Full, accurate, and accessible records

That is what the Public Records Act 2005 requires of all “public offices”.    Specifically

Every public office and local authority must create and maintain full and accurate records of its affairs, in accordance with normal, prudent business practice, including the records of any matter that is contracted out to an independent contractor.

and

Every public office must maintain in an accessible form, so as to be able to be used for subsequent reference, all public records that are in its control,

Under the Act “public office”

a) means the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand; and

(b) means the agencies or instruments of those branches of government;

I don’t think there would be any doubt that the Reserve Bank, and its Board, would qualify as “public offices”.  And yet the Board, in particular, appears to have, at best, a shaky grasp on its statutory responsibilities in this area.

As regular readers know, I’ve been trying to understand the process that led to the appointment in February of an acting Governor of the Reserve Bank, including understanding how, if at all, officials and ministers convinced themselves that the appointment is lawful.

As I noted in a recent post

Section 48 of the Act covers a vacancy in the office of Governor.    The key bits read as follows

If the office of Governor becomes vacant, the Minister shall, on the recommendation of the Board, appoint….[a person] to act as Governor for a period not exceeding 6 months or for the remainder of the Governor’s term, whichever is less.

The critical phrase here appears to be “whichever is less”.      When Don Brash resigned as Governor in April 2002, there was about sixteen months to run on his term.  The then Minister appointed Rod Carr to act as Governor.    He could be appointed for as long as six months, because there was still sixteen months to run on “the Governor’s term”.  By contrast, on 26 September this year there will be no days left on the Governor’s term.  Graeme Wheeler’s term will have expired at midnight the previous day.   So an acting Governor can only be appointed for…….. zero days, since there are no days left on “the Governor’s term”.  In other words, the Act simply does not appear to allow an acting Governor appointment along the lines of the (purported) Spencer appointment.

In an earlier post, I covered the extensive material The Treasury had released on the period leading up to the acting Governor appointment.

By contrast, the Reserve Bank Board released almost nothing.    I had lodged a pretty comprehensive request seeking

copies of all papers of the Reserve Bank Board relating to the end of Graeme Wheeler’s term as Governor, the process for appointing a permanent replacement, and the appointment of Grant Spencer as acting Governor.   This request includes papers on the Board’s agenda, minutes of relevant discussions, papers/letters sent to the Minister of Finance or Treasury, and filenotes of any relevant meetings.

I got back a copy of a single very brief letter from the chair of the Board to the Minister of Finance recommending the acting Governor appointment (with no supporting analysis or advice).    The only material they told me they were withholding was some Human Resources advice and some in-house legal advice.  The latter apparently covers the questions around the relevant provisions of the Reserve Bank Act, and I have appealed the Ombudsman the decision to withhold.   There was, if the Board was to be believed, nothing else at all.

But that seemed odd.  I knew that Board meetings had minutes, and if those minutes were often quite loosely written (in another context, I’m dealing with legal uncertainty created by loose Board minutes from 25 years ago), at least the minutes seemed likely to exist.  In fact, the letter from the Board chair to the Minister of Finance explicitly referred to an agreement by the Board on 30 January to make the acting Governor recommendation.  Surely there were minutes of that meeting (and the Bank’s Act explicitly covers both physical meetings and teleconference ones)?    They should have been captured in my earlier request, but perhaps there had been an adminstrative oversight?

I also knew from the papers Treasury had released that by late last year the Board had already been well-underway in getting going a process for appointing a new permanent Governor once Graeme Wheeler’s term expires in September, and had been told as late as the end of November by the then Minister of Finance to keep on with that process, apparently regardless of the election issue.  In fact, the Treasury papers referred to the Board already having appointed a search firm.  So out of curiousity, I lodged a new request, not just for the minutes of the 30 January meeting, but also for minutes of any Board meeting in the December quarter last year.

I got a response to that request yesterday.  They released in full the minutes of the half hour (teleconference) Board meeting held on 30 January.  They were brief, but of some interest.

The Board received advice from the Minister of Finance that, on advice the Cabinet Office and after consultation with Cabinet, he had decided to appoint an acting Governor for a six month period to cover the post-election caretaker period, allowing the next Government time to make a decision on the appointment of a permanent Governor for the next five-year term. The Minister asked the Board to recommend a candidate for acting Governor.

The Board agreed unanimously to recommend Grant Spencer, currently Deputy Governor and Head of Financial Stability, for the role of acting Governor. The Chair would forward this advice to the Minister.

The Board chair’s letter to the Minister, dated 31 January, had sought to imply that the initiative for the acting appointment recommendation had come from the Board itself (the Act certainly envisages the Board taking the lead).  That never seemed likely, given the material Treasury and the Minister of Finance had released.  These minutes confirm that the Board was simply told what to do, and complied.  It is a poor reflection on the Board  that they had simply seemed unbothered about moving ahead to make a long-term appointment, which would take effect around the time of the election, in a climate in which there was little cross-party consensus on Reserve Bank matters.  Fortunately they were stopped in their tracks by the Minister of Finance.

It is another illustration of the weakness of the Board (not necessarily the current individuals, but the structure).  It reinforces my call to remove the recommendation/appointment powers from them back to the (normal international) model in which the Minister of Finance simply appoints a Governor.   These people simply don’t have the background, or any legitimacy, to be making an appointment of one of the most powerful people in New Zealand.   If there is a change of government (in particular), amending this provision of the Reserve Bank Act should be an early legislative priority.

But what also caught my interest is that although the Board released the minutes of its three meetings held in the December quarter (I will post a link when the Bank puts the material on its website), there is no record at all of any of their deliberations or decisions around the process they had underway of moving towards appointing a new Governor.  We know a lot about it from the Treasury documents, but if these releases are to believed, the Reserve Bank’s Board simply kept no records.

There was plenty of material omitted from the minutes that were released, but all the headings of the individual items were released.  Some of the decisions to withhold look questionable, but since I wasn’t really interested in that other material, I won’t take that any further.

In the October 2016 meeting there is an item 8.3 “Director’s-only discussion”.    That may well have been an occasion on which they dealt with the coming gubernatorial appointment.  But, if so, we’ll never know.    The minutes of this discussion weren’t withheld (in which case that withholding could be challenged to the Ombudsman, and future historical researchers would probably get access anyway) but simply don’t exist at all.    Minutes are typically taken by the Board secretary, who is a Bank staff member, but there is no reason why one of the Board members themselves could not have minuted this discussion, and recorded them in a version of the minutes not given general circulation.  But there appears to be no record at all.

In the November 2016 meeting there was nothing similar at all, and no (apparent) discussion of these issues.   In the December 2016 meeting, despite coming only a couple of weeks after Bill English had told the Board chair he was comfortable with them moving ahead with selecting a Governor recommendation, there is also nothing recorded.  Again, there is an item 8.3 “Non-executive directors only Session”, but there are no minutes at all (again, to stress, the minutes aren’t withheld; they simply don’t seem to exist).

It is quite extraordinary, given that we know from the Treasury material that there had been interactions with the Minister of Finance, the directors had appointed a search firm, and were planning to start advertising in January, only a month later.  But where are records of any of this?  It is possible that some of the decisions had been made earlier, but it is simply inconceivable that there was no substantive discussion, and no decisions taken, in the last three months of last year.   But none of it appears to be recorded.

Now perhaps there are some secret records –  file notes, email exchanges among directors – that the Bank staff who handled my request were not aware of. But any such material would have been covered under one or both of my OIA requests, and when I lodged the OIA requests I was quite explicit that they were requests to the Board, not to the staff of the Bank.

We seem to be in the sad state of affairs where either the  powerful Board of a major government agency is denying the existence of records that do actually exist about the process they had underway, and had to call to a halt, to appoint a new Governor.   That would be in breach of the Official Information Act.    Or the same Board is so shoddy in its record-keeping that it would seem almost certain to be in breach of the Public Records Act.    I’m not quite sure which to believe (although I suspect it is mostly the latter explanation).  Neither seem remotely satisfactory.  Neither option seems like what one should expect from a government-appointed Board responsible for recommending the next Governor of the Reserve Bank, holder of the most powerful unelected role in New Zealand.

It is not even as though this is material about something under active consideration.    The search process they were working on late last year, apparently oblivious to the significance of the election, was called to a halt.    In fact, as the Bank told us last week

The Reserve Bank Board of Directors’ recruitment process to identify a successor to Mr Wheeler is to commence later in the year.

We have record-keeping requirements on public agencies, and disclosure requirements such as the OIA, in significant part to enhance accountability and

thereby to enhance respect for the law and to promote the good government of New Zealand

If records simply aren’t kept, we have no way of knowing whether public appointees have done their job adequately,  That doesn’t enhance respect for the law, or promote good government.  Specifically, we still have no basis for knowing how the Board of the Bank concluded, or whether they advised the Minister, that the appointment of an acting Governor in these circumstances was lawful.

Full, accurate, and accessible records are a statutory obligation.  The Reserve Bank’s Board doesn’t appear to have been complying, even though the appointment of a new Governor is one of the few areas in which the Act gives them explicit decisionmaking powers.   It simply isn’t good enough.

UPDATE: The Bank appears to have decided not to put this material on its website, contrary to their usual OIA practice.  Here are the minutes of the three December quarter meetings.

1.3 Board Minutes – 20 October 2016 – for release

1.3 Board Minutes – 17 November 2016 – for release

1.3 Board Minutes – 15 December 2016- for release

Backdoor entry to Australia?

In the various articles in the last few days on Australia’s decision to increase university fees for, among others, New Zealanders studying at Australian universities, there have been a few references to the fear sometimes expressed by Australian officials and politicians that New Zealand’s relatively liberal immigration policy might be being used by some material number of our migrants as a backdoor entry to Australia. Come to New Zealand, stay a few years and get citizenship, and then move on to Australia and the better-paid jobs that a more productive economy can offer.

It had some plausibility as an argument 20 years or so ago, when New Zealand’s immigration policy was much more open than Australia’s.  Any difference between the two countries’ immigration policies is much less marked now (they liberalised late in the Howard years).

It also hasn’t been an issue that I’ve paid much attention to –  it is, after all, mostly a matter for Australian policymakers.   But I thought I would take a quick look at the data SNZ has available on Infoshare.

Using the PLT data (with all its limitations) one can find numbers on the gross and net flows of New Zealand citizens between New Zealand and Australia, and also on the birthplaces (by country) of those making the move.  So one can easily work out what share of the New Zealand citizens moving to Australia (and coming back) were born in Australia and New Zealand, and what share were born elsewhere.  The data seem to be available only for the last 15 years.

