NZSF: engaging an alternative perspective

Andrew Coleman is one of New Zealand’s smartest economists, one of those people I learn something from almost every time I talk to him, or read something he has written.   Andrew currently divides his time between the University of Otago and the Productivity Commission.  But we disagree, it appears quite starkly, on the place of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund.  I’ve written various posts, mostly quite critical of the Fund for a variety of reasons (some things in NZSF’s own control, others a reflection of the political choices that led to the establishment of the NZSF).    I favour winding up the Fund and using the proceeds to repay debt.

In response to a couple of posts in recent months, Andrew has posted substantive and thoughtful comments that appear to be intended as a defence of the current system, and the place of NZSF in that system.   The first set was here and the second set was posted here on Saturday night.

As I understand it, Andrew and I share a view that there should be a universal public pension scheme, that is not less generous (relative to, say, average wages) than the current system.  Where, I think, there is a difference is that I firmly believe that the age of eligibility for NZS should be increased, and that subsequent further increases in the age of eligibility should be linked to further improvements in life expectancy (there should also be rather tighter residence requirements for eligibility) .    This makes a material difference because under my preferred model, NZS spending does not keep on increasing as a share of GDP, and is a manageable expense/burden for society. By contrast, Andrew often appears to be writing in a context that treats the current eligibility rules as a given, and thus focusing on how best to finance those (political) commitments.

Andrew puts a lot of emphasis on save-as-you-go (SAYGO) funding models, as distinct from pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) models.  A funded defined benefit pension scheme is a classic SAYGO model –  employees and the employer put aside money each week for, say, 40 years, and at retirement there is, in principle, enough to finance the employee’s pension for the rest of his or her life.  The power of compound interest has been harnessed.   In principle, at least in respect of the employer’s contribution, it could have been done another way: the firm could simply have invested the money itself (including reinvesting in its own operations) and then paid its share of the pensions as they fall due.  The reason that isn’t a good model is that (a) pensions of this sort are deferred remuneration and individual employees (reasonably enough) want a secure and certain claim, and (b) firms come and go, management changes, businesses fail etc.   A separate legal entity – a superannuation fund, with a trust deed etc – is the preferred way to go, but not because one approach involves saving and the other doesn’t, but because of agency/governance/enforcement issues.

How does the NZS/NZSF model fit in to this sort of picture?

First, as I noted in some earlier comments to Andrew

Our difference is around the specific place for the NZSF. Personally, I see any connection between it and NZS as just political branding. NZSF is just a set of govt-owned financial assets, and one can’t really put ribbons round particular pots of money.

NZSF does not make any future NZS promises more affordable,  If it manages reasonable returns –  as one might expect over time – it modestly improves the government’s overall financial position, and hence its ability to meet all future spending aspirations at something like current tax rates.

I’d prefer to think of managing the government’s balance sheet and income/expenditure, both now and across time, in an overall way, rather than assigning individual pots of money to individual line items.  That seems likely to be more efficient. It is also more realistic, about the nature of how government finances will end up being managed.  Governments can’t bind themselves to not use one pot of money labelled for purpose X for purpose Y if subsequent pressures change.  Probably, nor should they.  Wars happen, disasters happen, the uncertain happens.

Thus, Andrew argues the economic merits of savings, and I wouldn’t disagree with him particularly.  But in my proposal to wind up the NZSF and use the proceeeds to reduce debt, there is nothing that would reduce either public or private savings.  All that would happen is that the government balance sheet would be less leveraged (less debt, fewer financial assets, no change to the operating balance).  I’m also quite relaxed about the notion that if a government is going to take on far-future financial commitments (like an NZS) scheme, it should probably have a stronger balance sheet (more savings, less net debt) than a government that did none of those sort of things.   A balance sheet with near-zero net debt –  when, as Andrew notes, the government is very long-lived –  and extensive real asset holdings, in a country with above-average population growth, looks pretty cautious to me. Excluding a handful of countries with non-renewable natural resource extraction proceeds (Norway, Abu Dhabi etc), our government finances are among the most conservatively managed in the world.

So the issue isn’t one of whether the government should save or not, but simply of how much it should save.  I’m not sure of the answer to that question, but there are both political and economic dimensions to any answer.

