Once over fairly lightly: the Covid monetary policy review

(No, two posts in two weeks does not foreshadow any sort of return to regular blogging – tempting as it has occasionally been at least for the pre-election period – but having written copious amounts on the Reserve Bank’s monetary policy, associated governance, and lack of serious accountability during and after the Covid period, I thought it would be worthwhile documenting some reactions to the report of the Independent Review of the Monetary Policy Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic which was released on Wednesday yesterday. And, of course, writing helps clarify my own thoughts.)

One of the (minor) odd features of the report was that it did not include the terms of reference given to the reviewers by the government when they commissioned it back in February. Interested readers had to go hunting for themselves. Here is a link to the terms of reference.

There were a number of weaknesses in the terms of reference. The very first purpose listed for the review was to “support accountability” and yet only the decisions of the MPC itself were in scope (not, notably, those charged with holding them to account, whether the Bank’s Board, The Treasury, or the (then) Minister of Finance). Given that the system, as legislated by Parliament, is supposed to balance operational autonomy for the MPC with meaningful accountability, it is a shame that the workings of the entire system over that period were not reviewed. Equally less than ideal was that the reviewers chose to focus solely on the committee as a whole and not on the roles, responsibilities, performance etc of individual members, executive and external.

And it was only when I went back and read the terms of reference yesterday that I was reminded of this.

It seems very odd for ministers to put a page limit on an independent report, and especially one into matters so complex and consequential (and, as it happens, costly).

There was a KC report into the some specific issues around the conduct of the previous FMA chair Craig Stobo earlier this year, which (without apparent page limit) ran to 45 pages. The first of the reports into the Mount Maunganui landslide earlier this year ran to 250 pages. And more directly relevantly, as part of the 2023 (broad) review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, one of the authors of this review (Orphanides) wrote the reviewers a background paper on the RBA’s monetary policy near the effective lower bound, and it – just a background paper – ran to 62 pages. Lars Svensson’s 2001 independent review of Reserve Bank monetary policy ran to almost 80 pages.

Who knows quite why the Minister of Finance imposed such a limit, which more or less guaranteed that a lot of issues would have to be skated over all too lightly. Perhaps it was the delays they experienced with coalition partners and then finding potential reviewers, but we’d probably have gotten a more substantively useful document had the reporting deadline been extended somewhat (no doubt beyond the election) and the reviewers left freer to elaborate.

Another odd feature of this review – as opposed to Svensson’s – was that public submissions were not sought. The reviewers talked to a reasonable range of economists (only, listed at the back) but, for example, did not talk at all to one of Orr’s most vociferous economist critics during the period. Nor, for example, did they talk to (then) ministers or their advisers, to FEC members, to (it appears) senior Treasury people during the period (including the then Secretary, who was a non-voting MPC member) or even to people who were on the Reserve Bank Board (charged with holding MPC to account, and recommending (re)appointments) through the period. These sorts of people should have been relevant even if only as those who had direct exposure to the Bank and MPC members, and how they thought and operated, throughout this turbulent period. (To be clear, I’m not complaining for myself: not only did I have a fairly long meeting with the reviewers but at David Archer’s request I provided some written material at the start of the process, mostly as pointers to real-time perspectives and analysis I had written during the Covid period.)

The reviewers also seemed oblivious to (or at least uninterested in) the issue of whether or not, and if so to what extent, people (expert and otherwise) may have lost (or, I suppose, gained) confidence in the Reserve Bank/MPC through the experience of the period, whether from the substance of their decisions, the outcomes, the way they communicated and engaged, or otherwise. It is all a bit odd, especially as both Archer and Orphanides have had exposure to the wider governance/legitimacy side of things, Orphanides as Governor (central bank of Cyprus, admittedly part of the least-acccountable central bank system on earth, the ECB) and Archer latterly in his senior BIS role and various papers he has written or co-authored – I discussed one of those here a couple of years ago.

Back when the review was first announced to report in September (having been promised for some years) there were some feverish people on Twitter suggesting it was all a political jack-up designed to embarrass the Labour Party weeks out from the election. There was even talk of “evil” Atlas Network connections. I thought that was pretty much nonsense (and said so), initially because of what I knew of the reviewers (I worked with/for David on several occasions over 20 years, and today we are both trustees of the Reserve Bank’s troubled superannuation scheme), neither of whom seemed the type to do anything other than articulate their conclusions freely and frankly (and neither seemed likely to be wanting future business/appointments from the New Zealand government). As it happens, OIAed documents revealed that the original intention had been for the review to be done and completed ages ago, but…coalition parties and finding credible reviewers added delays.

And whatever your personal opinion of the government(s) in office over the period, I do not believe there is much evidence that the government or its ministers can be blamed for the succession of decisions that led to such a costly outbreak of inflation and such large financial losses. The MPC is set up to have operational autonomy over monetary policy, which is supposed to mean that specific governments neither get the blame when things go wrong (MPC makes bad calls) or gets the particular credit when things go well. In practice it isn’t like that, of course, but such pressures are to be resisted. Operational independence becomes hard to sustain if politicians get tarred with all the blame (or even the credit) but have none of the decision-making authority. Sure, bad appointments can be made but – to take Orr as an example – while he was appointed by Robertson in late 2017 it was (and had to be) on the recommendation of the Bank’s board, who had been wholly appointed by the outgoing National government. No doubt Robertson was weak to have gone along with the Orr/Quigley 2018/19 blackball on appointing experts as non-executive MPC members, but in doing so he was acting on advice (and Treasury seems not to have pushed back on that advice). Did those mediocre appointees make a difference? I’m a bit sceptical (much as I wish it was otherwise) and of course the reviewers never even touched on the quality of those on the MPC.

Where politics does come into focus primarily is in the context of the so-called dual mandate added to the Reserve Bank Act in 2018. The reviewers clearly did not like that amendment one little bit (which could readily have been predicted).

That was, no doubt, music to the ears of the Minister of Finance (quoted in her press release) but the problem is that the report itself offers no analysis at all to support the suggestion that the statutory change made any difference to policy choices or outcomes. They never, for example, even mention of the line run several times by the former Governor that in his assessment (and he did chair the committee) the change had made no difference to decisions made over this period, and they never (for example) engage in even the simplest cross-country assessment (did countries with dual-mandate specifications come through this period with worse outcomes than countries that retained a simpler specification?). It is well understood that in the face of demand shocks, you get exactly the same recommended policy response with a sole medium-term price stability focus (what the Bank was required to focus on immediately prior to the law change), as with something like a dual mandate specification. And since (as the report notes) no inflation-targeting central bank was ever an “inflation nutter” faced with near-term supply shocks to prices – precisely because of the output and employment consequences – it isn’t clear how the authors themselves believe the law change changed outcomes.

As I’ve pointed out on plenty of occasions, the Bank’s forecasts through 2020 and the first half of 2021 typically suggested that if anything MORE policy stimulus was required, and that such stimulus would both raise inflation towards the target midpoint and lower unemployment towards the non-inflationary sustainable rate (because forecast inflation was low and forecast unemployment was high). Their forecasts were very wrong, but there is nothing the reviewers point to – and they had access to MPC members and presumably to the unpublished background papers – suggesting the dual mandate made a difference. They were, of course, constrained by that page limit, but must have been aware of the political sensitivity of the issue. It is an unfortunate omission, and while they might seek to defend themselves by noting that the terms of reference explicitly refer to “the objectives of monetary policy that applied at the time”, they were the ones who chose to open up the dual mandate issue (probably rightly in my view, because it is a question that should be asked, and investigated seriously).

I noted that there was no attempt at a cross-country perspective on whether the form of the mandate made a difference (and I suspect they knew there was little reason to think it would) but it is just an example of another significant weakness of the report. They were specifically charged with considering as background “relevant decisions made by comparable central banks” but there are very few specific mentions of other central banks at all, and no attempts to compare and contrast policy choices, initial shocks (that central banks faced) or inflation outcomes (again allowing for things like different shocks – eg gas prices were to matter vastly in Europe in 2022, but not all in New Zealand). There is some reason to think that our Reserve Bank may have done worse than many (as I have long pointed out, and as more-recent Reserve Bank pieces note, we are estimated to have had probably large positive output gap – measure of economic overheating – of any advanced economy), but equally it is fair to point out (and the report never does) that central banks in most (but not all) advanced countries made very similar errors – notably forecasting errors – to those made by our Reserve Bank. On the one hand, that is some (modest) defence – it would be worse if ours had been uniquely bad – although on the other, each central bank takes on responsibility for outcomes only in its own country, and each has to be accountable for those national outcomes.

It is also puzzling that the report never looks closely at private sector, or implied market, views of the outlook for New Zealand inflation or required monetary policy. There is simply a parenthetic reference largely dismissing the fact that those views were very similar to the Bank’s (on grounds that the Bank’s forecasts can influence outside forecasters’ views). But when private forecasters and commentators think a central bank is getting things very wrong, they tend to say so (even if they also need to guess what the Bank will actually do). It is less bad when the MPC makes the same mistake as people operating in the private sector, with lots of money at stake, but……private forecasters, informed commentators, and hedge funds etc aren’t responsible for NZ monetary policy and inflation (or thus to the wider public at all), while the MPC is. In fact, the review is sometimes reluctant to even assign responsibility (on the very first page we are told, abstractly, that “mistakes were made”, but not that named individuals who assumed voluntarily the responsibility and prestige of MPC appointments themselves made those mistakes (here and abroad). The report is very light indeed on any serious form of accountability (including, for example, never once – in the body of the text – mentioning the names of those involved).

Incidentally, one wonders if journalists have sought comment on the report from those who were MPC members during the period. My guess is that they will be reasonably happy with it, to an extent they probably should not have been able to be.

They get off rather lightly, both individuallly and collectively. More than a few points are just never developed, Take, for example, this

And that footnote? “One of the reviewers, Mr Archer, does not agree with this statement.” There were, after all, only two reviewers (so, for a start, how did they decide whose view got in the main text and whose in the footnote?), and this is the only highlighted difference between them, and yet there is no sign of what evidence or reports they each used to reach a view on this quite significant issue (on which Archer has had strong documented views for years). They seem to resolve to agreeing on the abstract (“institutional arrangements” doing “enough to encourage diverse perspectives”) without serious analysis of what actually happened in the specific, very costly, period of policy conduct they were asked to review.

And while there are abstract and general issues worth considering, and certainly in any committee constituted as MPC then was, it is pretty extraordinary that none of the specifics around individuals, notably the Governor, are engaged with. Orr has had a reputation for too often having been intolerant of dissent or challenge, whether internal or externally-sourced. And during this period he was cycling through senior managers, including those directly associated with monetary policy. The able Deputy Governor had apparently had enough and announced he was leaving, only to have his employment summarily terminated a few weeks early, the Chief Economist through the period seemed pleasant but not really up to the senior role and seems to have found it best to leave, and then of course late in the period under review an utterly unqualified (for MPC-type responsibilities) new DCE responsible for macro matters was appointed. In a committee required by law to have a majority of internals those people, and sets of circumstances, don’t sound like a mix that would have produced optimally open debate and mutual challenge. Committees don’t exist in the abstract, but with concrete individuals, with their personalities, dispositions, incentives, and so on. Perhaps it really was all okay, but the reviewers make no serious attempt to engage on the issue.

