Bank.
  • we should also be a little cautious about that wording “the behaviours required for ensuring the long-term sustainability of that independence”.  Not only can the Governor or the Board not “ensure” that independence at all, but a variety of different types of behaviour –  not all desirable –  can be deployed contribute to that end.  Not making life difficult for the Minister (of whichever party) is a well-known bureaucratic survival strategy. It won’t necessarily be the behaviour that would in the wider public interest.    At the (perhaps absurd) extreme –  but it is an FBI day today –  J Edgar Hoover sustained his independence for the long-term in ways that were highly unseemly and not generally regarded as in the public interest.

Perhaps they just worded the advert badly, but it does rather betray a sense of a group of people who really aren’t suited for the role they’ve been given.  They might be okay at monitoring the routine performance of the Governor.  But you shouldn’t have control of the appointment to such a very powerful position in such hands at all –  and, even while it is, they should have delayed this process rather than rushing so far ahead before the looming election.

 

UPDATE:  For future reference (since the advert will be taken down when applications close) this is the advert

Governor

Close date:     08/07/2017 08:00
Office location:  Wellington

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (“the Bank”) is New Zealand’s central bank. It is responsible for monetary policy, promoting financial stability and issuing New Zealand’s currency. The current Governor is stepping down at the end of his term in 2017 and, accordingly, the Board is now seeking candidates to fill this vital and unique leadership role in the New Zealand economy. The Governor is appointed by the Minister of Finance on the recommendation of the Board.

The Governor is the Chief Executive of the Bank and a member of the Bank’s Board of Directors, and has the duty to ensure the Bank carries out the functions conferred on it by statutes, including The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989. 

KEY RESPONSIBILITIES

The Governor is responsible for the strategic direction of the Bank and for ensuring that strategy is consistent with the Bank’s key accountabilities in relation to: price stability, the soundness and efficiency of the financial system (including prudential regulation and oversight, supervision of banks, non-bank deposit-takers and insurance companies, and anti-money laundering), the supply of currency, and the operation of payment and settlement systems. As Chief Executive, the Governor is required to lead a high-performance culture and ensure that the Bank operates effectively and efficiently across its wide range of policy, operational and communication functions.

CANDIDATE PROFILE

The ideal candidate will be a person of outstanding intellectual ability, who is a leader in the national and international financial community. The person will have substantial and proven organisational leadership skills in a high-performing entity, a proven ability to manage governance relationships, a sound understanding of public policy decision-making regimes, and the ability to make decisions in the context of complex and sensitive environments. Personal style will be consistent with the national importance and gravitas of the role. The successful candidate will also demonstrate an appreciation of the significance of the Bank’s independence and the behaviours required for ensuring long-term sustainability of that independence.

The role is based in New Zealand’s capital city, Wellington. Remuneration is commensurate with the seniority of the role and the New Zealand public sector.

Interested candidates may phone Carrie Hobson or Stephen Leavy for a confidential discussion on +64 9 379 2224, or forward a current CV to Lina Vanifatova before 8 July 2017 at lina@hobsonleavy.com

 

 

Bank capital: some thoughts

Six months or so ago the Reserve Bank announced that it would be conducting a review of capital requirements for banks.  At the start of last month, they released an Issues Paper, inviting submissions by today (rather a short period of time, for an issue which has major implications for banks’ financing structures and, potentially, costs).   I’m not going to make a formal submission, but thought I might outline a few thoughts on some of the issues that are raised in (or omitted from) the paper.

I’d also note that it is a curious time to be undertaking the review.  Background work and supporting analysis is always welcome, but here is how the Reserve Bank summarises things.

Detailed consultation documents on policy proposals and options for each of the three components will be released later in 2017, with a view to concluding the review by the first quarter of 2018.

But the Reserve Bank is now well into a lame-duck phase.  Graeme Wheeler –  currently the sole formal decisionmaker at the Bank –  leaves office on 26 September, and then we have an acting Governor (lawfully or not) for six months.  Spencer’s temporary appointment expires (and he leaves the Bank) on 26 March 2018, which is presumably when a new permanent Governor will be expected to take office.   The incentives look all wrong for getting good decisions made, for which the decisionmakers will be able to be held accountable.     Big decisions in this area –  and the Bank is raising the possibility of big increases in capital requirements –  are something the new Governor should be fully coomfortable with (and, especially if an outsider is appointed, that shouldn’t just mean some pro forma tick granted in his or her first days in office.)    We have constitutional conventions limiting what governments can do immediately prior to elections.  It isn’t obvious why something similar shouldn’t govern the way unelected decisionmakers behave in lame-duck, or explicitly caretaker, periods.  Some decisions simply have to be made and can’t wait.   These sorts of ones aren’t in that category.

(In passing, and still on capital, I’d also note that there is something that seems not quite right about the Reserve Bank’s refusal to comment on why a couple of Kiwibank instruments have not been allowed to count as capital.   The capital rules should be clear and transparent.  The terms of the relevant instruments are also presumably not secret.  Perhaps Kiwibank has been told why their instruments missed out, but it seems unsatisfactory that everyone else is left guessing, or reliant on things like the deductions and speculations of an academic who was once a regulatory policy adviser (eg here and here).    I have no particular reason to question the Reserve Bank’s substantive decision, but these are matters of more than just private interest.  It is an old line, but no less true, that in matters where government agencies are exercising discretion sunlight is the best disinfectant.)

High levels of bank capital appeal to government officials.   To the extent that more of a bank’s assets are funded by shareholders rather than depositors then, all else equal, the less chance of a bank failing.  And if avoiding bank failure itself isn’t a public policy interest –  after all the Reserve Bank regularly reminds us that the supervisory regime isn’t supposed to produce zero failures –  minimising the cost of government bailouts is.   There might be various ways to do that –  the Open Bank Resolution model is designed to be one, but high levels of capital are another.

High levels of capital should also appeal to depositors and other creditors.  Your chances of getting your money back in full are increased the more the bank’s assets are funded by shareholdes, who bear the losses until their capital is exhausted.   Of course, that argument is weakened if you think that the government will bail out anyway, but that is just another reason for governments to err towards high levels of capital.

Capital typically costs more than deposits (or wholesale debt funding).  That isn’t surprising –  the shareholders are taking on more risk.  But, of course, the larger the share of equity funding then the lower the level of risk per unit of equity.  In principle, higher capital requirements lower the cost of capital.  Very low capital levels should tend to raise the cost of debt (debt-holders recognise an increased chance that they will be the ones who bear any losses).  Modigliani and Miller posited that, on certain assumptions, the value of a firm was unaffected by its financing structure –  to the extent that is true, higher capital requirements don’t affect the economics of (in this case) banking.

It won’t hold in some circumstances.  For example, if creditors are all sure a government will bail them out, a bank is much more profitable the lower the capital it can get away with.  In the presence of that sort of perceived or actual bailout risk, there is little doubt that increasing capital requirements is a real cost to the banks.  But it is almost certainly worth doing: it helps ensure that the risks are borne by the people responsible for the decisions of the bank (shareholders, and their representatives –  directors and management).

Taxes also complicate things.  If the tax system has an entrenched bias in favour of debt, then increased capital requirements will also represent a real cost to the banking system.  Many –  most –  tax systems do have such a bias.  For domestic shareholders, and to a first approximation, neither our tax system nor that of Australia have that bias.  That is because of the system of dividend imputation, which is designed to avoid the double-taxation of business profits (returns to equity).    Unfortunately, there is no mutual recognition of trans-Tasman imputation credits, and most of our banking system is made up of Australian banks with (mostly) Australian shareholders.   For most, but not all, of our banks increasing capital requirements is likely to represent some increase in effective cost.  And the resulting revenue gains are mostly likely to be collected by the Australian Tax Office.

An open question –  and one not really touched on in the Bank’s issues paper –  is to what extent our bank regulators should take account of these features of the tax system.  For most companies, capital structure is a choice shareholders and management make, weighing all the costs, benefits, opportunities and distortions themselves.  But in banking, for better or worse, regulators decide how much capital banks have to raise to support any given set of assets.   One could argue that tax is simply someone else’s problem:  if higher required capital ratios increased costs, the Australian banks could simply redouble their lobbying efforts in Canberra to get mutual recognition of imputation credits, and if that didn’t work, there would simply be a competitiveness advantage to New Zealand banks.   Perhaps that solution looks good on paper, but I think it is less compelling than it might seem. First, banks can and do lobby here too.  The Reserve Bank might get to set capital ratios at present, but that law could be changed.  And second, we benefit from having foreign banks, with risks spread across more than one economy.

Even if all the tax issues could be eliminated here –  and they won’t be in time for this review, if ever –  there is still the possibility that the market will trade on the basis that additional capital requirements will increase overall funding costs for banks, even if there is little rational long-term reason for them to do so.   One reason that problem could exist is because the tax biases are pervasive globally, and it is therefore a reasonable rule of thumb for investors to treat higher capital requirements as an expected cost.