Among those economic questions is whether, and if so to what extent, additional government savings (or even compelled private savings) actually raises national savings.   If there was full offset (every dollar of additional public savings was offset by an equivalent reduction in private savings) there would be no obvious societal benefit at all (in fact, given the deadweight costs of taxation – and intermediation costs – there would net welfare costs to society).    I see no evidence that, for example, the Australian compulsory savings system has raised national savings rates in Australia.  As for government savings itself, there seems to be plenty of sign of at least some private offset.

Among the political, or political economy, questions are ones about the durability of large tax-funded holdings of government financial assets in a democratic society.  It is one thing for governments to hold large asset pools in societies with little or no democratic accountability (Singapore, Abu Dhabi and so on) or even when the assets arise from a non-renewable natural resource (as in Norway).    It is another matter altogether when the assets are tax-funded, and governments face voters every few years, in a country no longer particularly well-off by advanced country standards.  Such accumulations of assets invite electoral auctions. They also invite political jockeying to see that the assets are used in line with the priorities and preferences of those currently in power (or, indeed, of those who happen to be managing the money).

There also arguments advanced that it would be natural for any portfolio to have some significant equity exposure to (for example) secure some of the equity risk premium for the Crown.  Against some abstract benchmark in which the government was otherwise funded by lump sum taxes on the one hand, and simply paid NZS on the other, I would agree.  But that isn’t what government finances (here or abroad) look like.  Through the income tax system, the government already has an effective equity stake in every business enterprise in the country (28 per cent of all profits go to the Crown, 28 per cent of losses can usually be written off against future earnings).  And the Crown has an extensive base of real assets (equity exposures) –  whether shares in SOEs or the extensive holdings of schools, hospital, roads etc (which don’t produce a dividend stream, but save the Crown paying user fees which would include someone else’s dividend stream).

Perhaps there is a case for more Crown equity exposures, but that case really needs to be made convincingly against the backdrop of the overall public finances, not just thought of relative to future expected NZS payments.   It should also be thought about in the context of citizens’ own “risk budgets”: increased equity exposures taken on by Crown agencies should, rationally, be offset at least in part by reduced private holdings.

In his writings in this area, Andrew Coleman puts quite a lot of emphasis on government (and, by extension, NZSF) as a long-lived agent, better placed to invest in long-term assets than the private sector, and less prone to liquidity pressures.   I think he is mostly wrong about that, for a variety of reasons.  From an anecdotal perspective, NZSF seems to have had more asset allocation changes in the last decade or so than the modest superannuation scheme I’m a trustee of.    But, and much more importantly, the government (at least in a democracy) doesn’t stand remote from its citizens and taxpayers, and taxpayers/voters don’t like large losses, and (I’d argue) especially not when their personal finances are already under greater than usual stress.   NZSF will record large losses in the next serious global recession –  the more so, as NZSF hedges back to NZD –  and that recession is also likely to put stress on the New Zealand government’s operating balances.     There is likely to be heightened pressure on the government, and on those managing the Fund, to account for their losses, and perhaps to cut those losses.  It might be silly, wrong, or in some longer-term sense irrational, but no investment strategy should ever be operated without considering the extreme loss tolerances of the ultimate investor (in this case, not some detached Treasury official, but voters).   I’m sceptical that the public is comfortable with the potential for tens of billions of annual mark to market losses (the scale we could be looking at if NZSF gets much bigger), coming at a time when (say) taxes are being raised or public spending is being cut.  In other words, even if an NZSF strategy offered possible longer-term benefits, it would do so only at the cost of concentrating periods of pain.

Another aspect of Andrew’s argument is an assumption (implicit, and sometimes explicit) that governments can be trusted, and will typically be good economic stewards.  It is far from clear why we should expect them to be so, especially when entrusted with other people’s money.  Each citizen has a strong interest in their own future financial position, and (one hopes) that of their children and grandchildren.   As individuals, politicians no doubt have the same interest.  But let lose on a whole country, politicians have interests which are rather different –  often as focused on the next election as anything longer –  and with little accountability (beyond losing office) if things go wrong.  These same governments that Andrew wants us to entrust more of our money to are the same sorts of governments that did Think Big, that turned our economy inwards for decades from the 1930s, that take us into wars, that ran us into serious debt problems (whether in 1939 or 1990), and so on.  They are same group who cavalierly talk of pursuing net zero carbon targets, even if the consequence is that (on their own numbers) GDP is cut by 10 to 22 per cent, with the costs falling disproportionately on the poor).   I’m not some anarchist who wants to get rid of all government, but I don’t think the track record is particularly good, especially when governments want to commit our money/resources for the long-term.