There isn’t even any reflection, anywhere in the report, on the fact that throughout the entire, very challenging, Covid period there was not one dissent recorded, ever (and while consensus was formally encouraged, votes were never prohibited, nor the clear expression of an alternative view). My bias is to the agree with Archer’s dissent, but….they had the opportunity to gather and report evidence from inside, and yet they seem to have chosen not to do so.

Perhaps in a similar vein, there is nothing in the report about the extent of external engagement, or otherwise, of MPC members during a period of extreme turbulence and great uncertainty. There were barely any serious speeches through the period, almost no external engagement by external MPC members, and little or no sign of any systematic attempts to engage with the uncertainty by, for example, hosting workshops or conferences to try to open themselves to alternative perspectives or explore the uncertainties they (and everyone else) faced. And, of course, because for example the external accountability stuff was out of scope, there is nothing about the frosty way in which the Bank engaged with any challenge or scrutiny at FEC. None of it suggested a “learning organisation”, an open one, or one that recognised the need to maintain its legitimacy and the centrality of accountability.

Not all punches are pulled. It was good to see the review highlight how extraordinary it was that nothing had been done before 2020 to ensure that banks’ systems etc could cope with negative (policy) interest rates (having had years of notice of the issue, and having themselves expressed in public the view that negative rates were likely to be a better tool than large scale asset purchases. Had they got onto that earlier – even had the new MPC raised concerns when it was established – it is likely the MPC would never have engaged in such large scale, risky, and (as it turned out) very costly LSAP purchases. Billions of dollars wasted for a failure by the Bank to have been suitably prepared for a foreseeable threat (makes MBIE’s technology project woes seem cheap). The Taxpayers’ Union may not be flavour of the week, but in their inimitable style they called out the waste.

But this is precisely where the official independent review gets weak. They suggest that the initial LSAP purchases were just fine (market stabilisation and all that), but don’t ever bother to engage on whether those RB purchases made any difference (to a temporary market liquidity crisis centred not here but in US Treasuries and where the Fed itself was intervening directly), or as to why once markets did settle profits weren’t quickly taken. More concerningly, there is no serious analysis of the effectiveness of the more-sustained LSAP purchase process that followed. They, fairly, note that to the extent there was much stimulus it proved, with hindsight, unwelcome (since inflation blew out) but never engage on the question of how much effective macroeconomic stimulus there actually was in the specific context of New Zealand. The financial losses are never quoted, and there is no attempt to engage or review with the claims, as recently as late last year, from the Reserve Bank that really it was all fine, and perhaps even net positive for the Crown. Without having done (or reported) any of that sort of analysis, they blithely suggest that there is a continuing role in the arsenal for LSAPs (and actually suggest legislative changes to remove some possible future roadblocks). And, on the other hand, despite those comments on negative interest rate capability earlier, there is nothing at all about the desirability of work to ease the remaining ELB constraint. Perhaps the reviewers think that would be a bad idea, but they don’t say, or offer any analysis. As it is, the OCR is about 350 basis points from the effective lower bound, and typical past cycles have involved 500 points of easing.

They also pull their punches around the Funding for Lending programme. They seem, reasonably, sceptical of the case for having introduced it (although, to be fair, it wasn’t completely inconsistent with their macro forecasts at the time) but never touch on the extraordianry way they went on providing crisis-support (cheap funding), exacerbating their OCR challenges long after any need for macro support had passed (claiming they were somehow “bound” – legally or morally was never clear, neither at all robust – to keep on).

Another area where I’d be critical of the report is around the initial monetary policy stimulus. The reviewers go to some lengths to portray the monetary policy approach from May to later in 2020 as reasonable given the forecasts the MPC was using. But in doing so they tend to treat the forecasts as a given, handed to the MPC by other people, when the forecasts themselves are the collective views of the MPC itself. They are certainly advised and supported by staff, but recall that the MPC at the time included the Governor and three other senior internal economists: the forecasts (or “baseline scenarios” as they were being called for a time in 2020) cannot be very meaningfully separated from the policy calls. In each case, each decisionmaker was applying their own “model” of the economy and of how the macroeconomics of the shock was going to play out, and then – given the Remit – how best policy should respond. MPC members had, certainly, to work with the initially limited data they had, but much more important in this case is that they were – again with hindsight – all clearly using the wrong models to think about how pandemic macroeconomics was going to play out (demand vs supply effects for example). This is a point that is simply never touched on in the report, even though it was (arguably) the single most important failing, not just by the Reserve Bank MPC but by macroeconomists around the world, in central banks and out. Perhaps we can call it pardonable to some extent – after all, it was a completely unknown sort of event – but it proved to be a huge and costly weakness. But also idiosyncratic.

Had we (they) properly understood the pandemic macroeconomics, and taken account of what fiscal policy was doing (as the Bank in fact did, so this isn’t the main issue), there would have been a strong case for the OCR never to have been cut in March 2020 and probably to have been raised very quickly, at least by the time the first successful lockdown was over. But again, the reviewers never engage with that sort of thought experiment, and they show no sign of having used their vast experience to reflect on why it was that the Bank (and so many others) misunderstood the economics. (I don’t purport to have a compelling answer either, but it was the root cause of what went so badly wrong later.)

Partly as a result, the report ends up being too inclined to absolve the MPC of responsibility for the mess (boom and bust, large unexpected transfers of purchasing power). If what was done initially was reasonable (“praiseworthy”, “rapid”, “innovative”, providing a “timely and much-need boost” [the latter as if lags are almost instant, and as if the aim of policy in March 2020 had not been to markedly shrink economic activity, temporarily]). And so the reviewers end up more or less buying into a line, run now by the Reserve Bank itself for several years, that really, while of course they should have started tightening a bit earlier, really it either wouldn’t have made much difference or would have done so only at untenable economic cost. The reviewers devote a lot of space to a little modelling exercise the Bank put out last year, suggesting that if they started tightening in late February 2021 with the goal of keeping inflation always at 3 per cent or less, it would have done huge economic damage (it first went through 3% in the June quarter, centred on mid-May). Well, of course, not only does no one thinks that monetary policy works with that short a lag, but….the bigger issue is why so much easing had been done in the first place. (I’m not suggesting the MPC members themselves deserve huge criticism for those March 2020 calls but….they did have quite the wrong model, and it was the source of what followed, the aftermath of which we are still living with.)

This has become a very long post. I want to finish with just a limited number of other specific points:

  • it is very odd that throughout the entire paper there is never a single reference to a core inflation measure (or concept). Now it is, of course, true that the inflation target is specified in terms of the headline CPI, but Remits and (previously PTAs) have always enjoined the Bank to “look through” temporary or one-off price disturbances, to extent consistent with maintaining medium-term price stability. Thus, central banks rarely respond directly to, eg, sharp rise or falls in petrol prices which can make a big difference to near-term headline inflation. In this case, for example, the report emphasises the large fall in the CPI in the June quarter 2020 (quoted in American-style annualised terms), while never noting the huge role that petrol prices played – you may recall world crude prices briefly going negative in a quarter when not much driving or flying was happening). The approach they take simply doesn’t engage with the practical and real challenges actual central bankers faced during that period (and thus one should be hesitant about their recommendation that “near-term inflation signals may be more robust than forecasts at the policy horizon – I’m no fan of medium-term forecasts, but the operative word there has to be “may”, in some circumstances.)
  • I agree with their broad approach to fiscal policy (consensus assignment remains appropriate and formal coordination is unlikely to be wise or called for) but am a bit hesitant about the suggestion that in some circumstances the Bank should build into its forecasts (or scenarios) its own view of what a government is likely to do. In terms of thinking about risks, there is probably some validity to the point, but I cannot see how it could be viable to include speculative numbers in published forecasts (it sets up potential for political fights in which the Bank is unncessarily caught in the middle).
  • Recommendation 11 proposes that “the Bank should allocate sufficient resources to support the effective functioning of the MPC, including policy, research and analysis to support diverse perspectives in policy deliberations”. There is no elaboration of this point in the body of the report (one of a couple of examples suggested the final process ended up rather rushed, another being around reviewing/altering the Remit), and I’m not fully sure what they have in mind. If, as I initially thought, they mean providing dedicated analytical resource to the external MPC members – as, for example, happens at the Bank of England – I strongly agree (otherwise the Governor has a stranglehold on what the Committee sees). But reading it again, it is possible they had something else in mind.
  • Recommendation 12 states “Sections 121 and 208 of the RBNZ Act create risks to monetary stability that should be reevaluated. The RBNZ Board should note have the authority to refuse to implement the MPC’s monetary policy.”. I want to devote some space to this because the Minister’s response to the report states explicitly that this “warrants further consideration and [the government] has commissioned further policy work from Treasury. Section 121 relates to powers of the Board, but actually (as the Report notes) section 208 relates to powers of the Minister, who can direct the Bank to “take all reasonable steps” to maintain a minimum level of capital specified by the Minister and have regard to the Minister’s expectations as to the Bank’s financial risk management. The report rather cavalierly suggests that “it is advisable to seek solutions that are implementable well before the Bank is required by unfortunate circumstances [emphasis added] to take on large financial risks to protect the New Zealand economy from from a deflationary shock”. This is melodramatic stuff, that not only does not engage with the likely actual effectiveness of either future LSAPs or big fx interventions, but more importantly does not engage with the guarantee powers the Minister of Finance already had under the Public Finance Act. To the Bank’s credit, it did not do the LSAP at its own risk (our risk imposed on us by them) but went and sought an indemnity from the Minister of Finance. It cannot be desirable that unelected officials, barely substantively accountable, can debauch the public finances without seeking the consent of the Minister of Finance. Extreme times call for political responsibility (including because, as demonstrated over 2020, with the best will in the world economists get thing badly wrong, and yet politicians are accountable). So I would urge The Treasury and whoever is Minister after the election not to be swayed by the these reviewers into re-establishing unlimited scope for the MPC to impose financial risks.

Overall, it is a fairly mixed bag of a report. If I scroll through the 12 formal recommendations I agree to a greater or lesser extent with most of them, although I think they probably tend to overstate what difference they might make in extreme unknown scenarios of the sort faced in 2020 and 2021. The recommendations are forward-looking, which is fine and has a place (including in the terms of reference they had to work to) but where the report is much weaker is on the backward-looking analysis and critical review. It gives passes to the MPC that aren’t really deserved and thus avoids some of the more difficult challenges of making sense of the period. It also tends, too much, to the purely technocratic – issues inside the Bank and the MPC – to the near-complete exclusion of the wider issues around legitimacy, accountability, and the confidence the public and markets might have in those who put their hands up to be entrusted with such huge delegated power.