Note that birthplaces don’t necessarily tie up closely with migration status.   I suspect that the bulk of Australian-born New Zealand citizens in these charts are the kids of New Zealanders who went to Australia for a few years, had a family there, and then came home.   And some portion of those born outside Australia and New Zealand will also be the children of New Zealanders, with citizenship by descent.   But the bulk of the movement of New Zealand citizens who were born outside Australia and New Zealand is likely to be people who were first given entry to New Zealand under our immigration policy.   Of course, some of the New Zealand born might be children born shortly after their parents arrived as immigrants, and thus in some sense also a phenomenon of the immigration policy.

Here is the chart for the net flow.

net flow to Aus

The Australia-born flow is small, and pretty stable, but has increased a bit in the last few years.   But the bulk of the action is in the New Zealand born line.

What of the non-Australasian born (our proxy for people who were policy-permitted immigrants to New Zealand?   That line looks like a very muted version of the NZ-born line –  many of the same fluctuations but on a much less pronounced scale.  Curiously, right at the moment more non-Australasian born New Zealanders are (net) leaving for Australia than NZ born NZ citizens.    Perhaps that might suggest there was something to the reported Australian concern.  But these are small net numbers of two quite large sets of gross flows.   So lets go directly to the gross flows.

This chart show PLT arrivals of NZ citizens from Australia (the much-vaunted people “coming home”).

arrivals from Aus

All three lines have increased in the last few years, with the largest percentage increase in the (small number) of Australian-born NZ citizens.   Non-Australasian NZ citizens coming back from Australia make up around 11 per cent of the total, and have done throughout the period we have data for.

non aus share

Of course, 11 per cent is a lot less than the foreign-born share of the population (around 25 per cent),  but that foreign-born population share has been increasing quite a lot in the last 15 years or so.

There is probably a lot more interest in the outflows to Australia.  Here is the same breakdown of NZ citizens by birthplace for departures.

departures to Aus

The numbers of Australian-born NZ citizens leaving for Australia has increased, but the numbers are very small.   And by far the largest absolute change has been in the NZ-born series –  outflows in the latest year to March are the lowest for any year in the data set.  But what of the non-Australasian born (the people who mostly initially came to New Zealand as immigrants?)

non aus share of departures

Somewhat to my surprise,  there has been quite a step up in the share of that group in the total outflows to Australia of NZ citizens.  In the most recent year, that share was 24 per cent, up from the around 17 per cent it had fluctuated around for some time.

Of course, as I noted foreign-born people make up around 25 per cent of the total population (that share may be higher again by next year’s Census).  So it shouldn’t surprise us that in the normal course of life, quite a few non-New Zealand born citizens will move to the better opportunities in Australia.  Some will be, for example, people who came as 2 year olds 40 years ago, and whose behaviour and motives are likely to be very similar to those of the NZ born.  The cold truth is that, typically, economic opportunities are better in Australia than they are in New Zealand.

And on the other hand, it is also likely that anyone who was sufficiently motivated to leave some foreign home and come to the ends of the earth (New Zealand) might, on average, be less settled, and more ready to move again,  than someone who had spent their whole life here.  That is an almost inescapable feature (not bug) of immigration, and doesn’t suggest any deliberate gaming of the system.

It is also worth pointing out that even if there is some gaming going on, the lags aren’t short.  The outflow of non-NZ born citizens in the last few years has nothing to do with NZ immigration policy in the last few years, because you have to have been here for five years to become a New Zealand citizen in the first place.  And, as I understand, when you apply for citizenship you have to sign a declaration stating that you intend to stay.  So, if there is the sort of issue Australians apparently worry about, it is quite a slow-burning story.

I don’t want to reach any strong conclusions (and I keep reminding people of the limitations of the self-reported intentions PLT data), but the twin facts:

(a) the foreign-born share of NZ citizens coming back from Australia is so much less than the share going to Australia, and

(b) the significant increase in the foreign-born share of NZ citizen departures in recent years

might suggest there is a little more of that sort of “backdoor entry” going on than I might previously have supposed.

If so, of course, it is totally rational behaviour on the part of the immigrants.  As I’ve repeatedly noted, and as I’ve even heard pro-immigration academics acknowledge, New Zealand isn’t a first choice for lots of migrants.  If they could get into Australia most would probably choose it over New Zealand (a bigger, higher income, country/market).  And they’d probably prefer the US, the UK, Ireland, and probably even Canada over New Zealand.   You take what you can get, and make the most of the opportunities that arise.  For those who become New Zealand citizens, access to the Australian labour market is one of those opportunities.

If we were genuinely attracting really highly-skilled migrants, that would be our loss and Australia’s gain, when they do move on.  But of course MBIE’s own data confirms that all too many aren’t that highly-skilled at all.  We don’t know what the skill mix looks like for those who later move on to Australia, but since the overall NZ outflow to Australia is often described as “looking like NZ” (in terms of skills/qualifications), perhaps it isn’t very different for once-immigrants who also move on.

I was planning to go on and write about how we should think about the option to move to Australia, and gradual changes that have made things tougher for New Zealanders doing so, but perhaps I’ll save that for another day.

And I won’t devote a post to the latest PR on Stuff from the MBIE-funded Professor Paul Spoonley.  Suffice to say that, relative to his piece in the Herald earlier in the week, he appears to have doubled down.    In that piece, even he thought some reforms were needed. But now…

Record immigration levels are not a bad thing for New Zealand, provided the current high standards for entry remain, an immigration expert says.

It was MBIE’s own data that showed that more than half of skilled migrant applicants couldn’t command more than $49000 per annum in the New Zealand labour market.

And while this time he avoids direct use of  the “xenophobia” slur, his case still seems to rest mostly on slurs and assertions.

But heading into elections, Spoonley said, it is important to call out prejudice in our leaders to avoid anti-immigration policies similar to the US.

“Let’s continue to debate immigration,” he said. “But let’s not stereotype or see one group or another as a problem.”

Instead of “xenophobia” now it is “prejudice” he claims to worry about.  Of course, he adduces no evidence, or examples, of such “prejudices”, or of how they are somehow driving the debate.  And as for US immigration policy, the immigration policy run under Barack Obama’s administration had its pros and cons (it wasn’t very skills focused), but the overall number of green cards issued per capita was around one third of the number of residence approvals we currently grant.

And, of course, the issue is hardly ever the migrants.  They are just people trying to make the best for themselves and their families.  The issue is, and should be, immigration policy choices made by our politicians, and by us as a society.

 

Winston Peters on the economy

Winston Peters gave a speech on the economy yesterday to a Wellington business audience.   Going by Alex Tarrant’s report, the delivered version must have been quite a bit different than the prepared and published text, but here I’m going to focus on the published text.

When I first started thinking about the possible role of immigration policy in explaining New Zealand’s dismal long-term economic performance, the immediate response from the person I sat next to at Treasury was “careful, or you’ll be sounding like Winston Peters”.  In a similar vein (although I stress that it wasn’t the representative reaction –  most people were simply puzzled and didn’t know what to make of it) one manager  thumped the table and with the emotion very evident in his voice declared that it was disgraceful that we were even having such a discussion at The Treasury.

Peters has long been a polarising figure, and particularly so for the denizens of economic orthodoxy (of whom I generally counted myself as one).  And, of course, he has been around for a long time –  first becoming a Cabinet minister the same day in 1990 as Murray McCully, and presumably with aspirations to again becoming a senior minister after  this year’s election.  He has been Minister of Maori Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Treasurer, and Deputy Prime Minister.  Very few ministerial careers will have spanned a longer period –  Sir Keith Holyoake at 28 years is the longest I could think of.

And yet there has always been the question of what he has actually achieved, or delivered.  At present, the list of concrete New Zealand First achievements includes the Super Gold Card, some stuff about cheaper doctor’s visits for children, and……..well, not that much else.  That isn’t to say the presence of New Zealand First has had no other influence on policy over the years (quite possibly some of the government’s immigration policy changes last year and this have been partly pre-emptive measures).  But in office, Peters just has not accomplished much.

That is true of monetary policy –  long one of his bugbears.   He negotiated a new Policy Targets Agreement when he became Treasurer in 1996.  That agreement slightly increased the inflation target –  mostly reflecting actual outcomes which had been in the upper half of the previous range.  But even that agreement was a very long way short of the pre-election rhetoric.    And once the agreement was signed he never gave the Bank any subsequent trouble.   We managed to do some really daft stuff under his watch –  the infamous MCI experiment –  but he never called us out on it.  He served as Foreign Minister under Helen Clark, and while he seemed to be a safe pair of hands in that role, his biggest achievement seemed to be securing a much bigger budget for MFAT.  Somehow, I suspect that was not one of the priorities of his voter base.

And, of course, it is true of immigration policy.  As I wrote about here, despite all the rhetoric –  much of which I think was touching on, or prompted by, legitimate issues and concerns – there was nothing material in the detailed coalition agreement in 1996, and also nothing in the arrangement with Labour over 2005 to 2008.    Throw into the mix his opposition to asset sales, his unease about foreign investment, his opposition to raising the NZS age and so on, and I’ve long been pretty sceptical of Peters.

And so I turned to an election year speech on economic policy with wary interest.

I liked some of his lines (even recognised some of them).    He is totally right to call out the government for the way they make up lines to try to (a) pretend all is well (or even better) in the economy, and (b) to mask evident points of vulnerability (eg housing problems are “quality problems”).  In his words, from the title of the speech, “the facade of prosperity”.    Productivity is poor and per capita real GDP growth is pretty weak.

And while I wouldn’t word things quite this way

The fact is, massive immigration is neo-liberal, globalist voodoo.
It is an attack on those who believe in the nation state.

As a general proposition, I think the ideology of large-scale immigration in much of the advanced world isn’t far from that description.  Based on faith rather than sight.  Our politicians typically aren’t ideologues and like to think of themselves as practical people, but they’ve supped from the same streams of thought, and seem indifferent to the lack of hard New Zealand specific evidence on the benefits to New Zealanders of their preferred approach.  For many, as Peters put it,

In their make-believe world immigration is a free good – a gift.

I’ve been pretty critical of the ex post government “spin”, that attempts to suggest that all is rosy.   But Peters portrays it as the fruit of some deliberate and different economic strategy adopted by the current government.

Every country could flatter its economic growth by turning on the immigration tap.

But only NZ has seen governments reckless and irresponsible enough to try it.

In fact, to a considerable extent the current government has been running much the same immigration policy as its predecessors, including governments of which Peters was a part.

One can see it in the centrepiece of our immigration policy, the residence approvals target.  It hadn’t changed for years, until a modest cut was announced last year by the current government.  And what of actual approvals?

residence approvals 2017

For the 12 months to March 2017, the number of approvals is a bit lower than the last June year.   Overall approvals fluctuate from year to year, but average approvals under the current government are pretty similar to those under the previous government.

And here, using the MBIE data, is the numbers of people getting a first work visa in each year (excluding for the moment working holiday scheme people).

work visas granted

Not surprisingly, numbers dipped during the recession, but even with the increase in the last couple of years, the total number of people granted first-time work visas was still barely higher than in the last year of the previous government.