And all this is before we look at the specifics of the way NZSF has actually been run:

  • overselling its investment returns in a rising market, while quietly noting that it takes 20 years of data to seriously evaluate their sort of risky strategies (which may do no real direct harm, but speaks to integrity),
  • used (together with ACC) to solve the previous government’s Kiwibank capital issues, in ways that inject no additional expertise to Kiwibank, while corroding effective accountability for this risky government-owned assets (no doubt at favourable pricing for NZSF, but at cost to the system),
  • the decision to reduce carbon exposures, purportedly as a normal risk-return call on business prospects, but nonetheless implemented in a way where the consequences can’t be monitored, and thus looked more like virtue-signalling and playing politics than a serious neutral investment stance,
  • the opportunistic bid to own part of all of the new light rail proposals. NZSF has little or no apparent experience in such assets, which themselves appear uneconomic, and thus the approach again smacks of politics and lobbying, more than pursuit of citizens’ longer-term interest.
  • the latest attempt to lobby for huge tax concessions (adding new distortions to the system) for projects (and project partners) they want to get involved in.

These problems will only get more serious if the Fund is allowed to grow larger. One experience which shook my confidence was involvement a decade ago in the then-government’s Jobs Summit, which occurred at the trough of the last recession.  The NZSF fund was small then, and the pressures were resisted, but it was likes bees round a honey pot as people (well-motivated and not) emerged with ideas of how the moneypot could be used to help.  Those pressures will return next time.

And all that is before the ethical investment question.    We all have exposures to all industries (legal, moral or not) through the tax system, but NZSF involves active choices to put our money in individual companies. You might not be comfortable with whaling companies, tobacco companies, arms companies, or even financial institutions like AMP. I’m not comfortable with exposures to hospital chains that do abortions, or conglomerates that produce pornography, and I’m not keen on funding McDonalds either. My point isn’t that my preferences are better than yours or vice versa, but investment is participation, it is support, and those investment choices are neither a natural nor necessary part of a New Zealand government.  (Neither is a large leveraged investment fund.)

In many respects, the governance provisions of the NZSF aren’t badly set up, if one is going to have a body of this sort.  But rules of that sort can only take one so far.  All Board members will have their own futures in mind –  and governments have lots of apppointments in their gift.  The same goes for the CEO.    And, of course, so many people now have business dealings with NZSF, including competing for investment mandates, that it is hard to ensure that ongoing robust scrutiny an asset of that size deserves.

As I’ve noted previously, one way to reduce some of the risks around NZSF would be to amend the legislation to prohibit the NZSF dealing with New Zealand or local governments (to buy or sell assets, or to invest in proposals floated by government agencies) –  or perhaps even just to restrict exposures to, say, 5 per cent of any project/deal.    It would restrict NZSF’s opportunities, but it would also restrict the scope for logrolling, sweetheart deals, and all the sort of stuff that simply shouldn’t happen in the idealised world some supporters envisage for NZSF.

Finally, in his most recent comments, Andrew posed this point

So here’s a question, in the interest of debate: Do you have similar issues with the ACC fund? And if not, what is different about the ACC fund that makes it better than the NZSF fund?

Actually, a few months ago I noted that I thought it was worth putting ACC onto a PAYGO basis –  and to the extent there are very long-term commitments on the Crown balance sheet, that should influence the overall structure of the Crown finances, including the extent to which the Crown saves (rather than have an individual ACC moneypot).  As it happens, the ACC investment performance has been better than that of NZSF.   But my views on ACC are influenced more by my long-term doubts about the merits, or the fairness, of treating all accident victims differently from those with very long-term illnesses or disabilities.

In conclusion, I think there two quite separate issues to evaluate, and we don’t help either conversation by conflating them (as the previous Labour government attempted to when it set up NZSF).  There is the question of what an appropriate NZS policy should be.  But then there are the, largely separable questions of:

  • what the appropriate overall shape of the government balance sheet, and income statement should look like, and
  • what, if any, role a standalone leveraged global investment fund has to play in such a balance sheet.