RB still defending a series of costly mistakes

We were away for a month and it has taken time to work through the backlog that inevitably builds up over such a mid-year absence. In the meantime, a fair bit more detail has emerged about the Orr/Quigley/Willis saga, between various OIA responses to me, one I’ve seen to another person, a bit more on the Bank’s extravagant new Auckland premises, the Bank’s Annual Report, and the pro-active (but very belated) detailed disclosures about the Orr golden payoff (other OIA responses are still being slow-walked by the Bank). And, of course, we’ve had the announcement of the new Governor and the, perhaps predictable and certainly appropriate, notice of resignation by the temporary Governor (and substantive Deputy Governor). I may eventually get to writing about some of that material, but I have updated my timeline of the Orr/Quigley/Willis saga where relevant.

The Reserve Bank isn’t exactly, in the jargon, a “learning organisation”, but more akin to one determined never to acknowledge a mistake (in a field in which, with the best will in the world, uncertainty means mistakes are pretty much inevitable). The last of the old guard – the Orr team – was at it again last week. Orr may have gone months ago, but Christian Hawkesby (who was the DCE responsible for monetary policy throughout the Covid period itself) is serving out his last few weeks, the other foundation MPC member (Bob Buckle) left just a few weeks ago, and no one expects the manifestly unqualified Karen Silk, the Orr DCE responsible for monetary policy for the last few years, to survive much longer. (There is the old and problematic board too, but monetary policy isn’t their field.) But the face of the latest effort in defence was the chief economist, another Orr groupie, Paul Conway (among many, the line that sticks with me was his closing remarks at the Bank’s early March conference, about having “lost a much-loved Governor”). Time is moving on but they seem determined to defend the Orr legacy, in which they’d all played greater or lesser parts. Specifically, the hugely expensive and risky LSAP.

There were a number of pieces released last Wednesday (links to them all here), headlined by a speech in Australia by Conway, supplemented by some comments from Conway in a Herald article on the Bank’s case (that really the LSAP paid for itself and, what’s more, it is really hard to assign any blame). Of the Bulletin article, “Pandemic lessons on the monetary and fiscal policy mix” by a couple of staff economists I haven’t got much to say: it is wordy and despite 10 pages of references offers little or no insight on the issues or the institution. Perhaps the only line in it that really caught my eye was a heading that claimed that fiscal and monetary policy “Coordination is an intricate and dynamic challenge”, a claim which not only seemed quite wrong, but also at odds with the thrust of Conway’s comments on that issue in his speech (where he seemed, rightly in my view, to be suggesting that what was needed was independence in operations, but keeping each other informed, and exchanging views on what works, what limitations there might be etc). As it ever was, but perhaps now institutionalised in that the Secretary to the Treasury is a non-voting member of the MPC. (Of course, the Treasury is also charged formally with monitoring the performance of the Bank, but the last 18 months suggests how hopeless they’ve been in that role.)

The centrepiece of what the Bank released last week is an Analytical Note by some of their researchers and some IMF staff which uses a model developed at the IMF to attempt to show that really the LSAP was a great success – macroeconomically and that it paid for itself (notwithstanding the $11 billion or so of direct losses incurred). It is a more elaborate version of the framework used by the IMF in a brief early note attached to their 2023 Article IV report (and talked up at the time by the former Governor as offering the “proper story” not some “piecemeal accounting story”), a piece whose claims I unpicked in a post at the time (link a couple of lines up).

So much money has been lost by central banks in the Covid QE interventions – in countries across the advanced world – that too many of those institutions, and their institutional allies (places like the IMF), now seem determined to try to prove a very weak case, that it was really all worthwhile (a case only made harder given the inflation mess that many advanced countries then went through, and which we are still living with the aftermath of). The effectiveness of generalised QE in government bonds – as distinct from specific interventions in dysfunctional markets – has been debated for 10-15 years now but my prior going into Covid was pretty much that of the eminent UK economist Charles Goodhart who in a Foreword to a book I reviewed some years ago (book completed just prior to Covid) opined that in his judgement:

“the direct effect on the real economy via interest rates, with actual or expected, and on portfolio balance, was of second-order importance, QE2, QE3 and QE Infinity are relatively toothless”.

It seemed to be pretty much the Reserve Bank’s approach then too (see this substantive interview with Orr in August 2019, and even just prior to the launch of the LSAP the then chief economist was quoted as playing down the likely impact of such policies), with an explicit preference from the Governor to use negative interest rates (as in Europe and Japan) instead.

I don’t want to bore readers with an interminable critique of all the papers (having already run various posts – eg here in response to some of their earlier claims – over the years of my scepticism that this big asset swap – all it was – made much useful difference to anything, to justify the risk and losses the Bank incurred for the Crown).

So I’m going to work backwards, responding to some of the easier-to-rebut assertions, and only at the end coming back to specific concerns about the particular model they are using in support (recall the distinction between support and illumination).

First, some Conway claims reported in the Herald article

“Conway said it was difficult to isolate the impact of a single tool the Monetary Policy Committee used at a time the Reserve Bank and Government were throwing a lot at the economy to keep it buoyed. He also recognised the collective response caused prices to soar. However, he cautioned against people assuming money printing was largely to blame for the economy overheating.”

You might easily forget reading that that the way our system is set up the Reserve Bank moves last. If the economy overheated – and on everyone’s reckoning it did (both IMF and Reserve Bank positive output gap estimates were very large) – it is the MPC’s fault. It is their job to, as far as possible, lean against the economy overheating (or the opposite) and keep core inflation near the target midpoint. They failed, and that is on them not on the government of the day (which might have run bigger deficits than many were comfortable with, but those deficits weren’t kept secret – most especially from the MPC). Whether or not the LSAP made much difference to demand (Conway believes it did), the responsibility clearly rests with the overall package of monetary policy measures – OCR setting, LSAP, and the Funding for Lending programme (that went on offering cheap loans to banks until the end of 2022). There is no sign in his speech, press release, or interview that Conway – and presumably his bosses – ever really accept that responsibility/blame. Nor is there any real mention of what was actually at the root of the problem: an egregious forecasting failure. Like many/most other forecasters – but unlike them actually wielding power and responsible for outcomes – the MPC badly badly misread the state of demand and resource pressures through Covid, and the result was the inflationary mess that followed. It was hard to get right – few did – but when you take the role you need to take the responsibility. All too few central bankers have. Conway wasn’t there when the worst mistakes were being made, but he now speaks for the institution (and, currently, specifically for Hawkesby, who held the critical role of DCE responsible for monetary policy when it mattered).

But if the forecasting mistakes were pretty common and widespread (inside and outside central banks, here and abroad), the most evident costly failure is purely on the Reserve Bank itself. This is from Conway’s speech

In other words, even granting for the moment the Bank’s view that the LSAP did a lot of good to justify the large losses, really they would prefer not to have used it at all, because a modestly negative OCR would have achieved the same (claimed) benefits without the massive financial risk and actual $11 billion in losses to the taxpayer. Last week’s papers use quite a bit of the passive voice, suggesting that the inability to use negative rates had been something quite out of their control, perhaps something banks were to blame for. Someone, anyone, no one…but certainly not the Bank.

Actually, it was all on the Reserve Bank. An internal working party in 2012 had recommended (I chaired it) that the Bank ensure our own systems and those of banks were able to cope with negative rates should they ever be needed. The then Governor accepted those recommendations, but it seems that nothing happened until it was far too late (it wasn’t until Covid was almost upon them that the Bank realised nothing had been done and some banks – apparently it wasn’t even all – weren’t operationally capable). It is all the more extraordinary because in the second half of the decade the Bank had clearly been doing preparatory thinking for coping with the next severe downturn – there was a thoughtful Bullletin article on options in 2018, and of course that serious interview of Orr’s I’d linked to earlier. But no one seems to have done the basic engine-room sort of work, reviewing with banks their ability to cope with an instrument used in other countries for many years by then. There was turnover at the top – Orr came on board in March 2018, Hawkesby in March 2019 – but it isn’t as if in mid 2019 these should have been remote issues (the OCR had been cut to its then lowest ever level of 1 per cent, and it wasn’t going to take a particuarly savage shock to put zero in view). And yet nothing was done and – on the Bank’s own telling – the cost to the taxpayer was the full $11 billion or so (since they themselves now say they could have had the macro benefits they claim without the risks/losses if only they – Orr, Hawkesby, the 2019 MPC – had ensured basic operational readiness). That was on them, and only them. (Incidentally, the Bank reckone that by Q42020 those issues were sorted out, and yet they went on taking additional LSAP risk – and then incurring further losses – well into mid 2021.)

A learning organisation, the sort that acknowledges mistakes and learns from them, would be quite open about the cost of their own failure. The Hawkesby/Conway Bank, not so much.

All that was on the assumption the Bank was right and there were huge gains achieved through their monetary policy efforts, notably including the LSAP purchases/punt.

And that rests on two propositions. The first is that there were substantial boosts to GDP, and second that government tax revenue was permanently higher as a result.

Conway used this chart (from the Analytical Note modelling effort)

(No, they aren’t saying tax revenue got to 42 per cent of GDP; it is just an illustrative device).

In principle, if there had been a very deep hole in economic activity which monetary policy choices had closed much quickly than otherwise, there’d also be a windfall gain in tax revenue. (That was the scenario for the highly questionable little IMF exercise in 2023 linked to earlier.)

Unfortunately, while in 2020 the Bank thought there was such a hole (eg as late as the November 2020 MPS the Bank thought there was a negative output gap of about 2.5 per cent, which would persist around those levels for the whole of 2021), they are now quite clear in there view that there was no such hole. In their most recent projections, they estimate that even in the September quarter of 2020 (ie straight after the first and longest severe lockdown) the output gap was (barely) positive. And in the real world monetary policy actions (starting from late March) just don’t have such large and immediate real effects as to have made a big difference to activity as soon as mid-August (ie halfway through the September quarter). With hindsight – albeit only with hindsight – monetary policy choices, including the LSAP if it had real effects, were driving the economy further away from a balanced position (ie into a substantially positive output gap, now estimated to have peaked at almost 4 per cent of GDP, and the associated surge in core inflation).

And this is where the Bank’s package last week gets borderline dishonest. Conway uses this chart

which a casual reader might think was all gain. But the chart ends just around the point where the output gap crosses into negative territory, and thus completely – and deliberately (we must assert for a senior policymaker) – ignores the more recent period, in which the Bank estimates that we are now in a materially negative output gap, and will in time have had three years of a negative output gap (ie GDP tracking below potential, with government tax revenue consequences). Pretty much all observers ascribe that negative output gap to the necessary working off of the earlier, marked, RB-allowed/enabled overheating (ie dealing with the inflation). Any honest reckoning of the fiscal consequences needs to take into account the entire period. There probably were some fiscal gains from the Bank’s monetary policy choices – surprise inflation reduced the real debt burden, and resulting fiscal drag picked up some extra revenue – but I doubt the Bank really wants to claim credit for that inflation they weren’t supposed to be aiming for and did not forecast.

Most likely, over the full period, there were modest – but largely unsought and undesired – revenue gains (achievable, see above, with conventional instruments if only the Bank had done its preparatory job – and for central banks, like airport fire brigades, preparation for crises is a core part of the job), but large and easily identifiable losses from the risky punt made on the LSAP.

