That’s the title of a new book, published this month, by veteran economist and commentator Brian Easton. The title is borrowed from a collection of poems, published in 1939, by New Zealand poet Allen Curnow, but presumably also keys off the author’s previous book published in 1997, In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy.
The full title of the new book, published by Victoria University Press, is Not in Narrow Seas: The Economic History of Aotearoa New Zealand. It is a curious title in a number of respects. First, there is that reference to the place – so beloved of public servants and the Wellington liberals – that is no place: New Zealand is the name of the modern country, and there was – so far as we know – no collective name for what went before. Then there is the definite article “the” – not “a” – suggesting a definitive treatment that just isn’t on offer, even in this big (655 pages of text) book. And then there is the suggestion that it is an “economic history”.
When I saw the title of the finished volume last month I was reminded of hearing Brian telling people – the book has been many years in the making – that it wasn’t going to be a conventional “economic history”, but something different, more of a “history of New Zealand from an economic perspective”. And it is somewhat reassuring that, however the publisher has chosen to present the finished book, the author still seems true to his earlier vision – he begins his final chapter thus “This is a history of Aotearoa New Zealand, centred on the economy”. Six years ago, seeking a new funding grant, he told interested parties
Not in Narrow Seas, as its title, suggests is an ambitious history of New Zealand . It is written from an economic perspective.
In fact, an extract from that document, written when the book was two-thirds done, probably gives you a good flavour of what is covered
As such it covers many issues which are often neglected by most general histories. These include:
– the interactions between the environment and the economy (and society generally); the book starts 600 million years ago at the geological foundation of New Zealand;
– the offshore origins of New Zealand’s peoples and the baggage they brought with them;
– there are seven chapters on the Maori plus further material in numerous other chapters;
– there is a whole chapter on the development of the Pacific Islands (after the proto-Maori left) in preparation for the account of the Pasifika coming to New Zealand;
– there are specific chapters on the non-market (household) economy in preparation for an account of mothers entering the earning labour force (one of the radical changes in the 1970s);
– there are five chapters on the evolution of the welfare state;
– the book pays attention to external events and globalisation;
– it could be argued this is the first ‘MMP history’ of New Zealand because it looks at how people voted as well as electoral seats won. (If this seems odd, it is rarely mentioned that when Coates lost power to Ward in 1928 his party won far more votes but fewer seats);
– this is not yet another history of the ‘long pink cloud’. It takes a critical view of the more extreme versions from this perspective, in part because it puts a lot more weight on the farm sector as a progressive force (albeit with its own kind of progressiveness);
– it synthesises the rise of Rogernomics with the events before, showing both the continuities and the disruptions;
– while not a cultural history, it integrates culture and intellectual activity into the narrative.
And, of course, there is a fair amount of more-conventional “economic” material as well.
Easton was economics columnist for the late lamented Listener for decades (I think I saw a reference to 37 years, a remarkable run) and you don’t hold down a slot like that without being able to write in a clear and accessible way, and make comprehensible what sometimes some economists almost seek to make imcomprehensible. That carries over to this book. If one were looking for straight economic history you might expect lots of tables and charts, but there is only a handful of either (by contrast, around 100 tables and charts in the much shorter In Stormy Seas). And breaking the text into 60 chapters means bite-sized chunks. For a serious work of non-fiction it is a relatively straightforward read (and, for better or worse, there are no footnotes). For those who don’t know much about how the story of New Zealand fits together, especially with an economic tinge, it is a useful introduction – especially when one recalls that the last comprehensive economic history of New Zealand, that by Gary Hawke, was published in 1985 (and had gone off to the publisher before any of the reforms of 1984 and beyond were even initiated).
But talking of “tinges” note that line in the extract above “this is not yet another history of the ‘long pink cloud’ “. He notes
Much of our history has indeed been written from a leftish perspective. However, the pink cloud obscures the total story of New Zealand’s development.
And he has some useful correctives to perspectives offered by other “leftish” authors, but make no mistake this is a book from the liberal-left as well. If he occasionally has positive things to say about National governments, for example, it is largely when they initiated things – ACC as an example – that were radical for their time. His is a “progressive” vision in which, to a first approximation, things have only got better and better as they’ve approached today’s state of affairs – even while there is still some way to go to get to the desired “progressive” end.
