The Wheeler letter

(I’ve had to spend much of the day at the Reserve Bank, in a meeting chaired by one of their Board members, attended by one Deputy Governor, and where the Governor himself just might turn up – he’s a member, but will no doubt find himself too busy on the day and send an alternate.  In the interests of that meeting –  which will be contentious enough anyway just on its own subject matter – this post is pre-scheduled to appear when I’ve got out of the building.)

On Monday, the Reserve Bank posted the full text of the Governor’s letter to BNZ CEO Anthony Healy, and of Healy’s initial reply to the Governor.  Valuable as Paul McBeth’s initial article in NBR was, it is always worth reading the full text of such documents if one can.    Some of this ground was already covered in my post on Saturday, but after a bit of comment on the letters themselves, I want to offer some other thoughts after a few days to reflect further on the issue, and the reaction to it.

First, the Governor’s letter.    What is clearer with the benefit of seeing the full letter is the extent to which it wasn’t anything like a one-off fit of pique on a bad day, but rather a culmination of a sustained campaign from the Governor and his senior management to put pressure on the BNZ to “silence” (materially alter what he was saying and how he was saying it) Stephen Toplis.  It is interesting that the letter was dated 11 May, the day of the release of the Monetary Policy Statement itself.  One might have supposed that the Governor would have had higher priorities that day, between a press conference, an FEC appearance and so on.

The first couple of paragraphs of his letter focus just on the specific Monetary Policy Statement preview that Stephen Toplis had written and published a few days earlier.

I am writing to you to draw your attention to the language used in the BNZ Markets Outlook of 8 May 2017, which appeared to bring into question the integrity of the Reserve Bank.  While I appreciate that you will not have reviewed the document in detail, I expect you would also be concerned at the nature of the language used.

As I noted in my earlier post, the Governor offers no evidence or examples to back his suggestion that the commentary concerned “questioned the integrity of the Reserve Bank”,    There was, in fact, nothing in the commentary that any reasonable reader could have read as impugning the Bank’s integrity.  Competence, diligence, or focus perhaps, but not integrity.  So the Governor was off to a poor start.   Perhaps he’d just got so worked up about Stephen Toplis over such a long period that he ending up seeing/reading stuff that just wasn’t there?

The document claims that the Bank would be negligent if it didn’t conform to the views of the BNZ economists.  Negligence is a serious accusation and implies that the Reserve Bank would not exercise reasonable care in the discharge of its responsibilities.  The document also makes other claims that the Reserve Bank would not implement monetary policy in the best interests of New Zealanders.  For example, we would not adjust our policy stance even if our analysis indicated that appropriate, if it in some way embarrassed the Reserve Bank.  To bring into question the Bank’s integrity while fundamentally misrepresenting how the Reserve Bank formulates policy is unacceptable.

To repeat, there is nothing in the document that any reasonable detached reader could take as impugning the integrity of the Bank.  There is also nothing to support the suggestion that BNZ claimed that the Reserve Bank “would not implement monetary policy in the best interests of New Zealanders” (although in fact the Bank’s statutory mandate is rather narrower than that anyway).    The commentary did suggest that the Bank would be reluctant to raise rates in May, whatever the data showed, because of how strongly they had previously adopted a fairly neutral bias.   Well, take it from me, having sat around monetary policy decision tables for decades, those conversations do actually happen in central banks.  Ask the Bank’s chief economist –  there are whole literatures on interest rate smoothing, consistent signals etc.  And, however much we sometimes like to pretend otherwise, no monetary policy decision is ever totally clear-cut, simply because no one knows the future.     What’s more, as I noted the other day, the Reserve Bank more or less did what BNZ said they needed to do –  they did show a track with (eventual) OCR increases in it.  So having made a conditional statement, that the Bank would be negligent – or remiss, or not adequately doing its job –  if an upward-sloping track wasn’t shown, they showed one.  So quite what was the Governor’s specific problem?

Perhaps Toplis could have chosen another word than “negligent”, but “negligent” is a synonym for various words for not doing a job well, and with due attention to responsibilities.  That is exactly what the Reserve Bank Act charges the Bank’s Board with assessing – it even makes brief reference to “neglect”.  The whole statutory accountability framework is built around quite personalised assessments of that sort.  If the Board can do such assessments why can’t the rest of us?

At this point, the Reserve Bank escalates the issue from a simple expression of concern to a not-very-veiled call for tighter control on Toplis, to suit the Governor’s preferences.

The Reserve Bank makes a considerable effort to explain its monetary policy processes, engage with market participants, and communicate clearly its monetary policy stance.  Given these efforts, I would have expected the BNZ economists to be more accurate and careful in their choice of words [is this a suggestion Toplis had been “negligent”?] I would also expect that the editorial quality assurance process (and any legal sign-off involved) would have identified that an accusation of negligence is inappropriate in a public document distributed by the Reserve Bank.

Quite why the Reserve Bank’s “efforts” should affect the evaluations of the Reserve Bank that the BNZ economists (or anyone else) make is a bit of a mystery.  Many people have criticised aspects of the Bank’s communications –  or policy –  over many years, rightly or wrongly.  They are free to do so.  They are also free to suggest that the Reserve Bank might not be doing its job adequately, if it did this, that or the other thing.  Only the other day, for example, I suggested that some of their regulatory interventions looked as though they might be ultra vires.

And then what is it with the suggestion of vetting and legal sign-off on market commentaries?  A preview for the Monetary Policy Statement, isn’t exactly a prospectus for a bond issue, or an official disclosure statement, with lawyers scrutinising every line to ensure statutory responsibilities are met.  It is an opinion piece, in a field where reasonable people’s views at times differ widely, and where the Reserve Bank has no privileged knowledge about what choices will prove to be right.

The next paragraph is mostly inoffensive.

I should stress that we respect the forecasts made by market analysts and play [sic] close attention to their views in our monetary policy processes.  We do not always expect to agree on outlook or policy responses, but instead seek that differences of view are reasoned and understood.

Well, fair enough I suppose, but anyone really is free to disagree with the Reserve Bank on any grounds they like.  It simply isn’t up to the Reserve Bank –  in a free society –  to decide what sort of disagreement is acceptable and what is not.      If the BNZ puts out consistently poor commentary –  in the eyes of its management and clients –  presumably there will, over time, be a diminution in the demand for that commentary.     There is a competitive market in opinion and analysis, including that on the Reserve Bank.

And then we learn that actually the pre-MPS commentary was just the last straw for the Governor.

You will recall that my fellow Governors each met separately with [withheld –  but presumably “Stephen Toplis”] to convey their concern at the personal nature of the criticism being expressed by the BNZ.  When this failed to address the situation I met with you and passed on examples of the material.  I mentioned that the BNZ approach was damaging to the Reserve Bank and the New Zealand financial market, and the personal nature of its tone was contrary to that of the other banks.

So Grant Spencer –  head of financial stability and responsible for regulation of BNZ –  Geoff Bascand, and John McDermott each met with Toplis –  not together, but in a succession of separate meetings.  Not apparently to discuss or debate the substance of the BNZ commentaries or concerns –  many of which have, over time, been quite well justified in my view –  but to demand repentance and amendment of ways.    That is what the Governor says –  “when this failed to address the situation” , or “when the BNZ economists still refused to comment the way I wanted them to”.  And the Governor complains about a personalised tone, even though he holds a very powerful position in a system which, as he knows, puts all the Bank’s power in his hands personally.

It is all rather extraordinary –  perhaps redeemed only by the fact that the Governor actually put it in writing and thus (upsetting as it apparently is to him) eventually making it known to the public.    The BNZ’s approach has certainly been more forceful than that of most other banks,  but it simply isn’t for the Governor to tell a bank how it is allowed to review or criticise him.  Lese-majeste is an offence in Thailand, but (a) this is New Zealand, and (b) Wheeler isn’t king.   Probably no one would think it amiss if the Bank found Toplis’s tone so obnoxious that they refused to meet with him –  no one has a right to meetings with the Governor or Chief Economist –  but even then you need a thick skin in this game, and to recognise that over time scrutiny, even if not written in quite the tone you might like, has benefits (for society, and probably even for the institution).

Finally

I would like you to be aware of our serious concerns about the inappropriateness of the language used in the document and would ask that you bring it to the attention of those responsible for the editorial quality and any legal sign-off.

So twice in a single page letter, we have the heavy-handed call for censorship and references to lawyers.  It is an extraordinary demand for a public servant to make of a private business in a free society. Extraordinary, having lost all sense of perspective, and quite –  to use the Governor’s  own words –  “unacceptable” and “inappropriate”.  And the Governor works for us –  it is quite reasonable for us to hold him to account –  while the BNZ does not work for the Governor.

I’ve had various discussions with people in the last few days about quite what was going on here. I’ve had people suggesting that maybe Wheeler wasn’t really responsible, but instead it was the Bank’s Communications Department, or one of the other Governors.    Only they will know, but based on my knowledge of, and exposure to, each of those individuals that seems very unlikely.  The Comms Dept can get prickly and precious at times, but they’ll have been only too well aware of how this would backfire if it ever got out.     Graeme Wheeler is the one who has demonstrated a thin skin, a reluctance to expose himself to scrutiny, and a reluctance to engage with alternative perspectives.   I’m pretty sure this was largely Wheeler-driven –  perhaps he just got to the end of his tether as his troubled five year term finally draws to his end.  Sadly, it seems that his colleagues were too weak to either convince him that he was over-reacting, or to refuse to be an active part in his censorship efforts.  I don’t like to believe they’d have been encouraging him, but perhaps they were.

What of Healy’s response?   It is mostly a holding response, but wasn’t written until several days after the Governor’s letter was sent, so presumably his lawyers, his regulatory affairs people, his Board, and perhaps his head office in Melbourne will all have been trying to work out how best to respond.

In an ideal world, perhaps, Healy would have written back along the lines of

“Dear Governor, Thank you for your letter of 11 May.  The contents and style of our economic commentaries are matters for us to determine, not for you.  We encourage and welcome robust debate, and we would hope you do too.”

But he was writing back to the chief executive  –  and single decisionmaker – of his regulatory agency.   I should be clear that I do not read Wheeler’s letter as any sort of direct threat to BNZ itself –  comply and censor Toplis or we will withhold this or that specific regulatory approval.  Even the supine banks would probably have taken him on over anything that overt.  But the banks need Reserve Bank say-so on numerous things large and small each year (people, models, instruments etc), and they are pretty cautious about getting offside with the boss of the regulatory agency, lest other disagrements risk colouring the attitudes of the Governor when he makes regulatory decisions.

And so Healy wrote

I refer to your letter of 11 May 2017 expressing concerns about commentary in the BNZ Markets Outlook  of 8 May 2017.

I would like to acknowledge both the sentiment and concerns you have expressed in your letter and assure you that [withheld –  but presumably either “Stephen Toplis is” or “the economics team are”] treating this matter with the utmost seriousness.

We will be reviewing the contents of the BNZ Markets Outlook and the concerns expressed in your letter in detail.  Once that process is complete, I would appreciate the opportunity to have a call with you to discuss the outcomes of that review.

Please let me know if a call in the week of 29 May would be possible and I will ask my Regulatory Affairs team to arrange this.

Thank you for bringing your concerns to my attention and I look forward to hearing from you.

[UPDATE: A commenter points out that the RB doesn’t appear to have quite fully deleted the name, and what appears still be showing suggests it can’t be “Toplis”]

Pretty weak and deferential really –  and the man knows this is the regulator he is dealing with, not just someone who disagrees with the team’s commentary.  It isn’t his PA arranging the call, but his Regulatory Affairs team.

Healy, no doubt, finds himself in a difficult position.  I guess the proof of his good intentions is that Toplis is still employed, and not obviously using a different tone or analysis in his reports.  Then again, there hasn’t been another MPS since this episode.   It would be interesting to know what was said in that phone call later in May, but I suspect it would be futile for anyone to try to OIA that information.  Again, in an ideal world, BNZ would front up to the media on this attempt by the central bank to intimidate them and censor their commentary.  I  don’t suppose anyone will be holding their breath waiting for that.  But failure to front up implicitly accepts and condones this sort of conduct by the Governor, whatever they might be saying in private.