Answering either question needs to range widely, and consider likely private sector responses to public sector choices, governance constraints, and the long track record of ambitious government interventions here and abroad.

 

 

 

9 thoughts on “NZSF: engaging an alternative perspective

  1. Unfortunately, Andrew Coleman within the Productivity Commission is clearly doing an extremely poor job identifying the core issues in NZ productivity poverty. But then again most NZ economists keep forgetting the 10 million cows it takes to generate a poverty stricken $15 billion in GDP. or that Primary Industries pays less than 5% of the total tax revenue of the government but expects 100% subsidies by the government.

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  2. I actually see merits in having compelled savings (private and public) and look at the wealth profile of Australia and also the vibrancy of their financial markets as evidence of positive consequences.
    From a public savings perspective there does need to be the right governance, mandate-preservation and interference-minimising arrangements in place for funds like NZSF and ACC. Clearly each fund has different strategies (both asset allocation and investment execution), philosophies and cultures in place which influence how they participate in the market. Responding to Andrew’s point, NZSF is a bit of a target because they make themselves one – they generate good returns but clearly want to be a vocal market participant seeking to influence both the market and regulatory settings. At this stage ACC appears to prefer the approach of quietly going about its business, actively investing in assets including NZ infrastructure development (which appears to be a big sector bugbear of NZSF) and also generating good returns; they don’t court, and therefore don’t get, the attention.

    Some other suggestions on top of MR’s view that both ACC and NZSF could be restricted from taking large (>5%) positions to remove undue influence:
    – You could go further and also require them to just invest passively and/or via expert managers who are better aligned by having their own skin in the game (or you could require ACC/NZSF staff to invest their own personal cash in the fund assets to give them skin in the game too).
    – You could set up separate funds for domestic national interest vs investment returns; both the Norwegian and Australian Sovereign systems do this – as I understand it they have separate capital pools for domestic “nation building” vs pension system buffering. The separation of objectives (and required return profiles) then allows a pure investment approach rather than muddying the waters and engaging in political gamesmanship to get subsidised returns for a commercial objective fund.
    (Of course, both the Norwegian and Australian funds are in MR’s construct true sovereign wealth funds – capitalised by surplus Government wealth as a result of finite commodity resource booms. So their domestic investments are funded from national savings, not national borrowing…)
    – The other area for improvement is better transparency around returns. Both ACC and NZSF are reasonably good on transparency but I would argue need to go even further as their boards are really part of the public sector gig-go-round (with low reward for being too active) and their monitoring agencies are poorly equipped to understand and manage the portfolio risk profiles. Given there are no wealth rewards/penalties for the teams from doing well/badly, you need to introduce granular transparency to avoid the inevitable agency issues with people playing with public money in a no-consequence manner. How about both funds report asset class/team level performance (not just total fund returns) vs asset class benchmarks, plus granular portfolio costs and also portfolio leverage/derivative positions (ie both funds are financed by borrowings so you don’t want to see portfolio leverage on top of funding leverage)?

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  3. I’m not surprised.

    Another way of looking at my perspective is to compare NZ govt finances 100 years ago and now. Debt was hugely higher, (world and NZ) real interest rates were higher, population growth was robust, and yet there were few long-term commitments (eg NZS, ACC, invalid benefits etc). One could argue that a big part of the difference is (as if) it were savings recognising the need to support those long-term commitments (ie SAYGO). I’m not suggesting it was consciously so, but neither am I suggesting (as SAYGO supporters sometimes seem to) that by not supporting NZSF or compulsory private savings that I think there are no implications of NZS for the structure of the rest of the Crown finances, including the net asset position.

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  4. Isn’t an NZSF fund invested in foreign assets a good hedge against poor performance of the New Zealand economy? If we continue to lag behind the rest of the world in economic growth, well, at least we’re benefiting from foreign economic growth through the NZSF.

    Obviously this would be absurd venture for a large country to get involved in. But such a hedge seems pretty natural for a small country with an economy still largely dependent on a few key industries, and with this unlikely to change anytime soon. We’re super vulnerable to changing fortunes. If the government can diversify its income sources, surely we’re all the better for that?