I always find it interesting to read the Acknowledgements sections, perhaps especially of New Zealand books. Easton has well over 100 names listed, some of people long dead (such as Bill Sutch). I recognised only half or two-thirds of them but the great bulk were people of the liberal-left (plus Winston Peters). That isn’t a criticism; just an observation about where the author’s central Wellington milieu is. In some respects, the book may be best seen as a distillation of Easton’s decades of thinking and debating about New Zealand (not just its economy).
I’m not going to attempt a full review of the book – I’d say that I’d leave that to the New Zealand Review of Books, except that that publication too has now passed into history – but I wanted to highlight just a few scattered points that struck me as I read.
First, in his earlier history of the post-war economy (mostly up to 1990) there was much to like. One of the key areas I disagreed with him on – I’ve dug out a published review I wrote at the time – was around macroeconomic policy since 1984. He reckoned the conduct of monetary policy, and in particular the handling of the nominal exchange rate, played a big part in explaining New Zealand economic underperformance. Here were my 1998 comments.
In the new book, although less space is devoted to it, this continues to be Easton’s view. I continue to think his case isn’t compellingly made, but then this is one of those issues where I’m closer to the New Zealand conventional wisdom than on most (I reckon macro management – fiscal and monetary policy – has been among the better bits of New Zealand economic policy in recent decades).
Having said that, one line in the new book that got a big tick next to it was his observation that the real exchange rate was probably the most important relative price in New Zealand (arguably the terms of trade). In that regard, I was a little surprised that with the benefit of another 20-25 years, there was nothing in the new book about the extent to which New Zealand’s real exchange rate had – over decades now – moved (risen, stayed high) in ways inconsistent with the productivity performance of the New Zealand economy, even adjusted for the improvement in the terms of trade, and the associated decline in the relative significance of the tradables/exportables sector of the economy. It is the same curious de-emphasis we now see from our officials and ministers faced with a really major adverse economic shock and apparently unbothered that a key stabilising relative price – the real exchange rate – has barely moved at all. Since one of the key elements in Easton’s economic history of New Zealand is the collapse in the wool price in 1966 – at the time wool was a third of our exports – it is all the more surprising.
Relatedly, I was quite surprised by how little mention there is in the book of the continuing relative decline in New Zealand’s productivity and material living standards over many decades, to today. Brian is well-known for asking hard questions about just what official statistics are actually measuring, so perhaps he doesn’t think we’ve continued to drift far behind – but I doubt that is the explanation (he explicitly highlights data for the late 30s that suggests that at that time our material living standards were still among the highest in the world). On the one hand, he seems to work with a model in which government policy doesn’t really make much difference – unless it is messing up “Rogernomics” and associated macro policy – but even if that is his model, he doesn’t make clear what he thinks is driving our relative decline (let alone – and perhaps one can’t ask for this in a history – what might make a difference). I wonder too if there isn’t an element of the point I’ve suggested over the years, that the powers that be in Wellington (political, bureaucratic, and other) finding our structural economic performance too hard to explain prefer no longer to talk about it much?
In passing – which is more or less how he treats it here – it may be worth noting that Easton here (as in the previous book) seems less than persuaded by the notion that large scale immigration to New Zealand since World War Two has done anything beneficial for the productivity or material living standards of New Zealanders. Here, as I’ve noted before, he stands in continuity with earlier authors on New Zealand economic history.
And two final points.
The first relates to the Productivity Commission. Commenting on developments this century, he notes of the Clark government
Curiously the government often reappointed or promoted those closely associated with Rogernomics, and they did little to create institutions to provide alternatives to neo-liberalism. By contrast, the National-ACT Government established the Productivity Commission, one of whose members was not only a “Rogernome” but had stood as an ACT candidate [former Treasury secretary Graham Scott].
and moving a decade on, he notes
…the Key-English Government, nudged by the ACT Party, established a Productivity Commission to help pursue its economic objectives. This agency remained in existence under the Ardern-Peters government. More generally, the Ardern-Peters Government had followed its predecessor’s habit of assuming a milder version of the neoliberal framework. Like the previous Labour Government it gave important jobs to former neoliberal enthusiasts.