There are big differences in two areas.   The first is working holiday scheme arrivals.

WHS

Even The Treasury has raised concern about the labour market impact of these visitors, but looking at the chart, it is a pretty strong and steady trend increase going back almost 20 years now.  It certainly doesn’t look like a whole new strategy by the current government.

Students are another matter.  There has been a recent big increase in student visa numbers, although still only back to around the 2002/03 peak.

student visas 17.png

Here, of course, there has been a deliberate policy change by the current government, in allowing many or most students significant work rights while they are in New Zealand.    It looked like, and was, an “export subsidy”, and has probably had adverse implications for New Zealanders at the lower end of the labour market (with commensurate gains to the students and their employers).   But this looks like the only significant liberalisation by the current government.  Otherwise, they’ve largely been running the same (misguided) immigration policy as their predecessors

The student issue aside, I suspect that most of what has happened isn’t strategy –  has there been any sign of a serious economic strategy? –  but of being overwhelmed by unexpected events (while the large scale mediocre New Zealand immigration policy ran on in the background).  In particular, the weakness of the Australian labour market (perhaps reinforced by the increasing recognition of the limited entitlements most New Zealanders have in Australia) means that the net outflow of New Zealanders has slowed markedly, and for longer than most had expected.   The escape valve for New Zealanders for the last 40 years or so isn’t working at present, and New Zealand has to cope somehow.

It is a bit like the larger influxes of settlers back to France, after Algeria gained independence, and to Portugal in the 1970s when Mozambique and Angola gained independence.  Opportunities that once existed abroad were no longer there, and a huge reflux of people put pressure on the home economy.  It boosted aggregate GDP quite a bit –  all these new people needed roofs over their heads –  but it didn’t do anything very evident for productivity or the per capita things that matter.

So I don’t buy the line that the current government set out to supercharge population growth.  It just happened.  Perhaps the protracted weakness of the Australian labour market was foreseeable, but it wasn’t widely foreseen.  If it had been the government could have wound back our non-citizen immigration programmes.   It probably wouldn’t have, because ministers still seem to believe the twin gospels of “productivity spillovers” and never-sated “skill shortages”, oblivious to the way that in aggregate immigration increases aggregate pressure on resources, not eases it. But they could have done something.

As it is, they seem mostly overwhelmed by events, without any real strategy other than a desperate hope that it will all come right, in the meantime all the “made up stuff” serves mostly to try to distract attention from the unbalanced, not very productive, mess the New Zealand economy is in.

The government might well be without a strategy, but you have to wonder if any other party has a serious alternative on offer.  Because in the Peters speech yesterday there was a lot of rhetoric about the past, and talk of how

New Zealand First has comprehensive, common sense economic policies designed to build a strong and resilient economy.

But there wasn’t a single word about they would actually do about immigration policy, in any of its dimensions.

I’ve heard Peters in the past talk of reducing the net PLT inflow to around 10000 to 15000 per annum.   But not even that was repeated in yesterday’s speech –  which, in a way, is welcome, because there is no meaningful way the net PLT inflow can be successfully targeted from year to year.  And there was nothing else, at all.  Even though it is only 4.5 months until the election.

Perhaps Peters thinks he can ride high simply on rhetoric.  And perhaps he can.  Perhaps he is concerned not to be outflanked by the Labour Party, which has also yet to release its immigration policy.  But there was nothing at all in the speech.   I’ve seen references to Peters wanting to set something around Pike River as some sort of “bottom line”, but (with due respect to the families of the victims) there are many more important issues in New Zealand.  Judging from his rhetoric, you might suppose Peters thinks immigration is one of those things.

And so I can’t help wondering if we are being set up for a repeat of the last two times Peters went into government: lots of talk in advance, and no action on immigration policy at all.   If it happens, of course, the establishment will be quietly content.  But nothing fundamental will have changed.

Of course, one can only hope that is true of another area of policy that he did discuss in some detail.

Since the Global Financial Crisis we have been in a new economic era that makes reform of the Reserve Bank Act urgent.

Updating the obsolete Reserve Bank Act is critical to take account of the realities of 2017 rather than using a tool that is now decades out of date.

While we cannot slavishly copy from others, in the area of monetary policy we can certainly learn from the experience of countries like Singapore.

The city-state of Singapore has a population of around 5.7 milllion people in a country hardly larger than Lake Taupo.

They don’t have our advantages but they have achieved an enviable record of growth and stayed competitive through using an exchange-rate based monetary policy.

Singapore has a managed float and has a good record in moderating short-term currency fluctuations to ensure that the Singaporean dollar reflects their economy’s fundamentals.

There is no magic wand to get the dollar down to an appropriate and competitive level – and we have never pretended that there is.

But in today’s environment of historically unprecedented low interest rates, failure to reform the Reserve Bank’s Act to make it fit for purpose is inexcusable.

Reduced exchange rate volatility might be helpful, but it simply isn’t the main game.  And Peters offers no thoughts at all on how the average level of the real exchange rate –  one of the critical symptoms of our economic problems –  might be lowered.    And even if you were after materially reduced exchange rate volatility, a Singapore style policy simply isn’t feasible in a country as dependent on foreign capital as New Zealand is.

All in all, it was pretty disappointing stuff –  the more so, because he isn’t far wrong in calling out the unreality of so much of emerges from the government on economic matters at present.

A world-leading debate on immigration?

Sometimes it can be hard to keep up with the flow of pro-immigration articles in the Herald.  At the moment of course, even they tend to be written with a defensive, more than celebratory, stance.

On Monday, the academic sociologist, Paul Spoonley –  who leads CaDDANZ the MBIE-funded academic immigration advocacy and research programme –  was out with a piece headed Xenophobia not welcome in migrant debate.     Hard to disagree with that.  Of course, not all fears are irrational, and political debate rarely occurs at the rarefied level of the fabled academic seminar room, but “deep-rooted fear towards foreigners” (the OED definition) doesn’t seem a particularly good basis for New Zealand’s immigration debate.  But what was a bit puzzling when I read the article, and then re-read it, was that Professor Spoonley offered no evidence that “xenophobia” was what was at work here.  And that’s good.  Presumably if there was such evidence he’d have mentioned it.

And despite generally being a champion of New Zealand’s non-citizen immigration policy, Spoonley himself has come to the conclusion that current immigration levels are “unsustainable” and some changes are needed.  Presumably he didn’t reach that conclusion based on “xenophobia”?

As it happens, most of the proposals he puts forward are pretty mild, or not even policies at all.

There is a case for revising aspects of the recruitment and approval of immigrants. The low value courses and qualifications offered by some educational providers puts New Zealand’s reputation at risk.

One could add that it is, in effect, an industry granted big export subsidies.   We’d sell more of any specific good or service, if doing so came attached with work rights or residence points.     Curiously, export education isn’t even that successful a subsidised industry.  The total number of people granted student visas in 2015/16 was only around 4 per cent higher than at the previous peak in 2002/03.

A more proactive regional focus. Canada and Australia allow regions to set their own targets and to recruit the skilled immigrants needed locally – without undermining local workers or wages. Up to a third of the points required for approval for permanent residence can be granted by regions.

This is even more daft, and dangerous, than the existing (quality-diluting) policy of giving additional points to people with jobs outside Auckland.  And since most local councils can’t even do well stuff they are already responsible for –  not making urban land unaffordable – I’m not sure I’d want to trust them with immigration policy.

Social cohesion. Positive settlement outcomes for both immigrants and host communities would benefit from a greater investment in helping transition immigrants to life in New Zealand – more generous provisions for English language acquisition, for example, would help.

Of course, we could spend even more taxpayers’ money, or we could simply require that people settling here –  refugees aside –  actually speak pretty good English.  These days, most really highly-skilled people –  the ones we might actually benefit from –  do.

And his final proposal

Let’s have a debate about population – its growth and distribution – as a context for decisions about immigration. And let’s not see immigration as a single causal factor or as a simple solution.

This is rhetoric rather than policy, but by all means have the debate.  I’m pretty wary of “population policy” myself, but some serious study of whether policy-driven rapid population growth over most of the period since World War Two has helped lift the material living standards of New Zealanders, or productivity in the New Zealand economy, would be a worthwhile subject for academic researchers.

In the end, Spoonley is mostly playing distraction.  He flings around the charge of “xenophobia,” without any substantiation, and then his own suggestions would make little useful difference in responding to the economic challenges, except by some tightening of rules around student visas (something the government has not yet addressed at all).

But the column that really grabbed my attention was one from the Herald business editor Liam Dann, headed Let’s lead the world on immigration debate.  A worthy aspiration no doubt.  But not, unfortunately, one the column contributed to. Instead, it is riddled with questionable claims and false comparisons, and at one point represents another example –  this time not from a government minister but from an acolyte –  of just making things up.

There is the weird opening.

It looks like immigration is going to be a big election issue.

That’s a shame.

He doesn’t like the way the debate has occurred in some other countries, so seems to think we should take some sort of self-denying ordinance, and not debate one of the larger government economic and social policy interventions there is.   Non-citizen immigration is, after all, far bigger here than in the UK, the US, or France.  Has been for a long time.

There have been a series of record highs for about a year. The numbers exceed even the great colonial influx into New Zealand in the 19th century.

On a per capita basis they exceed what the UK was experiencing pre-Brexit.

This is all rather misleading.   Considered per capita, the net inflow over the last year (New Zealander and non-citizens) hasn’t even exceeded levels seen 15 years ago, let alone at the peaks in the 19th century.  And, by contrast, every single year the number of non-citizens we let in far exceeds (per capita) the inflows to the UK.  So the analytical and policy issues shouldn’t be about this year’s PLT flow, but about the numbers (and terms on which) we allow non-citizens to settle and/or work here.

According to Dann

So we are vulnerable to populist political hijack.

Any world-leading debate on these topics would recognise that the essentials of our immigration policy haven’t changed much for 20 years at least.  Broadly speaking, we moved back to being a high (non-citizen) immigration country in the early 1990s.

I’m not even sure what “populist political hijack” really means, other “than some politician I really don’t like, responding to an issue of real public concern”.   Sounds like democracy to me, messy as it often is.

Funnily enough, Dann also thinks there are some real issues that need addressing.

Immigration policy of the past decade is not sustainable. Our infrastructure is under pressure and we are woefully behind in building to catch up. That’s not the fault of immigrants, of course. It is the fault of politicians and voters.

Not sure how this is all the fault of voters.   We were never asked if we wanted to have record rates of population growth, even though those in office knew that (say) the urban land markets were dysfunctional etc, so that importing lots of new people was only likely to exacerbate house price problems.