Of course, one mystery in all this is how the story got to the media.  Perhaps the BNZ themselves prompted Paul McBeth to lodge his OIA request.  If so, well done.  Presumably the Reserve Bank hierarchy didn’t want the news known, but I have heard stories that junior Reserve Bank staff were discussing the issue in Wellington bars.

In this episode, it is worth thinking briefly about the people involved.  In some respects, Stephen Toplis isn’t a person who will naturally command lots of sympathy –  highly paid economists of foreign banks, some might think, can simply fight their own battles.  And his style can be, and has been, somewhat abrasive, not just with the Reserve Bank.

And, on the other hand, Graeme Wheeler is three months from leaving office. For all the failings in his term of office –  and this is just another one –  why bother when he’ll soon be gone from public life?

It seems to me that the response on both counts is about precedents.  If powerful public officials attempt to shut down prominent economists, just think what they could do to other people.   And if Graeme Wheeler gets away with this attempt –  perhaps just having got the end of his tether –  what message does it send to other regulators, officials and politicians in our system?  Of course, others will try to keep their intimidation attempts quiet –  as no doubt Wheeler did – but if there is little downside when things do come out, they might as well just keep on exerting that improper pressure.   On this occasion it was about an almost unbelievably trivial thing –  use of the word “negligent” –  but on some occasions it will be more important things: the Muldoon attack on Len Bayliss was about serious and genuine differences of view about big picture economic policy.    Such behaviour just shouldn’t be acceptable in a free society, and the powerful need to know it.   And of course, the other reason to be concerned is that Geoff Bascand appears to have been fully involved in this, and he is widely expected to be a serious contender for Governor next year.

Very few people seem to have attempted to defend Wheeler’s behaviour –  at most a few have minimised it (“not a good look”).  But, given that fairly widespread apparent private disapproval,  what is quite disconcerting is the deafening public silence over Wheeler’s attempt to “silence” Toplis and the BNZ.    The BNZ itself hasn’t spoken out, and nor have any of the other banks or other bank economists.  I can understand how difficult it might be for some prominent individuals to take an open stand.  Then again, holding prominent positions carries with it responsibilities.  And if, say, all the banks spoke out together –  eg through the Bankers’ Association –  what could the Reserve Bank possibly do in response?

It is to the credit of Paul McBeth that he got the original OIA material and ran the story, but it was reported as straight news.   Where are other local media in deploring this attempt to limit open public debate and constrain critical review of a powerful institution?  So far, there seems to have been more interest abroad.  The story has been run on the Central Banking magazine’s website –  premier publication for central bankers, and one which has honoured the Reserve Bank in the past (central bank of the year in 2015).    I’ve spoken to one other foreign journalist who is quite stunned at the local silence (so far?) – not, it was put to me, what would have happened if an episode like this had happened in, say, the UK.

It isn’t a parliamentary sitting week, and Monday was Labour’s immigration policy day.  But not a word of protest or unease has been heard from representatives of any political party.  Of course, this isn’t a big vote-grabbing issue –  defending institutions such as freedom of speech, and the need for self-restraint by the powerful, rarely is.  Is this the worst offence in the world?  Perhaps not, but we preserve our institutions and conventions by taking a stand on even modest breaches; when people step over the mark, perhaps even without quite fully realising what they were doing.

And then of course there is the question of the Reserve Bank Board.  I know a few of the members, and they and the others look, on paper, to be people of decency who take their roles seriously.  It is difficult to believe that many of them can really be comfortable with the Governor’s attempts to intimidate the BNZ.  But if they aren’t, they have a responsibility to say so.  They don’t work for the Governor.  Their role isn’t to have the Governor’s back.  It is to act as agent for the Minister and the public, in ensuring that the Governor is doing his job, and not overstepping those marks.

Similarly, where is the Minister of Finance in all this?.  It would be a simple matter to let it be known that such behaviour is quite unacceptable in senior New Zealand public servants.  If he won’t make that clear, he leaves us wondering whether in fact the government thinks such behaviour is acceptable, or just “the way of the world” (memories of Alfred Ngaro).   That is the way the best elements of our free society are slowly but inexorably corroded.

As a final thought, I leave you with this quote

Financial markets, the business media, and other economic commentators all play a part in scrutinising and making sense of the Reserve Bank’s monetary policy choices. It is not difficult to make monetary policy choices that turn out to be wrong – indeed, in the nature of things, many will turn out to have been less than ideal. But the presence of the extensive market commentary, on every major piece of data and on OCR decisions themselves, means that if the Bank takes a position that even a significant minority of outsiders disagree with, the difference is likely to be highlighted. This not only allows for public debate and scrutiny, but also provides information that the Board themselves can (and does) use in questioning and evaluating the Governor.

It was the first thing that came up when I googled “monetary policy accountability and monitoring”.  As it happens, I wrote those words 10 year or so ago, but they are still sitting on the Reserve Bank’s website, as an official document in the “About monetary policy” section.  But after the Toplis affair, it is a little harder than it was to take it seriously as a representation of how the Reserve Bank thinks about the value of market commentary, alternative views, challenge and dissent.  If so, that would be a shame.

The Reserve Bank Act isn’t built around a philosophy of deference, but around a difficult- to-maintain balance between the huge amount of power given to the Governor, and a countervailing place for searching scrutiny –  by the Board, by the Minister, and by the public (including media and markets).    Whoever the new Governor is next year really needs to devote a lot of effort to rebuilding an open and engaging culture that welcomes, and relishes, debate and challenge.  At times, no doubt, it will be trying and frustrating, but that is how institutions in a democratic society are supposed to work.  Life for the powerful isn’t meant to be comfortable.

A BNZ economist and the powers that be

No, not Stephen Toplis.

This is a story about an earlier BNZ Chief Economist, Len Bayliss.   A commenter on my post on Graeme Wheeler’s attempt to silence Stephen Toplis reminded me of how Bayliss’s career at the BNZ ended, victim of intense pressure from the then Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Robert Muldoon, and a pusillanimous Board and management of what was then a wholly government-owned bank.

Len Bayliss was one of New Zealand’s leading, and most prominent, economists from the 1960s to the 1980s, particularly as the BNZ’s chief economist for 15 years or so.   A few years ago I did an interview about his career with him for the newsletter of the New Zealand Association of Economists.   As he records it, that interview and some follow-up questions from me prompted him to put together a volume of documents and recollections  –  Recollections: Bank of New Zealand 1981-1992  – dealing with his ouster from the BNZ and his later term as a government-appointed director of the BNZ as it descended into crisis and near-failure in the late 1980s and early 1990s.   I’m fortunate enough to have a copy.

Bayliss and Muldoon had, at one time, worked very closely together, with Bayliss having served as a member of the Advisory Group in the Prime Minister’s Department when National returned to office at the end of 1975.  A lot of financial liberalisation went on over the following couple of years, and Bayliss appears (there are conflicting accounts, but I’ve found Bayliss’s persuasive) to have played a key role in that.

Decades on, in that interview I did with him, Bayliss could still record of Muldoon

Excellent. He was the best boss I’ve ever had. Absolutely decisive. I wrote his speech for the Mansion House dinner, the most important speech he’d made after becoming PM. I gave it to him. He said send it to Treasury and see if it’s all right with them. They wrote back wanting something changed and wrote a little memo and he just put ‘No’. And he always was very proper. He may have been tough to his political opponents but as Bernard Galvin used to say, certainly in the time I was there, it was a very happy group. He never tried to force you to do anything. In a sense, he treated you just like a public servant, as a politician should treat them. He was decisive. He would argue very intelligently. Watching him at the Cabinet Economic Committee, he really tore strips off ministers who hadn’t done their homework. And I saw him several times in debates with Noel Lough [senior Treasury official]. Noel Lough was a lovely bloke but Muldoon really won the debates.

But after Bayliss’s return to the BNZ, and as New Zealand’s economic difficulties became increasingly apparent –  with Bayliss among those openly highlighting the issues – the sentiments certainly weren’t reciprocated.

The crisis began to come to a head after Bayliss was interviewed on Radio New Zealand’s Morning Report on 14 August 1981.   After a lengthy introduction, setting the scene for a discussion of the value of the exchange rate, the presenter turned to Bayliss

Bayliss:    I think we have to do a number of things.  We have to change the exchange rate, we’ve got to get our budget deficit reduced, we’ve got to get better control of the money supply and we’ve got to replace import controls by tariffs, and we’ve got to get more competition into the economy.

Reporter: Well, you’re talking about the exchange rate. You’re talking devaluation are you?

Bayliss: That would be it, yes.

The interview went on, concluding thus

Reporter:  Well, this artificially high value of our currency has been held for many years I mean its not a recent thing. You know, why do we keep on doing it?

Bayliss:  I think the reason we keep on with it is two-fold.  First of all if you just devalue and do nothing else….you get a very short-term gain and in six months’ time the rate of inflation is worse. I think the second reason is that we’ve built up a system in New Zealand where a large number of industries and sectors and firms and so on are subsidised and naturally these people fight hard to maintain their subsidies……. The New Zealand economy has had nil rates of growth for about five years and rising levels of unemployment and this is a pretty deplorable economic performance……If we are going to improve our economic performance then we have to make some pretty dramatic changes in economic policy.

The Prime Minister was not happy at all.   That shouldn’t have surprised anyone –  who likes have their approach openly criticised?  But the Prime Minister didn’t just complain to his colleagues, thump the desk, and get on with his day.  Instead, he wrote a letter to the chairman of the Board of the BNZ.  News of this letter got out  –  it took a while –  and on 15 October there was parliamentary question about it.  Answering on behalf of the Prime Minister, Jim Bolger stated

“I wrote to the Chairman of the Bank of New Zealand on 25 August 1981 expressing concern that Mr Bayliss’s comments were not only misleading and not factually based, but that they would also have an adverse effect on our international credit.  Both the management and the Chairman of the bank have told me they regretted Mr Bayliss’s comments”

Opposition MP Stan Rodger then asked

“Can this be taken as as indication that the Government is adverse to having open debate in society within the news media on economic developments and on economic factors affecting New Zealand society?”

Bolger:  “No it most certainly cannot be taken as an indication that we do not welcome public debate on issues.  The question that was posed is whether or not the issue that was being debated was being debated factually, whether it was being debated in a manner that would not be harmful to New Zealand.  As the answer was written by the Prime Minister, it was his belief that the NZ comments would affect New Zealand’s international credit.  That is something that is of some moment.”

Another Labour MP, Michael Bassett continued

“When the Prime Minister wrote to the Bank of New Zealand was it his intention to silence Mr Bayliss altogether, or was it simply to ensure that he debated the economy on terms that were agreeable to the Prime Minister?”

Bolger:  I cannot answer the question in the way it was posed because I do not know the precise intention of the Prime Minister when he wrote the letter. However, I am sure the Prime Minister will welcome debate on this issue or any other based on facts, not on any other basis.”

At the next meeting on the BNZ Board, (according to a contemporary file note) the Board apparently spent “considerable time discussing public statements on economic matters by the Chief Economist – in particular forthcoming speech to Hutt Chamber of Commerce”.    The chief executive informed Bayliss that “in future contents of any public statement on economy by Chief Economist should be such that they provoke no criticism whatsoever by Prime Minister.”

Bayliss responded (again, according to the file note) “impossible to make accurate, balanced and professional analysis of economy under such criteria –  a view which would be shared by all economists and many others. Board placing Chief Economist in impossible position –  best to cancel speech.”

To which the chief executive is recorded as responding “Can’t do that –  must make speech. Cancellation would damage image of BNZ and provoke public questioning of Board’s attitude. Only consideration must be BNZ’s public reputation.”

And so it went on in subsequent days.   Bayliss eventually informed that BNZ that under these conditions he would probably feel obliged to resign, and did so early the following year.   Both the Board of the BNZ and the Prime Minister disavowed any responsibility.

Bayliss includes in his collection of documents, a letter he received shortly after his resignation from John Stone, then the Secretary to the Treasury in Australia (and still vigorously contributing to the debate in Australia in his late 80s).  Stone wrote

“I learned yesterday of the announcement of your impending resignation from your present position with the Bank of New Zealand.  The reports which I saw of that development were naturally only of a general kind – the suggestion being that there had been some reaction from the political heights to the outspokennes and straight-speaking on the New Zealand economy which over recent years you have become well (and let me emphasise favourably) known.