I imagine one of the people Easton has in mind here is the current chair of the Productivity Commission, Murray Sherwin, who was head of the International Department of the Reserve Bank back in the days of the float of the exchange rate – an issue Easton has long written about and strenuously challenged how things were done – and, of course, a key figure at the Bank in the years when price stability was becoming established. I guess he must be almost the last of the people who held reasonably significant positions in those reforming days to still be in public office. But his term expires early next year, and it will be interesting who the government (I’m assuming Labour leads the next government too) chooses to replace him, and telling about the interest (if any) the government has in addressing longstanding economic failures, and how. [UPDATE: Brian tells me he didn’t have Sherwin in mind.]
But, to be blunt, if the Productivity Commission is the institution for the propagation of continued “neo-liberal excess” (my words, not Easton’s), those on the left wouldn’t seem to have that much to worry about. In addition, of course, to the fact that the “Key-English Government” seemed to have no serious structural “economic objectives” – do you recall them fixing the urban land market, addressing productivity underperformance etc? – the Commission itself has increasingly tended to reflect the same sort of “smart active government”, technocratic wing of the European social democratic movement, that we see in – notably – the OECD. Since governments appoint the Commissioners, the Commission will over time tend to reflect the preferences of governments of the day – and we’ve seen that already in the rather different tinge of appointments under this government. The Commission is certainly nearer in inclination – if better-resourced – to the old New Zealand Institute (former executive director, David Skilling) than to, say, the Business Roundtable or the New Zealand Initiative. To survive – as always a peripheral player, and rather small – I guess they have to meet the market one way or another.
Economists are renowned – sometimes fairly, sometimes not – for acting as if they believe that economics is some sort of universal discipline without which almost everything and everyone is poorer. But one rarely sees it quite so breathtakingly expressed as on page 75 of the book, discussing 19th century New Zealand, when Easton observes
Perhaps most of the settlers did not have well-formed opinions – economics was then a new discipline, even among the well-educated.
In summary, almost everyone reading the book will learn something, and perhaps on a few points be challenged to think a bit differently. It is fairly easy to read, but it isn’t “the economic history” of New Zealand. Then again, it doesn’t really aim to be. I noticed that back in 2014 Easton talked of wanting to have these appendices available on the publisher’s website (I presume the numbers refer to word count)
I. The Course of Population 3850
II. The Course of Prices 4200
III. Measuring Economic Activity 2100
IV. The Course of Output: 1860-1939 3250
V. The Course of Output: 1932-1955 2700
VI. The Course of Output: 1955- 3400
VII. The Structure of the Economy 4050
VIII. The Course of Productivity 1450
IX. Patterns of Government Spending 4850
X. Transfers 5650
XI. Debt and Deficits 3300
VUP doesn’t seem to have been receptive to that. I hope that in time Easton might be able to make this material available on his own website, and past such notes (including appendices in the 1997 book) were useful and interesting to the geekier of his readers.
12 thoughts on “Not in narrow seas”
Reblogged this on Utopia, you are standing in it!.
The productivity equation is easily solved. Fewer people and more automation. Drill for oil and gas, mining, large scale automated factories and money laundering or otherwise called large scale financial services increases productivity considerably. All of which we either do not want to do or because we are too isolated to do.
On Facebook I quoted a section from Greg Clydesdales book on Lessons from Argentina. A reply came back.
“With all due respect to self published authors everywhere, a self published book by an academic can carry about as much academic credibility as grocery list. This author is not without his detractors.”
To which I replied that that was ad hominem and appeal to authority.
“In the field of academic research and publishing, it is inescapable that self published authors are viewed with an element of skepticism. ….. Teresia Teaiwa, programme director for Pacific Studies at Victoria University, Otago University economist Paul Hansen who said the Clydesdales work showed poor use of data and failed to back up claims and Pacific Island Affairs Ministry chief executive Colin Tukuitonga also had 2 peer reviews indicating use of out dated data. “
In all honesty it seems like quibble as he provides detail in his book. The real lesson though is that you must not single any population for criticism. The net result is that New Zealand is not (or will become) a territory which is associated with any particular ethnic group. As a social primate that is significant? Without a popular national identity, it’s associated myth and culture what will replace it?
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Brezhnev was standing on the Lenin Mausoleum on May Day. First the mobile nuclear missile carriers rumbled past, then masses of tanks and goose-stepping soldiers. Overhead blasted masses of MiGs. After the soldiers came a gaggle of middle aged men in Cardigans with pocket protectors.