But all that assumes that the LSAPs made a material difference at all. That has long seemed quite unlikely to me. You can – as the Bank and IMF staff have done – construct a stylised model in which the LSAP makes a material difference, but that model doesn’t really seem to fit very well what was going on, here and abroad, and the LSAP simply isn’t necessary to explain almost everything that did go on.

To be clear, I think most economists will agree that if the LSAP worked it wasn’t as (in the Herald’s unfortunate term) “money-printing”. The volume of settlement cash created – all reimbursed at the OCR – was simply not a material channel. If the LSAP made a difference it did so by one of two (perhaps mutually reinforcing) mechanisms: altering market interest rates in ways that had macro consequences (this is the Reserve Bank’s own story going back to 2020), and/or reinforcing market convictions/views that the OCR will be kept extraordinarily low for a protracted period.

This is from the model Conway hung his hat on, in which he

cites the modelling exercise – not an empirical estimation but a stylised representation – in which the choice not to use the LSAP (in New Zealand) makes at peak about 150 basis points of difference to long-term government bond rates (relative to the counterfactual in which only the actual OCR cut was done) and a 20 per cent difference to the exchange rate. In this modelling exercise we are told that most of the work is being done by the exchange rate adjustment (itself responding to changing interest rate differentials), noting that long-term interest rates themselves aren’t a material part of the New Zealand domestic transmission mechanism.

But we are also told that the LSAP was roughly equivalent in its economic impacts to a 100 basis points cut in the OCR. And we’ve had plenty of swings in the relative policy rate spreads of 100 basis points or more (including since 2021) and none of them has resulted in a 20 per cent change in our exchange rate (which has been astonishingly stable over the last 15 years or so).

Another chart from Conway’s speech is this

where you’ll see (red bars) that New Zealand’s use of government bond purchases was one of the largest among advanced countries (similar to the UK and Canada). But you will also see quite a group of countries to the left of the chart that seem to have done little or no QE over this period. Korea, for example, also cuts its policy rate by 75 basis points, but is there any sign of its real exchange rate rocketing upwards because they did no QE? Well, no. And one can run through the other countries and you will search in vain for such large effects (and yes each country has its own idiosyncrasies). Australia did no material QE until the end of 2020 (for much of the year they relied on policy rate cuts and an announced target for a three year rate) and there isn’t any sign of the AUD appreciating sharply against the NZD (where our central bank was actively pursuing QE).

And there are similar problems with the long-term bond yield story. Eyeballing that chart Conway cited, you’d have to think that advanced countries that did no little or QE in government bonds would have seen their long-term government bond yields rise sharply (and, to be clear, the New Zealand OCR was about middle of the pack for how much advanced country central banks cut in 2020). But again, evidence of such effects is sparse indeed. Take Korea again, their long-term bond yields didn’t fall as much as New Zealand’s did, but they certainly didn’t rise in 2020. Nor did Norway’s or Iceland’s – or, indeed, any advanced country. I don’t find it implausible that the scale of New Zealand’s LSAP might have made a bit of difference to longer-term bond rates, but eyeballing the cross-country experiences something like 20-40 basis points looks more plausible – eg our long-term bond rate did fall more than Australia’s in mid 2020.

And that is for a 10 year bond. What matters in the domestic economy is mostly 1 and 2 year rates (including through the mortgage lending and refinancing channel). And so the important question is likely to be whether the LSAP did anything much – directly or by signalling reinforcement effects – to affect those short-term rates. And there I think champions of the effect of the policy will find themselves on the backfoot. Those shorter-term bond and swap rates certainly fell very low (some were briefly slightly negative for a few weeks around September 2020, although by the end of 2020 all the short-term bond yields were at or above the 25 basis points that was then the OCR), but is there good reason to suppose those rates would have been much different absent the LSAP (or with an LSAP brought to an end in say December 2020)?

What else was going on? By late 2020 the Reserve Bank told us the operational issues around negative rates had been sorted out. In the Survey of Expectations (semi-expert respondents), the December quarter survey remarkably – looking back now – had the mean expectation for the OCR a year ahead at -0.16 per cent (with inflation two years out nonetheless still expected to well undershoot the midpoint). The MPC itself had pledged back in March 2020 (rashly) not to change the OCR for a year. And what of the Bank’s own forecasts? With all the stimulus already built in the Bank in the November 2020 MPS was projecting that inflation would stay at or marginally below the bottom of the target range through 2021 and 2022, and that the output gap would remain deeply negative at least through all of 2021. The Bank published “unconstrained OCR” numbers – where the OCR would go if deeply negative OCRs were possible, to get inflation back towards target – getting down to -1.5 per cent by the end of 2021. The fact that those forecasts and expectations were deeply wrong – as we know now – is irrelevant to the fact that that was the air people were breathing (and markets were trading) in late 2020. The prospect of any rise in the OCR any time soon seemed remote, and cuts couldn’t be ruled out (remember that only the MPC pledge to March 2021 had ever prevented the OCR being cut to at least zero).

Is it plausible that the LSAP had some effect on these rates? Well, perhaps. I wouldn’t quibble if someone was suggesting 20 or 30 basis points but…..short-term rates were always going to be much more heavily influenced by expectations of future OCR moves, and – independent of any LSAP announcements – the macro forecasts at the time were very very weak (as actually they were in Australia – check the RBA November 2020 inflation projections).

What of the stylised modelling results themselves? Well, I’d take them with a considerable pinch of salt. You might have hoped that someone in the Reserve Bank with an instinctive feel for NZ business cycles etc (surely there are still one or two of them) might have interjected and asked at some point how it was that this model posited near-instantaneous real economic effects from a change in the real exchange rate (the usual stylised view has been that those lags are particularly long, longer than those for interest rate effecs)

Or someone might have asked how it was – so very convenient – that the model produces only helpful effects on inflation from the LSAP (with no LSAP and a higher exchange rate perhaps direct price effects hold up inflation in 2020), and no unhelpful ones, despite the large positive impact on the output gap. And, as a reminder, it is the standard view that the real economic effects of monetary policy take more like 6-8 quarters to be substantially seen in inflation. If the LSAP made a real and material difference, it should have made one also to inflation – exacerbating the problems – in mid-late 2021, but this exercise somehow manages to tidy away any such effect.

Who can know quite what is driving the people at the top of the Reserve Bank. Perhaps they genuinely believe all this stuff, but I guess if you’d been a prominent part in the loss to taxpayers of getting on for $11 billion you’d have a fairly strong incentive to convince yourself it had all really been worthwhile. And I guess with the current more-moderate personalities at least we’ve moved on from those claims Orr used to make that the benefits had actually been multiples of the cost.

But whatever now drives them, these are lessons I think you should take away:

  • had the Bank done its basic crisis preparedness job in the years leading up to Covid, LSAP would probably never have been deployed at all (or used only on a much smaller and briefer scale – the Bank also likes to claim they helped settle markets in late March 2020 although the evidence suggests any effect was small and entirely incidental to the Fed addressing problems at source).   Orr’s instincts on preferred policy instruments (effective and with much lower financial risk) were correct,
  • ultimately the major failure was a forecasting one.    On the path of forecasts as they were in 2020, 2021 and early 2022, the Bank would still have wanted to be providing lots of monetary policy stimulus for a long time (that is what forecasts of very low inflation and large negative output gaps tell central banks to do –  and contrary to Conway’s claim, this had nothing to do with the 2019-2023 specification of the Bank’s target; it would be the same today).  Thus, the path of inflation would have been very much as we actually experienced it.
  • but at least if we were going to experience the consequences of a major macro forecasting failure, the taxpayer wouldn’t have been facing almost $11 billion of losses in addition (to the inflation and the dislocation, still being experienced, in getting rid of it).
  • responsibility for the substance rests with those in office over 2019-2021 (Orr, Hawkesby, Bascand primarily –  and the rest of the then MPC)
  • responsibility for the spin now rests with Hawkesby, Conway, and (presumably) Silk.    Who knows if the rest of the MPC even saw this stuff before it went out.  It would be interesting to hear perspectives from some of them –  not involved over 2019 to 2021. 

Finally, in fairness one might note that central banks generally have not been great at acknowledging failure and mis-steps. But being in bad company really is no defence. Recall that the quid pro quo for central bank operating autonomy was supposed to be serious transparency and accountability, built on demonstrable expertise. All appear to have been lacking at 2 The Terrace.

Shameless central bankers

It was in mid-August that this particular bit of shameless Reserve Bank spin got going. From a post in late August

It proved to be nonsense of course. Once we had access to the short little IMF piece, published at the back of the Fund’s Article IV review, it was clear that it all amounted to a case of “if you assume big beneficial economic effects from the LSAP, then you get material tax revenue gains”, which might be set against the actual losses on the trade.

But the IMF’s picture bore not the slightest relationship to New Zealand reality through the LSAP period.

But none of that stops the Bank.

Here was their Annual Report, which will have been signed off by the Bank’s Board – the ones with little or no subject expertise.

And then this week their deputy chief executive responsible for monetary policy and markets – the one with no subject expertise at all – was at it in a speech given to investors etc in Sydney.

Now I have not seen any analyst endorse that little IMF exercise. And you can sort of tell that even the Bank knows it is shonky (but convenient). Note that both in the Annual Report and Silk’s speech they are careful not themselves to claim that the LSAP was profitable for the taxpayer, just to report (what is factually accurate) that the IMF – or at least a couple of back office researchers, given a couple of hours to play with a toy model – said it was. Silk herself only claims that the losses (they aren’t just “accounting losses” but real ones for taxpayers) are offset “to some extent” by other fiscal benefits to the Crown (and there might be even some very slight extent to which that is so, but it is by no means guaranteed). And the Annual Report text takes a similar approach – citing the IMF, without actually endorsing its work, but leading the casual reader to assume they did. The Bank knows better and simply choose egregious spin – the sort of dishonesty we might have got used to from politicians, but shouldn’t have to put up with from independent technocrats.

But here we are dealing with Quigley and Orr, who know better but seem to have a tenuous relationship with truth and serious analysis whenever something otherwise suits. And Silk, who may know no better – but can surely read, if she were at all curious – who is the senior manager with overall responsibility for the Bank’s macro and monetary policy analysis.

None of them should be in their roles (Silk should simply never have been appointed to hers). But will the new government care enough to do anything about this situation, or will spin and dishonesty continue to characterise our central bank, while those with the power to do anything about the situation get on with simply holding office?

Accountability

On Saturday dozens of candidates for the governing Labour Party stood for election to Parliament. The aim was to form (at least a big part of) the next government. They didn’t succeed. People will debate for decades precisely what motivated the public as a whole to vote as we did, but having governed for the last three years, they (Labour) lost. It is perhaps the key feature of our democratic system, perhaps especially in New Zealand with so few other checks and balances. You (and your party) wield great power, and if we the public aren’t satisfied – think you’ve done poorly, think another lot might be better, or simply wake up grumpy on election day – you are out. It is your (and your party’s) job to convince us to give you another go. If you don’t convince us you are out (and typically when a party loses power a satisfying number of individuals – even if rarely Cabinet ministers – actually lose their job (as MP) altogether). And if you are a disappointed Labour voter this morning, the beauty of the system is that no doubt your turn will come again. It is accountability – sometimes crude, rough and ready, perhaps even (by some standards) unfair or wrong – but the threat and risk is real, and the job holders keep it constantly in mind.