“Whether or not there is truth in those kinds of speculation I naturally do not know. If there were I would think it is a sad reflection upon a country for which as you know I retain a considerable affection.

Indeed.

Graeme Wheeler was a junior Treasury official in late 1981. I wonder what he made of Muldoon’s attack on Bayliss?  Did he even imagine that one day he’d be writing to the BNZ to complain of another economist whose style and/or substance had offended him, as high public servant and powerful regulator?  Surely not.

 

 

Two sides of the same coin

When, a couple of months ago, the current National-led government announced plans to tighten immigration policy in several areas, I summed up the changes as “a modest step that ignores the big picture“.

Yesterday, the Labour Party announced the immigration policy it will campaign on.  I’d use exactly the same words to describe their proposals.  Some of the changes –  the largest ones –  seem broadly sensible, but they won’t come close to tackling the real problems with New Zealand’s immigration policy.

In some ways the biggest difference between the two parties’ approaches is that National provided us with no estimates about what impact their changes would have on numbers (and the Prime Minister apparently claimed yesterday they would,  in fact, have no impact on numbers), while Labour is touting large numerical impacts but not acknowledging that they will actually have little or no medium to long-term effect on the net inflows of non-New Zealand citizens.

In many ways, none of this should be a surprise.  The “big New Zealand” strategy, revitalised over the last 25 years, has been a bipartisan project.   On either party’s policy, it remains one.   There is really no material difference between them –  just details which, while not unimportant, don’t affect the underlying strategy.  A strategy which, to the extent it had an economic performance objective behind it (recall how MBIE used to call our immigration policy, “a critical economic enabler”), has simply failed.  There is no reason to expect anything much better if future if we keep on with the same policies.

What determines the medium-term contribution of immigration policy to population growth is the residence programme, which aims to give out around 45000 residence approvals each year.  The government cut that target a little last year.  Labour’s policy doesn’t even mention it.   At 45000 approvals, the programme is roughly three times the size, in per capita terms, of the equivalent programme is the United States (where about one million green cards are issued each year).

But what of the proposals Labour did put forward.  Their policy document is here.   It is misconceived from the first sentences where they state

Migrants bring to New Zealand the skills we need to grow our economy

Have they not seen the OECD data showing that New Zealanders are among the most highly-skilled people in the advanced world, and that –  on average –  immigrants are a bit less skilled than natives?    On the scale the New Zealand immigration programme attempts to operate at, the typical new additions to the labour force from non-citizen migration are not as highly skilled as the people who are already here, and our own young people who enter, and move up in, the workforce each year.   There are, of course, no doubt some exceptionally talented people.   But most are people from poorer countries looking for better opportunities here for themselves and their families –  typically, too, people who couldn’t get into the richer and more successful Anglo countries.  (None of this is a criticism of the migrants –  pursing the best for themselves and their families is probably what all of us seek to do too – but it is a criticism of the policy framework that enables such large inflows of not overly-skilled people.)

Mostly Labour’s policy seems to be about fixing some pretty dubious changes made to the student visa system over recent years.   In fact, three-quarters of the total numerical impact of their policy comes (on their own numbers) from student visa changes.

Labour will stop issuing student visas for courses below a bachelor’s degree which are not independently assessed by the TEC and NZQA to be of high quality.

Labour will also limit the ability to work while studying to international students studying at Bachelor-level or higher. For those below that level, their course will have to have the ability to work approved as part of the course.

Labour will limit the “Post Study Work Visa – Open” after graduating from a course of study in New Zealand to those who have studied at Bachelor-level or higher.

Mostly, those seem like a broadly sensible direction of change.   That said, I’m slightly uneasy about relying on bureaucratic agencies to decide whether courses are “high quality” –  in principle, surely the market can take care of reputational and branding issues?

And while it might look good on paper, I’m a little uneasy about the line drawn between bachelor’s degree and other lines of study.  It seems to prioritise more academic courses of study over more vocational ones, and while the former will often require a higher level of skill, the potential for the system to be gamed, and for smart tertiary operators to further degrade some of the quality of their (very numerous) bachelor’s degree offerings can’t be ignored.  In the student visa data we already see some slightly suspicious signs (bottom right chart) of switching from PTEs to universities  I’d probably have been happier if the right to work while studying had been withdrawn, or more tightly limited, for all courses.   And if open post-study work visas had been restricted to those completing post-graduate qualifications.

Selling education to foreign students is an export industry, and tighter rules will (on Labour’s own numbers) mean a reduction in the total sales of that industry.   Does that bother me?  No, not really.  When you subsidise an activity you tend to get more of it.  We saw that with subsidies to manufacturing exporters in the 1970s and 80s, and with subsidies to farmers at around the same time.  We see it with film subsidies today.  Export incentives simply distort the economy, and leave us with lower levels of productivity, and wealth/income, than we would otherwise have.   In export education, we haven’t been giving out government cash with the export sales, but the work rights (during study and post-study) and the preferential access to points in applying for residence are subsidies nonetheless.  If the industry can stand on its own feet, with good quality educational offerings pitched at a price the market can stand, then good luck to it.  If not, we shouldn’t be wanting it here any more than we want car assembly plants or TV manufacturing operations here.

Labour estimates that their changes to student visas and post-work study visas will reduce numbers by around 17000, roughly evenly split between the two classes of changes.  But what they don’t tell you is that these will be one-off reductions in the total number of people here on those visas.    Since the number of people who settle here permanently is determined by the residence approvals programme, and that hasn’t changed, the changes Labour is promising around student visas –  while broadly sensible –  while make a difference to the net migration flow in the first year they are implemented (the transition to the lower stock level) and none at all thereafter.   They might change, a little, who ends up with a residence visa, but not how many are issued.  If you favour high levels of non-citizen immigration but just want the “rorts” tidied up, it makes quite a lot of sense.

The changes Labour proposes to work visas are also something of a mixed bag.  They are promising (but with few/no specifics) to make it harder for people to get work visas

Since 2011/12, the number of low-skill (ANZSCO 4 and 5) work visas issued has surged from 14,000 to 22,000. For example, the number of “retail supervisor” work visas has increased from 700 to 1,700. Labour will work with firms to train New Zealanders to fill skills gaps so we don’t have to permanently rely on immigration. A developed nation should be able to train enough retail staff to meet its own needs. Immigration should be a stop-gap to meet skills shortages, not a permanent crutch.

Labour will make changes that preserve and enhance the ability of businesses to get skilled workers to fill real skills gaps but which prevent the abuses of the system that currently happen.

The broad direction seems sensible enough –  after all, the official rhetoric about the gains from immigration relate to really highly-skilled people, but what does it mean specifically?

And I get much more wary about proposals to move to a more regional approach (on top of the additional points for regional jobs the government introduced last year, thus further reducing the skill level of the average migrant).  This is what they say:

Currently, few skill shortages are regionalised. This makes it hard for a region with a skills shortage in a specific occupation to get on the list if the shortage is not nationwide. Importantly it means that work visas are issued for jobs in regions where there is not actually a shortage which puts unnecessary pressures on housing and transport infrastructure there.

Labour’s regionalised system will work with local councils, unions and business to determine where shortages exist and will require that skilled immigrants work in the region that their visa is issued for. This will prevent skills shortages in one region being used to justify work visas in another, while also making it easier for regions with specific needs to have those skills shortages met.

Where skills shortages are identified, Labour will develop training plans with Industry Training Organisations so that the need for skilled workers is met domestically in the long-term. We will invest in training through Dole for Apprenticeships and Three Years Fees Free policies.

Frankly, it seems like a bureaucrat’s paradise, and just the thing for influential business groups that get the ear of some local council or other.  It is hard enough to ensure that local authorities operate in the interests of their people, without setting up more incentives that will allow local authorities to be used to pursue the interests of one particular class of voters.

More generally, it is an approach that suggests no confidence at all in market mechanisms to deal with incipient labour market pressures.  There is no suggestion in the document, at all, that higher wages might be a natural adjustment mechanism, whether to deal with increased demand in a particular region or for a particular set of skills.  Even the Prime Minister was running that line recently  –  and he isn’t from the party supported by the union movement.

Again, changes to reduce the number of work visas granted to people for fairly low-skilled occupations aren’t a bad thing, but they won’t make any difference to the average net inflow of non New Zealanders beyond the initial (quite small) one-off level adjustment.     And there is no willingness to rely on market mechanisms –  eg set a (say) $15000 per annum fee, and allow limited work visas for jobs where the employer is willing to pay the taxpayer that additional price.

There were two other initiatives in the package.  The first was the proposed new Exceptional Skills visa.

Labour will introduce an Exceptional Skills Visa. This visa will enable people with exceptional skills and talents that will enrich New Zealand society — not just its economy — to gain residency here. 

It will be available to people who can show they are in an occupation on the long-terms skills list and have significant experience or qualifications beyond that required (for example, experienced paediatric oncologist) or are internationally renowned for their skills or talents. Successful applicants will avoid the usual points system requirements for a Skilled Migrant Category visa and would be able to bring their partner and children within the visa. This visa will help grow high-tech new industries, meet the increasingly complex needs of the 21st Century and enrich our society. Exceptional Skills Visas for up to 1,000 people, including partners and children, will be offered every year

When I first saw reference to this I was quite encouraged.  And if it makes a little easier for people who are genuinely highly-skilled to get first claim on those 45000 residence approvals each year, then I don’t have any problem with it.   But it isn’t exactly the American exceptional ability visa, and we need to be realistic about New Zealand’s relative attractiveness (or lack of it) to people with really exceptional talents.   The suggestion that the programme will “help growth high-tech new industries, meet the increasingly complex needs of the 21st century” is probably little more than late 20th century vapourware.

As for the proposed KiwiBuild visas, I suppose they were politically necessary. You leave yourself open if you campaign on both big reductions in migrant numbers, and massive increases in house-building, if you don’t prioritise construction workers.  In fact, of course, this programme makes a one-off reduction in the number of people here –  reductions concentrated in the population group that probably has the least housing needs..  None of the medium-term pressures will have been eased at all, even if some dodgy rules around students do end tightened.

In passing, I was also interested in this comment

We will investigate ways to ensure that the Pacific Access Quota and Samoan Quota which are currently underutilised are fully met.

I guess there are really large numbers of Pacific voters in Labour’s South Auckland heartland.    These Pacific quotas, again, lower the average skill level of those we given residence approval too (since people only come in on those quotas if they can’t qualify otherwise, all within the 45000 approvals per annum total).  I imagine, too, that the Australian High Commission will have taken note of that line.

Overall, some interesting steps, some of which are genuinely in the right direction.  But, like the government, Labour is still in the thrall of the “big New Zealand” mentality, and its immigration policy –  like the government’s – remain this generation’s version of Think Big.  And it is just as damaging.    The policy doesn’t face up to the symptoms of our longer-term economic underperformance –  the feeble productivity growth, the persistently high real interest and exchange rates, the failure to see market-led exports growing as a share of GDP, and the constraints of extreme distance.  None of those suggest it makes any sense to keep running one here of the large non-citizen immigration programmes anywhere in the world, pulling in lots of new people year after year, even as decade after decade we drift slowly further behind other advanced countries, and se the opportunities for our own very able people deteriorate.

But that is Labour’s policy.  And that is National’s policy.

For anyone interested, the Law and Economics Association is hosting a seminar on immigration policy and economic performance on Monday evening 26 June.   Eric Crampton of the New Zealand Initiative and I will be speaking.  Details are here.

UPDATE: Here is what I said to Radio New Zealand yesterday afternoon on immigration, in a reasonably extended interview, partly on Labour’s announcement, but mostly on the more general issues.

An astonishing illustration of unfitness for public office

I wasn’t planning to write anything today, but I was flicking through the NBR website when I found a story that both shocks and appals me.  I suggest reading it first, before reading my take on it.

After my experiences with the Reserve Bank over the last couple of years, I thought I was beyond the possibility of being shocked by the Governor.  Clearly, naive optimist that I must really be, I was wrong.

Somehow the media got hold of a story that Graeme Wheeler had lodged an official protest with BNZ over something their head of economics, Stephen Toplis, had written.  So an Official Information Act request was lodged and the Bank has apparently responded by releasing both Wheeler’s letter to BNZ chief executive Anthony Healy and Healy’s response.  The Bank hasn’t put those documents with the other OIA releases on their website, so I have asked for a copy.