And, of course, the issues aren’t just about house prices or road congestion.  There is the small matter of the continuing poor productivity growth in New Zealand (none in the last five years), the shrinking (as a share of GDP) export sector, or the realities of living in a country at the ends of the earth where, for 40 years (with cyclical ups and downs) the natives have been leaving, pursuing better opportunities abroad.   Oh, and the highly misleading descriptions of the immigration programme –  we’ve repeatedly been told it was a skills-focused programme, helping lift productivity etc, and now MBIE’s own numbers show than more than more than half those applying for residence don’t have skills that command even $49000 per annum in the New Zealand labour market.

Dann continues

In other words, it’s our fault. We have been trying to have our cake and eat it too.

No, it isn’t “our” fault.  Voters didn’t ask for this.  Political leaders –  from both sides, but National is now in office –  made it happen.  And there is no “cake” for New Zealanders as a whole, only some nasty sectoral redistributions, and an overall economic performance that continues to underwhelm.   But apparently

One thing lost in the immigration debate at the moment is how successful the policies have been for New Zealand.

Really?

Economically, we have outshone our international peers. We have skipped the economic pain that most of the world felt after the global financial crisis.

That’s not all down to immigration but it has played a big part.

This is just making stuff up.  As I showed yesterday, we’ve done no better than the United States, which was the epicentre of the crisis –  and that despite having about three times the rate of legal immigration the US has (and other bonuses like a record average terms of trade).   We had a nasty recession, that took a long time to recover from –  and actually immigration policy in the “bust” period wasn’t materially different than it had been in the earlier “boom”.   We’ve underperformed Australia too.

real gdp phw dec 16 release

Sure, there are places that are worse still –  much of the euro area most notably –  but there is just nothing to back this claim that we have “outshone our peers”,  let alone that immigration policy has enabled us thus to shine.  Saying it often enough won’t make it true.   In fact, sometimes reality breaks through and even Dann seems embarrassed about channelling this stuff.

When you crunch the numbers on per capita GDP growth it has been far less flash.

Indeed. And it is things like per capita income growth and productivity growth that count.   Even on the labour market side of things, the SNZ release this morning shows that most of the OECD countries that control their own monetary policy have lower unemployment rates than we do.

Culturally, too, New Zealand has grabbed global attention in a way unimaginable a generation ago.

This country used to be largely unknown outside the Commonwealth, where we were acknowledged as a backward British colony that was good at sport and had lots of sheep.

Since we still hold the record low test cricket score, racked up in the bad old days when we had some of the very highest material living standards in the world, I’m not even sure about that “good at sport”.

But, frankly, what is he talking about?

100 years ago, before the First World War, people flocked here – and not just from the Commonwealth – to study New Zealand’s economic and social reforms.  And they often marvelled at what had been created, so quickly, so far from the centres of the world ( including (but not limited to) the best material living standards in the world).

Actually, 30 years ago, before the great immigration resumed, people abroad were fascinated by New Zealand’s economic reforms.  It was a darker story by then, trying to pull back from decades of decline, but the interest was real nonetheless.

Does anyone remember Dame Edna’s tragic Kiwi bridesmaid Madge Allsop? She summed up our image pretty well.

Personally, I don’t remember this character, but I’m sure Dann isn’t trying to suggest that Australians have stopped making fun of New Zealanders (accent and all), or vice versa.

So what is he talking about?  Does he know?   Allegedly….

Against all odds, New Zealand became cool.

Where is the evidence?  What does “cool” mean in this context?  And what does it do, even if it is true, for the living standards of ordinary New Zealanders?  Dann doesn’t tell us.  And yet somehow

Our place in the world has changed and that warrants debate about the immigration policy settings we have in place.

Actually, if one takes any sort of longer view of modern New Zealand history, our place in the world is in decline.  That is more or less inevitable.  We were once one of the handful of (very successful) offshoots of the most powerful empire in the world.   100 years ago there weren’t many independent countries, and few as successful as we were.  Since then,  many more countries have emerged, and quite a few have got a lot richer.   The UK’s global position has declined, and even the US is no longer what it was (in say the decades from 1940).  We are neither powerful nor important –  no longer with automatic access to counsels of the great and powerful we once had –  and, worse, we aren’t even that successful economically any more.  That has real implications for our own people, especially the poorer of them.

So, I really have no idea what Dann is on about.  Perhaps he is thinking of some references in once-hip publications like Lonely Planet guides?  But to what end?  As I ‘ve shown previously, our exports of services –  the lure of tourism, export education etc –  are lower now as a share of GDP than it was 15 years ago, in an age when international trade in services globally has become ever more important.

Leaving aside the detached-from-reality rhetoric, Dann tries to come back to specifics

The Government has belatedly started to recognised that with policy tweaks that have not yet had time to show results.

We could go further and look at more fundamental changes – such as how we set the criteria for residency.

But it would be a terrible thing for the debate to play out here the way it has in other parts of the world.

Quite what does that mean?  You might approve or disapprove of the Brexit result (I approve), but the process was an open one, there were no riots on the streets, and views differ on quite how large a role immigration policy played anyway.

I reckon Donald Trump is fundamentally ill-equipped to be US President.  Then again, the choice was a poor one.  I couldn’t have voted for him or his principal opponent.  And is a physical wall a good solution?  Quite probably not.   But it was an open and democratic election, and there were plenty of other issues at play in the election.  And –  unlike us –  the US really does have a large stock of illegal migrants in the country.  

Alternatively, and optimistically, New Zealand is in a position to lead the world on the immigration debate. We could do this right.

But simply flinging around, as slurs, references to Brexit or Trump isn’t really a great start to the sort of debate Dann claims to want to have in New Zealand.  After all, if immigration is an issue in those countries, there are good reasons why it could be a much bigger issue here (we simply take more people, per capita).

We could pay close attention to the data, we could look at economic impact studies and we could have a frank and open discussion about the kind of country we want to build.

That would certainly be a novel (but welcome) approach.  Perhaps Dann could point us to the New Zealand specific studies illustrating how New Zealanders, and New Zealand productivity levels, have been raised by decades of large scale immigration, much of it simply not that skilled?  Other champions of immigration policy haven’t been able to.    There is plenty of theory, but not much grounded analysis that takes specific and detailed account of the circumstances of New Zealand.

Dann doesn’t like the idea of Labour promising to do something to markedly cut the non-citizen immigration flow.

It is difficult for Labour because the politics are polarising. Labour wants power, it sees a rich vein of discontent but in the current topsy-turvy political environment, it has to make careful choices.

Retaining a traditional, optimistic liberal view leans towards free and open borders. That now puts them on the side of the neo-liberal globalists – not a fashionable place for the centre-left these days.

But campaigning to radically slash immigrant numbers by unspecified amounts puts them in the camp of angry nationalists like Winston Peters, Donald Trump and Nigel Farage.

It would certainly be good to see some specifics from Labour –  it is after all only four and half months until the election.  But it is not as if Labour has always been some sort of “open borders” party.  It was the Labour icon, Norman Kirk, who in the 1970s put in place the biggest post-war adjustment to immigration policy, depriving people from the United Kingdom (then far and away the main source country) of their automatic right to move here.

For the last few decades, Labour and National have had much the same immigration policy –  believers, apparently, in the rhetoric of lifting productivity through immigration, and in the skill shortages, that never seem to ease no matter how many decades we wait.

Suggesting that Labour would cut immigration by tens of thousands certainly needs something concrete behind it –  and soon –  but I’m afraid that comparisons between Andrew Little (or Jacinda Ardern, Grant Robertson, David Parker and Phil Twyford) and Donald Trump simply aren’t worthy of a serious journalist, and especially not one making the high-minded call for a world-leading immigration debate.

Dann starts to come to the end of his column

We can’t let the politics become emotive. This is fundamentally about economics. It should be boring.

Not sure I entirely agree.  Politics is about conflicting world views and values.  There are, and inevitably will be, emotional dimensions about that.  Personally, I’m angry at the decades of failure by a succession of political leaders to really grapple with New Zealand’s economic underperformance.   And pretty upset about the apparent (practical) indifference to the housing disaster, all politically wrought.    But Dann asks

Can we quantify how much value immigrants add to the economy?

How does the added value compare with the economic cost of new infrastructure that we need to cope with increased population?

It isn’t really a fiscal question, but the honest answer to his first question is that “no, no one really has”.  It has been a programme based on faith and theory, and often the short-term self-interest of employers (especially those in the non-tradables sector).    The government does not know if large-scale immigration has added to New Zealand’s productivity over time.      For such a large experiment, that is an extraordinary failure.

Distributional issues matter.

The harder question is trying to understand how the value and costs are distributed.

Some established citizens will be bigger beneficiaries than others. There are different geographic impacts.

Given we’ve had an immigration policy that favours wealthy immigrants it is self-fulfilling that our policies have increased wealth in this country.

But they may also have exacerbated inequality

Again, he has lost me.  Most of our immigrants aren’t very skilled or wealthy at all –  most can’t even earn $49000 a year, the starting salary for a primary teacher with a basic degree.  So there is no automatic presumption that the country is wealthier as a result (again, per capita, the only measure that really counts).  And it shouldn’t really be news to the business editor of our largest-circulation paper that inequality hasn’t materially changed in New Zealand in the last couple of decades (at least if the distorted housing market is excluded).   The New Zealand Initiative, rightly, point it out repeatedly.

I’m all for a good quality debate about New Zealand’s immigration policy.  One is certainly well overdue.  But when Dann’s call for such a debate is so riddled with errors, misconceptions, and slurs, it is hardly a good start.      In the end, it is hard to avoid a conclusion that what Dann really wants is just a continuation of the status quo, with a few more houses and roads built, and the column is mostly an attempt to avoid the real debates.   It certainly isn’t the start of a world-leading debate, especially not one that engages seriously with the decades of serious economic performance, or with the revealed choices of New Zealanders –  for 40 years now –  to leave.

A government that simply makes things up

Perhaps all governments these days eventually do it, but one of the things that I’ve come to dislike most about our current government is the way they and their acolytes simply make stuff up.    I could, I suppose, understand them not actually doing anything much.  After all, they didn’t promise to do anything much.

But the endless spin, and stuff that is just made up, sickens me.  Apart from anything else, I try to bring up my kids heeding the biblical injunction to honour those in authority over us.  I don’t read that as suggesting people won’t disagree with those who hold office, but there is something quite sick about the political process –  and perhaps about a society that tolerates this stuff –  when so often one reads comments from senior ministers or the Prime Minister to which one can only  explain to kids interested in such things that “they are just making it up”.    We should expect much better than that.

I’ve written before about the current and former Prime Ministers’ dismissal of housing or conjestion problems as “quality problems” or “signs of success“.  And there are the repeated claims that New Zealand’s economy is doing better than almost any other advanced country –  a suggestion ably challenged in an article by journalist Graham Adams yesterday.   But today, since it is the day Murray McCully leaves ministerial office after a very long period in ministerial roles in two governments. I wanted to focus on an unfounded claim in a recent speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs by the outgoing Minister of Foreign Affairs.