Over the years, I’ve tended to have a bias towards higher capital requirements.  I’ve read and imbibed Admati’s book (for example).  As recently as late last year I wrote here

My own, provisional, view is that for banks operating in New Zealand somewhat higher capital requirements would probably be beneficial, and that there would be few or no welfare costs involved in imposing such a standard.  My focus is not on avoiding the possible wider economic costs of banking crises (which I think are typically modest –  if there are major issues, they are about the misallocation of capital in booms), but on minimising the expected fiscal cost of government bailouts.  As I’ve explained previously, I do not think the OBR tool is a credible or time-consistent policy.

But I have been rethinking that position to some extent.   The Reserve Bank talks in its Issues Paper of the possibility of an “optimal” capital ratio (from the academic literature) of perhaps 14 per cent (with estimates that range even higher), well above the minimum ratios that are in place today.

But if there are additional costs from raising capital requirements –  which seems likely, at least to an extent –  we need some pretty hard-headed assessments of the real gains that might accrue to society as a whole to warrant those increased costs.  And those gains are hard to find:

  • for over 100 years our banking system has been impressively stable.  If that was in jeopardy in the late 1980s, that was in unrepeatable circumstances in which a huge range of controls had been removed in short order (and when there were no effective minimum capital requirements at all).
  • repeated stress tests, whether by the Reserve Bank, APRA, or the IMF all struggle to generate credible extreme scenarios in which the health of an indvidual bank, let alone the system, could be seriously impaired.  In most of those scenarios, the existing stock of capital hasn’t been impaired at all, let alone being at risk of being exhausted.
  • we have a banking system where most of the main players are owned by major larger overseas banking groups with a strong interest in the survival of the domestic operation, and the ability to provide any required capital support (the New Zealand regulated entities aren’t widely-held listed companies).

I’m still not sure what to make of the role of the OBR mechanism.  As I noted earlier, I’ve never been convinced that it is a credible or time-consistent option, but our officials appear to, and even ministers talk up the option.  If they really believe that they (and their successors) will be willing and able to impose material losses on bank creditors and depositors in the event of a future failure, there can’t be any strong case for higher capital requirements (indeed, arguably a very credible OBR eliminates the basis for capital requirements at all).  Even if officials and ministers aren’t 100 per cent sure about OBR, any material probability of it being able to be used in future crises needs to be weighed into the calculations when a proper cost-benefit assessment of proposals for higher capital requirements is being done.  At present, there is little or sustained discussion of the OBR issues in the Issues Paper.  I look forward to the inclusion of OBR considerations in a proper cost-benefit analysis if the Bank does end up proposing to raise capital ratios.

My other reason for unease is that in the Issues Paper the Reserve Bank does not engage at all with, for example, the past stress test results.  There is nothing in the paper to suggest that current capital ratios don’t more than adequately cover risks.  Instead, they fall back on generalised results from an offshore literature, and arguments about why New Zealand capital ratios should be higher than those abroad.  Those simply fail to convince.

Here is the gist of their argument

One of the principles of the capital review is that the regulatory capital ratios of New Zealand banks should be seen as conservative relative to those of their international peers, to reflect New Zealand’s current reliance on bank-intermediated funding, New Zealand’s exposure to international shocks, the concentration of our banking sector, the concentration of banks’ portfolios, and a regulatory approach that puts less weight on active supervision and relatively more weight on high level safety buffers such as regulatory capital.

I’m not sure what weight should rest on that “be seen as” in the second line.  I presume not that much, as these seem to be presented as arguments that would warrant genuinely higher capital ratios than in other countries, not just something about appearances.  But in substance they don’t amount to much:

  • “New Zealand’s current reliance on bank-intermediated funding”.  I’m not quite sure what point they are trying to make here.  Does the Reserve Bank regard bank-based intermediation as a bad thing?  If so why?  I presume the logic of the point is something about it being more important than in most places to avoid bank failures, but that simply isn’t made clear, or justifed with data.  Payments systems –  a big focus of Bank concern around the point of a bank failure –  tend to be based through the banking system everywhere.  It is not even as if our corporate bond market –  while modestly-sized –  is unusually small by international standards.   (Incidentally, it is also worth noting that there appears to be nothing in the Issues Paper about non-banks, some of whom the Reserve Bank also regulates.  Making bank-based intermediation relatively more expensive –  which higher capital requirements could do –  would tend to lead to disintermediation.)
  • “New Zealand’s exposure to international shocks”.   Again, it isn’t obvious what this point amounts to.  Presumably the sorts of shocks New Zealand is exposed to are reflected in the scenarios used in the stress tests the Bank and others have run?  And it isn’t obvious that New Zealand’s economy is more exposed to international shocks than many other advanced economies –  there was nothing very unusual for example about our experience of the crisis of 2008/09.   I suspect that lurking behind these words is some reference to the old bugbear, the relatively high level of net international indebtedness –  a point the Bank and the IMF often like to make.   But this simply isn’t an additional threat to the soundness of the financial system.  Rollover risks can be real, but they aren’t primarily dealt with by capital requirements (but by liquidity requirements) and as we saw in 2008/09 the Reserve Bank can easily temporarily replace offshore liquidity.  Funding cost shocks also aren’t a systemic threat because, with a floating exchange rate, the Reserve Bank is able to offset the effects through lowering the OCR and allowing the exchange rate to fall.  The difference between a fixed exchange rate country and a floating exchange rate one, in which the bank system’s assets are all in local currency, seems to be glossed over too easily.
  • “the concentration of our banking sector”    Is this really much different from the situation in most smaller advanced economies (or even than Australia and Canada)?
  • “the concentration of banks’ portfolios”.  This seems a very questionable point.  Banks’ exposure in New Zealand are largely to labour income (the largest component of GDP, and the most stable) –  that is really what a housing loan portfolio is about – and to the export receipts of one of our largest export industries.  That is very different from, say, being heavily exposed to property development loans, to financing corporate takeovers, or other flavours of the day.   The effective diversification is very substantial, including the fact that in any scenario in which labour income is severely impaired (large increases in unemployment) it is all but certain the exchange rate will be falling (boosting dairy returns).  The two biggest components of the banks’ books themselves thus provide additional diversification.
  • “a regulatory approach that puts less weight on active supervision and relatively more weight on high level safety buffers such as regulatory capital.”     Is the Reserve Bank really saying they believe that on-site supervision would produce better financial stability outcomes?  I’m sceptical, but if they are saying that, surely the case would be strong to change the regulatory philosophy.  It would, almost certainly, be cheaper than a large increase in capital requirements.  At very least, if they want to rely on this argument, it would need to be carefully evaluated in any cost-benefit analysis.

It all leaves me a bit uneasy as to whether there is really the strong case for higher capital ratios that the Bank might like us to believe.  They’ll need to provide much more robust analysis if they really choose to pursue such an option.

And a final thought.  The Bank devotes some space in their Issues Paper to considering the role of convertible capital instruments  –  issued as debt but converting to equity under certain (more or less well-defined) adverse event circumstances.  In doing so, they provide vital loss-absorbing capacity, providing a buffer for depositors and other non-equity creditors.  There are some practical problems with these instruments –  the Bank touches on many of them –  and they probably shouldn’t be marketed to retail investors (at least without very explicit warnings) lest the pressures mount for holders of these instruments also be to bailed out in a crisis.     Nonetheless, in the presence of the tax issues discussed earlier, convertible instruments look like a generally attractive option for supporting the robustness of banks in a cost-efficient way.

Given that I was interested in this paragraph  on convertible instruments from the Bank.

In New Zealand there has been no conversion at all of Basel-compliant AT1 and Tier 2 instruments, because banks have not been in financial difficulty, so there is even less certainty about the practical effects of conversion in New Zealand’s particular legal and institutional environments. In the Reserve Bank’s view these instruments should be regarded as essentially untested in the New Zealand environment.

Of course, the same can be said for OBR, and indeed for almost all the crisis-management provisions of New Zealand bank supervisory legislation.

The Bank does draw attention to the risk of bailouts of holders of convertible capital (co-co) instruments.  On the other hand, they can work when banks fail.  Earlier this week, Banco Popular in Spain “failed”.  It was taken over, for 1 euro, by Banco Santander, which will inject a lot of new equity into Popular.   Popular had co-co instruments on issue.  Here is what happened to the price of those bonds.

popular co-co

Banks can fail, banks should fail from time to time (as businesses in other sectors should), and when they do it should be clearly established who is likely to lose money.  This looks like a good example, where the shareholders and the holders of the co-cos will have lost everything they had invested in these instruments.

To revert briefly to our own Reserve Bank’s review, perhaps there is a case for higher capital ratios.  But, if they want to pursue that option, it isn’t likely to be cost-free, and any such proposal will need to be backed by a robust and detailed cost-benefit analysis. For now, it isn’t clear that the reasons they have suggested why capital ratios here should be higher than those in other advanced countries really stand up to scrutiny.

 

“Considerable public interest”?

As I noted yesterday, the Minister of Finance and Grant Spencer have signed a document purporting to be a Policy Targets Agreement, to cover the management of monetary policy between the end of Graeme Wheeler’s term and 26 March 2018.   I also noted that I had lodged OIA requests with the Bank and Treasury for the documents relevant to the pseudo-PTA.