Many other people in the public employ also wield considerable amounts of power. In some cases, that power is quite tightly constrained and often (for example) there are appeal authorities. If a benefit clerk denies you a benefit you are clearly legally entitled to you will probably end up getting it, and if the clerk’s mistake is severe or repeated often enough they might lose their job. Less so at more exalted levels. When, for example, the wrong person is put in prison for decades typically no one responsible pays a price. When the Public Service Commissioner engages in repeated blatant attempts to mislead to protect one of his own, it seems that no pays a price.

And then there are central banks.

Every few months I do a book review for the house journal of central bankers, Central Banking magazine. They are often fairly obscure books that I otherwise wouldn’t come across or wouldn’t spend my own money on (at academic publishing prices). A few months back I reviewed Inflation Targeting and Central Banks: Institutional Set-ups and Monetary Policy Effectiveness (hardback yours from Amazon at a mere US$170 – yes, there is a cheaper paperback if anyone is really interested), by a mid-career economist at the Polish central bank, in turn based on her fairly recent PhD thesis. The focus isn’t on the question of what difference inflation targeting makes but on what institutional details, which differ across inflation-targeting central banks, seem to make a difference. Sadly for the author – these things happen – her thesis was finished before the outbreak of inflation in much of the advanced world in the last 2-3 years.

At the core of the book is a set of painstakingly-compiled indexes on various aspects of inflation-targeting central banks which might be thought to be relevant to how those central banks might perform in managing inflation. There are ones for independence, ones for transparency, and so on, but the one that stuck with me months on was the one for accountability. Accountability used to be thought of as an absolutely critical element – the quid pro quo – for the operational independence that so many countries have given to central banks in the last few decades. With great power goes great responsibility, and ideas like that. The Reserve Bank itself was very fond on that sort of rhetoric. In fact, there used to be a substantive article on that topic by me on their website, in which I waxed eloquent on the topic (after it was toned down when my original version upset the Bank’s then Board by suggesting that for all the importance of accountability it was more difficult in practice than in theory). At a more casual level my favourite example has always been a radio interview then-Governor Don Brash did in 2003, the transcript of which the Bank chose to publish, in which there is a snippet that runs as follows:

Brash: ….we were concerned……we were running risk of inflation coming in above 2 per cent which is the top of our target

Interviewer: And then you’d lose your job?

Brash: Exactly right.

I was working overseas at the time, and can only assume my colleagues gulped when they saw it put so unequivocally. But it wasn’t inconsistent with a meeting the handful of senior monetary policy advisers had with Don in one of his first days in office. He eyed us up – chief economist, deputy chief economist, and manager responsible for monetary policy advice – and said (words to the effect of) “you know we are going to introduce a new law in which if inflation is away from target I can lose my job. Just be sure to realise gentlemen that if I go, you are going too.” Not ever taken – at least by me – as a threat, but as a simple statement of the then-prevalent idea (crucial in the public sector reforms being done at the time) that operational independence and authority went hand in hand with serious personal responsibility and potential personal consequences. It was part of the logic of having a single decision-maker system (an element of the New Zealand system that no one chose to follow and – in one of Labour’s better reforms in recent years – was finally replaced here_.

But that was then.

By contrast, these are the components of the Accountability sub-index in the recent book I mentioned

There is nothing very idiosyncratic about the book or the work in it; indeed, she seeks to be guided by the literature and current conventional understanding. And if you look down that list of items – which is the sort of stuff central bankers often now seem to have in mind when they ever mention “accountability – you’ll quickly realise that there is really a heavy emphasis on transparency (a good thing in itself of course) and almost none of them on any sort of accountability that involves real consequences for individuals, anyone paying any sort of price. The only one of these items that represents anything like that sort of accountability is item 6.7 but even there the provision is about whether Governors/MPC members can be dismissed for neglecting their work (not turning up to meetings etc), not for actual performance in the job.

But if there are no personal consequences for failure and inadequate performance, why would we hand over all this power? I’ve written here before about former Bank of England Deputy Governor Paul Tucker’s book Unelected Power – which ranges much wider than just central banks – where his first criterion for whether a function should be delegated to people voters can’t themselves toss out (eg central bankers) is whether the goal – what is expecting from the delegatees – can be sufficiently specified that we know whether outcomes are in line with what was sought. If there is no such clear advance specification either there will be no effective accountability or such accountability will at best be rather arbitrary.

As it happens, almost no one believes the over-simplified accountability expressed in that 1993 Brash quote above makes sense, even if expressed in core inflation terms (I don’t think most people involved really did even in 1993 – although there was a brief period of hubris where it all seemed surprisingly easy – and certainly as soon as inflation went above the target range in 1995 there was some hasty rearticulation of that sense).

But if we have handed over all this power – and central bank monetary policy decisions, good ones and bad, have huge ramifications for the economy as a whole and for many individuals – we should be able to point to behaviours or outcomes that would result in dismissal, non-reappointment, or other serious sanctions. Or otherwise in practical terms central banker inhabit a gilded sphere of huge power and no effective responsibility at all. And central banks aren’t like a Supreme Court, where we look at judges to be non-corrupt (including conflicts of interest) and able……but the desired products are about process – judging without fear or favour – not about particular outcomes, or decisions in a particular direction. It is right that it should be hard to remove a Supreme Court judge. It is less clear it should be so for central bank Governors, MPC members etc. The jobs are at times difficult to do excellently, but no one is forced to take the job, with its associated pay, power, prestige and post-office opportunities.

The problem – power has been handed over, but with no commensurate real accountability – isn’t just a New Zealand phenomenon, but one evident across the entire advanced world (the ECB at the most extreme, an institution existing by international treaty rather than domestic statute).

When I wrote my review I noted that “it isn’t clear that any central bank policymaker has paid any price at all for the recent stark departures of core inflation from target. It tends not to be that way for corporate CEOs or their senior managers when things go wrong in their bailiwicks.” It is possible there is now one exception to that story – the decision by the Australian government not to reappoint Phil Lowe on the completion of his seven year term – but even there it isn’t clear how much is about specific policy failures and how much about a more general discontents with the organisation and a desire for a modernised etc RBA structure, and the desire for a fresh face atop it. The promotion of a senior insider – not known to have sharply dissented from what policy mistakes there were – is at least a clue.

It increasingly looks to me as though delegation of discretionary monetary policy to central bankers should be rethought. I have long been fairly ambivalent but when the system is faced with its biggest test in decades – in all the years globally of delegating operational independence – central banks fail (the only possible to read recent core inflation outcomes relative to the targets given them) and no one pays a price (with just possibly a solo Australian exception) it begins to look as though we should leave the decisions with those whom we can toss out – Grant Robertson’s fate on Saturday – and keep central banks on as researchers, expert advisers, and as implementation agencies, but not themselves being unaccountable wielders of great powers.

The outgoing New Zealand government has made numerous bad economic choices in the last couple of years. Prominent among them were the decisions to reappoint MPC members, to allow the appointment to the MPC of someone with no relevant professional background or expertise, to reappoint the chair of the RB Board (while surrounding him with a bunch of non-entities, none of whom had any relevant expertise) and (above all on this front) the decision to reappoint the Governor. The latter decision was most especially egregious because it was Robertson himself who had amended the law to require parliamentary parties to be consulted before a Governor was (re)appointed, and when the two main Opposition parties both objected, Robertson went ahead anyway. If the operational independence of a Governor, appointed to a term not aligned with parliamentary terms, means anything, it surely should at least mean that the person appointed commands respect – for their capability, integrity etc – across political party lines. By simply ignoring dissent – that his own reforms formally invited – Robertson made Orr’s reappointment a purely opportunistic partisan call. At the time – 11 months ago – I outlined a list of 22 reasons Orr should not have been reappointed (and at that I wasn’t convinced simply missing the inflation target was one)

I’ll come back – probably tomorrow – to a post on what I think the incoming government and its Minister of Finance (presumably Willis) should do about Orr and the Reserve Bank now.

But this rest of this post is to illustrate that not even the rituals Parliament forces them to go through – in this case the production of an Annual Report – amount to any sort of accountability at all. (One day. perhaps next year now, they will have to front up on it to the new FEC, but sadly select committee scrutiny – committees being seriously under-resourced – is hit and miss at best, the more so in this case if Grant Robertson is the key Opposition figure on the new FEC reviewing the performance of the man he appointed and reappointed.)

It is difficult to know where to start on the Annual Report that was released last week.

It might be quite useful if you care about the Bank’s emissions, as there is several pages of material, but you shouldn’t (since we have an ETS for that). It is almost utterly useless for anything much that the Bank is responsible for. There are administrative things like why the Bank has 22 senior managers earning more than $300000 a year, or why it has 36 people shown in the senior management group (in a total of 510 FTE), or why staff numbers have risen sharply yet again, or why – having signed up to a very generous five year funding agreement in 2020 – they were coming cap in hand for lots more funding (much of which they got) this year. Or why the part-time chair of the Board – who has a fulltime job running a university, and where many of the key powers are statutorily delegated to the MPC – is pulling in $170000 a year; this the same chair who has been shown to have actively misrepresented – and led Treasury to make false statements about – the past ban on expertise on the MPC (issues he has never addressed). Or why the Governor gets away with actively misleading FEC. Or how seriously (or not) conflicts of interest are taken (even how the Board sees itself relative to the recent lofty words in the RB/FMA review of financial institutions’ governance).

But on policy matters it is arguably even worse. In a year when core inflation has – again – been miles away from the Bank’s target, the Board chair’s statement is reduced to 1.5 emollient pages uttering no concerns at all (recall that the Board does not do monetary policy, but it is charged by statute with reviewing monetary policy and the MPC and making recommendations on appointments of MPC members and the Governor). We learn nothing at all from the highly-paid chair as to why he and his Board of unqualified non-entities considered, in the circumstances, that reappointments had been warranted (nothing in Board minutes has provided anything more).

We do however learn of the Board’s effort to indulge the political whims of the Governor and Board members, the Treaty of Waitangi (a) not being mentioned in the acts supposedly governing the Bank, and b) not itself mentioning anything even remotely connected to monetary policy or financial stability.

There is a couple of page section on monetary policy in the body of the report. But in itself this is a reminder that the MPC – which wields the power – publishes no Annual Report, and exposes itself to no serious scrutiny. In this central bank not only does the deputy chief executive responsible for economics and monetary policy never give a serious speech on the subject, she is never seriously exposed to either media or parliamentary scrutiny. External members are so sheltered we have on idea what any of them think, what contribution they make, and so on. They never front FEC or any serious media. Perhaps it isn’t surprising that the total remuneration of these three ornamental figures isn’t much more than what the chair of the Board himself is paid.