I should add that Toplis is not some close friend of mine.  I always find his commentaries stimulating, but we usually disagree on the substance of monetary policy.  In fact, when I was in the gun from the Governor last year, Toplis was sending the Bank snarky comments about me (that he no doubt didn’t expect to be published).  But no one should be treated, by a top public servant, the way he has now been treated by Graeme Wheeler.

What is Wheeler’s complaint?    Apparently, he was upset with the preview of the latest Monetary Policy Statement that Toplis had written.

Mr Wheeler, who is to step down as governor on September 26, wrote to Mr Healy on May 11, the day the MPS was released, saying a preview written by BNZ head of research Stephen Toplis called into question the Reserve Bank’s integrity by saying it would be “negligent” not to admit it had a tightening bias, expressed “through an explicit expression of rate increase(s) in its published OCR track.” 

For some context, here is what Toplis actually wrote

So why do we think the RBNZ will sit pat this week? Simply because it said it would. When it released its March OCR review, the Bank reaffirmed that not only did it expect interest rates to stay where they were for the foreseeable future but it went on to reiterate that it thought there was equal chance that the next move could be a cut as a hike. To hike this week would leave the Bank with egg splattered all over its face, a prospect it couldn’t abide.

But surely, at the very least, the Bank will be forced to admit that it now has a tightening bias? Equally, it would be negligent not to express this through an explicit expression of rate increase(s) in its published OCR track. The biggest questions should revolve around how early the Bank is prepared to poke in a first rate increase and how quickly (if at all) rates rise thereafter.

Toplis seemed to be trying to strike a middle path.   Hawks, he argued, would be foolish to think Wheeler would raise the OCR in May, whatever they thought the data showed.  And doves who might expect a flat (OCR) track forever were also likely to be mistaken.    In Toplis’s view –  given the data he had seen –  it would be “negligent” of the Bank not to show some rate increases in the published OCR track.

And, as it happens, the Bank largely agreed.  The actual OCR track released in the May MPS wasn’t  anywhere near aggressive enough for BNZ’s liking  (I agreed with the Bank this time), but it did show some increases in the OCR eventually.    Presumably they thought it would be wrong –  inconsistent with their obligations under the PTA – not to have done so.

So quite what was the Governor’s problem?

Monetary policy is one of those areas of considerable uncertainty.  Reasonable people can and will differ quite materially on what the best approach is.  But the power –  very considerable power over the way the economy develops in the short to medium term –  is vested only in the Reserve Bank.  More specifically, it is vested in a single individual, the Governor.  It is one of the unfortunate aspects of the single decisionmaker model that any criticism of the Bank’s decisions is inevitably a criticism of an individual’s actions/choices.   For a thick-skinned and self-confident individual on the receiving end, that just shouldn’t be a problem.  After all, the Governor took on the job voluntarily, knowing that he would be making key decisions in an area where (a) almost inevitably there would be mistakes (almost the nature of uncertainty) and (b) where he would subject to a lot of scrutiny from smart people, in political and economic spheres, here and abroad.  He gets paid a great deal of money (by New Zealand public sector standards)  to make the decisions and be accountable for them.   A self-confident Governor might either (a) let disagreements wash over him, or (b) pick up the phone and invite the critic in for coffee and an open exchange of views.   But Wheeler is notoriously thin-skinned –  and unwilling to engage.

Here is how NBR continued the story

Mr Wheeler’s letter describes a back story, suggesting he reached out to Mr Healy after failing to bring Mr Toplis to heel. It says Mr Wheeler’s deputy governors had individually approached someone (the name is redacted) “to convey their concern at the personal nature of the criticism being expressed by the BNZ in its written publications.”

“When this failed to address the situation I met with you and passed on examples of the material,” Wheeler wrote. “I mentioned that the BNZ approach was damaging to the Reserve Bank and the New Zealand financial market, and the personal nature of its tone was contrary to that of other banks.”

Clearly, Wheeler’s concern was more than just the particular pre-MPS commentary.  And certainly, more than most other bank economists, Toplis is willing to quite openly disagree with the Governor and the Bank, sometimes with a vigorous style.   But there is nothing “personal” in that preview, and even if there were, the Governor personally exercises the power.

Personally, I wish there were more like Toplis willing to openly question and challenge the Bank.  The Bank –  the Governor –  after all wields huge power, not just in monetary policy but in regulatory matters, with rather little effective accountability.  Banks in particular are very reluctant to openly call out the Reserve Bank –  journalists have told me how difficult it is to get anyone to go on the record.

What bothers the Governor?   Apparently, he thinks the Reserve Bank is damaged by criticism.   It isn’t clear how or why, unless the Bank is operating in a way that leads people who read the criticism, and think about it, to conclude “yes, that’s right”.  High-performing organisation shouldn’t need to worry about criticisms,  And insular, low-performing organisations, need the criticism –  and need to be willing to learn from it.   Even more important, when it is a troubled public sector organisation,  the public need the criticised body to learn from and respond constructively to criticism by lifting its game.

Perhaps even more oddly, the Governor thinks that Toplis’s commentary is “damaging the New Zealand financial market”.  Who knows what he means by that?    There is a competitive market in commentary.   If Toplis’s criticism are wrong (on average over time) presumably that reflects badly on Toplis and the BNZ.  If they right, perhaps it reflects badly on the Governor himself, but that doesn’t harm the New Zealand markets or economy.  People having less faith in the Governor might, in principle, be a bad thing, but not if the criticisms are well-founded.  And if they aren’t well-founded, the sort of observers who matter will go elsewhere for their commentary.

Wheeler clearly doesn’t see it that way

In his letter to Mr Healy, Mr Wheeler said it was “unacceptable” to question the Reserve Bank’s integrity while “fundamentally misrepresenting” how it sets monetary policy.

“I would also expect that the editorial quality assurance process (and any legal sign-off involved) would have identified that an accusation of negligence is inappropriate in a public document distributed by BNZ.”

 

Perhaps there is something in the Governor’s concern that I’m missing, but nothing in that quote above from the MPS preview questions the Bank’s integrity.  It sets out some hypotheticals, and suggests the Reserve Bank would be not doing its job –  “negligent”  –  if it didn’t do something Toplis favoured.    But it did do it –  there were rate hikes put into the OCR forward track.  And even if the Bank has disagreed altogether –  and run with a dead flat OCR track –  the BNZ claim was “negligence”, it wasn’t a comment on integrity at all.   When people suggest the Reserve Bank isn’t running monetary policy well, that is a judgement on their competence or their diligence (or just a disagreement about the data), but it isn’t a reflection on anyone’s integrity.  It is disconcerting that the Governor doesn’t seem able to tell the difference.  Nor, apparently, were the Bank’s Deputy and Assistant Governors.

The whole thing is extraordinary.  I’ve never worked in a bank economics team, but I’ve never supposed that they had their daily or weekly economics commentaries signed off by in-house lawyers (or indeed by anyone much).   It is chilling to have the Governor of the Reserve Bank writing to the chief executive of a major bank in effect urging such tight control.   What is it, one can only wonder, that the Governor is afraid of?   And isn’t this, after all, the Governor who regularly claims that the Bank is highly accountable, partly because of the scrutiny financial market participants and commentators provide?

All this would be quite bad enough if the Reserve Bank was simply a monetary policy body.  Some central banks are.   Such central banks influence the economy and the rate of inflation, but have little or no direct regulatory influence over private financial institutions.  Access might still be valuable, but the central bank just doesn’t have that much leverage.  Nor should it.

But that isn’t the model in New Zealand.  Here, the Reserve Bank –  the Governor personally –  not only sets monetary policy, and sets prudential policy, but is also responsible for a wide range of detailed regulatory approvals that banks and financial institutions need to keep operating in this market.  Mr Healy himself will have needed the Governor’s approval to take up his current position.  So will all his direct reports.  And approval of individuals is just the least of it.   That is a huge amount of power, and all vested in one person.  In this case, it appears, an extremely thin-skinned and reactive one.

Banks are typically pretty scared of the regulator –  whether here or abroad –  and unwilling to take them on over regulatory matters.  That is bad enough.    What is worse is when the Governor of the Reserve Bank openly –  directly and through his deputies –  attempts to coerce banks to just keep quiet, to say only stuff that the Reserve Bank likes to be said.  We might expect that in Singapore, Russia, or other semi-authoritarian states.  We shouldn’t tolerate it in a free and democratic society, governed by the rule of law not the whims of powerful men, like New Zealand.   It would be bad enough from an elected politician –  and I’m sure it goes on there to some extent (we saw recently the Alfred Ngaro comments) –  but it is far far worse in an unelected, and exceptionally powerful, public servant.

As far as we can tell, the BNZ hasn’t been cowed by Wheeler’s approach.   Perhaps they just think “there he goes again, and thank goodness he’ll be gone in another three months or so”.  But even if they aren’t (this time), it is a chilling example that people in other organisations will take note of.  Some of them will be more cautious, more risk averse, and the message will go down “be careful what you say; don’t upset the central bank”.  We’ll be poorer for it.  And actually, over time, the quality of our Reserve Bank would be poorer for it to, if the extent of robust scrutiny of this powerful institution was even less than it is now.

The fault here is clearly primarily with Graeme Wheeler, who reveals himself to be manifestly unfit to hold his current high office.   But there are other people who need to take some responsibility:

  • where, for example, in all this were Grant Spencer, Geoff Bascand, and John McDermott, the deputy and assistant governors.   Wheeler has tried to tell us that that group makes all the Bank’s major decisions collectively, whatever the legal position.  The NBR article implies that they too were making calls to the BNZ to get pressure put on Toplis to alter his commentary.  Were any of them willing to stand up to Wheeler and tell him that he appeared to have lost all sense of perspective, and that if he went ahead with these actions it would only leave him and the Bank looking worse (even before this OIA, I gather the story was pretty widely known)?  If not, why not?  If not, why we would we suppose that any of them was fit to hold the office of Governor –  Spencer will be acting for six months, and Bascand is widely expected to be a leading contender for the permanent role?   Do any of them know what is, and isn’t fit behaviour for a regulator?  You would hope so given that Spencer is now Head of Financial Stability, and Bascand will assume that role in September.
  • where is the Bank’s Board in all this?  They exist to monitor the performance of the Governor, and the chair has often seen his role as a bit of a confidential sounding board for the Governor.  They were totally supine over the OCR leak last year, backing the Governor to the hilt?   Will it be different this time –  when the Annual Report comes out in a few months?  If not, how could we possibly consider that these individuals are fit to take the lead responsibility for choosing a new Governor?
  • What does the Minister of Finance make of this?   He appoints, and can dismiss, the Governor. I hope some journalists are willing to ask hard questions of the Minister, and not allow themselves to be fobbed off, about whether this sort of conduct is acceptable from a New Zealand public servant?
  • And what of the Finance and Expenditure Committee?  Are they willing to call Wheeler before them to answer openly for his conduct in this matter?  If not, what use are they to citizens?

I noticed that one commenter on the NBR article observed that if this is what Wheeler made of Toplis’s comments

“This is insane. Can you ask for Wheeler’s correspondence with Michael Reddell?”

There is no such correspondence.    The difference is that Graeme Wheeler has no leverage over me.   Stephen Toplis, by contrast, works for a bank over which the Reserve Bank has extensive regulatory clout.   It shouldn’t make a difference –  views are views and should stand or fall on their own merits –  but in Graeme Wheeler’s Reserve Bank, sadly, it appears to.  That is simply unacceptable.

He might only have three months left in office, but it is now three months too long.  The words of Oliver Cromwell to the Rump Parliament –  or Leo Amery to Neville Chamberlain in May 1940 –  come to mind

You have sat too long for any good you have been doing lately … Depart, I say; and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!

 

 

 

Advertising for a Governor

I was settling in for an afternoon of watching the gripping UK election results, when someone sent me a copy of a job advert that had appeared in Australia this morning.  The advert was for the job of Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.  (It is also on the Reserve Bank’s website.)