He begins with an unexceptionable observation

The key feature of the past decade has been the rise of China, in terms of both our bi-lateral relationship, and as a regional and global power.

Not just of the past decade, but the past several decades.

And, as the Minister notes, there has been a big growth in bilateral trade (goods and services).

In my eight and a half years in this role I have seen our exports to China increase from around $2 billion to nearly $10 billion, and visitor numbers more than quadruple from under 100,000 to over 400,000.

But then he dramatically over-reaches

Had it not been for the dramatic expansion of trade and economic relations with China in the early years of the Key Government, New Zealand would have suffered a long and sustained recession, and all of the associated social challenges that we have seen in some European nations.

There is simply no support for this proposition anywhere in the rest of the speech.

The implication, of course, is that New Zealand has done well over the term of this government.  But here is a chart of real GDP per capita for New Zealand and the United States, both normalised to 100 in the December quarter of 2007, just prior to the recession.

real GDP pc NZ and US

The United States, you will recall, was the epicentre of the financial crisis, and had a very nasty fall in house prices.  The United States cut interest rates as far as they then thought they could go.

New Zealand, by contrast, had a relatively modest home-grown financial crisis (localised in the non-systemic finance companies), never reached the limits of conventional monetary policy, and had a much stronger fiscal position going into the recession than the US (or most other advanced countries had).  Oh, and we the big bonus of a sharp fall in interest rates, as a country that had borrowed heavily from the rest of the world.

And yet look at the chart.  The initial recession was certainly a little deeper in the US than it was here –  but China wasn’t a significant influence on what was happening here in 2008/09.  But then we had a double-dip recession in 2010.

For a couple of years it looked as though we might be doing a bit better than the US, at least on this metric, but even that optimistic possibility has now faded away.  Over the nine years shown, real GDP per capita has grown almost exactly as slowly in New Zealand as it has in the United States (average growth rates of barely 0.5 per cent per annum).   You’d have to know economic data pretty well to be able to tell apart the US and New Zealand lines for the last six years or so.

So we had a pretty nasty recession, which we took years to recover from.  On some metrics – eg the unemployment rate –  we still haven’t.  And all that even though China took up a larger share of our exports.  It is so even though in those “early years of the Key government”, China was a big source of demand driving activity in our biggest trade and investment partner, Australia.

The Minister seemed to be telling a trade and exports story –  certainly those are the numbers he quoted.    But here are exports as a share of GDP for the two countries, again back to December 2007.

exports to GDP US and NZ

In both countries, exports took a hit during the recession – in the US’s case it was mostly volumes, while it our case much of it was prices (the fall in export prices).   But, despite all that additional trade between New Zealand and China, our export share of GDP has fallen quite a bit over the last few years, while that in the US (always much lower, given that the US is a large country) has held remarkably steady.

Perhaps this fawning “China our saviour” line went over well when the Premier of China was visiting recently, but it really doesn’t amount to much at all.  The country composition of our exports has changed –  and for a couple of years perhaps high prices out of China for milk powder lifted farmer incomes –  but as a share of the overall income, exports have been shrinking.  We produce stuff (mostly bulk commodities), and someone buys it.  In recent years, China has been a more important buyer –  although Australia remains our largest export market –  and the free trade market with China is likely to have been helpful, but it has hardly transformed our economic fortunes.

There are other differences between the US and New Zealand experiences.  The US unemployment rate went up much more than ours did during the recession, but then came down much more sharply and is now a bit lower than ours.

U rates in floaters

But one striking difference over the last few years is in the estimated population growth rates.

population US and NZ

Overall, ours is a story of little or no productivity growth (none for the last five years), of an economy that –  going by the headline statistics –  seems increasingly inward focused, reliant on population-fuelled (and earthquake rebuild fuelled) domestic demand.   And it is a pretty poor performance all round.

There are, of course, worse places among the advanced countries, and if that is all the Minister had wanted to say, no one could disagree.  But instead he over-reached, suggesting that somehow we’d done well.  We haven’t.  And mostly that is down to our own choices –  or, more specifically, those of the government in which Mr McCully has been a senior minister.

What (e/im)migration data to use when

I was having a conversation with someone the other day, trying to explain both what data there were on movements of people into (and out of) New Zealand, and which data was useful for what purpose.  Reflecting on that afterwards, it seemed that a post might be useful.  This follows on from my post last week on the Herald’s misleading article on “work visas”, but is intended to be much general, not aimed at anyone  or any recent comment in particular, and to be something I can refer (others) back to.

For those who find my discursive posts a bit trying the quick summary is that if you want to talk about immigration policy –  something that only affects non-citizen movements –  use the MBIE data.  MBIE, of course, could and should make it much easier to do so.

Being an island a long way from anywhere, it is pretty easy to count pretty reliably the number of people coming into or leaving New Zealand.   Perhaps there are a few illegals who never declare themselves, but even if so it is a trivial issue for us.

And, of course, when you enter or leave New Zealand you have to fill in, and hand over, an arrival or departure card before you can continue with your journey.  We know exactly how many people come in and go out.  In principle, the data could be available daily, but in practice monthly is just fine.  Statistics New Zealand publish that data.

But these data often aren’t that useful for anything.     Even seasonally adjusted, this is what the quarterly data look like  (in all chart in this post, I’ve annualised any quarterly or monthly data, so that you can implicitly benchmark it against the headline net annual inflows people are most familiar with).

net arrivals

There is a huge amount of short-term volatility, and any new quarter’s information has almost no information value at all.   After the event you can see the big net inflow periods around 2002/03 and over the last few years, but it takes a lot of time to discern any trends.   Some of the volatility relates to identifiable one-off events: one can readily see the short-term inflows for the last Lions tour in 2005, and for the Rugby World Cup in 2011.  Much of the rest of the volatility can’t easily be pinned down, or adjusted for, at all.  So mostly (but see below) people don’t pay much attention to this series.   Using total movements data is made even harder by the fact that SNZ don’t publish a breakdown by citizenship (even though they have the data).

The permanent and long-term migration (PLT) data are a (largely successful) attempt to look through the noise, and provide a reasonable timely indicator of (changes in) the number of people coming and going fairly permanently.   If you say on your arrival/departure card that you are intending to come (or be away) for more than 12 months you end up in the PLT category.    This is what that data looks like (quarterly seasonally adjusted, and then annualised).

net PLT arrivals

There are still big cycles in this series, but the short-term volatility is much less than in the net total arrivals chart above  (and it would be even more obvious if the scale on the second chart was not much more compressed than that on the first chart).

What is more, SNZ publish this data by citizenship.  That enables us to separate out movements of New Zealand citizens, (who don’t permission at all to come and go), Australian citizens (who do need permission, but have been given ex ante blanket permission) and all other citizens, who need specific approval from the New Zealand government to come and stay.     I showed the chart of New Zealand and non-New Zealand citizens a week or so ago.

plt by citizenship apr 17

Both those series are also quite smooth.  Usually, it takes only a few quarters to see if the trends in these series have been changing.

That can be really useful, at least in principle, for some purposes.  If you are the Reserve Bank, trying to keep tabs on housing market pressures or overall pressure on resources, it is useful additional information.  It is more important here than in many countries both because immigration flows are so large, but also because the scale of the cyclical variations –  relative to the size of the economy –  are larger than in most advanced countries.

It is also useful information if you want to comment on the behaviour of New Zealanders (coming and going), because it is all the data we have.  New Zealanders don’t need permission to come and go  (it is also the only data on Australian citizen movements, but the size of those flows, and the variation in them, is quite small).

But the PLT data aren’t ideal by any means –  not even for the movements of New Zealanders.  As we’ll see below, they probably pick turning points quite well, but for levels they can at times be quite seriously misleading.

And that isn’t because of ill-will or malice on anyone’s part.  It simply reflects the fact the data rely on self-reported intentions.   Sometimes people aren’t sure of their plans, but even when (probably mostly) they are, plans change.   Plenty of New Zealanders head off to Australia, in particular, planning never to come back.  But some won’t find a job, and others will just miss friends and family, and they’ll be back within 12 months.  Others go, planning to be a way for only a few months, but they find they like it, a temporary turns more permanent, or perhaps they just fall in love.   And if they ever come back, it will be an absence much longer than 12 months.    And, even for New Zealanders, this all works in reverse: people come home, intending to stay, but actually…they miss the bright lights or whatever and are gone again a few months later.

Plans also change for non-citizens.  After a few months, some find New Zealand isn’t all it seemed on the brochure, and some go home again.  For others, they might have come for a few months, and then found opportunities for a work visa, or even eventually for residence.

You might think the differences/errors would be small, but often they aren’t.  They probably don’t much affect the usefulness of a single quarter’s data, compared with that for the prevous quarter, and for macro forecasters that might be almost all that matters.   But over very long periods, the differences can be massive (and unpredictable).    Here is a chart showing the cumulative net arrivals for the last 20 years or so, from both the PLT data and the total migration data.

net immigration

With this particular starting point, the cumulative gap isn’t that large at present.  But at times it has been very large.   (And the big differences at times aren’t just changes in the stock of tourists in New Zealand, or New Zealand tourists abroad.)   Cumulatively, over this 20 year period we’ve a bit more actual permanent and long-term migration than the arrival and departure cards suggested.   But in the last decade or so, it has been the other way round (as the gap between the two lines has materially closed).   It isn’t easy to get a sense of how much of the differences are changes of plans by New Zealand citizens and how much by non-New Zealanders.

Statistics New Zealand recognise that the PLT numbers they publish –  and which they themselves use in publishing quarterly population estimates for the periods between censuses –  are no more than approximate indicators.  Prompted by the Reserve Bank, a  couple of years ago they published this note on work they had done on Alternative methods for measuring permanent and long-term migration.

Here is their opening chart, which highlights (in particular) the big gap between total migration (net passenger movements) and recorded PLT in the 2002 and 2003 period.

Graph, Comparison between net passenger movements and recorded net PLT migration, year ended June 2000 to 2013.

They identified three possible methods of working out (later) who actually was away for, or in New Zealand for, more than 12 months.  Those methods produced impressively consistent results

Graph, Comparison between net recorded PLT and alternative net PLT migration methods, year ended June 2000 to 2013.

As is clear in the chart, the actual PLT inflow over 2002 and 2003 was much larger than had been suggested by the reported intentions of travellers in the published PLT data (in fact, since New Zealand’s population was quite a bit smaller then, the net inflow as a share of population at peak was a bit larger than what we’ve seen  –  according to published data –  in the last year or so.)

The limitation of these alternative methods is that they can be done only after a year has passed since the initial arrivals/departures happened.  That is no small point, but it is hardly unique to immigration data. Our official GDP series are regularly revised for several years after the quarter to which they relate, as better annual data come available to Statistics New Zealand.