As it happens, Treasury had already beaten me to it, and they rang this morning to point me to the obscure corner of their website where they had yesterday pro-actively released the one substantive relevant document.   Pro-active release of papers by minister and public servants is to be strongly encouraged, and welcomed when it occurs.  Not only is it consistent with the principles that underpin the Official Information Act, but it is also cheaper and easier for the agency concerned.    I probably wouldn’t have bothered with this post if I hadn’t wanted to commend Treasury.

Just occasionally one gets a sense of having made a very slight difference.   In recommending pro-active release Treasury noted

There is considerable public interest in Mr Spencer’s appointment, and a proactive release would pre-empt an expected OIA request.

It (more or less) did that, but to be honest I’ve not seen any one much other than me writing about the Spencer appointment.   Treasury went on

We also consider the proactive release of this report desirable as it would help to ensure that future public commentary on Mr Spencer’s appointment is well-informed. This is because some commentary about Mr Spencer’s appointment has questioned whether the appointment is legal, based on an inappropriate interpretation of the Act and an erroneous assumption that you would not be signing a PTA with Mr Spencer.

I had certainly misunderstood the implication of earlier statements from the Minister about the PTA.  I remain convinced that both the appointment is illegal, and that there is no statutory provision for a PTA with an acting Governor.  My interpretation of the Act may well be erroneous, but the best way to clear that up would be for the Minister, the Treasury, or the Bank’s Board to explain –  or provide –  their own legal advice and interpretation of the relevant provisions.  They continue to refuse to do that (although I will refer this paper to the Ombudsman’s office, for consideration in reviewing whether it would be in the public interest for the relevant legal advice, or a summary of it, to be released).

What else do we learn from the Treasury’s advice to the Minister?

First,

A PTA is required for the appointment of both a permanent and an interim Governor.

It is clearly Treasury’s interpretation, but they provide no justification for that interpretation.  There is, after all, no mention of an interim or acting Governor in any of the provisions of the Act dealing with PTAs.   Again, a summary of the legal advice would help clarify the matter.

Second,

The Board recommends that Mr Spencer be appointed on the same terms and conditions as the current Governor. This is also the basis upon which Mr Spencer has accepted the appointment.

I don’t have any real problem with that, but…..an acting appointee doesn’t really have the same responsibilities as a substantive Governor (medium-term planning and positioning of the institution etc), and has no effective accountability (monetary policy, for example, works with a lag of more than six months, and Spencer will be long gone before the impact of any of his choices are apparent.  But I guess Spencer was doing them a favour in taking the job.

The Treasury appears to be relying on a creative interpretation of the Act in which every reference to the Governor is somehow construed to also mean an acting Governor.  But they aren’t even consistent about that.   They note that

The process of agreeing the conditions of employment is complicated by the Act requiring you to agree the conditions of employment, including remuneration, with the Governor. As Mr Spencer will not be the Governor until after assuming the office of Governor, the conditions of employment should not be formally signed until Mr Spencer’s appointment takes effect.

In fact, of course, Mr Spencer will never be Governor, only acting Governor.   But it seems a rather literal interpretation of the relevant section of the Act to suppose that the terms and conditions can’t be agreed until a person (acting or substantive) has actually taken office.  I wonder if the same approach was applied when Messrs Bollard and Wheeler were appointed?  If it really is a correct interpretation, it looks like a case for a minor amendment to the Act (joining a long list of necessary reforms).

To repeat, kudos to Treasury for the pro-active release.  I do hope they will adopt the same approach next year when a new longer-term PTA is signed with the new permanent Governor, and would encourage the Reserve Bank to consider following Treasury’s lead.  In the meantime, as they are no doubt aware, Treasury is still to respond to a request for the papers relevant to the 2012 PTA.  Pro-active release at the time would have been much simpler.

 

 

 

Roger Douglas, the economy, and an option for reform

I went along yesterday to a Treasury guest lecture, to hear from one of great figures in the history of New Zealand economic policymaking, Sir Roger Douglas, and his co-author Auckland University economics professor Robert MacCulloch.   Their presentation was based on a recent paper proposing a wholesale reshaping of New Zealand’s tax and welfare system.  I’ll get back to that.

Roger Douglas is 79 now, and if his voice is weaker than it was once way, his passion for a better New Zealand is as clear as ever.   In his brief remarks, there was more evidence of a passionate desire to do stuff that would make for a more prosperous, and fairer, New Zealand than one is likely to hear from our current crop of political leaders in an entire election campaign.

I very much liked the fact that they started their lecture with a chart of real GDP per hour worked (my favourite productivity indicator) for New Zealand and other OECD countries.   Things are, very much, not okay economically was the intended message.   Music to my ears.

Unfortunately, given that they made quite a bit of the graph, they got the wrong chart.

What they showed was something very like this.

Douglas RGDP phw 1

Both speakers made something of it, telling of a large gap that opened up in the Muldoon years, but which then closed substantially again following the reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s, only to resume widening again in the last 15 years or so (when, as they noted, no politician has been willing to do any significant reforms).

But the chart looked a bit odd to me, and I wondered about all the new –  mostly poorer –  countries that had entered the OECD in the last couple of decades.

Sure enough, when I got home and dug out the data myself, it became clear that what they (or whoever prepared the chart for them –  I think they mentioned the Reserve Bank) had done, was simply to average the real GDP per hour worked of whichever countries the OECD happened to have data for in any particular year.  That is how I produced the chart above.

Unfortunately, in 1970 when the chart starts. the OECD had this data for only 23 countries.  By 2015 it had data for 35.    The odd rich country (Austria) was missing in 1970, but so were almost all the emerging markets and former communist eastern European countries now in the OECD (several weren’t even separate countries then).   It is only since 1995 that the OECD has had data for all 35.

So here is another way of looking at the chart.  The extra line is the average real GDP per hour worked for the 23 countries the OECD did have data for in 1970 –  a fixed panel of countries throughout the whole period.

douglas 2

And here is how New Zealand productivity (on this measure) has performed relative to the OECD.  I’ve shown both the measure relative to the average of the OECD countries with data for the whole period, and relative to the full sample of countries for the period since 1995 when data are available for all of them.  Remember that most of the new-joiners are poorer than us, so the orange line is above the blue line.

douglas 3

There has been the odd good year here and there – and a few phases (including, actually, the Muldoon years, and the last decade) when we’ve gone sideways – but over the entire period since 1970 there has never been a phase when, on this measure, we’ve done consistently better than the group of other OECD countries.  The pretty clear trend has been downwards.

I really wish it had been otherwise – not just because it is my country too, and I care about its fortunes, but because I supported a great deal of the reforms that were done (and which I still consider were mostly to the good).    But even if the reformers expected, and hoped for, something better –  some closing of the gaps –  it just hasn’t happened.

I probably wouldn’t make much of it on this occasion, except that (a) Sir Roger is an eminent figure, and (b) the presentation yesterday, and the (no doubt unintentionally)  misleading slide, was being presented to quite a large crowd of past and present econocrats.

However, the main focus of the Douglas/MacCulloch presentation was a proposal for a radical reshaping of the tax and welfare system.  There is a nice accessible summary here (which includes a link to fuller versions).   The gist of the proposal is as follows:

  • much lower income tax rates,
  • a lower company tax rate (and eliminated “corporate welfare”), and
  • higher GST

But, “in exchange”, people have to contribute a set proportion of their income  (and there is an employer contribution too) to dedicated private accounts for:

  • health
  • risk events (unemployment, disability etc)
  • superannuation

There are lots of details, but on health everyone would have to buy an insurance policy against catastrophic events (anything more than $20000 per annum) and would have to meet other expenses either from their own health account, or if that was exhausted from direct government funding.  Something similar applies to unemployment: your risk account is your first line of support, but if that is exhausted the government remains provider of last resort.

For retirement income, if I understand the scheme correctly, in many ways it isn’t much different than what we have now:  a universal basic state pension, on top of which is private savings (including through Kiwisaver, although as they note Kiwisaver isn’t compulsory and their retirement accounts would be).  The difference is that the age of eligibility would be gradually raised from the current 65 to 70.

It would represent a massive rejigging of the system.  They argue that, in respect of health, it is largely the Singaporean model, and in Singapore health outcomes are very good and health expenditure (public and private) as a share of GDP is remarkably low. I don’t know enough about the Singaporean system to comment further, including whether it is likely to be replicable elsewhere.

There are all sorts of potential practical and philisophical problems.  I wouldn’t rule out the possibility of some real benefits, for some people in time, or even more generally.  But Douglas and MacCulloch argue that it is a politically feasible way to get necessary reform going again.  And on that –  fairly critical – count I’m sceptical.

In a fuller version of their paper they state

Most of the long-term reduction in government spending under the “Savings-not-Taxes” regime comes from the following sources. First, pension spending drops from $28.1b (under the existing system) to $17.4b (under the new regime) due mainly to the rise in the retirement age from 65 to 70 years old between 2015 and 2035. Second, there are the cuts in ‘corporate welfare’ and interest-free loans and grants to students from high-income, high-capital families.

