(For anyone who followed a link looking for my post on the National Party and the PRC, it is here)
A few days ago one of my posts included the chart showing that there has been very little labour productivity growth in New Zealand for most of this decade. A commenter asked
A question for you on the productivity flat line. Is it reflective of levels of investment? How does the productive capital stock per worker look over the last decade?
And so today I’ll try to step through some of the data that sheds a bit of light on that question. As background, it is worth bearing in mind that for decades New Zealand business investment as a share of GDP has been relatively low by OECD country standards, especially once one takes account of our relatively fast population growth rate. The biggest exception was that outbreak of government-inspired wastefulness, Think Big, in early-mid 1980s. Not all investment captured in the national accounts statistics is “a good thing”.
First, some flow data. Here is investment as a share of GDP (using quarterly seasonally adjusted data).
Lots of houses repaired (Canterbury) and built (nationwide) but once you set residential investment spending to one side. the remaining investment as a share of GDP has been very subdued indeed, not really much higher than during the recession at the end of last decade.
There isn’t an official published series of business investment, so I use the same proxy the OECD does: start from total investment and subtract residential investment and government investment spending. There is a small overlap there (some government residential investment spending), but with that caveat noted here is the proxy for business investment as a share of GDP.
The only times this business investment proxy was lower than at present was in the depths of the two serious recessions (1991 and 2000-10). And yet over recent years, our population was growing consistently faster than at any time in recent decades. Businesses tend to invest when there are prospective profitable opportunities – especially when financing conditions aren’t unduly constraining. Presumably, those opportunities just haven’t been there in New Zealand in recent years.
My commenter’s question was about capital stocks. Statistics New Zealand publishes net (of depreciation) capital stock data. The upside is that there is a good long time series, but the downside is that it is annual data so that the most recent observation is for the March 2018 year.
Here are a couple of stock series, expressed as percentages of nominal GDP.
(I don’t know what accounts for the sharp lift back in mid-70s, but you can see the Think Big effect in the early 80s.)
Those were nominal (current price) series. If we want to look at the capital stock relative to real variables (eg hours worked) we need to use the constant price data instead. Here is the real capital stock, ex housing, per hour worked.
I’m not quite sure what to make of the entire chart – I’m a little surprised there wasn’t more growth in the 1990s – but for the more recent period it is certainly consistent with the (very weak) productivity picture.
Perhaps as sobering is this simple chart, showing the percentage increase in the real capital stock from the year to March 2008 to the year to March 2018.
Pretty significant growth in the non-market component (the bits not subject to market tests, either at the evaluation stage or in operation, and basicially set by government – central or local) relative to the growth in the market sector non-housing capital stock. Firms operating in more-or-less competitive markets just don’t seem to have seen the remunerative projects to invest in. That isn’t in any fundamental sense the “cause” of our really weak productivity growth, but it will be a reflection of the same factors.
On my telling, the persistently high real exchange rate is, in turn, a significant proximate part of that story.