Unfortunately, Statistics New Zealand apparently has no money to update or report these better estimates on an ongoing basis.  That seems quite extraordinary –  although perhaps par for the course in underfunding important statistics in New Zealand –  for data that plays such a significant role in economic monitoring and public debate in New Zealand.

The alternative methods don’t invalidate the use of the published PLT numbers for short-term cyclical analysis.  Even though these are only annual charts, you can see that the turning points in the series are much the same as in the published PLT data.  But if the absolute level of the net numbers can be out by so much –   as SNZ themselves recognise in completing this analytical work –  so, inevitably, will the absolute levels of the many of the derivative series drawn from the PLT numbers.  Use the overall PLT numbers by all means for some short-term purposes (is the rate of population growth right now accelerating, slowing or holding roughly steady), but it is crucial to recognise the limitations of those data.

Perhaps the new Minister of Statistics could look at securing some budgetary funding for Statistics New Zealand, to enable them to move those alternative methods into becoming a regularly-published and updated part of the suite of official statistics?

But if you want to have an informed discussion about immigration policy –  the choices by the New Zealand government as to how many non-citizens to allow to live and work here, under what terms and programmes – the PLT numbers really aren’t very useful at all.    After all, the PLT data only capture visa types rather loosely, and many people change the visa they are on while onshore (including more than 70 per cent of those eventually granted New Zealand residence visas).

More importantly, we can use –  what surely government officials advising ministers on immigration policy mostly use –  direct administrative data generated by MBIE itself on the numbers and types of visas granted, and to whom they are granted.  MBIE administer the immigration programmes, and grant the visas that are issued.  They know exactly how many they have issued, and to whom.  And they know when those visas are cancelled, and thus can tell you how many are outstanding.     It is immeasurably superior data for discussions of immigration policy.

The problem is that although MBIE has this data, and presumably could update it every single day from its own systems, it is really quite hard for the public –  and even analysts –  to use it on a timely basis.

Once a year they publish Migration Trends and Outlook, chock-full of interesting charts and tables.  And at the same time they provide accompanying detailed summary spreadsheets of the annual data both on the residence approvals programme –  the centrepiece of our immigration policy –  and on the numerous temporary visa programmes.   Those tables are great.

But these publications are available only with quite a lag.  Last year’s report, for the year to June 2016, came out in late November.  Presumably the next issue is now at least six months away.  For some purposes it isn’t a problem.    For others, it is serious problem.  Analysts cannnot simply go to the MBIE website (let alone the Statistics New Zealand website, where much of this should be accessible) and find easy to use summary data on a monthly or quarterly basis, seasonally adjusted where appropriate.    Consider another set of administrative data.   Building permits are also granted by government entities: Statistics New Zealand collect them from 70 or TLAs and make the data available, readily usable, by the end of the following month.   Since only one agency issues visas, there is really no excuse for not having at least as good data (coverage and timeliness and accessibility) on immigration approvals.

MBIE do put out quite a lot of data on a monthly basis.  But it is a series of enormous (eg half a million lines long) spreadsheets here.    You could, if you wanted, produce your own summary tables, formatted along the lines of MBIE’s annual tables, on a monthly basis.  You could, if had the technical capability, seasonally adjust the data yourself.    But to do so is a major hassle for any ordinary analyst (public sector, media or whatever), the more so when one is used to statistical agencies providing accessible summary data, in usable formats and seasonally adjusted where appropriate.     As I noted the other day, it took me an hour or so to generate 10 numbers on how many Essential Skills visas had been granted to nationals of various countries in the last year.  By contrast, it took less than two minutes to download the comparable data for earlier years (from the MBIE summary tables).

It isn’t good enough.    The outgoing head of MBIE, David Smol, and the Minister of Immigration should really make it a matter of priority to get this data out there, in readily usable form, on a high frequency and timely basis.   It is inconceivable that it would cost much to do so, and by doing so they would help contribute to a much better informed debate on actual immigration policy.   It isn’t as if, as in some countries, immigration policy is minor matter in New Zeland –  like or not, even MBIE recognise that we have one of the largest per capita immigration programmes of any advanced country.

Now, it is true that for many of visa programmes, neither the numbers approved nor the make-up of those who receive approvals, change very much from year to year.    Mostly, if you want to know about how many people, and what sort of people, we are approving, whether as residents, students, or the various classes of work visas, looking at the last annual numbers will give you a reasonable picture.  There just isn’t that much noise in the series –  and I commend the Migration Trends and Outlook tables to those, perhaps including those in political parties, wanting to offer deeper analysis or policy alternatives.  But year old data simply isn’t good enough, when much more timely data are available internally –  and could readily be formatted to be more widely usable by non-government analysts and commentators.   Nature abhors a vacuum, and when it is so much easier simply to fall back on timely PLT data then, with all their limitations, too many people will do so.  And the debate will be the poorer for that.

It can easily be done.  For example, Education New Zealand gets the student visa data, apparently within a few days of the end of each month.   They in turn transform that data into a fascinating monthly “dashboard” (an example is here).   There is no reason why we couldn’t have official detailed tables, and a Hot off the Press from Statistics New Zealand, for these and the other visa categories.  After all, immigration policy is (concretely) about how many visas we issue, to whom, and on what terms.   When people want to talk about how many work visas have been issued, and to whom, they shouldn’t be going anywhere near the PLT data.  They should turning automatically and instinctively to accessible data from the visa-granting agency.

And when people want to debate the medium-term contribution of immigration policy to New Zealand population growth, again they shouldn’t be going anywhere near the PLT data, but turning to the rich data MBIE has, going back a large number of years now, on the total numbers and the various possible breakdowns (age, nationality, sex, occupation, approval stream etc).   These are people who will, in most cases, be future New Zealanders.  By comparison, PLT arrivals data will shed almost no useful light at all.

(Sometimes, of course, like all statistics, if they can’t be used for actual illumination the PLT numbers can still be (mis)used for support).

Because you can’t easily get it from MBIE, here is the table I ran last week on one breakdown of residence approvals for the year ending March 2017 (with thanks to the reader with MS Access who did generated them).

Residence Approvals: Year ended 31 March 2017
Application Substream Application Criteria Number approved
Skilled Migrant Skilled Migrant 25,357
Work to Residence Talent – Accredited Employer 1,464
Investor Category Investor 2 Category 1,404
Entrepreneur Category Entrepreneur category 740
Work to Residence Long Term Skill Shortage List Occupation 527
Investor Category Investor 1 Category 154
Partnership Deferral Skilled Skills/Business deferral 142
Work to Residence Religious Worker 122
Work to Residence Talent – Sports 27
Employee of businesses Employees of businesses 3
Business / Skilled Sub-total 29,940
Refugee 1,902
Samoa Quota 1,008
Pacific Access 607
Other Ministerial direction 295
Other Victims of Domestic Violence 28
Section 61 Section 61 133
International / Humanitarian Sub-total 3,973
Family Tier 1 & 2 Family Parent Tier 1 2,555
Parent Family parent 457
Sibling Family sibling 397
Adult Child Family child adult 47
Sibling Family sibling 2
Parent Sibling Adult Child Stream Sub-total 3,458
Partnership Partnership 9,439
Dependant Child Family child dependent 1,861
Partnership Partnership – Partner of an Expatriate 1,247
Parent Retirement Parent Retirement 37
Partnership Deferral Family Partnership deferral 23
Dependant Child Family Child dependent – Dependants of an Expatriate 11
Partnership Partnership 3
Uncapped Family Sponsored Stream Sub-total 12,621

And here is my own (time-consuming) table of the top 10 countries for people getting granted Essential Skills work visas, updated to include the year to March 2017.

Essential skills visas granted, by country
2006/07 2015/16 12mths to Mar 17
Philippines 1695 5,408 6174
India 1943 4,812 4904
UK 4692 3,686 4086
Fiji 2145 1,973 1756
China 2749 1,823 1801
South Africa 2003 1,382 1807
Ireland 481 969 824
Brazil 1376 923 1066
South Korea 1145 828 767
United States 1493 820 837
Total all countries 31015 31766 32775

You should really be able to get those, and so much more, readily from MBIE. Sadly, you can’t.

As a result, the debate –  whichever angle you find yourself inclining towards – is poorer than it could, and should, be.

UPDATE: I can also recommend Alex Tarrant’s amusing piece on some of the data issues.

Brash vs Gould vs Brash

Former UK Labour MP (and academic administrator) Bryan Gould, and former Reserve Bank Governor (and political leader) Don Brash have been engaged in a fairly robust exchange of views in the op-ed pages of the Herald.

Gould began it a couple of weeks ago with a column, initially prompted by some combination of the initiatives from both the Minister of Finance, and the Labour Party, that may lead to governance reforms at the Reserve Bank, and Sonny Bill Williams’ Islam-inspired objections to interest, and hence to sponsorship by the BNZ.   The politicians being not very radical at all, Gould pointed us to Williams.

Sonny Bill, however, has succeeded, if we are thoughtful enough to recognise it, in throwing a spotlight on the entire role of the banks in our economy and our society.

Gould’s specific concern?

It is the willingness, not to say keenness, of the banks to lend on mortgage that provides the virtually limitless purchasing power that is constantly bidding up the prices of homes in Auckland and, now, elsewhere.

It is the banks that are fuelling the housing unaffordability crisis, a crisis that is leaving families homeless and widening the gap between rich and poor.

Gould isn’t keen on operational autonomy for the Reserve Bank, whether on monetary policy or banking regulation, at all.

Why should the Government be able to hide behind the Governor of the Reserve Bank and duck responsibility for a policy of the greatest importance to so many Kiwis? Why should ministers not be held to account in Parliament and to the country for failing to deliver outcomes they were elected to deliver?

And actually, I have some sympathy with him on that.   Banking regulation should be administered by the Reserve Bank, but approved by the Minister of Finance or Parliament itself.

But Gould’s argument isn’t some abstract one about the optimal assignment of powers within the Reserve Bank Act.     His concern is that banks create credit, and in so doing create new deposits, as a profit-making business.

They lend you money that they themselves create out of nothing, through the stroke of a pen or, today, a computer entry.

The banks make their money, in other words, by charging interest on money that they themselves create. Not surprisingly, they are keen to lend as much as possible.

In fact, most businesses are keen to increase volume, at least for as long as they can make money on the marginal addition to their sales.   Supermarkets are typically keen on selling you more groceries, health food shops on selling you more health food, fashion outlets on selling you more clothes etc.  But Gould’s bugbear is banks (and, presumably, other lending institutions).   To read Gould, you’d think that banks crammed money down the throats of unwilling borrowers.  There doesn’t seem to be any role for demand in his story (let alone for the regulatory restrictions that artificially inflate urban land values).  Banks, as currently structured, don’t appear to serve any socially useful purpose.