In other words, huge changes to the entire tax and welfare system, to get the NZS age up from 65 to 70, to get rid of what they describe as (and I agree with them) as “corporate welfare” (film subsidies, Callaghan funding and so), and to eliminate interest-free student loans and related support to high income earners.

In the question time, I asked why they regarded the sweeping change as more politically feasible than simply focusing on those three items.   I guess I sort of knew how Douglas would reply –  it was a variant of a line he has used for many years, about doing lots of changes which can (a) distract people,  but (b) provide an opportunity for everyone to benefit in some area.  But I wasn’t really persuaded.  They argue, for example, that people from high income families currently getting interest-free student loans would benefit from the lower tax rates in the Douglas-MacCulloch plan.  Fair enough I suppose.

But the big money is in NZS cutbacks.  It isn’t clear how the people who are most uneasy about raising the NZS age –  the current middle-aged –  are likely to benefit systematically very much from anything in the Douglas-MacCulloch package.  Any gains/savings would be probabilistic at best (especially as health expenditures rise with age), and the potential personal losses (five extra years without NZS) certain and specific.     I think change can and will be made –  governments in the 1990s did raise the NZS age by five years, and got re-elected –  but I don’t see how the huge “throw everything in the air” approach really helps.  Grey Power, and Winston Peters, will be quite capable of seeing through to the bottom line.

Similarly, corporate welfare is a real scourge.   But how does reforming the tax and welfare system on a large scale make it easier to, first, scrap those provisions, and then later resist the endless pressures that will come from various loquacious vested interests to put them back in place?  I just don’t see it.    It looks like an approach that, rather than making major savings more feasible, would simple multiply the number of enemies the reformers would make.

All that said, and sceptical as I am, it was good to see a serious plan outlined by people who really care.  And credit goes to The Treasury for hosting the event.

(In passing I’d also add that one thing I really like about the package is that it would put sickness, disability and accidents all on the same footing).  

In many respects, the saddest line of the day was one made almost in passing by Professor MacCulloch.  He told us that he administers a fairly generously-funded visiting professorship at the University of Auckland, which aims to bring in distinguished or innovative, leading international thinkers to contribute to policy debate and development in New Zealand.    But the last three people who had been invited had declined the invitation to come.  There was, so far as they could tell, nothing bold or interesting on the table here, no real prospect of significant reform, or interest in it from our political leaders.

Things were very different, in that regard, 20 or 30 years ago.  It is not as if, sadly, we have in the interim solved all our problems, and re-establishing a position as a world-leading economy,  or a world-leader in dealing with the various social dysfunctions.  We just drift, and allow our elites to tell themselves (and us) tales about how everything is really just fine.

 

A pseudo-PTA and other miscellania

This morning it was announced that something that purports to be a Policy Targets Agreement, to cover the conduct of monetary policy during the six months after Graeme Wheeler leaves office, had been signed between the Minister of Finance and Grant Spencer, currently the deputy chief executive of the Reserve Bank.  The Minister announced some months ago that he intended to appoint Spencer as acting Governor for six months, to get the appointment of a permanent Governor clear of the election period.

There are a number of problems with this:

  • first, the Minister has no statutory power to appoint an acting Governor, except where a Governor resigns or otherwise leaves office during an uncompleted term, and
  • second, even if it were argued, contrary to the clear sense of the legislation, that the Minister had such appointment powers, there is also no statutory provision for a Policy Targets Agreement between an acting Governor and the Minister (rather, the Act envisages that the acting Governor would run monetary policy under the PTA already signed with the substantive Governor for his/her unexpectedly foreshortened term).

You might respond that even if there is no statutory provision, there is nothing to stop the Minister and the “acting Governor” signing an agreed statement about how monetary policy would be run during the “acting Governor’s” term.  And if the acting Governor appointment was itself lawful, I would agree with you.   But the so-called Policy Targets Agreement signed yesterday explicitly states the parties believe it to be the genuine binding article, not just some informal statement of agreed intentions.

This agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor  of the Reserve  Bank of New Zealand (the Bank) is made under section 9 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 (the Act).

The Reserve Bank’s statement stressed that there were no changes in this new (pseudo) PTA, relative to the current PTA applying during Graeme Wheeler’s term.   Unfortunately they seem to have taken that a bit too literally.  You’ll notice that in that extract (immediately above) it is referred to as an agreement between “the Governor” and the Minister.  But the Minister’s announcement in February was that Spencer would only be “acting Governor”.  Indeed, there is no way that Spencer could have been appointed as “Governor”, because any new person appointed as Governor has to be appointed for a term of five years, and any such appointment would have defeated the whole point of not making a long-term appointment in or around the election period.

It wasn’t just a slip either.  At the bottom of the document it is signed by Steven Joyce as Minister of Finance and by Grant Spencer as “Governor Designate”  (the “designate” bit matters, because real PTAs have to be agreed before the appointment is formally made).  But Spencer isn’t “Governor designate” at all, he is “acting Governor designate”.     I guess they are trying to slip him in under the provisions of section 9 (rules governing the PTAs) which refer only to the Governor, not to any acting Governors.  As I said before, the Act does not provide for acting Governors to sign proper PTAs.  So the document resembles a PTA, but it can’t in fact be one.

Does it matter?  In one sense, perhaps not.  But laws matter, and details matter, and this appointment, and the purported PTA, appear to be in breach of the law.   If nothing goes wrong and there are no legal challenges during the “acting Governor’s” term, then there probably won’t be any practical problems. But the Governor exercises a lot of powers, including in crises, and the last thing one needs in crises –  which one never foresees correctly the timing of – is uncertainty as to whether a purported Governor really has powers to do what he is trying to do.

(As I have noted previously, there are remedies, even if awkward ones.  For example, Graeme Wheeler –  as an existing Governor – could have been reappointed for six months, and a new PTA signed with him, all while he announced his intention to resign after one day.  Nothing then would prevent the Minister appointing Spencer as lawful acting Governor, operating under a fully lawful PTA.)

I have put in OIA requests with both the Bank and Treasury for the papers relevant to today’s purported PTA.

Being in a slightly flippant mood this evening, I thought I’d throw a few curiosities from the day.

First, on looking on the blog statistics page I discovered that someone had got to my blog today by searching under  “functions of weet bix to the unborn”.    Quite why anyone would be searching for anything using those words for a search at all is a beyond my understanding.   On scrolling down several pages of search results I discovered that I had once, long ago, referred to Weetbix, but not to nutrition or the unborn.

Second, the Reserve Bank might find my OIA requests annoying (they did, after all, launch a whole charging regime in response).   But other people lodge requests too.  I occasionally have a look at the ones the Bank releases.   Some are easy to answer, but distinctly strange.   A few weeks ago they responded to this one

I would like a categorical response to the question­ ” What influence does the Rothschild family exert over the reserve bank of New Zealand?

The categorical answer, of course, is none whatever, although the Bank gave the person a slightly fuller response.

It has been quite a while since I’d seen such a New Zealand-focused example of the old conspiracy theory, in which bankers –  especially perhaps Jewish bankers –  had the central banks of the world under their thumb.  It is a fascinating, if unnerving, phenomenon.  On a par, I suppose, with the whole “one world government” conspiracy stories:  I have on my shelves a book which claims that Don Brash was installed as Reserve Bank Governor by the one world government, as a safe pair of hands, as the son of someone who himself had been part of the conspiracy, as a leading figure in the World Council of Churches.

And finally, looking back at Steven Joyce’s statement on 7 February announcing that Graeme Wheeler was retiring, I noticed the Minister’s description of the Governor’s conduct

The Governor has performed his role calmly and expertly during a highly unusual period for the world economy

Calmness having been so prominently highlighted as a feature of the Governor’s stewardship, I can only assume that the story I heard a while ago on the grapevine, that the Governor had, as it were, tossed his toys out of the cot when someone wrote something the Governor disagreed with, couldn’t possibly be true.

 

 

Unaffordable housing markets and the next generation

Last week I’d been discussing house prices etc with a couple of friends whose kids are a bit older than mine, of an age where they might in years gone by (not that long ago) have been thinking of buying a house.   As one noted, they didn’t know what to advise their kids.  Another talked of the seeming inevitability of parental assistance –  which, in many families, isn’t much of an option.  I know of another friend who decided that parental assistance was probably inevitable, so bought another house himself so that at least his position was hedged –  if house prices went down, so would the needs of his kids, and if they stayed high or rose further, there would be some additional wealth in the inflated value of the additional house.   When this week’s Listener reports yet another poll suggesting housing is the most important issue going into this year’s election, we can’t be the only one having these sorts of conversations.

And then I found a Labour Party election pamphlet in my letterbox.  There was a lot of text, but on only two issues –  health and housing.

Jacinda says everywhere she goes, one topic keeps coming up: the housing crisis.  “National has failed on housing.  People are worried that they or their kids won’t ever be able to get on the property ladder.