Someone turns to Brezhnev and enquires what these men are doing in a military parade. Brezhnev responds, these are my economists, never underestimate the destructive power of an economist…
NZ Productivity Commission Mission Statement
The Commission seeks to influence two principal outcomes:
1.Lift New Zealand’s productivity and, as a result,
2.Lift the wellbeing of New Zealanders
A review of the TEAM does not inspire confidence they can deliver on those goals
This release does not instill confidence from above
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I read the link and found its base idea of the importance of clusters of small export orientated companies sensible. There are a few phrases that worry me. Encouraging our govt to ‘foster international links’ seems like an excuse for more bureaucrats to fly to expensive destinations – they are more than willing to do this but as a very well travelled friend said “it doesn’t matter how remote a place you go to you always find a Kiwi”; not Danes, Finns, Swiss or Singaporese. Encouraging any govt to invest in ‘strategic infrastructure’ is a recipe for white elephants. On the other hand encouraging small businesses to link with our universities makes sense but it would be helpful if many of our universities were not sited where property is so expensive and if it is the STEM subjects that are of value to businesses my local University was planning to substantially reduce them. There was no mention of company tax – does that have no effect on NZ productivity.
Iconoclast, what did you find non-inspirational?
The use of Pine trees was a large scale strategic NZ government project to utilise it’s large land holdings. At the time there no builders anywhere in NZ or around the world that would use Pine timber as a building product due to its prone to rot. The NZ government research, DSIR at the time worked out that dunking the timber in a chemical bath prevented rot and a new timber industry was born.
Yes, those tens of thousands of hectares of Pine forests was planted by the NZ government without a market for the Pine timber. It was considered a white elephant project to give out of work kiwis a job but now considered visionary.
The jargon and buzz-words and motherhood statements. While NZ is reeling and people are losing their livelihoods, Hamed Shafiee, a Senior Advisor at the Productivity Commission, who is presumably a highly paid consultant, writes what amounts to a series of lofty tripe. In 1980 I joined Fletcher Challenge, an NZ conglomerate of about 100 subsidiaries. Fletchers set out on a journey to transform itself from a labour intensive operation to a capital intensive operation. It would exit all businesses that it couldn’t be the dominant player. It recruited executive CEOs from a global head-hunting drive and set out to become a multi-national business. The drive was relentless. The company grew. I attended a number of company seminars addressed by Hugh Fletcher. Business-wise he was inspirational. He knew where he was going and wanted to go. And how to get there. It was an exciting time. Fairly ruthless. There was nothing else like it in NZ. It was a company flexing itself in a hurry. It expanded into Australia, Hong Kong, China and Canada. Then it all fell apart in the 1990’s. The falling out between Hugh Fletcher (MD) and Sir Ron Trotter (Chairman), two heavyweights, was the beginning of the end. The two main commercial events were the USD $1 billion law suit against Fletcher Energy and the failure of the Chinese Central North Island Partnership. I can say I left Fletchers with a level of business acumen that would never have benn acquired otherwise. Reading the various productions out of the Productivity Commission one does not get sense there is any understanding of how business begins, grows and dies. The entire team of the Productivity Commission are bureaucrats, appointed by government, answering a curated task without business answers. I am coming to the view that the answers they seek cannot be met with macro-visions, but more likely micro-visions. My lens is different to their lens.
Here is Bryan Gaynor’s generous Fletcher Challenge obituary from 2001
Now in 2020, Fletcher Building …. what can one say
I joined Fletcher Building in NZ when it was building skyscrapers successfully throughout South East Asia. The Tabung Haji, the 5 pillars of Islam was built by Fletcher Building in Malaysia.
The more I read the more I discover small businesses thriving when the buisness economy is doing well. I’ve none of the experience that Iconoclast and GGS bring to their comments but I did live in Birmingham as a child and knew of its reputation for specialised manufacturing. I’ve read the same applied in Japan and now in China – we dream of copying their big companies but it is the little ones that seem to matter. Like a complex ecology they exploit every opportunity and they are more resilient to dramatic change.
Some small points. If Easton does not have any footnotes in such a large tome (and neither did Hawke), it is not really historical scholarship. That matters because he got $50 000 in funding from the NZ History Research Trust fund, which is a lot more than actual historians get. And another quibble, he is described as Dr Easton by VUP, but he did not write a PhD thesis, as I understand it he was gifted it by Canterbury University. It obviously pays to be well connected.