They don’t deserve many, but this announcement this morning is unambiguously positive.
Cabinet papers will be proactively released, Minister of State Services Chris Hipkins announced today.
The move is part of the Government’s wider plan to improve openness and reflects its commitment to the international Open Government Partnership.
The Cabinet papers will be released no later than 30 business days after a Cabinet decision. This process will be in place for Cabinet papers lodged from 1 January 2019, Chris Hipkins – who is also responsible for Open Government – said. ……
“Cabinet papers will be released within 30 business days of the Cabinet decision unless there is good reason not to publish. If we can publish it, we will.”
It will, almost certainly, end up less good than it sounds. But it is a start. The official papers upon which our governors make their official decisions should be open to public scrutiny, with only a short delay. As the Minister’s press release notes
“This change is consistent with the spirit of the OIA which states that information should be made available unless a good reason exists for withholding it.
“Proactive release of official information promotes good government and transparency and fosters public trust and confidence in government and the public agencies.”
Of course, only time will tell how (a) this government chooses to run the system, and (b) whether future governments regard themselves bound by the newly-established practice (the law isn’t being amended to require pro-active release, but it probably should be). I don’t suppose we will ever see any Cabinet papers that might deal with awkward issues around the relationship with the People’s Republic of China, or PRC interference in New Zealand public and commercial life. Perhaps we shouldn’t either. Some things – a few – need to be not only deliberated in secret, but to able to have the relevant considerations and supporting evidence kept under wraps for a longer period. And, reasonably enough in my view, they won’t be releasing papers relating to recommendations for honours (they say they will withhold papers relating to appointments as well, and that is more concerning).
What worries me a little more is that
Individual ministers will have responsibility for releasing Cabinet papers, which will be subject to an assessment to decide if there are good reasons to withhold any of the information.
If individual ministers are making the decision, how will we be confident that all ministers are applying more or less the same standard? There is no suggestion of a central monitoring process, and there will be more or less ornery ministers, more or less politically uncomfortable issues, weaker and less confident ministers, and – as our arrangements have developed – ministers who hold ministerial warrants but aren’t part of Cabinet, or even of the government itself. Will, for example, the Greens ministers be bound by this new Cabinet practice?
But if the principle is that the official papers upon which our governors make their official decisions should be open to public scrutiny, with only a short delay, shouldn’t this principle be extended – either voluntarily, or mandatorily – to other state agencies that make major policy decisions, that attract considerable public interest and scrutiny?
One could readily extend the principle to the boards of all Crown entities (subject to similar specific exclusions as the Cabinet will apply to itself).
But, of course, the entity I particularly had in mind was the Reserve Bank. The Bank’s longstanding line has been that, even though they make vital economic decisions that can materially affect the short to medium term performance of the economy, it would be costly, damaging, and confusing to release the background papers that the Governor receives prior to making his or her decision. After all, they tell us, there is the MPS or the press release, and the Governor holds a press conference once a quarter. What more do we need to know, they argue? They simply generally refuse to release background papers – although I did once manage to get them to release some that were ten years old (to make the point that, at most, there is a time dimension to any decision on whether material can be released under the OIA).
But those arguments apply – if at all – just as much to decisions made by Cabinet, often on much more complex and sensitive issues than those the Reserve Bank deals with. Cabinet decisions are announced by ministers, the PM holds press conferences, and ministers are generally pretty accessible to the media (more so than most Governors). But the Cabinet has rightly decided to release (most) Cabinet papers, and recognises that doing so is right and proper in a free and open society, and will over time enhance confidence.
The same should go for the Reserve Bank. If the Governor is serious when he talks about being open and transparent – as he seems to be on all matters that he isn’t responsible for – he’d take the lead on this issue, and announce that in future the big folder of background papers prepared going into each Monetary Policy Statement, together with the (anonymised) written advice of his advisers on the OCR decision, would be routinely released (perhaps with a small number of redactions) six weeks after the OCR/MPS announcement to which they relate. Six weeks is long enough that plenty of new data will have emerged since the papers were written (indeed, it will be close to the next OCR decision), and short enough to still be of use/interest to analysts in understanding the Bank’s thinking (recall that we still have no idea what analysis they used last year when they announced they were assuming half of the building associated with Kiwibuild houses would be offset by reduced other residential building activity).
And if the Governor won’t take the lead, the Minister of Finance should insist on this sort of approach as part of the legislation and procedures around the establishment of the new statutory Monetary Policy Committee.
Most likely the Bank will continue to fall back on spurious arguments about potential damage to the “substantial economic interests of New Zealand” (an OIA ground that hasn’t been well-tested), or risks of confusion. Those arguments are just wrong, and risk sounding (or perhaps are) self-serving: powerful bureaucrats protecting their particular monopoly on information/advice. Cabinet has been willing to step beyond those arguments, and we should expect the Reserve Bank Governor – a very powerful unelected policymaker – to be even more ready to do so (being, after all, unelected and thus with less legitimacy). If he doesn’t do so willingly, he should be left with no choice.