Andrew can relate –  he’s concerned about what the future holds for his 16-year-old son, Cam. “I want Cam and his generation to have the same opportunities I had, and more.  But it’s getting so much harder for young people to buy a house. I worry that Cam and other young New Zealanders won’t ever be able to afford their own homes.”

That struck a chord with me.  Partly because my (slightly younger) son knows his son.  But also because my own first house was about 50 metres from Little’s current house which, according to a recent Herald article, is approximately valued at $920,000.  I walk past both houses most days.   It isn’t a fancy neighbourhood by any means –  pleasant, but not fancy.

I bought my own first house in December 1988 –  which I guess is almost thirty years ago, although in many ways it seems just yesterday.   I paid $152000 for it, which at the time was less than twice my income.  The Reserve Bank’s inflation calculator says that is roughly $287000 in today’s money.  I looked up the same website the Herald used to get a value for Little’s house.  It estimates –  who knows how accurately –  that my old house is now worth around $800000.        The current owners have extended it a bit, but it is still a three bedroom house, and the bottom outside walls of the garage have rusted a bit more than they had in 1988.    But then productivity has risen since then –  real GDP per hour worked is up around 35 per cent –  and with it earnings across the economy.

I’m not sure what the Reserve Bank now pays people who’ve been managers in their economics areas for just over a year (that was me in December 1988), but I’m quite sure it isn’t anything like $400000 a year –  recall that I paid less than twice my then income for the house.  In fact, in the Reserve Bank’s Annual Report last year, only four people were getting paid at least that much –  the Chief Economist looked to be receiving just over $400000 per annum.  It brings back memories of a training course I did at the Swiss National Bank in 1990, where they told us that house prices in Berne were so high that only the most senior managers could afford to purchase their own house.  I still recall the astonishment I felt, and never imagined it would be like that in New Zealand.

On Monday the Herald ran their regular supplement of QVNZ house values across all the different suburbs and localities in the North Island.    Island Bay median prices have now, apparently gone just over $800000.  No doubt that still seems quite cheap to Aucklanders –  although I did find one North Shore suburb (Birkdale) that was cheaper –  no one much else in likely to find them so.  In the whole of fast-growing Hamilton and Tauranga, only one suburb is that expensive.

Which brings me back to Andrew Little and the Labour Party.  I’m quite happy to take him at his word on his concern for his own son.   But what does it amount to?  It isn’t that long since Little told us (and here) he didn’t want house prices to fall.

But asked if he welcomed signs Auckland house prices were falling, Little said no.

and

“Having the right number of houses, or closer to it, stabilises prices, it doesn’t collapse prices.”

Labour has a list of policies on housing (I’ll come to them in a minute) but are they simply supposed to stop already unaffordable houses getting ever-more unaffordable?

As I’ve noted before, if nominal house prices stayed flat from here, then even if productivity growth picks up quite a bit, it would still be 20 years before house price to income ratios halved from here. It isn’t much of an answer for today’s generation of twenty-somethings, let alone 16 year old Cam.

Flat house prices –  while better than what we’ve had –  just shouldn’t be regarded as an acceptable outcome after the house price inflation of the last 25 years.  I know people who have bought recently, taking on lots of debt to do so, get very uneasy about house prices falling but (a) that is a minority, (b) an increasing number of those buying recently have been quite tightly constrained by LVR limits, and (c) perhaps most importantly, there has never been an economic reform where there were no losers.   Yes, the more people who have entered the market on prices that assume the continuance of regulatory restrictions, the harder it is to undo those restrictions, but the restrictions themselves are pretty morally indefensible in the first place (just like those that had us assembling TVs or cars, or making kids clothes, in New Zealand at vast expense to consumers).

I suspect there is an element of the concern is a worry –  derived from, say, the US and Irish experience last decade – that any significant fall in house prices is somehow economically disastrous.   When a sharp fall in house prices results from massive over-building, and a serious misallocation of credit, that is probably a quite reasonable concern, especially when (as in Ireland) the authorities have no monetary policy leeway to offset the fall in demand associated with the housing slump.    It is a quite different prospect if the falls in house and land prices arise because regulatory restrictions are unwound –  if anything that would be likely to stimulate building activity –  in a country which has its own monetary policy and exchange rate.   That is what could, and should, be done in New Zealand.  We certainly don’t have a problem of an oversupply of new houses.

But what is Labour proposing?  After the Labour Party conference last month, I expressed concern that in a speech largely devoted to housing, Andrew Little had not mentioned at all freeing up the urban land market.  Labour’s housing spokesperson, Phil Twyford has been good on this stuff (and there is still reference to it in the policy documents on the website)

But in the entire speech –  and recall that most of it was devoted to housing –  there was not a single mention of freeing up the market in urban land, reforming the planning system etc.  Not even a hint.    I understand that giving landowners choice etc probably isn’t the sort of stuff that gets the Labour faithful to their feet with applause.   But to include not a single mention of the key distortion that has given us some of the most expensive (relative to income) house prices in the advanced world, doesn’t inspire much confidence.     Planning reform isn’t going to be easy.  Few big reforms are under MMP.  It probably isn’t something the Greens are keen on.  And if the putative Prime Minister isn’t on-board, hasn’t yet internalised (or even been willing to simply state it openly) that this is where the biggest problems lie, it is hard to believe that a new government would really be willing to spend much political capital in reforming and freeing up the system, no matter how capable, hardworking and insightful a portfolio minister might be.

So when the Labour pamphlet landed in the letterbox, I looked to see what Labour was going to do about housing.   The four point plan from Little’s speech, was now reduced to a two point plan (ok, so it is a pamphlet and there is less space)

  • building more houses themselves (“affordable” ones)
  • crack down on foreign speculators

There was also a pledge on “healthy rentals” but, whatever the merits of that, it isn’t going to make housig more affordable.

Perhaps I just don’t get out much, but I’ve seen very little talk of “foreign speculators” playing much of a role –  any in fact –  in the Island Bay market.  They explain, almost certainly, precisely nothing about why my humble first house is valued at roughly three times (in real terms) what I paid for it.

But more importantly there is nothing, not a hint, in the entire pamphlet of freeing up the urban land market.   Sure, one could mount an argument that it might be hard to put that sort of promise into catchy phrases that attract the attention of potential voters.  But that is why you employ marketing people isn’t it?  And successful political leaders find ways of putting their vision into language that resonates with ordinary people.

It all leaves me deeply discouraged about the prospects for meaningful change.  No one else seems to have managed it, and now Labour –  after toying with ideas of reform –  seems to be getting cold feet, and won’t campaign on freeing up the land market.   The outlook for 16 year old Cam isn’t great, and neither it seems is that for my kids.  As I reflected on the friend who wasn’t sure what to advise his kids, I noticed in the Herald house prices supplement that median prices in my old childhood home, Kawerau, were still only $181000.   My younger daughter wants to be a primary school teacher.   She has been hanging around me too long because when we were in the Bay of Plenty on holiday over Christmas I was reading out Kawerau house prices, and her immediate reaction was “Daddy, I want to live there when I grow up”.    Perhaps in time that’s what I’ll have to advise her –  after all, there are national salary scales for teachers.  Kawerau, for all its problems, isn’t all bad as a town, but New Zealand kids surely deserve better than that.

 

Rebalancing: not so much

Rebalancing the economy was a big theme when the current government came to office.

In a brief post on Friday afternoon, I looked back to Bill English’s 2009 Budget speech, shortly after the current government had taken office, and compared his complaints then about the weak export performance in recent years, with the record over the term of the current government.

Of course, exports weren’t the only indicator the then Minister made quite a bit of in his early speeches. I found three such speeches, the 2009 Budget speech, a speech in October 2009 to the Institute of Chartered Accountants (the link to which was working on Friday but not this morning), and the 2010 Budget speech.

There was also a concern about productivity.  In the 2009 Budget

Further, New Zealand’s productivity performance has been poor over the past decade. Ultimately, better productivity growth is the only way to create jobs and sustain high living standards.

And in the NZICA speech

“since 2003, our productivity has sunk to a 25-year low”

and the 2010 Budget referred to

“negative productivity growth between 2000 and 2009”

And there was concern about a lagging tradables sector.  In the 2009 Budget

The common elements to each of these imbalances are excessive growth of the domestic and consumption sectors of the economy. Meanwhile there has been insufficient growth and investment in those parts of the economy that either export or compete with foreign producers.

To NZICA a few months later

…the tradables sector –  that’s exporters or industries competing with imports –  has actually been in recession for five years, contracting by about 10 per cent in that time.

Even more staggering, there have been almost no net jobs created in the tradeables side of the economy for the past 10 years.  By contrast, the non-tradeables sector –  domestic industries not competing with exports, including the Government –  has grown by 15 per cent in the past five years.

And in the 2010 Budget

By contrast, output from exporters and import-competing industries had been in decline since 2005.  These include sectors such as agriculture, horticulture, mining and resources, forestry, fishing, food manufacturing and tourism, all areas where New Zealand should be benefiting from its natural advantages.