It seems pretty extraordinary for the Reserve Bank’s Board to be proceeding with this process now.  They were just getting underway with the search late last year, seemingly oblivious to the election, when the Minister of Finance told them to stop, and to nominate someone as an acting Governor.   One of the conventions under which our system of government operates is that major appointments are not made close to an election.   As the Minister of Finance noted, in announcing the acting Governor appointment

This will give the next Government time to make a decision on the appointment of a permanent Governor for the next five year term.

Since then we’ve learned that the current government has commissioned a report on possible statutory changes to the governance of the Bank.  And the main oppositions parties have also confirmed that they favour changes, both to the governance and to the mandate of the Reserve Bank.  Who knows which side will win, and what changes they would each make if they did.

But, clearly champing at the bit, the Board is already out with its advert.  In fact, applications close on 8 July, which is a whole 10 or 11 weeks before the election.   So the people who are brave or ambitious enough to apply actually have relatively little idea what they will be applying for.  Will they be the single decisionmaker –  a key dimension of the current model/job –  or not?  And even if not, will they just be presiding over a group of people they appoint, or something more Bank of England-like.  Will they be charged with low unemployment or not?  And so on.

Of course recruitment processes take time.  But with an acting Governor appointed through to late March next year, it isn’t obvious why the Board couldn’t have put their advert out in late August, looking for applications or expressions of interest by the end of September.   At least people considering applying might have a bit more a sense of quite what the role, as one part of overall New Zealand economic and financial management, might be.

The Board holds the whip-hand in the appointment process.  The Minister of Finance can only appoint as Governor someone the Board has recommended (a candidate the Board proposes can be rejected, but then it is up to the Board to find another candidate).    That is a very unusual model.  In most advanced countries, the Governor is appointed directly by the Minister of Finance or the Cabinet.  They can take advice from anyone they like, but aren’t bound by any recommendations.  It is the way things work in Australia and the United Kingdom for example.  In the US, the President nominates, and the Senate confirms (or not).  In those countries, such mechanisms provide a high level of democratic control over an appointment which is hugely influential, over the short to medium term performance of the economy, and over the financial system.  In New Zealand, the Governor is even more powerful –  single legal decisionmaker –  but there is very little democratic control over who wields that power.   (The situation is even worse here if the government changes –  the current Board were all appointed by the current government, and on average will tend to reflect that government’s interests/preferences/biases).

And so I’ve argued that the Opposition should quite simply state that one of the first pieces of legislation they would pass would be a short amendment to the Reserve Bank Act to remove the formal role of the Board in the process of appointing a Governor.  It might be hard for them to do so –  it could look like a power grab –  but when our model is so out of line with international practice,  any competent Opposition should easily be able to make the case.  Promise to consult and take advice, for sure, but we should ensure that the elected Minister of Finance (and Cabinet) can do as their overseas peers can, and appoint as Governor someone in whom they have full confidence, not just someone the company directors appointed by the previous government wheel up.

What about substance of the Board’s advert?   No doubt a person who fitted the profile might well be a good Governor, but there is a “walk on water” feel to it.  Perhaps that isn’t uncommon with job adverts.   What are they after?

  • The ideal candidate will be a person of outstanding intellectual ability,
  • who is a leader in the national and international financial community.
  • The person will have substantial and proven organisational leadership skills in a high-performing entity,
  • a proven ability to manage governance relationships,
  • a sound understanding of public policy decision-making regimes, and
  • the ability to make decisions in the context of complex and sensitive environments.
  • Personal style will be consistent with the national importance and gravitas of the role.
  • The successful candidate will also demonstrate an appreciation of the significance of the Bank’s independence and the behaviours required for ensuring long-term sustainability of that independence.

It is hard to argue too much with any of the individual items, although if I did I might wonder about:

  • the emphasis on “outstanding intellectual ability”, but no mention at all of character or judgement.  In tough times, and crises –  a big part of what we have a Reserve Bank for –  the latter seem likely to be more important than the former.
  • they have clearly chosen to emphasise financial experience/standing rather than policy experience.  It isn’t clear why an ideal candidate for this role –  a New Zealand public policy and communications role –  really would be a “leader in the international financial community”.   That was, after all, what they thought they were getting last time.
  • The explicit comment about personal style and gravitas was interesting.   Are they suggesting that the new Governor might be more open to scrutiny and debate?  If so, that would be welcome.

I was inclined to agree with the comment made by the person who sent me the advert that it wasn’t clear that any of the various names mentioned as potential candidates really fitted this description.  Geoff Bascand, for example, would get a significant mark against him if they really want “a leader in the national and international financial community”.  There would be other marks against Adrian Orr, David Archer, Murray Sherwin.  Perhaps they are, after all, looking for an experienced banker?  One thing that is striking is that there is nothing in the profile stressing knowledge of, understanding of, or relationships in, the New Zealand economy or financial system.  That looks like quite a gap –  and I reiterate my view that an overseas appointment, of a non New Zealander, would be untenable especially while the single decisionmaker system remains.

The final item on the profile list was particularly interesting.

The successful candidate will also demonstrate an appreciation of the significance of the Bank’s independence and the behaviours required for ensuring long-term sustainability of that independence.

It sparked my interest on several counts:

  • first, I’ve never seen wording like it previously in an advert for the Governor’s position,
  • second, it sounds really quite embattled as if the Board think that the Bank’s independence might soon be under threat, but
  • third, and most importantly, just how appropriate is this?  Parliament decides how independent or otherwise, in some or all areas of its responsibility, and it is the role of the Governor, and the Board for that matter, to work within the parameters that Parliament lays down. It isn’t the role of the Board to be seeking a chief executive who will advocate for a particular model of how the Bank should be run.   After all, even if everyone agreed (as most do) that the Bank should have operational independence around monetary policy, and on the detailed implementation of prudential policy, there is a lot of room in between, where views and international practices differ.   Should fx intervention be decided by the Governor?  In some countries it is, and others not.  Should regulatory policy  parameters (eg DTI limits) be set by the Governor, or the Bank, or by the Minister?  Again, practices differ, and so can reasonable people.    It is quite inappropriate for the Board to looking to employ someone to defend all the powers Parliament happens for the time being to have assigned to the Bank.
  • we should also be a little cautious about that wording “the behaviours required for ensuring the long-term sustainability of that independence”.  Not only can the Governor or the Board not “ensure” that independence at all, but a variety of different types of behaviour –  not all desirable –  can be deployed contribute to that end.  Not making life difficult for the Minister (of whichever party) is a well-known bureaucratic survival strategy. It won’t necessarily be the behaviour that would in the wider public interest.    At the (perhaps absurd) extreme –  but it is an FBI day today –  J Edgar Hoover sustained his independence for the long-term in ways that were highly unseemly and not generally regarded as in the public interest.

Perhaps they just worded the advert badly, but it does rather betray a sense of a group of people who really aren’t suited for the role they’ve been given.  They might be okay at monitoring the routine performance of the Governor.  But you shouldn’t have control of the appointment to such a very powerful position in such hands at all –  and, even while it is, they should have delayed this process rather than rushing so far ahead before the looming election.

 

UPDATE:  For future reference (since the advert will be taken down when applications close) this is the advert

Governor

Close date:     08/07/2017 08:00
Office location:  Wellington

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (“the Bank”) is New Zealand’s central bank. It is responsible for monetary policy, promoting financial stability and issuing New Zealand’s currency. The current Governor is stepping down at the end of his term in 2017 and, accordingly, the Board is now seeking candidates to fill this vital and unique leadership role in the New Zealand economy. The Governor is appointed by the Minister of Finance on the recommendation of the Board.

The Governor is the Chief Executive of the Bank and a member of the Bank’s Board of Directors, and has the duty to ensure the Bank carries out the functions conferred on it by statutes, including The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989. 

KEY RESPONSIBILITIES

The Governor is responsible for the strategic direction of the Bank and for ensuring that strategy is consistent with the Bank’s key accountabilities in relation to: price stability, the soundness and efficiency of the financial system (including prudential regulation and oversight, supervision of banks, non-bank deposit-takers and insurance companies, and anti-money laundering), the supply of currency, and the operation of payment and settlement systems. As Chief Executive, the Governor is required to lead a high-performance culture and ensure that the Bank operates effectively and efficiently across its wide range of policy, operational and communication functions.

CANDIDATE PROFILE

The ideal candidate will be a person of outstanding intellectual ability, who is a leader in the national and international financial community. The person will have substantial and proven organisational leadership skills in a high-performing entity, a proven ability to manage governance relationships, a sound understanding of public policy decision-making regimes, and the ability to make decisions in the context of complex and sensitive environments. Personal style will be consistent with the national importance and gravitas of the role. The successful candidate will also demonstrate an appreciation of the significance of the Bank’s independence and the behaviours required for ensuring long-term sustainability of that independence.

The role is based in New Zealand’s capital city, Wellington. Remuneration is commensurate with the seniority of the role and the New Zealand public sector.

Interested candidates may phone Carrie Hobson or Stephen Leavy for a confidential discussion on +64 9 379 2224, or forward a current CV to Lina Vanifatova before 8 July 2017 at lina@hobsonleavy.com

 

 

Bank capital: some thoughts

Six months or so ago the Reserve Bank announced that it would be conducting a review of capital requirements for banks.  At the start of last month, they released an Issues Paper, inviting submissions by today (rather a short period of time, for an issue which has major implications for banks’ financing structures and, potentially, costs).   I’m not going to make a formal submission, but thought I might outline a few thoughts on some of the issues that are raised in (or omitted from) the paper.

I’d also note that it is a curious time to be undertaking the review.  Background work and supporting analysis is always welcome, but here is how the Reserve Bank summarises things.

Detailed consultation documents on policy proposals and options for each of the three components will be released later in 2017, with a view to concluding the review by the first quarter of 2018.

But the Reserve Bank is now well into a lame-duck phase.  Graeme Wheeler –  currently the sole formal decisionmaker at the Bank –  leaves office on 26 September, and then we have an acting Governor (lawfully or not) for six months.  Spencer’s temporary appointment expires (and he leaves the Bank) on 26 March 2018, which is presumably when a new permanent Governor will be expected to take office.   The incentives look all wrong for getting good decisions made, for which the decisionmakers will be able to be held accountable.     Big decisions in this area –  and the Bank is raising the possibility of big increases in capital requirements –  are something the new Governor should be fully coomfortable with (and, especially if an outsider is appointed, that shouldn’t just mean some pro forma tick granted in his or her first days in office.)    We have constitutional conventions limiting what governments can do immediately prior to elections.  It isn’t obvious why something similar shouldn’t govern the way unelected decisionmakers behave in lame-duck, or explicitly caretaker, periods.  Some decisions simply have to be made and can’t wait.   These sorts of ones aren’t in that category.

(In passing, and still on capital, I’d also note that there is something that seems not quite right about the Reserve Bank’s refusal to comment on why a couple of Kiwibank instruments have not been allowed to count as capital.   The capital rules should be clear and transparent.  The terms of the relevant instruments are also presumably not secret.  Perhaps Kiwibank has been told why their instruments missed out, but it seems unsatisfactory that everyone else is left guessing, or reliant on things like the deductions and speculations of an academic who was once a regulatory policy adviser (eg here and here).    I have no particular reason to question the Reserve Bank’s substantive decision, but these are matters of more than just private interest.  It is an old line, but no less true, that in matters where government agencies are exercising discretion sunlight is the best disinfectant.)

High levels of bank capital appeal to government officials.   To the extent that more of a bank’s assets are funded by shareholders rather than depositors then, all else equal, the less chance of a bank failing.  And if avoiding bank failure itself isn’t a public policy interest –  after all the Reserve Bank regularly reminds us that the supervisory regime isn’t supposed to produce zero failures –  minimising the cost of government bailouts is.   There might be various ways to do that –  the Open Bank Resolution model is designed to be one, but high levels of capital are another.

High levels of capital should also appeal to depositors and other creditors.  Your chances of getting your money back in full are increased the more the bank’s assets are funded by shareholdes, who bear the losses until their capital is exhausted.   Of course, that argument is weakened if you think that the government will bail out anyway, but that is just another reason for governments to err towards high levels of capital.

Capital typically costs more than deposits (or wholesale debt funding).  That isn’t surprising –  the shareholders are taking on more risk.  But, of course, the larger the share of equity funding then the lower the level of risk per unit of equity.  In principle, higher capital requirements lower the cost of capital.  Very low capital levels should tend to raise the cost of debt (debt-holders recognise an increased chance that they will be the ones who bear any losses).  Modigliani and Miller posited that, on certain assumptions, the value of a firm was unaffected by its financing structure –  to the extent that is true, higher capital requirements don’t affect the economics of (in this case) banking.