But then surely the Board would be doing a rigorous review (it is after all the Board’s job, by law)? That would be difficult when most of the Board has no relevant expertise (the Governor is the main exception, and he chairs the MPC….).

But what we actually get in no sign of any serious thought, challenge or questioning, no attempt to frame the MPC’s achievements and failings. Instead we get this process-heavy but substantively-empty little box

It might be interesting to OIA that “self-review” MPC members are said to have carried out, but you’d just have no idea from any of this that the biggest monetary policy failure in decades had happened on the MPC members’ watch – even as all expiring terms were renewed. It is Potemkin-like “accountability”, with barely even that level of pretence. (Note here that the weak internal review last year wasn’t even an MPC document but rather a management one.)

If that is all rather weak it gets worse when the LSAP comes into view. This, you will recall, was the bondbuying programme in which the MPC’s choices cost taxpayers now just over $12 billion, a simply staggering sum of money, swamping all those “fiscal holes” of the recent election campaign. There are lot of LSAP references – it is the Annual Accounts after all – but none from the Board chair, and here is the one substantive bit.

I’ve highlighted the utterly egregious bit. As they say, IMF staff did put out a little modelling exercise. but it has no credibility whatever, as the scenario described in the exercise bore no relationship to what actually happened in the New Zealand economy in 2020 and 2021. It was a scenario under which, even with the LSAP, the New Zealand economy languished underemployed for three years (but a bit less so because of LSAP) rather than an overheated economy with very high inflation and – in the Governor’s own words – employment running above maximum sustainable employment. I critiqued the piece in a post here, and I know of no economists who read the IMF piece and concluded “ah yes, of course, notwithstanding that the LSAP had a direct loss of $12bn, in fact the taxpayer was really made better off by that intervention after all”. I’m sure no serious economist at the Reserve Bank – there still are some – believes it either. But there seems to be a premium on keeping quiet, and keeping your head down, in the Orr central bank. It was dishonest when the Governor first ran this line in an interview with the Herald but perhaps then he’d seen no critiques (or asked for one); it is materially worse when the Board chair (and the Governor’s 35 senior colleagues) let him get away with it and repeat it, without any scrutiny or further attempt to make a case, in what is supposed to be a powerful public institution’s premier accountability document.

Any serious accountability for the Bank seemed to be dead, at least under the outgoing government. Whether it will be any less bad under the new government it is far too soon to tell. But if it isn’t, serious questions needed to be asked about whether the model is any longer fit for purpose in the sort of democracy New Zealanders typically aspire to have – we’ll delegate power, but if you take up that power and stuff things up then you should personally pay some price. In this document not only in there is serious scrutiny, no personal consequences, but not even a glimpse of contrition from any of them. Never mind the huge losses, never mind the arbitrary deeply disruptive inflation, never mind the lies……after all, the government hasn’t seemed to mind.

Almost any private sector CEO, committee or Board that had stuffed up as badly as the Reserve Bank – with corporate excess and loss of focus thrown in – would have been sent packing some time ago. The stock price would have been falling, investors demanding change, and the business press all over the situation. But not here, not our central bank………

But we haven’t had a three year negative output gap

One of the great things about being a prominent organisation that releases complex material to select media under embargo is that you can get uncontested coverage in the first (and probably only) news cycle. Adrian Orr will have been glad of that when it came to the embargoed release yesterday (the public only got to see it at 5:43 this morning) of the IMF’s Article IV report, and in particular the short (600 words) annex on the fiscal implications of the Reserve Bank’s LSAP programme – the one on which the Reserve Bank has so far lost $11bn.

It was 10 days or so ago that we first heard that some such paper was coming. The Governor was being interviewed by the Herald‘s Madison Reidy after the Monetary Policy Statement. She asked Orr about the LSAP losses and noted in contrast the fiscal costs of the storms/cyclone this year. In his usual effusive style he responded that the LSAP itself had already more than paid for the cyclone recovery costs, moving on to suggest that only accountants could think otherwise “who know the cost of everything and the value of nothing”. He then went to say that the IMF had a paper, which he hoped would be published, showing that the LSAP had actually improved the government’s finances, and that it would offer the “proper story” not some “piecemeal accounting story”.

That caught my eye. Knowing that the IMF Article IV report was due before long, I wondered if they’d have a Selected Issues paper on the topic. These are supplementary research pieces, usually 15-20 pages or so, undertaken by Fund staff (often on topics requested by the authorities) as part of the Article IV review process. The latest two such papers are here.

But it proved not. Instead, we got only a little annex on the topic (600 words and two pictures) on pages 64-66 of the main report. The “proper story” it certainly isn’t – and in fairness to the Fund, as distinct from the Governor, it doesn’t really purport to be. What it is is a little exercise by a few researchers (not working specifically on New Zealand) using a model, as yet unpublished, that they have developed for work on central bank exit strategies, showing that on certain assumptions something like the LSAP could end up producing net fiscal benefits. Surprise, surprise. Of course. It could. The question really is about the realism of the assumptions etc.

Orr, and probably the Fund, will have been pretty happy with the Herald‘s coverage this morning, under the headline “Reserve Bank’s money-printing buoyed Govt books, says IMF” (well except that – rightly – the Governor and IMF would disavow the suggestion that the LSAP was “money-printing”: it was just an enormous asset swap). The results could be read as backing the Governor’s claim – a year ago in an interview with the same journalist – that the benefits to the economy had been “multiples” of the direct cost (although she seems not to have realised that because she contrasts these results with Orr’s 2022 claim).

The first of the two charts really captures the gist of why the little model analysis sheds no useful light at all (SS here simply means steady state).

I showed the top left chart to a 3rd year economics undergraduate, who immediately spotted the problem. It isn’t very hard.

You’ll note that in this example real GDP falls materially below the steady state, or potential, and stays there – converging ever so slowly – for years. By construction of the model, the LSAP intervention – about the scale of the actual LSAP programme – lifts real GDP, but again throughout the entire forecast period real output is at or below potential. There is, in other words, a negative output gap right through the period in the scenario. As the model is constructed, the LSAP intervention boosts real GDP, so that there is a smaller negative output gap. But it is always either negative or zero. Thus, the LSAP has unambiguously boosted real GDP, and thus tax revenues. Working back from the (few) numbers in the little note, and knowing the tax/GDP ratio in New Zealand is about 30 per cent, the total GDP difference must be of the order of 7-8 per cent of GDP. The current LSAP losses to the Reserve Bank are just over 2.5 per cent of GDP, so on those numbers the gains from the LSAP would be “multiples” of the Reserve Bank losses.

But have we had a negative output gap throughout the last 3+ years since the LSAP got underway at the end of March 2020?

Not according to the Reserve Bank, or to any other serious macroeconomic analyst. But since it is the Reserve Bank making the bold claims, and because their numbers are easy to find, here is the Reserve Bank’s current view of the output gap over the period since the start of 2019. I’ve also shown their projections from the last (pre Covid, pre LSAP) MPS.

The output gap is now estimated – several years on – to have been negative for only two quarters, March and June 2020. Every quarter from September 2020 onwards has been positive.

Doesn’t that just mean even more tax revenue and more net benefit?

No, it doesn’t. What went with the persistently positive and large output gap? Why, that was the sharp and now sustained rise in inflation. And how do the Reserve Bank’s modelling and forecast efforts envisage that core inflation comes back to target again? Why, via (raising the OCR and engendering) a fairly protracted negative output gap

and when output is running below potential for several years (and on these projections it isn’t even back to potential by 2026), tax revenue will, all else equal, be running lower than it would otherwise have been. In fact, the way the forecasting models are set up, things are pretty much symmetrical – it will be take roughly as much excess capacity as there was excess demand. We simply haven’t been in the world the IMF’s little desk exercise assumed/portrayed. And thus the numbers are just pretty meaningless when it comes to making claims about the fiscal or other net costs/ benefits of the LSAP. In his day, the Governor would have recognised that once he read the short note and thought for a minute or two.

There are many other limitations to the analysis, even on its own terms. First, the subsequent inflation seems to be treated as quite unrelated to the (with hindsight excessive) stimulus that had gone before. Second, while they assert that the LSAP was a better (net cheaper) intervention than anything else they make no attempt to show this. Thus, had we wanted to throw another $11bn at the economy we could instead have simply given the money to households ($2000 or so per capita). That almost certainly would have engendered a significant demand response (and more than what most New Zealand economists outside Bank believe the LSAP actually did). And we know that actually the OCR hadn’t been lowered to any sort of effective floor, just to the 0.25 per cent the MPC had chosen to set it at. So at least some of any stimulus the LSAP provided could have been done simply by setting the OCR lower – at no risk to the Crown at all. The Funding for Lending programme, used long and late by the Bank, seemed to be an effective tool for stimulus…..and involved no financial risk to taxpayers at all. Had the Bank been doing its job in the run-up to Covid, the negative OCR tool would have been available from the start. You might not like that tool, but the Governor had told us before Covid that he did, and it could have been used at no financial risk to the Crown.

And all this simply assumes – no serious attempt has ever been made to show – that in the specific circumstances of New Zealand (where shorter-term rates are overwhelmingly what matter, and they were anchored by OCR expectations), the LSAP had any material (even inflationary) stimulus at all, to justify the huge financial risks that were taken with no serious advance scrutiny, and which ended up going very bad.

I could take the opportunity to run through all the arguments around LSAP effectiveness again, but I won’t. About a year ago Orr made a strong play to defend it, and the alleged benefits, and I spent a long post then unpicking his arguments. Sometimes – there are so many – one just forgets occasions when Orr has just made stuff up. He was at it again this week.

As for the IMF piece, it is what it is. If you ever find yourself in a deep economic hole, seemingly intractable, you want all the monetary policy stimulus you can get. Best of all, use the OCR and use it aggressively. Perhaps QE can add some value on occasion (probably not much in New Zealand, but perhaps anything might help then in such a scenario). But that – we now realise – just isn’t where the New Zealand economy – or most other economies – found themselves after March 2020. In fact, it is the Reserve Bank itself that now reckons the economy was already overheating – GDP above potential – by the second half of 2020.

The $11bn men and women of the MPC

Three months ago I wrote a short post here using some new data the Reserve Bank had started to publish on the monthly payments Treasury was making to the Reserve Bank as the losses were gradually realised on the huge portfolio of bonds the Bank and MPC had run up in 2020 and 2021 (the LSAP). It was to the Bank’s credit that they have started making the data available, and although there have been a few glitches since then, when I have got in touch they have been very helpful.

I can remember the days when I and a few others used to jeer at them for having lost $7 billion (and these numbers are a proxy – albeit an imperfect one – for big and very real losses for the taxpayer from the asset swap programme, executed at probably the single most inopportune time since interest rates were liberalised 40 years ago). Last year, the Taxpayers’ Union gave the Governor a lifetime achievement award for waste, citing then estimates of $8.5 billion of losses.

That was then. When I ran the first post in May total RB losses (now properly measured, with the indemnity payment data) had been bobbling just either side of $10 billion. With today’s update by the Bank of the relevant spreadsheet, here is the position to the end of July.