And, of course, there was a lot about the shift from fiscal surpluses to fiscal deficits, and about the large current account deficits in the years immediately prior to the recession.

How then have things gone under the watch of the current government?

Before bombarding you with numbers and charts, I would stress that while most of these variables are influenced by government policy choices few are under the direct control of governments, almost all government policies work with a lag, many comparisons also ideally need to take account of what is going on elsewhere in the world, and so on.   So while I will show various comparisons of how some of these economic indicators have done under the National government in the 1990s, the Labour-led government from 1999 to 2008, and the National-led government since then, using averages over the specific terms in office, no one is going to seriously claim that, say, Helen Clark or John  Key coming to office in late 1999 or late 2008 materially altered economic performance in the subsequent quarter or two.   The recession of 2008/09 would have happened, and been more or less as severe as it was, whenever in 2008 or 2009 a New Zealand election had been held.  Fortunately, all three governments held office for prolonged periods, and the use of annual average growth rates also makes comparative growth rates at least a starting point for an informed comparison of the various governments.   Events, good and ill, outside government control all complicate the matter.  To take the current government’s terms as an example, earthquakes were a severe adverse shock, and on the other hand the terms of trade have averaged higher than for many decades.  Neither was, in the slightest, something governments controlled.

What about exports?  Here I’m using annual totals (so the first number is the average growth rate in total per capita annual export volumes from the year to December 1990 to the year to December 1999).

Export volumes (per capita) – annual average growth rate (%)
Bolger-Shipley government term 4.7
Clark government term 2.1
Key-English government term 1.5
2007q4 to now 1.1

I’d probably focus most on the final line –  the growth rate since just before the recession –  even though it doesn’t cleanly line up with one government or the other.

What about the relative performance of the tradables and non-tradables sector.  I’ve used this indicator a lot, but, as I’ve noted previously, the then Minister had been quite keen on it.    This was more or less the chart the Minister would have had in mind in mid 2009 (there have been subsequent data revisions, but they don’t affect the story much).

t and nt to dec 08

The dip in the blue line right at the end was the recession, but tradables sector output appeared to have been stagnating for some years.

And here is how the same chart appears now.

t and nt to dec 16

If you were worried about this indicator in mid 2009 (and not everyone was), things don’t look any better now (this is particularly apparent in the per capita version of this chart here ).

Here are the average annual per capita growth rates for the tradables and non-tradables GDP components.

Tradables Non-tradables
Annual average per capita growth rate
Bolger-Shipley 2.3 1.7
Clark -0.1 2.5
Key-English 1.4 1.1
2007q4 to now -0.6 0.9

An impartial observer would suggest not much change under the current government.  Tradables output appears to have grown faster, but that appears to be only because the government changed at the very bottom of the recession.     Date the comparison from just prior to the recession, and performance on this indicator –  which new Minister of Finance Bill English seemed to quite like –  hasn’t been particularly encouraging.In those quotes I cited earlier, there was reference to employment growth in the tradables and non-tradables sector.  There is no easy way I’m aware of to make that calculation, in a way that lines up with the split in the GDP numbers.  I recall being involved in some discussions at the time about a possible tradables vs non-tradables employment indicator, but can’t now shed any further light.What about productivity?I’m not sure where the Minister got his numbers in 2009 supporting the claim that productivity growth had been negative in the previous few years.  It may have been SNZ’s multi-factor productivity indicator (for the “measured sector”.MFP to 16 MFP measures are quite cyclical –  if plant lies idle in a recession measured MFP will fall –  but unfortunately the latest observations are only around the same levels reached a decade ago.  There was no MFP growth late in the previous boom.  There has been none since.

Labour productivity measures are more widely cited.  I tend to use (and do so here) GDP per hour worked calculated by averaging the two real GDP measures and dividing them by HLFS hours worked.  Treasury uses a production GDP based measure.  It doesn’t materially affect these comparisons (if anything, my measure is slightly more favourable over the last eight years).It would be remiss of me not to remind readers that global productivity growth has also been weak over the last decade, but as I’ve illustrated in various posts, New Zealand has continued do worse than the typical advanced country average over recent years, and our sharp productivity slowdown really seems to date from around 2012.Of course, there is another side of the picture.  There is no doubt credit due for the effort that has gone in to close the fiscal deficit.  In the course of that period, the government accounts have been buffeted, on the one hand by the impact of the earthquakes, and on the other by the record high average terms of trade New Zealand has been enjoying.Interestingly, for those who do want to emphasise the role of fiscal policy in exacerbating or easing pressure on the real exchange rate, here is a chart of government consumption spending (on actual goods and services, not just cash transfers) as a share of GDP.Govt C

Real GDP per hour worked
Annual average growth rate
Bolger-Shipley 1.1
Clark 1.3
Key-English 0.6
2007q4 to now 0.5

It is a certainly a smaller share of the economy than it was during the recession –  that peak was a combination of rising government spending and the way that relatively stable government spending tends to rise as a share of GDP in every recession (you can see it even in the early 1990s).   As of now, government consumption spending as a share of GDP is still almost two full percentage points higher than the share it averaged –  under two different governments – from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s.   Whatever the merits of such spending, it won’t have facilitated any sort of rebalancing of the economy.

We now expect New Zealand governments to run balanced budgets, or even surpluses.  All three governments since 1990 have.  That is no small achievement, but there isn’t much to differentiate one government from the others.

What about the current account deficit?    It certainly is smaller than we had experienced in the years running up to the recession –  but those years look exceptional.

CAD

In fact, the current account deficit at present (2.7 per cent of GDP) isn’t much different from the average over the period 1988 to 2004 (3.1 per cent).   And that despite two things largely outside New Zealand’s control:

  • the interest rate on our quite large accumulated stock of foreign debt is much lower than it was (most of the debt is hedged back to NZD, and New Zealand short-term interest rates in the last four years of the boom averaged 6 per cent or more (the OCR peaked at 8.25 per cent).  The OCR now is 1.75 per cent.    The gap is smaller at longer maturities, but there was a quite unexpected windfall in the reduction in interest rates,
  • the very high average level of the terms of trade (almost 10 per cent higher in the last three years than in the last years of the previous boom).

Another way of expressing the current account balance is the difference between savings and investment.    Government investment as a share of GDP is now much as it was during the pre-recession boom years.  Other investment –  despite all the construction activiity –  is not.

investment to dec 16

Despite all the population growth the non-government sector as a whole appears not to have been finding the scale of remunerative investment opportunities that they were voluntarily undertaking –  wisely or not –  in the pre-recession period.   Not quite the sort of rebalancing that the 2009 Minister of Finance appeared to have in mind.

Perhaps the subdued investment isn’t too surprising given that, on Treasury’s estimates, New Zealand has had a negative output gap –  unemployed excess resources –  for getting on for 10 years now.

And what of saving?  We don’t have a quarterly national savings series, but the other side of savings is spending –  consumption.     An earlier chart showed that government consumption was still running higher than we’d seen previously.   Here is total consumption as a share of GDP.

total consumption

The latest observation is just a little below the average of the history of the series (consistent with the annual national saving rate data, which is just slightly above the average of the history of the series).

What to make of all this?   New Zealand’s productivity performance has been pretty poor, as has the overall performance of its tradable sector.  Consistent with the continuing excess capacity, and perhaps with the weak productivity performance, non-housing private investment has remained pretty subdued, and that is  reflected in the smaller current account deficit than we’d seen for some time.   Economic outcomes are never fully the result of government choices.  But as the current incumbents approach the voters a few months from now, on the sorts of indicators they incumbents were citing, with legitiimate concern, when they came to office, the story doesn’t look like a particularly favourable one, of corners turned, new and better trajectories set out on.   And that without even mentioning house prices.

The Rennie review

A couple of months ago we learned that the new Minister of Finance had requested Treasury to have a review done of two key aspects of the governance of the Reserve Bank:

  • whether something like the existing internal committee in which the Governor makes his OCR decisions should be formalised in legislation, and
  • whether the Reserve Bank should remain the “owner” of the various pieces of legislation (RB Act, as well as the insurance and non-bank legislation) it operates under.

Treasury, in turn, contracted Iain Rennie to conduct the review. Rennie was, until not long ago, State Services Commissioner.  And a bit earlier in his career he had been Treasury’s Deputy Secretary for macroeconomic policy, including all matters to do with the Reserve Bank.

Learning of the review, someone lodged an Official Information Act request with The Treasury, seeking (a) the terms of reference of the review, and (b) the terms on which Rennie was engaged.    Treasury’s response, dated 17 May, is here.

Somewhat strangely, the terms of reference for the review were withheld, allegedly to “maintain the constitutional conventions protecting the confidentiality of advice tendered by ministers and officials”.      Which seems strange because (a) the Minister had already talked to the media (first link above) about what the review would cover, and (b) because Rennie is neither a minister nor an official, just a consultant hired to provide some analysis and advice.  The terms of reference for that work hardly seem to amount to “advice”.   Treasury further state that the terms of reference are withheld “to enable Minister and officials to have undisturbed consideration of advice”.  I’m not clear that that is a statutory ground, and –  as importantly –  how knowledge of a consultant’s terms of reference would interfere with “undisturbed consideration of advice” is far from clear.