It won’t hold in some circumstances.  For example, if creditors are all sure a government will bail them out, a bank is much more profitable the lower the capital it can get away with.  In the presence of that sort of perceived or actual bailout risk, there is little doubt that increasing capital requirements is a real cost to the banks.  But it is almost certainly worth doing: it helps ensure that the risks are borne by the people responsible for the decisions of the bank (shareholders, and their representatives –  directors and management).

Taxes also complicate things.  If the tax system has an entrenched bias in favour of debt, then increased capital requirements will also represent a real cost to the banking system.  Many –  most –  tax systems do have such a bias.  For domestic shareholders, and to a first approximation, neither our tax system nor that of Australia have that bias.  That is because of the system of dividend imputation, which is designed to avoid the double-taxation of business profits (returns to equity).    Unfortunately, there is no mutual recognition of trans-Tasman imputation credits, and most of our banking system is made up of Australian banks with (mostly) Australian shareholders.   For most, but not all, of our banks increasing capital requirements is likely to represent some increase in effective cost.  And the resulting revenue gains are mostly likely to be collected by the Australian Tax Office.

An open question –  and one not really touched on in the Bank’s issues paper –  is to what extent our bank regulators should take account of these features of the tax system.  For most companies, capital structure is a choice shareholders and management make, weighing all the costs, benefits, opportunities and distortions themselves.  But in banking, for better or worse, regulators decide how much capital banks have to raise to support any given set of assets.   One could argue that tax is simply someone else’s problem:  if higher required capital ratios increased costs, the Australian banks could simply redouble their lobbying efforts in Canberra to get mutual recognition of imputation credits, and if that didn’t work, there would simply be a competitiveness advantage to New Zealand banks.   Perhaps that solution looks good on paper, but I think it is less compelling than it might seem. First, banks can and do lobby here too.  The Reserve Bank might get to set capital ratios at present, but that law could be changed.  And second, we benefit from having foreign banks, with risks spread across more than one economy.

Even if all the tax issues could be eliminated here –  and they won’t be in time for this review, if ever –  there is still the possibility that the market will trade on the basis that additional capital requirements will increase overall funding costs for banks, even if there is little rational long-term reason for them to do so.   One reason that problem could exist is because the tax biases are pervasive globally, and it is therefore a reasonable rule of thumb for investors to treat higher capital requirements as an expected cost.

Over the years, I’ve tended to have a bias towards higher capital requirements.  I’ve read and imbibed Admati’s book (for example).  As recently as late last year I wrote here

My own, provisional, view is that for banks operating in New Zealand somewhat higher capital requirements would probably be beneficial, and that there would be few or no welfare costs involved in imposing such a standard.  My focus is not on avoiding the possible wider economic costs of banking crises (which I think are typically modest –  if there are major issues, they are about the misallocation of capital in booms), but on minimising the expected fiscal cost of government bailouts.  As I’ve explained previously, I do not think the OBR tool is a credible or time-consistent policy.

But I have been rethinking that position to some extent.   The Reserve Bank talks in its Issues Paper of the possibility of an “optimal” capital ratio (from the academic literature) of perhaps 14 per cent (with estimates that range even higher), well above the minimum ratios that are in place today.

But if there are additional costs from raising capital requirements –  which seems likely, at least to an extent –  we need some pretty hard-headed assessments of the real gains that might accrue to society as a whole to warrant those increased costs.  And those gains are hard to find:

  • for over 100 years our banking system has been impressively stable.  If that was in jeopardy in the late 1980s, that was in unrepeatable circumstances in which a huge range of controls had been removed in short order (and when there were no effective minimum capital requirements at all).
  • repeated stress tests, whether by the Reserve Bank, APRA, or the IMF all struggle to generate credible extreme scenarios in which the health of an indvidual bank, let alone the system, could be seriously impaired.  In most of those scenarios, the existing stock of capital hasn’t been impaired at all, let alone being at risk of being exhausted.
  • we have a banking system where most of the main players are owned by major larger overseas banking groups with a strong interest in the survival of the domestic operation, and the ability to provide any required capital support (the New Zealand regulated entities aren’t widely-held listed companies).

I’m still not sure what to make of the role of the OBR mechanism.  As I noted earlier, I’ve never been convinced that it is a credible or time-consistent option, but our officials appear to, and even ministers talk up the option.  If they really believe that they (and their successors) will be willing and able to impose material losses on bank creditors and depositors in the event of a future failure, there can’t be any strong case for higher capital requirements (indeed, arguably a very credible OBR eliminates the basis for capital requirements at all).  Even if officials and ministers aren’t 100 per cent sure about OBR, any material probability of it being able to be used in future crises needs to be weighed into the calculations when a proper cost-benefit assessment of proposals for higher capital requirements is being done.  At present, there is little or sustained discussion of the OBR issues in the Issues Paper.  I look forward to the inclusion of OBR considerations in a proper cost-benefit analysis if the Bank does end up proposing to raise capital ratios.

My other reason for unease is that in the Issues Paper the Reserve Bank does not engage at all with, for example, the past stress test results.  There is nothing in the paper to suggest that current capital ratios don’t more than adequately cover risks.  Instead, they fall back on generalised results from an offshore literature, and arguments about why New Zealand capital ratios should be higher than those abroad.  Those simply fail to convince.

Here is the gist of their argument

One of the principles of the capital review is that the regulatory capital ratios of New Zealand banks should be seen as conservative relative to those of their international peers, to reflect New Zealand’s current reliance on bank-intermediated funding, New Zealand’s exposure to international shocks, the concentration of our banking sector, the concentration of banks’ portfolios, and a regulatory approach that puts less weight on active supervision and relatively more weight on high level safety buffers such as regulatory capital.

I’m not sure what weight should rest on that “be seen as” in the second line.  I presume not that much, as these seem to be presented as arguments that would warrant genuinely higher capital ratios than in other countries, not just something about appearances.  But in substance they don’t amount to much:

  • “New Zealand’s current reliance on bank-intermediated funding”.  I’m not quite sure what point they are trying to make here.  Does the Reserve Bank regard bank-based intermediation as a bad thing?  If so why?  I presume the logic of the point is something about it being more important than in most places to avoid bank failures, but that simply isn’t made clear, or justifed with data.  Payments systems –  a big focus of Bank concern around the point of a bank failure –  tend to be based through the banking system everywhere.  It is not even as if our corporate bond market –  while modestly-sized –  is unusually small by international standards.   (Incidentally, it is also worth noting that there appears to be nothing in the Issues Paper about non-banks, some of whom the Reserve Bank also regulates.  Making bank-based intermediation relatively more expensive –  which higher capital requirements could do –  would tend to lead to disintermediation.)
  • “New Zealand’s exposure to international shocks”.   Again, it isn’t obvious what this point amounts to.  Presumably the sorts of shocks New Zealand is exposed to are reflected in the scenarios used in the stress tests the Bank and others have run?  And it isn’t obvious that New Zealand’s economy is more exposed to international shocks than many other advanced economies –  there was nothing very unusual for example about our experience of the crisis of 2008/09.   I suspect that lurking behind these words is some reference to the old bugbear, the relatively high level of net international indebtedness –  a point the Bank and the IMF often like to make.   But this simply isn’t an additional threat to the soundness of the financial system.  Rollover risks can be real, but they aren’t primarily dealt with by capital requirements (but by liquidity requirements) and as we saw in 2008/09 the Reserve Bank can easily temporarily replace offshore liquidity.  Funding cost shocks also aren’t a systemic threat because, with a floating exchange rate, the Reserve Bank is able to offset the effects through lowering the OCR and allowing the exchange rate to fall.  The difference between a fixed exchange rate country and a floating exchange rate one, in which the bank system’s assets are all in local currency, seems to be glossed over too easily.
  • “the concentration of our banking sector”    Is this really much different from the situation in most smaller advanced economies (or even than Australia and Canada)?
  • “the concentration of banks’ portfolios”.  This seems a very questionable point.  Banks’ exposure in New Zealand are largely to labour income (the largest component of GDP, and the most stable) –  that is really what a housing loan portfolio is about – and to the export receipts of one of our largest export industries.  That is very different from, say, being heavily exposed to property development loans, to financing corporate takeovers, or other flavours of the day.   The effective diversification is very substantial, including the fact that in any scenario in which labour income is severely impaired (large increases in unemployment) it is all but certain the exchange rate will be falling (boosting dairy returns).  The two biggest components of the banks’ books themselves thus provide additional diversification.
  • “a regulatory approach that puts less weight on active supervision and relatively more weight on high level safety buffers such as regulatory capital.”     Is the Reserve Bank really saying they believe that on-site supervision would produce better financial stability outcomes?  I’m sceptical, but if they are saying that, surely the case would be strong to change the regulatory philosophy.  It would, almost certainly, be cheaper than a large increase in capital requirements.  At very least, if they want to rely on this argument, it would need to be carefully evaluated in any cost-benefit analysis.

It all leaves me a bit uneasy as to whether there is really the strong case for higher capital ratios that the Bank might like us to believe.  They’ll need to provide much more robust analysis if they really choose to pursue such an option.

And a final thought.  The Bank devotes some space in their Issues Paper to considering the role of convertible capital instruments  –  issued as debt but converting to equity under certain (more or less well-defined) adverse event circumstances.  In doing so, they provide vital loss-absorbing capacity, providing a buffer for depositors and other non-equity creditors.  There are some practical problems with these instruments –  the Bank touches on many of them –  and they probably shouldn’t be marketed to retail investors (at least without very explicit warnings) lest the pressures mount for holders of these instruments also be to bailed out in a crisis.     Nonetheless, in the presence of the tax issues discussed earlier, convertible instruments look like a generally attractive option for supporting the robustness of banks in a cost-efficient way.

Given that I was interested in this paragraph  on convertible instruments from the Bank.

In New Zealand there has been no conversion at all of Basel-compliant AT1 and Tier 2 instruments, because banks have not been in financial difficulty, so there is even less certainty about the practical effects of conversion in New Zealand’s particular legal and institutional environments. In the Reserve Bank’s view these instruments should be regarded as essentially untested in the New Zealand environment.

Of course, the same can be said for OBR, and indeed for almost all the crisis-management provisions of New Zealand bank supervisory legislation.

The Bank does draw attention to the risk of bailouts of holders of convertible capital (co-co) instruments.  On the other hand, they can work when banks fail.  Earlier this week, Banco Popular in Spain “failed”.  It was taken over, for 1 euro, by Banco Santander, which will inject a lot of new equity into Popular.   Popular had co-co instruments on issue.  Here is what happened to the price of those bonds.

popular co-co

Banks can fail, banks should fail from time to time (as businesses in other sectors should), and when they do it should be clearly established who is likely to lose money.  This looks like a good example, where the shareholders and the holders of the co-cos will have lost everything they had invested in these instruments.

To revert briefly to our own Reserve Bank’s review, perhaps there is a case for higher capital ratios.  But, if they want to pursue that option, it isn’t likely to be cost-free, and any such proposal will need to be backed by a robust and detailed cost-benefit analysis. For now, it isn’t clear that the reasons they have suggested why capital ratios here should be higher than those in other advanced countries really stand up to scrutiny.

 

“Considerable public interest”?

As I noted yesterday, the Minister of Finance and Grant Spencer have signed a document purporting to be a Policy Targets Agreement, to cover the management of monetary policy between the end of Graeme Wheeler’s term and 26 March 2018.   I also noted that I had lodged OIA requests with the Bank and Treasury for the documents relevant to the pseudo-PTA.

As it happens, Treasury had already beaten me to it, and they rang this morning to point me to the obscure corner of their website where they had yesterday pro-actively released the one substantive relevant document.   Pro-active release of papers by minister and public servants is to be strongly encouraged, and welcomed when it occurs.  Not only is it consistent with the principles that underpin the Official Information Act, but it is also cheaper and easier for the agency concerned.    I probably wouldn’t have bothered with this post if I hadn’t wanted to commend Treasury.