    There is a real threat. We can’t predict the future. But to identify just a few possible threats: the lab-grown “clean meat” technology and inevitable analogs in synthetic dairy, and their consequences for our agricultural industry; our increasing dependence on China and the uncertainty associated with their long-term trajectory; rising trade barriers among the world’s largest countries.

    This would be different if the cost of borrowing was less than the income gained. But the government can borrow at a lower rate than the return it receives from NZSF.

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    • The government can borrow at a lower rate than the return it needs to give to the NZSF. NZSF needs a decent return, higher than the 2.8% cost of funds for the government from its investments in order to remain viable to meet its current mandate to a provide an income to above 65 NZ residents.

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    • A (private) build-up of net overseas assets would, indeed, be a rational and expected response (all else equal) if future prospects here were poor. Households would tend to save more (not expecting such strong future income growth) and investment would be subdued, and in consequence the NIIP position would swing towards positive.

      But that is a rather different thing from the govt taking it upon itself to build up such assets (while still having considerable gross debt). The government isn’t an independent agency, but just one that draws on our willingness to pay taxes etc (and not to adjust our behaviour to offset what they are doing).

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  5. Thanks for your comments, Michael

    I suspect we agree on some of these issues, although not others. I agree that a major problem with a sovereign wealth fund is that a future government may be tempted to confiscate it. We have actual experience of this in New Zealand: The National Endowment Act of 1907 set aside 7 million acres of land to fund education and old age pensions in perpetuity, but in the 1920s this Endowment was folded into the general fund and nothing more was heard of it. Personally, I favour a much stronger governance structure than the one we have. For instance, we could have cohort specific funds (fund investing the moneys paid in by those born in the 1970s for instance) which could only be changed or governed by people born from those cohorts. Neither the acting Prime Minister, the Prime Minister, or the previous Prime Minister could fiddle with that one.It is worth noting that good governance is possible: US States typically have their own funds to pay the pensions of state workers and these have always resisted raids. (Bosworth and Burtless (2004) have a nice description of this issue in the National Tax Journal, where they contrast the governance structures of U.S. states with national governments)

    May I briefly address a couple of your points?

    The age of eligibility is not actually my central concern. Raising the age in line with rising life expectancy (or more particularly with the rising late-life employment opportunities that are associated with improving late-life health) does not remove the problem of the opportunity cost associated with PAYGO funded retirement schemes. The problem occurs so long as the rate of return to capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy, for then any future pension could be achieved at lower cost through a SAYGO scheme. With reasonable values (growth rate of real GDP = 2.5%, real return to capital = 5%) a dollar invested in a SAYGO scheme each year over the typical life of a person starting young and growing old will return twice as much as a dollar contributed in a PAYGO scheme. A young person born in NZ or moving to NZ inherits some infrastructure and an education that helps them, and some debt and a PAYGO funded pension scheme that hurts them. The opportunity costs associated with the PAYGO pension scheme is large and increasing – and it will continue to increase unless the age of eligibility rises an awful lot. People your age and my age (which, I understand, is about the same because it’s not true that I have been 37 for 6 years) did not have to pay too much in pensions in the 1990s and 2000s because there weren’t many people born in the 1920s and 1930s relative to the numbers born in the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover some of those who were born in those decades had a relatively short life expectancy either because they got shot during wars or learned to smoke during wars or because medical technology was relatively primitive. This is one of the reasons the opportunity costs is rising: the ratio of old people to working age people is rising for reasons other than rising life-expectancy. Even if this ration was not rising, the opportunity cost would still be very high. PAYGO schemes are inefficient ways of funding retirement incomes in a dynamically efficient economy.

    To my mind this means it is worth while searching for a mechanism to deliver efficient SAYGO outcomes. This could be a public SAYGO fund such as the NZSF (which I believe could have very good risk sharing benefits); it could be a compulsory saving system that is a substitute for some of the public pension (the Australian approach); or it could increased voluntary saving that is a substitute for the pension. (This last approach is what would happen if we were to raise the age of eligibility for a pension and people wanted to stop working at 65: they would have to use voluntary savings to fund the difference.) All of these strategies have the merit of substituting a SAYGO system for a PAYGO system. This reduces the costs on future generations, because a dollar invested earns a higher return than a dollar transferred between generations in a dynamically efficient economy. One of the reasons we don’t do this is the zero-sum game problem; the gains to future generations come at the expense of higher costs imposed on at least one generation, and this becomes a political issue of how the costs and benefits are shared. Nonetheless, there is no inherent reason why the intergenerational distribution of costs and benefits that are associated with a PAYGO funded system should be considered “correct” or natural. A PAYGO system is not intergenerationally neutral and all the evidence suggests the cost on future genreations will be higher than the costs on cohorts my age. Prefunding through the NZSF alters the identity of the people who bear these costs. Prefunding through debt repayment also alters the distribution of costs, but by a much smaller amount than if the funds are well invested.