As you might expect, Don Brash –  a former Governor, a former ANZ director, and currently chair of one of the small Chinese banks in New Zealand –  disagreed.   Writing of Gould he notes

He then goes on to blame this money creation for the housing affordability crisis which Auckland now finds itself in, and to attack the Government for washing its hands of this aspect of the housing crisis.

Mr Gould is not alone in peddling this nonsense, but that certainly doesn’t make it correct.

Don Brash isn’t disputing the rather obvious point that the banking system, in the course of lending, also create deposits.  As he says

The banking system does create money.

But at this point he rather veers away from the substance of the issue (Gould’s claim that bank credit creation at the root cause of the housing affordability problems – dismissed by Brash as “peddling this nonsense”) to make a correct, and useful, but in this context perhaps subsidiary, point.    What is more or less true of the system as a whole, just isn’t true for any individual bank.

If individual banks really could create money by “the stroke of a pen or a computer entry”, as Mr Gould contends, why do they bother paying interest on deposits, why do they borrow funds from parent banks overseas, why do they borrow funds in the international market, why do they need to hold some funds in government securities as a liquidity reserve, why do some banks occasionally run out of money when customers lose confidence in them?

….I now chair the small New Zealand subsidiary of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China….. It would certainly make life very much easier if we could, “by the stroke of a pen or a computer entry”, simply create the money which we lend out to New Zealand borrowers. Unfortunately, we can’t.

Individual banks, and their managers and boards, have to worry (sometimes a lot) about the funding side of their balance sheets.  If Don Brash’s bank increases lending to New Zealand borrowers, that process will indeed create new deposits for the New Zealand banking system as a whole.  But there is no guarantee any of those deposits will come back to his bank.  In the immediate term,  if one bank increases lending more than other banks do, that will lead to a loss of liquidity from the lending bank.  In boom times, it might be easy to fund such rapid lending growth.  In times of crisis, funding can be almost everything.  I was heavily involved in these issues in the midst of the 2008/09 financial crisis, and recall banks telling us then that no matter what initiatives the government or the Reserve Bank took, they’d be reluctant to increase lending if they couldn’t count on secure on-market funding.  Their Boards just wouldn’t let them.

But in a way, Brash’s response didn’t actually deal with Gould’s point –  that for the banking system as a whole, deposits don’t usually constrain lending. Rather the two typically grow as part of a simultaneous process (with some exceptions about changes in the current account deficit etc).  If so, perhaps the credit creation process could be the root cause of the (housing) problem?

Gould returned to the fray in a column in yesterday’s Herald.   But, oddly, he doesn’t attempt to defend his view that banks are the cause of the housing problem.  Rather he tries to teach the former Governor to suck eggs, offering lay lessons in monetary economics, and suggesting that Brash doesn’t really know what he is talking about.

In fact, he first misrepresents what Brash said

…..I said the vast majority of new money in circulation is created by the banks “by the stroke of a pen”, and they then make their profits by charging interest on the money they create.

If this is “nonsense”, the “peddlers” include some very distinguished economists.

But, as you can see from the quotes above, Brash seems to be mostly using the “peddling nonsense” phrase to respond to the housing affordability argument.  Moreover, he explicitly states (see above) that the banking system creates money  (personally, I’d prefer he’d used “deposits” rather than “money”).

In fact, in the entire latest Gould column there is not a single mention of the housing issue.  Instead, there are extensive quotes from a very good –  but entirely conventional –  Bank of England Bulletin article from a few years ago on how the credit and deposit creation process actually works, and how that process is quite different from the very stylised approach that often lingers in elementary economics textbooks.     In fact, our Reserve Bank made many of the same points in an article in their Bulletin a few years earlier.  A (then) Reserve Bank senior manager was making these points in a speech 15 years ago.  But the Bank of England article is very good.    Then again, recall that the Bank of England runs things pretty much exactly the same way our Reserve Bank does.    There simply isn’t any stunning fresh insight in the BOE piece to up-end how best to think about monetary policy and banking regulation.

So when Gould quotes the BOE piece

They then go on to say, “Another common misconception is that the central bank determines the quantity of loans and deposits in the economy by controlling the quantity of central bank money – the so-called ‘money multiplier’ approach…[but that] is not an accurate description of how money is created in reality.”

They go on. “Banks first decide how much to lend depending on the profitable lending opportunities available to them – which will, crucially, depend on the interest rate set… It is these lending decisions that determine how many bank deposits are created by the banking system.

Anyone who knows anything about this stuff is simply drumming their fingers, and going “yes, yes, tell us something we didn’t know”.   But do notice the mention of interest rates in that second paragraph.  The way central banks choose to manage the monetary system these days relies on adjusting an official interest rate, not on attempting to directly manage quantities (of base money, lending, deposits or whatever).   Demand for credit matters quite a lot, and the interest rate is a key rationing device.     When overall demand is weak at any given interest rate –  as has been the case for the last decade –  interest rates tend to fall, and official interest rates are typically cut.  Banks can’t just generate new demand out of thin air.

Gould concludes

But the capacity they [banks] have is hugely important. I concluded by asking whether it was wise to entrust such wide-ranging powers – so significant in their impact on the whole economy – to the banks, and then to arrange that the only person able to regulate that impact was himself a banker – the Governor of the Reserve Bank.

Reasonable people can differ on the extent to which banks should be regulated, and even on who should do the regulation (one should always cautious about the risk of capture, of bureaucrats/ministers by those they are supposed to be regulating).

But in his two articles put together, Gould has done nothing (at all) to substantiate his claim that banks are the prime (or even just a key) source of the housing affordability problems.    Simply describing the way in which credit and deposits are created, across the banking system as a whole, contributes little.

I would grant one point.  If banks could not create credit – in the process (simultaneously) allowing young generations to borrow from older ones – house price cycles would look rather different.  Perhaps house prices would be a little lower.  But the biggest change would probably be not in the level of house prices, but in who owned the houses.   Even more young people would be unable to purchase their own home, and more of those homes would be owned by those not constrained by access to credit (be it the evil “investors”, cashed-up foreigners, or institutional vehicles such as pension funds).  Systemic credit risks might be lower, but at what cost to individual families etc?  The fundamental factors that create (artificial) scarcity  –  land use restrictions running hard into rapidly rising population-fuelled demand –  wouldn’t have changed at all.

And for believers in the idea that the banking system is the source of the problem, it is often worth pointing them to the United States.    It has the same sort of banking system we do –  the banking system simulataneously creates loans and deposits –  and yet vast swathes of the country, including big cities often with quite rapid population growth, have had no problems with unaffordable house prices (as a resource on this, try this excellent interview with leading US housing academic Joseph Gyourko, which almost deserves its own post).  The private banking system isn’t the problem.  Land use and housing supply restrictions are.    The banking system certainly enables some people who would otherwise be squeezed out completely to purchase (in fact that is what it always did for first home buyers –  whether the “bank” was a private one, or the State Advances Corporation).  If house prices ever do fall back a long way, some borrowers might well regret having borrowed.   But in all sorts of areas of life, hindsight is like that. For now, they’ve made the best decisions they could for themselves, with the information they have,

Monetary reform ideas have a long tradition –  sometimes advocated by some pretty prominent economists (eg Laurence Kotlikoff, who came through New Zealand a few years ago).  Usually, there is (a lot) less there than the advocates make out.  Sometimes – as with Social Credit –  the analysis is simply misconceived, or even straight-out nutty.  I suspect Gould is in the former camp.  We could, if we wanted to, have a quite different system of monetary management.  I think we’d mostly be worse off if we did.  And since our system is the same system adopted now across virtually the entire world, the burden of proof should surely be on the advocates of change to demonstrate that the outcomes of their alternative visions would be demonstrably superior.  Gould hasn’t done that.  And it is no use simply going ‘but the 2008/09 crisis was so awful, anything has to be better’ without a great deal more supporting analysis, of the causes and consequences of those crisis episodes, than is on offer here.

 

When Australia’s unemployment drops, more people will go there again

I had things more interesting (at least to me) to write about today, but I heard the Minister of Finance on Morning Report talking up the alleged strength of the New Zealand economy, noting that we were now – in some way or another –  doing what south-east Queensland had done previously, becoming all that we always wanted to be, and so New Zealanders weren’t fleeing the country any more.  He was careful not to suggest that the diaspora is coming home –  they simply aren’t, and haven’t at any time in the 40 years since the large trend net outflow began.    As if it is somehow relevant to current New Zealand immigration policy debates – and recall that immigration policy is about non-citizens – he and others keep telling us “but they could”.    It can happen.  It did to some extent in Ireland, but it happened there after they structurally transformed their economy and successfully lifted their productivity performance.  There is no sign of such a successful transformation here, whether under this government or the long run of its predecessors.

I’ve run this cartoon before
richardson

As I noted, since this was first run in early 1991

…. we’ve had Bill Birch, Winston Peters, Bill English, Michael Cullen, and Bill English again, and although we’ve had plenty of cyclical ups and downs, never at any time have we looked like successfully or sustainably reversing our relative economic decline.

And now we can add Steven Joyce to the list.

But what about those net migration flows to Australia that the Minister was talking about?

net PLT to Aus

Going back 1978/79, I’ve shown three different measures of net outflow here:

  • New Zealand citizens only
  • New Zealand and Australian citizens (the group not requiring specific approval to move trans-Tasman)
  • all citizenships

Mostly the patterns are all but identical, and dominated by fluctuations in the movement of New Zealand citizens.  That makes sense: New Zealanders are free to move, and New Zealand has been materially poorer than  Australia throughout this almost 40 year period.     And over that period, there is no very obvious change in the trend –  just large average outflows, but very large cyclical fluctuations in those net outflows.

It is interesting that right at the end of the chart there is some divergence.  Over the last year, for the first time in 40 years, there has been a net inflow of around 2000 non New Zealand/non-Australian citizens from Australia.  I’m not quite sure why that is, but it is broadly consistent with the theme of this post.  Given a choice between going to Australia or staying in New Zealand, not many people tend to go when the Australian labour market is weak.     Over the last 12 months, a net 4206 New Zealanders left for Australia, but that is a lot lower than the average of around 25000 in a typical year.

In that chart above there have been five episodes when the net flow to Australia (on any of the measures shrunk a lot for a period).  The peaks were around:

  • 1982/83
  • 1991
  • 2002/03
  • 2009/10
  • the present.

And here is a chart of Australia’s unemployment rate.

Aus U

It  shouldn’t be any great surprise that all those temporary reductions in the net outflow to Australia coincided with periods of increased unemployment in Australia.  If anything, the Australian unemployment rate looks more important as an explanatory factor than, say, the difference between the New Zealand and Australian unemployment rates.   In 1991, for example, both countries had very high unemployment  –  and at present both countries have unemployment rates well above pre-recession levels.

