I don’t usually pay much attention to forecasts of nominal GDP. Not many people in New Zealand really seem to. But The Treasury takes nominal GDP forecasts more seriously than most, since nominal GDP (in aggregate) is, more or less, the tax base.
Out of little more than idle curiosity I dug out the numbers from last December’s HYEFU forecasts – the last before the coronavirus – and compared them to the numbers published in last week’s BEFU, accompanying the Budget. And this was what I found.
|Nominal GDP ($bn)|
Over the full five years, New Zealand’s nominal GDP is projected to be $128 billion less than The Treasury thought only a few months ago.
Recall that changes in nominal GDP can be broken down into three broad components:
- the change in real GDP (the volume of stuff produced here),
- the change in the general price level (inflation), and
- the terms of trade
On this occasion, changes in the terms of trade make only a tiny difference over the five years taken together.
General (CPI) inflation is expected to be lower than previously thought. On average over the five years, the price level in the BEFU forecasts is about 1.8 per cent lower than in the HYEFU forecasts. That accounts for about $33 billion in lost nominal GDP.
The balance – the overwhelming bulk of the loss – is real GDP.
I haven’t written anything much about The Treasury’s forecasts, which were done quite a while ago, and could not fully incorporate the final fiscal decisions the government made. But for what it is worth, I reckon Treasury’s numbers were on the optimistic side – quite possibly on all three components of nominal GDP. On inflation, for example, they are more optimistic than the Reserve Bank (which finished its forecasts later), even as they assume tighter monetary conditions than the Bank does.
But the point I really wanted to make was that these forecast GDP losses will never be made back (in the sense that some future year will be higher to compensate – resources not used this year mostly represents a permanent loss of wealth). And that these losses occur despite all the fiscal support (and rather limited monetary support). And fiscal here includes both the effects of the automatic stabilisers (mainly lower tax revenue as the economy shrinks) and the discretionary policy initiatives (temporary and permanent).
How large are those fiscal numbers? Well, here is core Crown revenue (more than 90 per cent of which is tax)
|Core Crown revenue ($bn)|
Almost $50 billion the Crown was expecting but which it won’t now receive. Some of that will be the result of discretionary initiatives – the corporate tax clawback scheme, much of which will result in permanent losses, and the business tax changes announced in the 17 March package – but the bulk of the loss will be the automatic stabilisers at work.
And on the expenditure side?
|Core Crown expenses ($bn)|
Almost $70 billion of current spending the Crown didn’t expect to make only a few months ago. A small amount of this will be the automatic stabilisers at work (the unemployment benefit), but The Treasury is pretty optimistic about unemployment. Most of the change is discretionary policy initiatives (announced or provided for).
And here is the change in net debt
|Net core Crown debt (incl NZSF) as at year end ($bn)|
That will be almost $135 billion higher than expected.
As I’ve noted in earlier posts, I don’t have too much problem with the extent of overall fiscal support (although I would have structured it differently and made it more frontloaded – consistent with the “pandemic insurance” model).
But even on this scale, fiscal policy is nowhere near enough to stop the losses. Some of those losses are now unavoidable. It is only five weeks until the end of 2019/2020, so we can treat $26 billion of nominal GDP losses (see first table) as water under the bridge now. As it happens, fiscal policy looks to have more than fully “replaced” the income loss in aggregate (whether $27 billion from operating revenue and expenses in combination, or the $33 billion increase in net debt) – not as windfall, but as borrowing (narrowing future choices). (UPDATE: Even in quote marks “replaced” isn’t really quite right there, as without the fiscal initiatives it is near-certain that actual nominal GDP would have been at least a bit lower than The Treasury now forecasts, even for 19/20.)
But there is a great deal of lost income/output ahead of us, even on these (relatively optimistic) Treasury numbers.
Which is really where monetary policy should be coming in. The Treasury assumes that monetary policy does almost nothing: there is no further fall in the 90 day rate (the variable they forecast), and as they will recognise as well as anyone inflation expectations have fallen, so real rates are little changed from where they were at the start of the year. And although the exchange rate is lower throughout than they assumed in the HYEFU, the difference is less than 5 per cent – better than nothing of course, but tiny by comparison with exchange rate adjustments that have been part of previous recoveries. It isn’t entirely clear how The Treasury has allowed for the LSAP bond purchase programme, but whatever effect they are assuming…….there is still a great deal of lost output.
The Governor has often been heard calling for banks – private businesses – to be “courageous”. It is never quite clear what he means, but he apparently wants to risk other peoples’ money. But the central bank is ours – a public institution. A courageous central bank, that had really grasped the likely severity of this slump, could have begun to make a real difference. If they’d cut the OCR back in February, and taken steps to ensure that large amounts of deposits couldn’t be converted to physical cash, and then cut the OCR to deeply negative levels (perhaps – 5 per cent) as the full horror dawned, we’d be in a much better position now looking ahead. Wholesale lending and deposit rates would be substantially negative at the short end, and even real rates on longer-term assets might be as low as they now, without much need for bond purchases. Retail rates might also in many case be modestly negative – perhaps for small depositors achieved through fees. And, almost certainly, the exchange rate would have fallen a long way, assisting in the stabilisation and recovery goal. There are winners and losers from such steps – as there are from any interventions, or from choices just to sit to the sidelines – but it is really just conventional macroeconomics: in a time of serious excess capacity and falling inflation expectations, act to seek to bring domestic demand forward, and net demand towards New Zealand producers. Working hand in hand with the substantial fiscal support (see above), we’d be hugely better positioned to minimise those large future nominal GDP losses – losses that at present, we risk never making back.
But neither the Governor nor, apparently, the Minister of Finance seem bothered.
Finally, if nominal GDP appears to be a slightly abstract thing, it is worth recalling that almost all debt is nominal and it is nominal incomes that support outstanding debt. There is about $500 billion of (intermediated) Private Sector Credit at present (and some other private credit on top of that). Most likely that stock won’t grow much over the next few years. But government debt will – on Treasury’s numbers net debt rises by $134 billion. Against those stocks, a cumulative loss of nominal GDP of $128 billion over five years is no small loss. As noted earlier, amid all the uncertainties, the precise numbers are only illustrative, but the broad magnitude of the likely losses (on current policies) are what – and that magnitude is large, if anything perhaps understated on The Treasury’s numbers.