    This seems to be at the heart of the disagreement – you are much less confident than me in the ability of the NZSF (or the ACC fund) to produce a return higher than the growth rate of the economy or the government bond rate. May I offer the parable of the ferry and a bridge? A society uses a ferry to shift people across a river. “Why don’t we build a bridge, that will be much more efficient in the long run,” says a local. “Ooh, you shouldn’t do that, you might build a bad bridge and then you would waste all your money and be worse off than just using the ferry,” said the cynic. “That’s true”, says the local, “but I didn’t suggest we build a bad bridge. Let’s build a good bridge, I know they exist.” Yes,” said the cynic, “it is possible to build a good bridge but I fear we won’t be able to do this. Bridges built by the city government have a reputation for falling down. And this river is prone to slips and slides. It is better to keep the ferry.”
    I am happy to believe the benefits of building a good bridge are very high, making it worth the effort to see how we can build a good one. Maybe it is not possible – but the upside makes it worthwhile seeing if we can learn to build a decent bridge. And I take your point, seeing the equivalent of the local bridge manager using local materials rather the best international materials or builders to do the maintenance should be considered worrying.

    The saving point is interesting. When you first introduce or expand a PAYGO system, you should see a reduction in savings if people had previously been using private savings mechanisms to save for their retirement. The first generation of recipients get an increase in transfer income, which is likely to be spent. The first generation of taxpayers face higher taxes but since they are promised a pension in the future they can reduce their savings by a similar amount and thus maintain their contemporaneous consumption levels. This suggest aggregate consumption will increase and aggregate savings will decline (which happened under Muldoon when NZS was significantly expanded in 1976, except he didn’t raise taxes much so the increase in consumption was funded out of national debt. Unfortunately the time series evidence on this point is clouded by the mass emigration that occurred between 1976 and 1980.) However, when a PAYGO scheme is cut a different dynamic mechanism kicks in because the losses may be taken in the distant future when the pension cuts actually happen. In the 1990s Australia began a compulsory saving scheme, maintained the current level of pension payments, and promised a reduction in the future level of pension payments (though the asset testing mechanism.) There was no immediate cut in taxes or cut in the consumption of the old. The compulsory contributions were phased in in lieu of real wage increases, and people clearly offset some of the compulsory savings with reduced voluntary savings. (David Gruen estimated that compulsory saving increased national saving rates by about 1.5% so far suggesting quite a lot of offset.) But some of the effect of the scheme will occur in the future when, for a given level of savings, people will have lower consumption because they will not also be in receipt of a pension. The whole adjustment process may be much slower when a PAYGO pension scheme is partially replaced with a SAYGO scheme than when a PAYGO-funded pension scheme is first introduced.

    Your last point is central to the whole debate: what is the appropriate structure for the government balance sheet? If the government were to adopt an intergenerationally neutral approach to the budget, it would issue debt to fund infrastructure investments and the education of the young while simultaneously accumulating assets to fund pensions and health care for the old. There doesn’t seem to be a reason why it needs to to fund pensions by accumulating debt, although it could do so. If you think it can manage risk and want to have an intergenerationally neutral budget, it makes sense to invest in higher yielding assets (particularly internationally diversified ones) or else the opportunity costs are very high. If you are skeptical about the governments ability to manage risk, some other system is optimal, and this may involve a smaller pension scheme and greater private savings.

    I clearly like building good bridges. And I appreciate your efforts to build a bridge to enable some debate.

    regards
    Andrew

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    • Andrew

      Thanks for such a substantive response. In the interests of giving some visibility to the debate on important policy and analytical issues, I will try to respond substantively in a separate post later in the week.

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