The greater importance of the Australian unemployment rate shouldn’t be a surprise.  New Zealanders don’t need to have a firm job offer, or advance approval, to move to Australia.  They can do so “on spec”, looking for work once they arrive.   But a typical person will be much less likely to take that risk if the search process in Australia is going to be long and arduous and might fail altogether.  And the risks have increased over the years, as Australian first tightened access to welfare for New Zealanders living in Australia, and then as people become more aware of the rather limited entitlements New Zealanders have there, even if they have been in Australia for some years.

It isn’t a mechanical relationship of course.  And the Australian unemployment rate now –  at around 6 per cent –  is a lot lower than it was in those 1983 and 1991 peaks.  But since the wage gaps between New Zealand and Australia haven’t narrowed at all, and the productivity gaps have continued to widen,  it seems only prudent to assume that as and when the Australian labour market improves, the net outflow to Australia will resume in something like full historical numbers.

In the repeated burble from the government about the alleged strength of the New Zealand economy, it is often overlooked that while our unemployment rate is not high in absolute terms it is still well above what we experienced pre-recession, and more so than is the case for most other advanced countries that have control of their own monetary policy.   And Australia is in much the same position,

U rates in floaters

And even most of these countries largely ran out of conventional monetary policy room.  Neither New Zealand or Australia did.   Neither labour market is that strong.  Against that backdrop it shouldn’t really be surprising that the outflow to Australia has temporarily slowed.   It doesn’t reflect any credit (or discredit for that matter) on our government.  It looks like mostly a cyclical issue in Australia.  An easier stance of policy by the Reserve Bank of Australia  –  which would have been warranted with inflation persistently below target – would probably have seen rather stronger outflows even over the last couple of years.

UPDATE:  Just to reinforce the point about Australian unemployment, here is an ABS chart from a few months ago highlighting how their underemployment measure has not fallen even as the official unemployment rate has.

Graph 1, Unemployment and Underemployment rate, November 1980 to November 2016
Graph: Graph 1, Unemployment and Underemployment rate, November 1980 to November 2016

 

France and some near-neighbours

After a run of posts on immigration, or indeed on Reserve Bank issues, I often feel like something completely different.  No doubt that is a relief to readers, but it also helps remind me that I intend to write about what takes my fancy and interests me, and not primarily pushing particular causes.

And it is not as if I want to weigh in to the Herald vs Winston Peters contretemps, in which (at least on my reading) the Herald was using numbers that were accurate but seriously misleading (whether with an agenda, or just because they weren’t famliar with the better data, or some combination of the two, I have no idea), while Winston Peters was also, as far as I can tell, factually accurate but really rather distasteful.

But France is coming towards the end of a fascinating election campaign, which (for political junkies) has meant lots of fascinating articles about French politics, French society, and so on.   It has resolved to a race between two unconventional candidates, neither with strong parliamentary support, and so potential challenges in governing.  And if, as seems likely, Macron wins, the challenge to the “globalist” establishment seems unlikely to go away any time soon.

No doubt there have been some articles around on the French economy, but I must have missed them.   So I decided to download some data, mostly from the IMF World Economic Outlook database, and amuse myself by looking at a few comparisons between France on the one hand, and Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany on the other (with a sideways glance at the rather different UK economy from time to time).  They seem like good comparators for France, as Australia often is for New Zealand.    References to New Zealand will be few and far between, but just note that these are all countries with materially higher real GDP per capita than New Zealand has.   And the productivity gaps –  using real GDP per hour worked –  are much larger again.    For those four continental countries, the OECD estimates that average GDP per hour worked is now more than 60 per cent higher than that in New Zealand.

First up is a comparison of real per capita GDP growth, in national currency terms (although of course all four continental countries use the same currency now) since 1990.

real GDP pc growth Fr etc

Over that full period, France has been clearly the worst performer, but interestingly that has only been clear since about 2010.   Until then, on this measure Germany and France had been tracking very closely together.

And some of the difference with Germany may still “just” be cyclical (things that economists put “just” in front of can still matter quite a bit in elections).  Here are the IMF estimates of the respective output gaps.

output gap fr

There is materially more excess capacity in France than in the other four countries.

Consistent with this, the unemployment rate is materially higher in France than in the other countries.  It is about 10 per cent in France, compared with a range of 4 to 6 per cent for Germany, Netherlands and the UK (with Belgium in the middle). France probably has a higher NAIRU.    But here is the IMF estimate of this year’s unemployment rate, less the actual unemployment rate for 2007, the last year of the previous boom.

U rate FranceFrance is, again, the worst performer.

The government debt position is pretty poor too (although not that much worse than the UK’s).

govt debt fr

I’m never quite sure why people think Germany should increase government spending and increase its government debt –  especially in a country with little or no population growth.   France’s numbers –  among the very highest in any advanced country –  don’t look like something to emulate, no matter good the resulting school lunches might be.

govt spending france

Current account numbers aren’t that easy to interpret without lots of context, but even for an advanced economy with modest population growth, surpluses the size of Germany’s (or the Netherlands) look, at very least, anomalous.   There isn’t anything inherently virtuous about France’s near-balance position, but it typically wouldn’t be an indicator of serious trouble either.

CAD Fr

With a bit more demand and a stronger cyclical position – hard to engineer with such high public debt, and no national monetary policy – the current account deficit would no doubt be a bit wider.

It isn’t all a bad news story.  Here, for example, is total investment as a share of GDP.

investment fr

The investment share of GDP in France last year was higher than that of any of these countries –  far higher, for example, than in cyclically more-stretched Germany.   At least some of those big, really successful, global French companies must have been seeing some good opportunities at home.

Despite all that government spending and generous welfare provision, nothing really stands out about the French national savings rate either.

savings fr

Even within common currency areas, real exchange rates can move – at times quite considerably. We saw that a lot in the run-up to the crisis, with real exchange rate appreciations in peripheral countries (such as Ireland) relative to core euro countries. Perhaps such movements help explain, or mitigate, France’s disappointing relative performance?

These are the BIS’s broad real exchange rate measures for France and Germany.

exch rate fr

The two countries’ real exchange rates have moved all but identically ever since the creation of the euro.    It isn’t clear why there hasn’t been more movement (especially in recent years) but it isn’t hard to suspect that if the franc and mark were again different currencies, we wouldn’t have seen anything like as strong a common trend.

Over the longer-term, it is hardly as if France is some hopeless case.   If we look at meausures of labour productivity, real GDP per hour worked (in PPP terms)  in each of France, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany are among the highest anywhere, averaging something very similar to the US numbers  (the UK is quite a bit lower).   The OECD’s series for that data goes back to 1970.  Here is how France has done relative to the other three continentals.

fr real gdp phwFrance caught up over the first few decades and has largely held its own since, at least relative to these comparators.

Of course, one of the striking things about France is how little labour input is used.

employment rates fr.png

Since, as we saw above, the French unemployment rate is higher than usual, the picture is slightly exaggerated at present.  but the difference between France (and Belgium) and the other three countries is stark.      (In New Zealand, by the way, the employment rate in the same quarter was 66.9 per cent, while the US is similar to Germany, Netherlands and the UK.)

The differences are just as stark, if not more so, if we look at hours worked per capita.  Here I use the Conference Board’s Total Economy database.

hours worked per capita Fr

The average French person –  man, woman, child, young middle-aged and old –  worked around 600 hours last year.  The average New Zealander worked more than 50 per cent more –  and still managed clearly the lowest real GDP per capita of any country in this chart.   So little output for so much input.

There are lots of stories about the possible connections between hours and productivity.  If, for example, you impose tough regulations and make employing labour very expensive, firms will have to adapt such that the people who are employed are highly productive (they have to earn their keep).   The less productive firms and people are simply priced out.   But higher taxes –  certainly than somewhere like New Zealand –  and provisions of retirement income policies also play a part in discouraging French working hours, and not just from the unproductive.  Plenty of very capable people have long holidays, shortish work weeks, and relatively early retirements.   As a result, French GDP per capita is lower than those of the other continentals in this sample, even though productivity per hour worked is very similar.

I don’t have strong lessons to draw from this post –  it was a discursive tour, as much out of curiosity as anything.  But I’ve long been a sceptic of the euro and –  disruptive as a break-up or withdrawal inevitably would be –  it isn’t obvious that French voters could look on the single currency as any sort of unalloyed blessing for them, and their country, especially in the years since 2007.

There are good reasons to be glad not to be in France –  Islamic terorism among them. But when one looks as these data –  not just for France but for each of the continental countries here –  from a New Zealand perspective, aware of all the regulation and high taxes etc in France, it is a reminder of how much location really does seem to matter.  I’m in the middle of reading a wonderful new book by a leading academic expert on trade, convergence etc –  which I expect I will write about here soon.  As he notes, technological innovations made extensive trade in goods possible from the 19th century, and then trade in ideas (all that ICT), but if anything face-to-face contact now seems to matter more than ever, and firms and global economic activity seems increasingly concentrated in cities and regions like those of northern Europe (or east Asia, or North America), not in the isolated peripheries.

 

Which countries did Essential Skills visa grantees come from in the last year?

As I’ve said, MBIE do release approvals data monthly, but it is hard to use (at least for a lay person with a spreadsheet). The temporary approvals spreadsheet is some half a million lines long.

But I decided to brave it anyway.  The spreadsheet contains approvals up to the end of March 2017.  And I was curious as to whether there was anything in the Essential Skills approvals (those for some of the more –  supposedly –  skilled roles) to back the suggestions being made by the Herald and Professor Paul Spoonley.  To minimise my effort –  and the last column of this little table took the best part of an hour –  I focused just on approvals of people from the 10 countries that were top of the list in the latest summary MBIE data (that for the year to June 2016).

There is some overlap in the last two columns.  The first two columns are June years (the basis of MBIE’s summary data) and the final column is a March year (seeing as it is still April now).

Essential skills visas granted, by country
2006/07 2015/16 12mths to Mar 17
Philippines 1695 5,408 6174
India 1943 4,812 4904
UK 4692 3,686 4086
Fiji 2145 1,973 1756
China 2749 1,823 1801
South Africa 2003 1,382 1807
Ireland 481 969 824
Brazil 1376 923 1066
South Korea 1145 828 767
United States 1493 820 837
Total all countries 31015 31766 32775

But there isn’t much sign of the patterns having changed in the most recent year.  Of the European countries, UK approvals are up a bit, but still below where they were a decade ago, and Irish approvals are down a bit, but still above where they were a decade ago.  And by a clear margin, approvals of people from the Phippines and India top the list.

Two other things caught my eye.   Total approvals haven’t changed much  –  in the last year, or in the last decade (although they did dip during the recession).  And approvals for people from China have been tailing off.  The peak year for Chinese approvals was, in fact, 2004/05.