But Treasury did release Rennie’s terms of engagement, and some other interesting bits of information.   We learn that

The Treasury is contracting Iain Rennie to provide a report assessing governance and decision-making at the Reserve Bank.

Is this different, I wonder, than looking at the relevant statutory provisions (the implication  of the words is that the report will assess actual governance and decisionmaking, rather than the relevant laws)?  Perhaps not.  The wording might also be taken as implying that the review covers more than just decisionmaking for monetary policy.  If so, that would be welcome.

Pleasingly, Treasury seemed not just to be pushing a single option.

The analysis should outline a few alternative, coherent reform packages, and draw out the central design trade-offs, while making clear a preferred approach.

We also learn, and this did surprise me a little, that the contract period began on 7 February.  That was the day the Minister of Finance announced Grant Spencer’s appointment as acting Governor, having taken the relevant paper to Cabinet that morning.   If Rennie’s contract started from 7 February, presumably the Minister’s decision to initiate this review work had been taken some time earlier –  perhaps not long after he took office.

When he took the job, Rennie undertook to have his report completed by 31 March (in return for $60000 + GST).  In fact, the papers confirm that Rennie took longer than expected and, by mutual agreement, the final report was delivered to Treasury on 18 April.

In undertaking this contract, Rennie and Treasury agreed that

In completing the work, the author will engage with an agreed set of domestic and international experts

This seems a strange provision.  It suggests that Treasury could veto who Rennie could consult with in researching the issues and analysing the options.  It would be very interesting to know who these experts are –  perhaps especially the domestic ones.   (I’ve written extensively on the issues and wasn’t consulted –  not that I had expected to be.)  I will lodge an OIA request for that information.

Having received Rennie’s report, Treasury has a further step in the process, presumably before they pass on the report, and their own advice, to the Minister of Finance.

The key deliverable is a report, which will be peer reviewed by a panel of international experts.

Again, it would be useful –  and interesting to know –  which “international experts” they are consulting, and perhaps a little surprising that the peer review process does not appear to include people who might be expert in New Zealand public sector governance.  The Reserve Bank is,  after all, one government entity among many.

It would be good if we could get some clear answers from Treasury and the Minister of Finance as to when the final report, together with comments from the peer reviewers, might be available.   In his earlier comments, Steven Joyce told the Fairfax journalist that  “he expected Rennie to report back some time after May’s Budget”.   That was clearly somewhat misleading –  the original contract had a report back from Rennie by 31 March –  but even setting that aside, it is now after the Budget.    As this is an issue where the political parties differ –  Labour, the Greens, and (I think) New Zealand First already promising change –  it would be highly desirable to have this expert report, peer-reviewed by international experts, in the public domain as soon as possible.

In digging around, I stumbled across The Treasury’s 2001 advice to the then Minister of Finance on the recommendations of the Svensson inquiry into monetary policy and the Reserve Bank.  I’d seen it at the time, but long since forgotten it.  The principal author  of the paper was someone who is now a Treasury Deputy Secretary, but his boss –  also listed on the paper –  was one Iain Rennie, then deputy secretary responsible for matters macro.

Svensson had a number of sensible recommendations.  Until that time, the Governor had chaired the Reserve Bank Board, even though the Board’s main job was to monitor and hold the Governor to account.  That was clearly a nonsense, and Svensson recommended change.  That recommendation has been adopted and the law was changed accordingly.   But Svensson also recommended removing the Governor from the Board altogether –  it being, at very least, anomalous to have the Governor as a member of a body whose main purpose is to review his own performance (as distinct, say, from a business in which a Managing Director might be a member of the board, but in that case the Board has all the ultimate strategic decisionaming responsibilities).  The Police Commissioner, for example, isn’t involved in the governance of the IPCA.  Rennie and Treasury advised against making that change, even though they explicitly recognised what the role of the Board was.   Quite why is never made clear.

And then, perhaps more importantly, Svensson recommended that the law be changed to shift away from the single decisionmaker structure, in which all executive powers are vested in the Governor personally.  Even then, in 2001, it was an unusual model internationally.  Svensson proposed legislating to give an internal committee of senior Bank managers the formal decisionmaking powers.

Here was the response of Rennie’s wing of Treasury.

We believe the clear and strong accountability of the present structure has considerable merit.  The Governor is solely and clearly responsible for monetary policy performance and may be dismissed by the Minister in the event of inadequate performance.  While the Minister’s ability to dismiss a poorly performing Governor may be severely limited in practice, his ability to dismiss a poorly performing committee would be even more limited.

The formation of a decision-making committee would require extensive changes to the Reserve Bank Act.  The statutory responsibility for price stability that currently rests with the Governor, and the statutory relationship between the Minister and the Governor, would need to be amended to give effect to the responsibilities of the Committee.

The issues raised above suggest that the potential benefits of forming a formal internal decision-making committee are likely to be small.

Having taken such a stance then, one can only hope that in conducting his recent review, Rennie is rather more open to change than he was in 2001.   (I should add that I did not then, and do not now, think Svensson’s specific recommendation should have been adopted –  but there are other feasible approaches to adopting a collective decisionmaking model).  It is striking, for example, that in this Treasury advice there is no mention at all of how other government agencies in New Zealand are governed (hint: none involving policy setting involve single decisionmakers, with no rights of appeal).  It is also telling of how the Bank has changed –  by legislation and gubernatorial inclination –  that there is no discussion at all of how the financial regulatory powers of the Bank should be governed.  In many respects, the advice seems stuck in the 1980s –  when the Reserve Bank structure was first designed –  including with the emphasis on the ability of the Minister to sack an individual relative to a committee.  That was an important consideration in the late 1980s, but it isn’t one that has led us to have other government rule-making, policymaking, agencies governed by single (unelected) decisionmakers.

It is, of course, a little unfair to hold anyone to advice they offered sixteen years ago, and I’m not seriously attempting to.  Times and attitudes, and responsibilities, change. But it can be difficult at times for senior people to walk away from public stances on important issues that they have taken previously.   I hope that when we finally see the Rennie report, a willingness to approach the issue with a genuinely fresh set of eyes is evident.

Exports, as seen from the 2009 Budget

I was exchanging notes with someone earlier this afternoon about how the government has lapsed into blather and “making it up” in so many areas.  I was pointing out how doubly sad it was because when the government had first taken the office, the then Minister of Finance –  now Prime Minister –  seemed to have a real concern about some of serious underlying imbalances and indicators of underperformance.  I used to help provide material to his office in support of that.

It is hard to track down old ministerial speeches that far back.  But take the 2009 Budget speech as just one example.  The Minister of Finance said

Indeed export volumes have on average grown by less than 2 per cent annually over the past five years. It has been hard being an exporter in recent times.

noting that

in the long term New Zealand must balance its economy in favour of more investment and jobs in internationally competitive industries.

So how has New Zealand done since?

English on exports

The Minister delivered this speech in May 2009, so presumably the latest data he had available was that to December 2008 (right at the worst of the recession).  In the five years to December 2008, export volumes had indeed –  even with subsequent data revisions –  increased by a bit under 2 per cent per annum.

Export growth had certainly been falling away quite sharply over the previous few years, and those peak growth rates from the five years to 1995 (almost 8 per cent) and to 2003 (almost 6 per cent) were distant memories.  But perhaps a fairer benchmark might not be growth rates to the depth of the severe recession, but perhaps in the five years to the end of the boom.  That seems doubly so because the Minister was arguing that the boom had been severely unbalanced, an opportunity wasted etc.  In the five years to December 2007 (the last pre-recession quarter) export volumes had grown at an average annual rate of 2.7 per cent.

And how are things now?   In his Budget last week, the new Minister of Finance asserted that

Under the Government’s strong economic leadership, New Zealand is shaping globalisation to its advantage.  We’ve embraced increased trade, new technologies, innovation and investment.

In the last five years, export volumes have grown at an annual average rate of 2.83 per cent.   It is a little better than those five years to December 2007.   But if 2.7 per cent annual growth was unsatisfactory, it must be hard to regard 2.83 per cent with equanimity.   Average export growth rates have been much lower under this government than under its predecessor.    Not exactly “shaping globalisation to our advantage……embraced increased trade”.

Now, of course, exports aren’t everything, and we only export so that we can import.  But it is a pretty meagre result.  At least back in 2009, the government could face the challenges squarely (they happened on someone else’s watch).   By now, eight years on, all they seem to have left is falling back on rhetoric, and hoping no one notices the data.

As the (now) Prime Minister noted in 2009, it had been “hard to be an exporter in recent times”.  The real exchange rate had increased a lot during those boom years.    In his 2009 Budget speech the Minister was welcoming the sharp fall in the exchange rate.  Unfortunately –  given the lack of sustained productivity growth to match –  that proved rather fleeting, and it has averaged just as high in the last seven years or so, as it did in the last few years of the previous government’s term.

rerReal exchange rates aren’t things that ministers or governors directly control.  They reflect the balance of (tradables vs non-tradables) forces in the economy.  That balance here –  still –  makes it hard to manage much export volume growth from New Zealand.