Just occasionally one gets a sense of having made a very slight difference.   In recommending pro-active release Treasury noted

There is considerable public interest in Mr Spencer’s appointment, and a proactive release would pre-empt an expected OIA request.

It (more or less) did that, but to be honest I’ve not seen any one much other than me writing about the Spencer appointment.   Treasury went on

We also consider the proactive release of this report desirable as it would help to ensure that future public commentary on Mr Spencer’s appointment is well-informed. This is because some commentary about Mr Spencer’s appointment has questioned whether the appointment is legal, based on an inappropriate interpretation of the Act and an erroneous assumption that you would not be signing a PTA with Mr Spencer.

I had certainly misunderstood the implication of earlier statements from the Minister about the PTA.  I remain convinced that both the appointment is illegal, and that there is no statutory provision for a PTA with an acting Governor.  My interpretation of the Act may well be erroneous, but the best way to clear that up would be for the Minister, the Treasury, or the Bank’s Board to explain –  or provide –  their own legal advice and interpretation of the relevant provisions.  They continue to refuse to do that (although I will refer this paper to the Ombudsman’s office, for consideration in reviewing whether it would be in the public interest for the relevant legal advice, or a summary of it, to be released).

What else do we learn from the Treasury’s advice to the Minister?

First,

A PTA is required for the appointment of both a permanent and an interim Governor.

It is clearly Treasury’s interpretation, but they provide no justification for that interpretation.  There is, after all, no mention of an interim or acting Governor in any of the provisions of the Act dealing with PTAs.   Again, a summary of the legal advice would help clarify the matter.

Second,

The Board recommends that Mr Spencer be appointed on the same terms and conditions as the current Governor. This is also the basis upon which Mr Spencer has accepted the appointment.

I don’t have any real problem with that, but…..an acting appointee doesn’t really have the same responsibilities as a substantive Governor (medium-term planning and positioning of the institution etc), and has no effective accountability (monetary policy, for example, works with a lag of more than six months, and Spencer will be long gone before the impact of any of his choices are apparent.  But I guess Spencer was doing them a favour in taking the job.

The Treasury appears to be relying on a creative interpretation of the Act in which every reference to the Governor is somehow construed to also mean an acting Governor.  But they aren’t even consistent about that.   They note that

The process of agreeing the conditions of employment is complicated by the Act requiring you to agree the conditions of employment, including remuneration, with the Governor. As Mr Spencer will not be the Governor until after assuming the office of Governor, the conditions of employment should not be formally signed until Mr Spencer’s appointment takes effect.

In fact, of course, Mr Spencer will never be Governor, only acting Governor.   But it seems a rather literal interpretation of the relevant section of the Act to suppose that the terms and conditions can’t be agreed until a person (acting or substantive) has actually taken office.  I wonder if the same approach was applied when Messrs Bollard and Wheeler were appointed?  If it really is a correct interpretation, it looks like a case for a minor amendment to the Act (joining a long list of necessary reforms).

To repeat, kudos to Treasury for the pro-active release.  I do hope they will adopt the same approach next year when a new longer-term PTA is signed with the new permanent Governor, and would encourage the Reserve Bank to consider following Treasury’s lead.  In the meantime, as they are no doubt aware, Treasury is still to respond to a request for the papers relevant to the 2012 PTA.  Pro-active release at the time would have been much simpler.

 

 

 

Roger Douglas, the economy, and an option for reform

I went along yesterday to a Treasury guest lecture, to hear from one of great figures in the history of New Zealand economic policymaking, Sir Roger Douglas, and his co-author Auckland University economics professor Robert MacCulloch.   Their presentation was based on a recent paper proposing a wholesale reshaping of New Zealand’s tax and welfare system.  I’ll get back to that.

Roger Douglas is 79 now, and if his voice is weaker than it was once way, his passion for a better New Zealand is as clear as ever.   In his brief remarks, there was more evidence of a passionate desire to do stuff that would make for a more prosperous, and fairer, New Zealand than one is likely to hear from our current crop of political leaders in an entire election campaign.

I very much liked the fact that they started their lecture with a chart of real GDP per hour worked (my favourite productivity indicator) for New Zealand and other OECD countries.   Things are, very much, not okay economically was the intended message.   Music to my ears.

Unfortunately, given that they made quite a bit of the graph, they got the wrong chart.

What they showed was something very like this.

Douglas RGDP phw 1

Both speakers made something of it, telling of a large gap that opened up in the Muldoon years, but which then closed substantially again following the reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s, only to resume widening again in the last 15 years or so (when, as they noted, no politician has been willing to do any significant reforms).

But the chart looked a bit odd to me, and I wondered about all the new –  mostly poorer –  countries that had entered the OECD in the last couple of decades.

Sure enough, when I got home and dug out the data myself, it became clear that what they (or whoever prepared the chart for them –  I think they mentioned the Reserve Bank) had done, was simply to average the real GDP per hour worked of whichever countries the OECD happened to have data for in any particular year.  That is how I produced the chart above.

Unfortunately, in 1970 when the chart starts. the OECD had this data for only 23 countries.  By 2015 it had data for 35.    The odd rich country (Austria) was missing in 1970, but so were almost all the emerging markets and former communist eastern European countries now in the OECD (several weren’t even separate countries then).   It is only since 1995 that the OECD has had data for all 35.

So here is another way of looking at the chart.  The extra line is the average real GDP per hour worked for the 23 countries the OECD did have data for in 1970 –  a fixed panel of countries throughout the whole period.

douglas 2

And here is how New Zealand productivity (on this measure) has performed relative to the OECD.  I’ve shown both the measure relative to the average of the OECD countries with data for the whole period, and relative to the full sample of countries for the period since 1995 when data are available for all of them.  Remember that most of the new-joiners are poorer than us, so the orange line is above the blue line.

douglas 3

There has been the odd good year here and there – and a few phases (including, actually, the Muldoon years, and the last decade) when we’ve gone sideways – but over the entire period since 1970 there has never been a phase when, on this measure, we’ve done consistently better than the group of other OECD countries.  The pretty clear trend has been downwards.

I really wish it had been otherwise – not just because it is my country too, and I care about its fortunes, but because I supported a great deal of the reforms that were done (and which I still consider were mostly to the good).    But even if the reformers expected, and hoped for, something better –  some closing of the gaps –  it just hasn’t happened.

I probably wouldn’t make much of it on this occasion, except that (a) Sir Roger is an eminent figure, and (b) the presentation yesterday, and the (no doubt unintentionally)  misleading slide, was being presented to quite a large crowd of past and present econocrats.

However, the main focus of the Douglas/MacCulloch presentation was a proposal for a radical reshaping of the tax and welfare system.  There is a nice accessible summary here (which includes a link to fuller versions).   The gist of the proposal is as follows:

  • much lower income tax rates,
  • a lower company tax rate (and eliminated “corporate welfare”), and
  • higher GST

But, “in exchange”, people have to contribute a set proportion of their income  (and there is an employer contribution too) to dedicated private accounts for:

  • health
  • risk events (unemployment, disability etc)
  • superannuation

There are lots of details, but on health everyone would have to buy an insurance policy against catastrophic events (anything more than $20000 per annum) and would have to meet other expenses either from their own health account, or if that was exhausted from direct government funding.  Something similar applies to unemployment: your risk account is your first line of support, but if that is exhausted the government remains provider of last resort.

For retirement income, if I understand the scheme correctly, in many ways it isn’t much different than what we have now:  a universal basic state pension, on top of which is private savings (including through Kiwisaver, although as they note Kiwisaver isn’t compulsory and their retirement accounts would be).  The difference is that the age of eligibility would be gradually raised from the current 65 to 70.

It would represent a massive rejigging of the system.  They argue that, in respect of health, it is largely the Singaporean model, and in Singapore health outcomes are very good and health expenditure (public and private) as a share of GDP is remarkably low. I don’t know enough about the Singaporean system to comment further, including whether it is likely to be replicable elsewhere.

There are all sorts of potential practical and philisophical problems.  I wouldn’t rule out the possibility of some real benefits, for some people in time, or even more generally.  But Douglas and MacCulloch argue that it is a politically feasible way to get necessary reform going again.  And on that –  fairly critical – count I’m sceptical.

In a fuller version of their paper they state

Most of the long-term reduction in government spending under the “Savings-not-Taxes” regime comes from the following sources. First, pension spending drops from $28.1b (under the existing system) to $17.4b (under the new regime) due mainly to the rise in the retirement age from 65 to 70 years old between 2015 and 2035. Second, there are the cuts in ‘corporate welfare’ and interest-free loans and grants to students from high-income, high-capital families.

In other words, huge changes to the entire tax and welfare system, to get the NZS age up from 65 to 70, to get rid of what they describe as (and I agree with them) as “corporate welfare” (film subsidies, Callaghan funding and so), and to eliminate interest-free student loans and related support to high income earners.

In the question time, I asked why they regarded the sweeping change as more politically feasible than simply focusing on those three items.   I guess I sort of knew how Douglas would reply –  it was a variant of a line he has used for many years, about doing lots of changes which can (a) distract people,  but (b) provide an opportunity for everyone to benefit in some area.  But I wasn’t really persuaded.  They argue, for example, that people from high income families currently getting interest-free student loans would benefit from the lower tax rates in the Douglas-MacCulloch plan.  Fair enough I suppose.

But the big money is in NZS cutbacks.  It isn’t clear how the people who are most uneasy about raising the NZS age –  the current middle-aged –  are likely to benefit systematically very much from anything in the Douglas-MacCulloch package.  Any gains/savings would be probabilistic at best (especially as health expenditures rise with age), and the potential personal losses (five extra years without NZS) certain and specific.     I think change can and will be made –  governments in the 1990s did raise the NZS age by five years, and got re-elected –  but I don’t see how the huge “throw everything in the air” approach really helps.  Grey Power, and Winston Peters, will be quite capable of seeing through to the bottom line.

Similarly, corporate welfare is a real scourge.   But how does reforming the tax and welfare system on a large scale make it easier to, first, scrap those provisions, and then later resist the endless pressures that will come from various loquacious vested interests to put them back in place?  I just don’t see it.    It looks like an approach that, rather than making major savings more feasible, would simple multiply the number of enemies the reformers would make.

All that said, and sceptical as I am, it was good to see a serious plan outlined by people who really care.  And credit goes to The Treasury for hosting the event.

(In passing I’d also add that one thing I really like about the package is that it would put sickness, disability and accidents all on the same footing).  

In many respects, the saddest line of the day was one made almost in passing by Professor MacCulloch.  He told us that he administers a fairly generously-funded visiting professorship at the University of Auckland, which aims to bring in distinguished or innovative, leading international thinkers to contribute to policy debate and development in New Zealand.    But the last three people who had been invited had declined the invitation to come.  There was, so far as they could tell, nothing bold or interesting on the table here, no real prospect of significant reform, or interest in it from our political leaders.

Things were very different, in that regard, 20 or 30 years ago.  It is not as if, sadly, we have in the interim solved all our problems, and re-establishing a position as a world-leading economy,  or a world-leader in dealing with the various social dysfunctions.  We just drift, and allow our elites to tell themselves (and us) tales about how everything is really just fine.

 

A pseudo-PTA and other miscellania

This morning it was announced that something that purports to be a Policy Targets Agreement, to cover the conduct of monetary policy during the six months after Graeme Wheeler leaves office, had been signed between the Minister of Finance and Grant Spencer, currently the deputy chief executive of the Reserve Bank.  The Minister announced some months ago that he intended to appoint Spencer as acting Governor for six months, to get the appointment of a permanent Governor clear of the election period.

There are a number of problems with this:

  • first, the Minister has no statutory power to appoint an acting Governor, except where a Governor resigns or otherwise leaves office during an uncompleted term, and
  • second, even if it were argued, contrary to the clear sense of the legislation, that the Minister had such appointment powers, there is also no statutory provision for a Policy Targets Agreement between an acting Governor and the Minister (rather, the Act envisages that the acting Governor would run monetary policy under the PTA already signed with the substantive Governor for his/her unexpectedly foreshortened term).

You might respond that even if there is no statutory provision, there is nothing to stop the Minister and the “acting Governor” signing an agreed statement about how monetary policy would be run during the “acting Governor’s” term.  And if the acting Governor appointment was itself lawful, I would agree with you.   But the so-called Policy Targets Agreement signed yesterday explicitly states the parties believe it to be the genuine binding article, not just some informal statement of agreed intentions.

This agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor  of the Reserve  Bank of New Zealand (the Bank) is made under section 9 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 (the Act).

The Reserve Bank’s statement stressed that there were no changes in this new (pseudo) PTA, relative to the current PTA applying during Graeme Wheeler’s term.   Unfortunately they seem to have taken that a bit too literally.  You’ll notice that in that extract (immediately above) it is referred to as an agreement between “the Governor” and the Minister.  But the Minister’s announcement in February was that Spencer would only be “acting Governor”.  Indeed, there is no way that Spencer could have been appointed as “Governor”, because any new person appointed as Governor has to be appointed for a term of five years, and any such appointment would have defeated the whole point of not making a long-term appointment in or around the election period.

It wasn’t just a slip either.  At the bottom of the document it is signed by Steven Joyce as Minister of Finance and by Grant Spencer as “Governor Designate”  (the “designate” bit matters, because real PTAs have to be agreed before the appointment is formally made).  But Spencer isn’t “Governor designate” at all, he is “acting Governor designate”.     I guess they are trying to slip him in under the provisions of section 9 (rules governing the PTAs) which refer only to the Governor, not to any acting Governors.  As I said before, the Act does not provide for acting Governors to sign proper PTAs.  So the document resembles a PTA, but it can’t in fact be one.

Does it matter?  In one sense, perhaps not.  But laws matter, and details matter, and this appointment, and the purported PTA, appear to be in breach of the law.   If nothing goes wrong and there are no legal challenges during the “acting Governor’s” term, then there probably won’t be any practical problems. But the Governor exercises a lot of powers, including in crises, and the last thing one needs in crises –  which one never foresees correctly the timing of – is uncertainty as to whether a purported Governor really has powers to do what he is trying to do.

(As I have noted previously, there are remedies, even if awkward ones.  For example, Graeme Wheeler –  as an existing Governor – could have been reappointed for six months, and a new PTA signed with him, all while he announced his intention to resign after one day.  Nothing then would prevent the Minister appointing Spencer as lawful acting Governor, operating under a fully lawful PTA.)

I have put in OIA requests with both the Bank and Treasury for the papers relevant to today’s purported PTA.

Being in a slightly flippant mood this evening, I thought I’d throw a few curiosities from the day.

First, on looking on the blog statistics page I discovered that someone had got to my blog today by searching under  “functions of weet bix to the unborn”.    Quite why anyone would be searching for anything using those words for a search at all is a beyond my understanding.   On scrolling down several pages of search results I discovered that I had once, long ago, referred to Weetbix, but not to nutrition or the unborn.

Second, the Reserve Bank might find my OIA requests annoying (they did, after all, launch a whole charging regime in response).   But other people lodge requests too.  I occasionally have a look at the ones the Bank releases.   Some are easy to answer, but distinctly strange.   A few weeks ago they responded to this one

I would like a categorical response to the question­ ” What influence does the Rothschild family exert over the reserve bank of New Zealand?

The categorical answer, of course, is none whatever, although the Bank gave the person a slightly fuller response.

It has been quite a while since I’d seen such a New Zealand-focused example of the old conspiracy theory, in which bankers –  especially perhaps Jewish bankers –  had the central banks of the world under their thumb.  It is a fascinating, if unnerving, phenomenon.  On a par, I suppose, with the whole “one world government” conspiracy stories:  I have on my shelves a book which claims that Don Brash was installed as Reserve Bank Governor by the one world government, as a safe pair of hands, as the son of someone who himself had been part of the conspiracy, as a leading figure in the World Council of Churches.

And finally, looking back at Steven Joyce’s statement on 7 February announcing that Graeme Wheeler was retiring, I noticed the Minister’s description of the Governor’s conduct

The Governor has performed his role calmly and expertly during a highly unusual period for the world economy

Calmness having been so prominently highlighted as a feature of the Governor’s stewardship, I can only assume that the story I heard a while ago on the grapevine, that the Governor had, as it were, tossed his toys out of the cot when someone wrote something the Governor disagreed with, couldn’t possibly be true.

 

 

Unaffordable housing markets and the next generation

Last week I’d been discussing house prices etc with a couple of friends whose kids are a bit older than mine, of an age where they might in years gone by (not that long ago) have been thinking of buying a house.   As one noted, they didn’t know what to advise their kids.  Another talked of the seeming inevitability of parental assistance –  which, in many families, isn’t much of an option.  I know of another friend who decided that parental assistance was probably inevitable, so bought another house himself so that at least his position was hedged –  if house prices went down, so would the needs of his kids, and if they stayed high or rose further, there would be some additional wealth in the inflated value of the additional house.   When this week’s Listener reports yet another poll suggesting housing is the most important issue going into this year’s election, we can’t be the only one having these sorts of conversations.

And then I found a Labour Party election pamphlet in my letterbox.  There was a lot of text, but on only two issues –  health and housing.

Jacinda says everywhere she goes, one topic keeps coming up: the housing crisis.  “National has failed on housing.  People are worried that they or their kids won’t ever be able to get on the property ladder.

Andrew can relate –  he’s concerned about what the future holds for his 16-year-old son, Cam. “I want Cam and his generation to have the same opportunities I had, and more.  But it’s getting so much harder for young people to buy a house. I worry that Cam and other young New Zealanders won’t ever be able to afford their own homes.”

That struck a chord with me.  Partly because my (slightly younger) son knows his son.  But also because my own first house was about 50 metres from Little’s current house which, according to a recent Herald article, is approximately valued at $920,000.  I walk past both houses most days.   It isn’t a fancy neighbourhood by any means –  pleasant, but not fancy.

I bought my own first house in December 1988 –  which I guess is almost thirty years ago, although in many ways it seems just yesterday.   I paid $152000 for it, which at the time was less than twice my income.  The Reserve Bank’s inflation calculator says that is roughly $287000 in today’s money.  I looked up the same website the Herald used to get a value for Little’s house.  It estimates –  who knows how accurately –  that my old house is now worth around $800000.        The current owners have extended it a bit, but it is still a three bedroom house, and the bottom outside walls of the garage have rusted a bit more than they had in 1988.    But then productivity has risen since then –  real GDP per hour worked is up around 35 per cent –  and with it earnings across the economy.

I’m not sure what the Reserve Bank now pays people who’ve been managers in their economics areas for just over a year (that was me in December 1988), but I’m quite sure it isn’t anything like $400000 a year –  recall that I paid less than twice my then income for the house.  In fact, in the Reserve Bank’s Annual Report last year, only four people were getting paid at least that much –  the Chief Economist looked to be receiving just over $400000 per annum.  It brings back memories of a training course I did at the Swiss National Bank in 1990, where they told us that house prices in Berne were so high that only the most senior managers could afford to purchase their own house.  I still recall the astonishment I felt, and never imagined it would be like that in New Zealand.

On Monday the Herald ran their regular supplement of QVNZ house values across all the different suburbs and localities in the North Island.    Island Bay median prices have now, apparently gone just over $800000.  No doubt that still seems quite cheap to Aucklanders –  although I did find one North Shore suburb (Birkdale) that was cheaper –  no one much else in likely to find them so.  In the whole of fast-growing Hamilton and Tauranga, only one suburb is that expensive.

Which brings me back to Andrew Little and the Labour Party.  I’m quite happy to take him at his word on his concern for his own son.   But what does it amount to?  It isn’t that long since Little told us (and here) he didn’t want house prices to fall.

But asked if he welcomed signs Auckland house prices were falling, Little said no.

and

“Having the right number of houses, or closer to it, stabilises prices, it doesn’t collapse prices.”

Labour has a list of policies on housing (I’ll come to them in a minute) but are they simply supposed to stop already unaffordable houses getting ever-more unaffordable?

As I’ve noted before, if nominal house prices stayed flat from here, then even if productivity growth picks up quite a bit, it would still be 20 years before house price to income ratios halved from here. It isn’t much of an answer for today’s generation of twenty-somethings, let alone 16 year old Cam.

Flat house prices –  while better than what we’ve had –  just shouldn’t be regarded as an acceptable outcome after the house price inflation of the last 25 years.  I know people who have bought recently, taking on lots of debt to do so, get very uneasy about house prices falling but (a) that is a minority, (b) an increasing number of those buying recently have been quite tightly constrained by LVR limits, and (c) perhaps most importantly, there has never been an economic reform where there were no losers.   Yes, the more people who have entered the market on prices that assume the continuance of regulatory restrictions, the harder it is to undo those restrictions, but the restrictions themselves are pretty morally indefensible in the first place (just like those that had us assembling TVs or cars, or making kids clothes, in New Zealand at vast expense to consumers).

I suspect there is an element of the concern is a worry –  derived from, say, the US and Irish experience last decade – that any significant fall in house prices is somehow economically disastrous.   When a sharp fall in house prices results from massive over-building, and a serious misallocation of credit, that is probably a quite reasonable concern, especially when (as in Ireland) the authorities have no monetary policy leeway to offset the fall in demand associated with the housing slump.    It is a quite different prospect if the falls in house and land prices arise because regulatory restrictions are unwound –  if anything that would be likely to stimulate building activity –  in a country which has its own monetary policy and exchange rate.   That is what could, and should, be done in New Zealand.  We certainly don’t have a problem of an oversupply of new houses.

But what is Labour proposing?  After the Labour Party conference last month, I expressed concern that in a speech largely devoted to housing, Andrew Little had not mentioned at all freeing up the urban land market.  Labour’s housing spokesperson, Phil Twyford has been good on this stuff (and there is still reference to it in the policy documents on the website)

But in the entire speech –  and recall that most of it was devoted to housing –  there was not a single mention of freeing up the market in urban land, reforming the planning system etc.  Not even a hint.    I understand that giving landowners choice etc probably isn’t the sort of stuff that gets the Labour faithful to their feet with applause.   But to include not a single mention of the key distortion that has given us some of the most expensive (relative to income) house prices in the advanced world, doesn’t inspire much confidence.     Planning reform isn’t going to be easy.  Few big reforms are under MMP.  It probably isn’t something the Greens are keen on.  And if the putative Prime Minister isn’t on-board, hasn’t yet internalised (or even been willing to simply state it openly) that this is where the biggest problems lie, it is hard to believe that a new government would really be willing to spend much political capital in reforming and freeing up the system, no matter how capable, hardworking and insightful a portfolio minister might be.

So when the Labour pamphlet landed in the letterbox, I looked to see what Labour was going to do about housing.   The four point plan from Little’s speech, was now reduced to a two point plan (ok, so it is a pamphlet and there is less space)

  • building more houses themselves (“affordable” ones)
  • crack down on foreign speculators

There was also a pledge on “healthy rentals” but, whatever the merits of that, it isn’t going to make housig more affordable.

Perhaps I just don’t get out much, but I’ve seen very little talk of “foreign speculators” playing much of a role –  any in fact –  in the Island Bay market.  They explain, almost certainly, precisely nothing about why my humble first house is valued at roughly three times (in real terms) what I paid for it.

But more importantly there is nothing, not a hint, in the entire pamphlet of freeing up the urban land market.   Sure, one could mount an argument that it might be hard to put that sort of promise into catchy phrases that attract the attention of potential voters.  But that is why you employ marketing people isn’t it?  And successful political leaders find ways of putting their vision into language that resonates with ordinary people.

It all leaves me deeply discouraged about the prospects for meaningful change.  No one else seems to have managed it, and now Labour –  after toying with ideas of reform –  seems to be getting cold feet, and won’t campaign on freeing up the land market.   The outlook for 16 year old Cam isn’t great, and neither it seems is that for my kids.  As I reflected on the friend who wasn’t sure what to advise his kids, I noticed in the Herald house prices supplement that median prices in my old childhood home, Kawerau, were still only $181000.   My younger daughter wants to be a primary school teacher.   She has been hanging around me too long because when we were in the Bay of Plenty on holiday over Christmas I was reading out Kawerau house prices, and her immediate reaction was “Daddy, I want to live there when I grow up”.    Perhaps in time that’s what I’ll have to advise her –  after all, there are national salary scales for teachers.  Kawerau, for all its problems, isn’t all bad as a town, but New Zealand kids surely deserve better than that.