Several years ago the Law and Economics Association hosted an event in Wellington in which the New Zealand Initiative’s Eric Crampton and I each told our stories about New Zealand immigration policy. My account is here, and a link to the talk I gave is here.
A few months ago a couple of Victoria University of Wellington academics responsible for a Masters class (in a programme I didn’t even know existed (Masters in Philosophy, Politics and Economics)) invited us to do something similar for their class. We did that today.
My text (a bit fuller than what I actually used) is here (if Eric chooses to link to his slides on his blog I will include a link) (UPDATE: link here). My focus was solely on the economic dimensions of immigration policy, and in particular on the implications for economywide productivity (as the best proxy for whether large-scale policy-led non-citizen immigration has been beneficial for New Zealanders). My focus was primarily on the long-term programme, and entirely on the situation in normal times (ie I was not addressing the current Covid mess, which reflects poorly on the government but has no necessary connection to the appropriate medium-term approach).
My approach tends to start from a series of stylised facts about New Zealand’s economics performance in recent decades. This was the list I used this time.
But first, the gist of my story, which starts from a set of stylised facts about our economy. Most of them are not in contention, even if the meaning and implications are debated:
- New Zealand’s productivity growth has continued to languish, and even after the reforms of the 80s and early 90s (including a return to large-scale immigration) there has been no narrowing of the gaps. We’ve fallen further behind Australia, and increasingly behind central and eastern European OECD countries. It would now take a two-thirds lift in the level of productivity to catch the OECD leading bunch,
- Foreign trade as a share of GDP has stagnated, and this century has gone backwards. This in the new great age of globalisation,
- New Zealand’s exports have remained overwhelmingly reliant on natural resources (whether agriculture, tourism or whatever).
- Consistent with this, the rapid growth areas in our economy have been the non-tradable, not internationally competitive, sectors,
- Also consistent with this, our real exchange rate has remained high, even as productivity has declined relative to other countries over decades,
- Even as real interest rates have fallen, they have remained persistently higher than those in other advanced economies,
- Business investment as a share of GDP has been weak (OECD lower quartile),
- Indications are, globally, that if anything distance has become more important not less, with high value economic activity increasingly clustered in big cities near the major markets of the world,
- Unlike what we see in the US and Europe, GDP per capita in by far our biggest city isn’t much better than that for the country as whole – if anything the gap has been narrowing.
- Over the last few decades, no country has aimed to bring more migrants (% of population) than New Zealand did – although Canada and Australia have come close to matching us, and Israel too.
- OECD data show the NZ migrants also have the highest average skills levels (but still a bit behind natives) of migrants to any OECD countries.
Not one of the expected economywide benefits of a large-scale immigration promotion policy has shown up. Not one. And we aren’t five years into this experiment, by 25 to 30.
I stepped through my standard arguments for why large scale immigration here may have been damaging to our medium-term economic performance. I noted that of the handful of OECD countries that have tried anything on the scale of New Zealand’s experiment (Canada and Australia and – in a slightly different context – Israel) none stands out as a productivity leader, and yet very little of the literature on the economics of immigration looks specifically at this group of countries. What isn’t always appreciated is that New Zealand has much more experience of large scale immigration and emigration (the latter, of nationals) than almost any other country – the sustained outflow of natives has been a thing since at least the mid 1970s, while our governments have actively promoted large-scale non-citizen immigration for all but about 15 years since World War Two.
When we’ve considered the economic performance over recent decades of the active immigration-promoting countries, and the countries experiencing outflows of their own people, the ball should really be in the court of the pro-immigration economists to show us, concretely, where and how large-scale immigration is lifting the productivity and incomes of the natives. That is particularly so in New Zealand, given the disadvantages we can enumerate in advance – distance and continued natural resource reliance – and the signal implicit in the decades-long outflow of natives.
I talked about a number of other problems, and (in particular) gaps, in the existing literature before ending with this conclusion.
There might be all sorts of reasons for favouring high immigration – better ethnic restaurants, defence, a liking of big cities, or trains. If your country has prospered greatly, you might be happy to share the gains widely. But the economic case for large scale immigration, as a way of boosting the productivity outcomes for natives in already advanced economies, looks thin at best. Not many countries have run the experiment in modern times, notwithstanding the models that are claimed to support such an approach. New Zealand has been at the forefront – actively promoting large scale immigration for all but 15 years since World War Two. Unfortunately, New Zealand has had the worst relative economic performance of any advanced economy over those decades – we haven’t just come back to the pack, but now languish well down the rankings, have led the GDP per capita tables just 100 years ago (when abundant land, small population, and asymmetrically favourable technology shocks combined in our favour).
As I review the experience of advanced countries, if one wanted to take a punt on policy promoting large scale immigration (and few have) the best places to try look to be countries:
- Close to the centres of global economic activity (whether Europe, North America, or East Asia),
- Having experienced an asymmetric productivity shock – whether from the market or other policy reforms – favouring longer-term economic prospects in your country,
- With economies with substantial reliance primarily on sophisticated manufactured products and high-tech services,
- With their own people coming back home
And it looks like a highly risky strategy if your country is
- Very far from anywhere,
- Heavily dependent on (fixed) natural resources,
- And has seen little sign of asymmetric favourable productivity shocks for your industries in a quite a long time,
- Somewhere your own people have been leaving in large numbers
These look to be quite general insights. And yet few if any of the countries that have three or four of the first characteristics have gone in heavily for policy-led immigration (perhaps Ireland or the UK might have been the closest- but UK immigration per capita was also about a third of New Zealand’s (per capita), and the UK is no productivity star). Of the countries that went heavily for policy-led immigration, even Canada and Israel each meet only one of the three criteria – and neither can readily show the economic gains from large-scale migration. Australia and New Zealand meet none.
As for New Zealand, we can (sadly) tick all four items in that second class of conditions. This was – and is – perhaps the least propitious advanced economy on earth to experiment with a large-scale immigration strategy. And yet we did. If it was perhaps defensible in 1946, and optimistic in 1990, persisting now it just stubbornly wrongheaded, defying experience and evidence. It isn’t quite as wrongheaded as a strategy to promote mass migration – however able the people – to Kerguelen, the Chathams or the Falklands, but not far short of it. Australia has coped better with its experiment only because they were able to bring to market lots of natural resources previously lying idle.
It isn’t that people are any different here – locals or migrants. And water still flows downhill. But the opportunities just aren’t very good at all. It is an old line but no less true for that: a definition of insanity is doing the same thing again and again and expecting a different result. We’ve tried this one far too many times for our own good.
 I recall Eric Crampton once suggesting an Ethiopian quota
 The contrast, say, to the economic gains New Zealand Maori may have received from 19th C immigration.