Yes, total RB losses from this grossly overblown under-analysed programme have now reached $11 billion (which was also the last total estimate from The Treasury I’d seen).

But, again, that was then, and in August to date bond yields appear to have risen another 20 basis points or so. As the portfolio slowly shrinks and the longest bonds are sold off first, the extent of further losses should diminish, but there is no sign we’ve yet reached the limit.

I’ve tended to focus in on the Governor as responsible, and there is little doubt that he is the dominant figure on the MPC.

But we shouldn’t forget the other internal MPC members who shared in the decisions to accumulate the risk:

Then Deputy Governor, Geoff Bascand

Then Assistant (now Deputy) Governor, Christian Hawkesby

Then Chief Economist, Yuong Ha

One has since been promoted and two have moved on, although with no hint that sharing responsibility for absolutely huge taxpayer losses was a part of either move.

More recently, Karen Silk and Paul Conway have joined the MPC. They weren’t there when the risk was taken on, but they have been part of the decision not to close it out quickly, and thus to continue to expose taxpayers to further losses.

And then of course, there are the three externals, all reappointed since the LSAP folly: Bob Buckle, Peter Harris, and Caroline Saunders.

And who reappointed them and Orr? Well, that would be the Minister of Finance and the Bank’s Board, the latter chaired by Neil Quigley, who has just proved you can apparently just make up stuff to Treasury, lead Treasury to lie to the press, and still carry right on as chair of a government board. In this country new depths of poor governance seem to be plumbed almost every week.

Finally, we shouldn’t completely exclude the Secretary to the Treasury from responsibility. She sits as a non-voting member of the MPC and she advises the Minister on things like indemnities and Bank performance. There is not even a hint (eg in the MPC minutes or OIAed papers) that she has ever dissented from the highly risky and costly LSAP intervention.

That is quite a list of people who share responsibility for losses that have now reached $2000 per man, woman and child in this country. Readers will reflect on just what nice-to-haves that politicians are now competing to bribe us with (with borrowed money) might have been considerably more affordable had the Bank stuck to the OCR which, boring as it may be, tends not to make or lose taxpayers much money at all.

I suppose one way of looking at that list of the responsible men and women is that if we averaged it out, the loss was a bit under $1 billion per responsible public figure. There wasn’t even a good party (as Mr Leauanae enjoyed on leaving MPP) just reckless waste and losses on a scale not seen in New Zealand public finances for a very long time.

And no one paid any personal price. There was no personal accountability at all. Most of these people still hold their high, and highly paid, offices. While you and I are covering the losses they so carelessly racked up. It is some slim consolation that one of them is up for election in a few weeks.

The $10bn amendment

Late yesterday afternoon the Minister of Finance issued a new Remit to the Reserve Bank Monetary Policy Committee (his statement is here, the new Remit itself is here). The Minister’s statement tends to minimise the entire thing (and nothing really about the inflation target changes), but – no doubt consciously and deliberately – gives not a mention to the most material addition to the Remit.

The lead-in to the more-specific targets section of the Remit is now as follows:

This was the backdrop to the additional words I’ve highlighted

$10 billion of so of losses of taxpayers’ money as a result of Reserve Bank MPC choices around the LSAP programme, choices that had the imprimatur of the Minister of Finance (and apparently no objection from the Treasury). As the bonds are being sold back to The Treasury, the realised component of the losses is mounting significantly each month ($317m in indemnity payments were made to the Bank last month), but total estimated losses hang fairly steadily around $10 billion.

The addition to the Remit is welcome. Formally, it doesn’t bind the MPC to anything much (note that “where appropriate” at the start of the second sentence, which appears to conditions things in the third sentence too) but will add put pressure to a) do some advance analysis and b) disclose their thinking and analysis when next the MPC is tempted to throw caution to the wind and take huge risky punts in the financial markets (conventional monetary policy, by contrast, poses very little financial risk to the taxpayer). In 2020 there is no sign they ever did the risk analysis, they certainly never shared anything substantive with the public, they just took the plunge, and over the following months got the Minister to agree to up their gambling limit, still with no serious risk analysis, and no disclosure.

But think what it cost the taxpayer – you and me – to get here: it really is the $10 billion amendment.

MPC members have never made a serious attempt to defend either the alarmingly poor process or the wildy costly financial outcomes. The Governor has waved his hands and blustered about the (wider economic) gains being “multiples” of the losses, but has produced no serious analysis to support such claims (and in the unlikely event there was such a boost to aggregate demand, that would mean the LSAP programme had directly contributed to the high inflation looming recession mess we are in now), while the external MPC members have never said anything about anything they’ve been responsible for. And yet, having simply thrown away $10bn, on no good process or analysis, each of Orr and the three externals have been reappointed by…….Robertson, the man who signed off on the indemnity, not having himself demanded serious supporting analysis from the MPC or The Treasury.

There was an article in the Herald the other day about the Auditor-General having reviewed aspects of that great Labour/New Zealand First boondoggle, the Provincial Growth Fund. This was the headline

The LSAP involved multiples of the amounts involved in the PGF, clear and documented losses, and no serious attempt to show whether there were any benefits at all. $10 billion is a lot of money. It would seem an obvious case for the Auditor-General to look into, given that none of those we should rely on as first line of defence (RB Board, Treasury, Minister of Finance, FEC) seem at all interested. Much easier to file it under experience, avoid even any serious expression of contrition (whether for these losses or the inflation debacle), reappoint all those involved, and just throw out bone with a slight (if welcome) amendment to the Remit.

New LSAP data

There have been various posts here over the last couple of years about the losses to the taxpayer resulting from the Reserve Bank’s Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programme. Some of these have been more about explaining than excoriating (the latest such explanatory post is here).

As I noted in that most recent post, in the early days of the LSAP the line item on the Reserve Bank balance sheet for the claim on the Crown indemnity was a rough but reasonable estimate of the total losses, based on market prices as at the successive balance dates. It became an increasingly inadequate indicator as the LSAP programme started to be unwound, with the longest-dated bonds being sold back to Treasury, losses being realised, and payments being made from the Treasury to the Reserve Bank under the indemnity.

But the amounts of those indemnity payments were not being routinely disclosed (eg the RB does not publish a monthly income statement) and analysts were reduced to picking up snippets of information from OIAed documents. It wasn’t exactly transparent.

Anyway, in an OIA request to the Treasury and in a conversation with someone from the Bank I suggested it would be helpful if the monthly indemnity payment amounts by Treasury were to be routinely disclosed. That way, whatever debates we might want to have about the merits or otherwise of the LSAP programme, at least we would all be working with the same numbers.

And thus it has come to be, and this morning a new spreadsheet on the Bank’s website went live with monthly updates on payments and receipts under the LSAP indemnity. The link to it is about half-way down this page.

Here are the two components

Here is the Bank’s own description of the numbers in the blue line

There were net transfers to Treasury for a while because the coupon rates the Reserve Bank was receiving were higher than the (OCR) funding cost.

And here is the chart showing total losses, realised and unrealised.

The total will keep fluctuating a bit from month to month as market rates change, but the variability will gradually diminish as (a) the size of the remaining LSAP portfolio continues to steadily shrink, and (b) the longest-dated bonds have been sold back first. But for at least the last eight months, something around $10bn in total losses has been the best (market price) guess.

There were two points to this post. The first was to use the new data to illustrate better than has been possible until now with hard numbers just what has happened with the LSAP gains and losses over time. And the second was to acknowledge the Bank and thank them for making the data available. The losses probably aren’t something the Bank is really comfortable with, but one shouldn’t be hiding from the hard numbers, and in publishing them regularly now the Bank apparently is not. And that is welcome.

$10 billion is, however, a lot of taxpayers’ money to have lost.

Keeping track of the LSAP losses

This is mostly a follow-up to my post last Saturday on the LSAP losses.

In that post I noted that while the LSAP was still running, the monthly line item on the Reserve Bank balance sheet recording the Bank’s mark-to-market claim on The Treasury under the indemnity was a reasonable proxy, on prevailing market prices, of the direct fiscal losses the LSAP programme would result in. And it was an official number.

The Reserve Bank published its monthly balance sheet for the end of March. The Bank’s claim under the indemnity as at 31 March stood at $7821 million.

However, as I also noted in Saturday’s post, this number is no longer even an approximate estimate of the direct fiscal losses from the LSAP programme. It is still a best guess, on market prices, of the unrealised losses on the bonds the Bank is still holding.

But the Bank’s holding of bonds are now much lower than they were at peak. In the programme as a whole, the Bank purchased government bonds with a face value of $53480 million and LGFA bonds with a face value of $1735 million. All of those purchases were covered by the indemnity.

However, since July last year the Bank has been selling back to The Treasury each month government bonds with a face value of $415 million. Total sales to date – most recently a parcel on Monday – total $4150 million. The resales programme is starting with the longest-dated (most risky) bonds, on which the largest percentage losses will typically have been made. As those bonds are sold back to The Treasury the Reserve Bank’s losses are realised, and their claim on the indemnity is met each month by The Treasury. (In addition, as the table below records, there were some payments from the RB to Treasury in the period before resales began, which may represent higher coupon payments to the Reserve Bank exceeding the Reserve Bank’s (OCR) funding costs during the very low OCR period.)

There appears to be no easy place to find the monthly indemnity payments (I have suggested to Treasury that in the interests of transparency it would be good if they or the Bank provided such a table), but there were some hard numbers, and some indications, in a November 2022 Treasury paper that I drew from in Saturday’s post

Actual market rates have changed since then, but the total payouts to date could be almost $2 billion.

In addition to the sales back to The Treasury, some of the bonds the Reserve Bank purchased have matured in their hands.

On the LGFA side, $216m (face value) matured in May 2021, $250m in April 2022, and another $250m this month.

In respect of government bonds, $1300m matured in May 2021 (and on those bonds the Crown appears to have roughly broken even from having done the LSAP purchases – the OCR, the Bank’s funding cost, having been 0.25 per cent throughout the period the May 2021 bonds were held), and another $7471 million (face value) matured a few days ago, 15 April 2023.

As a reminder, here is what the Reserve Bank is indemnified for

Whatever claim the Reserve Bank had in respect of the April 2023 bonds will presumably drop out of the reported indemnity claim balance sheet item in the next balance sheet and will have been met by Treasury in their monthly payment.

Total LSAP bond purchases were $55215 million (face value). Maturities and resales mean that the face value has been reduced by (face value) $9487 million [correction $13637m – the original number was just maturities]. The monthly reported indemnity claim item on the Reserve Bank’s balance sheet captures only the market-implied loss on the bonds still held. But the total direct fiscal losses on the programme – not reported very transparently – include the substantial realised losses already settled by The Treasury. Each month – while market bond rates remain high – the realised losses will mount and the indemnity claim item (while fluctuating from month to month) will be trending down. When the last bonds mature or are sold (several years away yet on current plans), the Reserve Bank balance sheet indemnity item will drop away to zero. But large losses will have been met by the taxpayer – on what we know at present, probably something like $10bn of them.

Understanding LSAP losses

There was an article on Business Desk yesterday that led with the suggestion that the LSAP losses now totalled almost $20 billion.