 

 

A tale of two economies

I’ve never known much about Romania.  There was Olivia Manning’s Balkan TrilogyRichard Wurmbrand was one of the Christian heroes of my youth, and there were the bleak last years of Ceaucescu culminating in a firing squad on Christmas Day 1989.  But that was about it. I had occasionally used it as an example of a rare country that had managed less growth in per capita income than New Zealand over the 20th century.   The rule of law, private property, strong institutions and freedom have quite a lot to be said for them.

And then the other day, an eastern European immigrant to New Zealand was commenting here.  I was curious why an east European had chosen New Zealand, as several of the eastern European economies seemed to have pretty good prospects, perhaps even better than those of New Zealand.  I had in mind especially the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia (each now with GDP per hour worked very similar to that in New Zealand).  In our subsequent exchange, it turned out that he was Romanian.

And that prompted me to go and check out some data on Romania.  It was a pretty sobering story, for a New Zealander.

Romania had its ups and downs in the 20th century.   Just prior to World War One (when we were one of handful of richest countries in the world) Romania was doing well.   GDP per capita is estimated to have been 75 per cent of that of, say, Norway.   They did really badly for the following 30 years, and then –  on these measures –  quite well economically for the first few communist decades (large scale industrialisation etc).  As with many of the eastern bloc countries, things worsened again for them in the 1980s. Older readers may remember accounts of the “austerity policy” in which everything –  particularly citizen living standards –  was subordinated to repaying the government’s foreign debt.

Things actually got quite a lot worse for Romania (at least in bottom line economic numbers, even if they were free), as for many of the former eastern bloc countries, in the years immediately after end of communist rule (so many distortions to unwind, so many governance problems etc).  In Romania’s case things finally bottomed out –  at least relative to New Zealand – in 2000.

Absolute levels comparisons between Romania and New Zealand are a bit fraught.  Romania isn’t in the OECD, and while they are in the EU we aren’t.  Here are ratios of Romania’s GDP per capita, in purchasing power parity terms, relative to New Zealand since 1990 from (a) the IMF World Economic Outlook database, and (b) the Conference Board Total Economy database.

Romania 2

Those of you who want to be relatively more upbeat on the New Zealand story might choose to emphasise the Conference Board number, and to note that – even after ending decades of communism – on that measure Romania now isn’t much higher relative to New Zealand than it was in 1990.  Personally from all the accounts I’ve seen, I’m more than a little sceptical that Romania’s real living standards in 1990 were in fact half those of New Zealand.   Things are better measured now.

But here is the Conference Board’s real GDP per hour worked series (Romania relative to New Zealand).  The Romanian data only go back to 1995, and these days Romanian statistics are part of Eurostat (ie they won’t be perfect, but I’m not sure there is more reason to doubt statistics for them than for us).

romania 3

In absolute terms it isn’t such a stunning achievement –  since New Zealand productivity growth has lagged that of most other advanced countries over this period –  but………..one of the once-richest countries of the world is on course for having Romania, almost a byword in instability, repression etc for so many decades, catch us up.  It would take a while if current trends continue.  But not that long.  Simply extrapolating the relative performance of just the last decade (and they had a very nasty recession in 2008/09 during that time) about another 20 years.

So how we do maintain a big lead in GDP per capita?  Simply by having more people work more hours.  Here is hours worked per capita (ie per man, woman, and child of all ages).

romania 4

The next time you hear Steven Joyce, or some other minister or business cheerleader, boast that we have more people working than most countries, do try to remember that labour is a cost (to individuals, who would often do other stuff instead if they could) and that the Stakhanovite cult –  extolling the virtues of tireless labour –  was a feature of the communist system, not ours.

Of course, if people do want to work and can’t, then there is a problem.  We measure that through the unemployment statistics.  Romania’s unemployment rate is a bit higher than New Zealand, but at 5.5 per cent the difference is pretty small.  We still do a lot things better than Romania:  we score top of the Transparency International rankings, while Romania is 57th.  We top the World Bank’s ease of doing business index, and they are 36th (not bad at all given where they came from, but a long way off us).   But look at the bottom line growth and productivity performances.

Of course, sometimes what you find in countries with a run of impressive-looking fast growth is that:

  • it is built on big government deficits, or
  • big ill-founded private credit booms, reflected in
  • big current account deficits, and
  • appreciating real exchange rates, with an economy increasingly skewed towards construction and domestic demand.

Our government finances are in better shape than theirs.  The Romanian government (on IMF numbers) has a deficit of about 2 per cent of GDP, while we have a small surplus.  Gross government debt in New Zealand is about 30 per cent of GDP, and in Romania it is about 40 per cent.  But even that is pretty low by advanced country standards.   And for my friends who like to emphasise size of government, (still on IMF numbers) both revenue and expenditure as a share of GDP are a bit smaller in Romania than in New Zealand.

Romanian private credit was very rapid, and looked rather risky, in the years leading up to 2008.  But not now.  There is a chart at the link, and overall domestic credit growth has been running at under 5 per cent per annum for the last few years.

Reflecting the pre-crisis boom in private credit, the Romanian current account deficit widened sharply.    But these days, deficits in Romania are similar to the modest ones we currently have in New Zealand.

romania 5

Romanian investment has fallen back from what they experienced in the credit boom period.  Then again, it is still higher, as a share of GDP, than that in New Zealand.

romania 6

In fact, they had exactly the sort of worrying real exchange rate appreciation one might have expected in the credit-boom years.

romania 7

But after that credit boom ended, the real exchange rate fell back.

Perhaps consistent with that, firms based in Romania seem to have been doing rather well in international markets.  Exports look as though they were squeezed out during the credit boom, but the subsequent recovery and trend growth is pretty impressive.  For a country with a population of about 20 million people, it is a reasonably high foreign trade share (this is exports, but imports are equally important).  Australia, for example, is around 20 per cent of GDP.

romania 8(You will recall that New Zealand has been going backwards on this metric.)

And there was one other interesting comparison.

romania 9

Since 1990, Romania’s population has fallen by 16 per cent, and ours has risen by 40 per cent.   There are several differences.  As I showed a few weeks ago, New Zealand’s total fertility rate over recent decades has been averaging below replacement.  Romania’s has been materially lower still, currently around 1.4.   And both countries have had material outflows of their own citizens: we had a net outflow of New Zealand citizens of around half a million people since 1990.    Romania has also had big outflows but (as far as I can tell) smaller cumulatively than those from New Zealand (there is a reference here to about 2.3 million Romanians living abroad long-term).

But, of course, the other difference is non-citizen immigration.  We’ve for a long time aimed to grant residence approvals equal to around 1 per cent of the population each year.  Since 1990, those policies have given us a net inflow of around one million non-citizens.

The OECD’s International Migration Outlook recorded in 2015 that

Romania sets annual quotas for work authorisations to be issued, although historically demand has been lower than the quotas.  For both 2014 and 2015, the quotas were set at 5500, including 900 intra-corporate transfers and 900 highly-skilled migrants.

In a country of 20 million people.   Not necessarily a policy I’d recommend, but……

Subdued population growth (well, falling population actually) doesn’t seem to have been inconsistent with a pretty impressive period of productivity growth, export growth, strong investment etc etc, all in a country still with its share of governance and regulatory problems.  And that investment isn’t largely having to keep up with a rapidly rising population, it is presumably responding the incentives and opportunities firms are finding).  Perhaps the Romanians, in aggregate and in some sense, wish their population wasn’t falling –  there is still anguishing about the outflow of skilled people – but probably their best hope of reversing that (perhaps slim given the low birth rate) is to keep right on with what they’ve been doing for the last 10 years.  In time, perhaps many of the diaspora might even return –  as they started to in Ireland after they finally got their act together.

30 years ago, Bob Jones toured the country lamenting that the New Zealand economy had come to resemble a Polish shipyard, a byword for inefficiency and industrial disruption.  I do hope in 30 years time there aren’t reforming Romanian politicians campaigning, warning their fellow citizens to avoid the decline and fall of New Zealand.  Yes, for now they are still poorer and, on average, less productive than we are. But those gaps have started closing fast, and the foundations of the growth don’t look that bad at all.

UPDATE: I forgot to mention Romania’s 16 per cent company tax rate.  Not sure (whether as Baptist or economist) I quite approve of the separate regime for nightclubs and gambling operations.

(On another topic, I discovered that my name was being bandied around in Parliament’s question time the other day   –  question 2 here. Winston Peters was quoting me, and Steven Joyce was batting him away.  All good fun no doubt.     But I did notice this comment from the Minister “I appreciate that the member has been talking to Mr Reddell a bit”.  In fact, I have never met Mr Peters, I have never talked to him, never emailed him or had any contact with him whatsoever.  If he or his office appear to read my stuff at times well, of course, I welcome that, as I welcome any readers.   Specific policy proposals, that might actually make a difference, would be even more welcome.)