As soon as the article appeared I emailed the author and pointed out that the two numbers she was using could not be added together and that the best estimate of the direct fiscal losses were still around $10 billion. We had a few email exchanges and a telephone conversation, by which point she accepted that her number was wrong, but didn’t fully understand why she was wrong (apparently several other journalists were also confused), and indicated that there would be a further article forthcoming, using quotes I (and others?) had provided. I didn’t have the time for anything in depth yesterday but suggested I might write a post today that attempted a fuller and more intuitive explanation.

Unfortunately I didn’t print off the original piece and the article online has now been changed. The original opening has been modified to remove the explicit $20 billion assertion (it is still in the heading but with a question mark) and this note has been added at the start.

As it stands, the article now begins

But it isn’t “before” it at all. Instead, the number labelled as the mark-to-market losses on the LSAP portfolio is just, in effect, a subset of the Treasury estimate referred to in the first paragraph.

Note that everything in this post, in Jenny Ruth’s article, and in the Treasury papers referred to, deals only with the direct fiscal losses to the taxpayer from the LSAP programme. It does not deal with any possible offsetting savings by lowering general Treasury issuance costs or with possible macroeconomic benefits (or costs), not because either of these might not be important, but simply because the issue at hand is about the direct fiscal costs only.

Jenny Ruth’s article drew on the Treasury paper to the Minister of Finance, dated 6 December 2022, which I discussed (together with a follow up note from the Reserve Bank) in this recent post on the idea of tiering returns on the current very large level of settlement cash balances. The paper itself is included in the huge recent OIA release from the Minister of Finance, hosted on Treasury’s website. So too is one other Treasury paper I will draw from.

Here is the $10.5 billion number from the Treasury paper Ruth draws on

Note that there is a footnote at the end of that sentence. Here is the footnote, some of which was withheld

This, on its own, really should have been enough to suggest to any reader that the two numbers were approximating to the same thing, and thus could not be added together. (All that said, this paper was about tiering and so did not go into any great depth on how the various LSAP loss numbers were derived.)

But here it is worth taking a step back.

For the last 18 months or more I have been banging on about the rising scale of the direct fiscal losses associated with the LSAP. To illustrate that point I regularly used, both here and on Twitter, a chart of the line item on the Reserve Bank’s monthly published balance sheet of the Bank’s claim under the Crown indemnity the Minister of Finance has given them for any LSAP losses. I used that because (a) it was available monthly, and it was an official number and (b) because, while there were no realisations (bonds sold off again) it was a reasonable best estimate (the market price) at the time of what the actual direct fiscal losses were.

But, as I have pointed out, and as The Treasury itself has frequently pointed out, the indemnity claim itself does not represent the cost to the wider Crown finances. The indemnity claim is just a transfer from the Treasury to the Reserve Bank. Had the indemnity not been given, the Reserve Bank could still have done the LSAP. Instead of a large claim on The Treasury for the indemnity it would instead be showing large losses itself and deeply negative equity (as is the situation with the RBA, which did large scale bond buying, without an indemnity). Either way, taxpayers are worse off but they are worse off because of the LSAP (and subsequent movement in market prices for bonds) not because of the indemnity. The Reserve Bank balance sheet is consolidated into the Crown accounts, and transfers among entities included in that consolidation don’t make us taxpayers any worse (or better) off. They are really just intra-group transfers.

It is also worth noting – as many early sceptics did in their responses – that if the LSAP bonds were to be held to maturity by the Reserve Bank no indemnity claim would have been payable at all. The market price of the bonds approaching matiruty would have tended towards the face value of the bonds.

But that is not the same as saying there would have been no direct fiscal losses from the decision to do the LSAP.

What matters in assessing the direct fiscal costs is not the flows between the Reserve Bank and the Treasury (intra-group transfers) but the flows between the government as a whole (here, Treasury and Reserve Bank combined) and the private sector. The LSAP changed the private sector’s lending to the government from bond holdings to settlement cash balances at the Reserve Bank. This is the story I’ve been telling for ages that the LSAP is just a big asset swap. Treasury says the same thing (from that same 6 December paper)

In what follows, I’m treating the Reseve Bank and Treasury as one consolidated entity (whole-of-Crown). In decision making terms it doesn’t work that way (the RB MPC made independent decisions to do the LSAP), but I think the substance may be clearer if I do.

Take a very simplified example in which these are the only transactions whole-of-Crown does:

Step 1

  • the government issues $50 billion of long-term bonds to the private sector to finance $50 billion of spending,
  • the net effect of those two transactions is no change to the level of settlement cash balances (spending boosts settlement cash, but issuing bonds drains those balances)
  • in this scenario, the government now has $50 billion of long-term debt outstanding and no extra (RB) settlement cash balances outstanding

Step 2 (the LSAP)

  • the Reserve Bank (branch of government) buys back the $50 billions of bonds on the open market,
  • paying for its purchases boosts the total level of settlement cash by the full purchase price (for simplicity, assume also $50 billion)
  • having done this, the government (whole of Crown) now has a) no long-term debt outstanding (one division might have issued the debt while another has repurchased it, but they net to zero) and (b) $50 billion of extra settlement cash liabilities outstanding.

The government could have financed that $50 billion at the market interest rate on the long-term bonds.  Instead, it is now financing itself with settlement cash balances (in economic substance, borrowing from banks) on which its Reserve Bank arm pays the full OCR interest rate, reviewed every six weeks or so.

The direct fiscal cost of the decision to do the LSAP is the difference in the debt servicing costs in these two scenarios (how much whole-of-Crown pays the private sector).   Transfers between the government and the Reserve Bank themselves don’t add to or subtract from those numbers at all.

When the LSAP was underway, the Reserve Bank was probably buying back the bonds at yields to maturity of around 1 per cent.   In other words, the Crown was giving up, say, 1 per cent fixed rate financing and replacing it with variable rate financing.  Had the OCR averaged below that (approximate) 1 per cent over the remaining life of the bonds, there would have been a net direct fiscal saving.   If that seemed unlikely even in 2020, it wasn’t impossible (for the first year or more the OCR was 0.25 per cent).

But it hasn’t happened (or, to be strictly accurate, since we do not know what disasters might lie just around the corner, it now seems most unlikely to happen).  The OCR is now 5.25 per cent.  From here, in its latest OCR review the Reserve Bank indicated it isn’t sure where the OCR will go next.   The market is looking towards rate cuts at some point, but the market does not expect anything like an average of 1 per cent or less.  There will, almost certainly, be substantial net direct fiscal costs from the LSAP programme.   

That number was what The Treasury was estimating (reporting in early December) at about $10.5 billion.  Bond yields, changing from day to day, encapsulate implicit market expectations of future short-term rates, including the future path of the OCR over the remaining life of the relevant bond.  Thus, the mark-to-market value of a bond position is going to approximate to the estimated net direct fiscal losses from a decision to purchase those bonds (as Treasury notes in the first quote above).  They are two ways of looking at the same thing, not different losses that can be added together.

Current market bond yields are a little below those at the end of October, so Treasury’s best estimate now of the net direct fiscal losses would probably be a little lower.   Since we don’t know exactly the date as at which they came up with the $10.5 billion or the precise details of their methodology we can’t be quite sure how much lower, but $10 billion or perhaps a touch below look to be about right.  Those estimates too will, in principle, change every day.

As Jenny Ruth’s article notes, the Reserve Bank balance sheet for 31 March will be published on Tuesday, and we will get an update on the Bank’s claim on the Treasury under the indemnity.   However, the claim under the indemnity no longer approximates the total expected net fiscal direct losses (or the Reserve Bank’s own losses).  That is (mostly) because some of the LSAP bonds have been sold (back to Treasury), under a steady announced monthly programme, crystallising some of the Reserve Bank’s losses, and triggering payments from the government to the Reserve Bank under the indemnity (some of the shorter-term bonds have also been held to maturity).   I am not aware of where we might find an up-to-date time series of these payments, but in that big Treasury OIA release there is a 24 November 2022 paper to the Minister of Finance on monthly indemnity payments.  It includes a table of actual indemnity payments to date

indemnity 1

 

and one of expected payments over the followng year (on market rates prevailing when the estimates were done)

indemnity 2

Jenny Ruth reported (correctly) the Bank’s outstanding indemnity claim as at the end of February of around $8.75bn. But to get the total Reserve Bank losses under the indemnity one would have to add to that (a) the $438 million of known indemnity payments already made, and (b) any other indemnity payments between November and February, estimated in the Treasury papers then at another $1.1bn or so. In other words, a total a bit over $10 billion. Note that the entire interest rate yield curve for medium to long term bonds is lower now than it was in Oct/Nov (or in February) so accurate estimates now would be a bit lower – probably a touch below $10 billion.

If I think back to yesterday’s conversation I think one issue that may be playing on people’s mind is “yes, we know about the settlement cash payments you describe, but…..surely there are still those mark to market losses showing on the RB balance sheet”.

And that is true, but if the Treasury were to engage in full mark to market accounting of the value of its debts (which few entities do, or are required to be accounting standards, but which is nonetheless the economic substance), what would have happened to the market value of the debt Treasury had issued? It would have increased massively – low interest outstandings are very valuable when the market rate is so much higher. In fact, the market value of the increased value of the Treasury’s liability in respect of the LSAP bonds would be equal to the reduced market value of the Reserve Bank’s holdings of those LSAP bonds. The two net out – reverting to my oversimplified scenario it is as if the whole-of-Crown no longer has that debt outstanding at all.

The indemnity (claim and payments) matters a lot to the Reserve Bank. It doesn’t much matter to us, or to the Treasury. We face whatever gains (or losses) the LSAP gives rise to whether or not there was an indemnity. The remaining claim – latest estimate out on Tuesday – is (from our perspective) little more than an intra-group memo item. But as taxpayers we don’t care much about either the RB or the Treasury finances individually, but about the consolidated financial position, which is what determines the losses we ultimately have to bear.

Finally, because some LSAP bonds are being held to maturity (and there are losses arising from them, albeit often smaller) there will never be a single government accounts line item capturing the full net direct fiscal costs of the LSAP programme.

I hope this post has made things a bit clearer. I’m happy to engage with anyone on the points in it, or any that are relevant that I may have missed.

UPDATE (17/4): Jenny Ruth’s follow-up story written on Friday is here. Note that this line she was given by Treasury is wrong or at best misleading.

If the Reserve Bank sold the LSAP bonds on-market that would certainly and automatically drain settlement cash levels. If the Reserve Bank sold the bonds back to the Treasury that transaction alone would not affect banks’ settlement account balances at all (it would just deplete the government’s account at the RB). The effect on settlement cash would arise only as and when the Treasury issued new bonds on-market to replenish the government’s account and (in effect) replace the bonds the RB had sold back to them.

It is a small point, but since the Treasury line is now on the public record and there is evident lack of clarity in some quarters about the LSAP issues it is worth being as clear as possible. As per the post above, transfers/flows between the RB and Treasurydo not directly affect banks or the wider public. For many purposes (but not all) there are just intra-group transfers among branches of whole-of-government.