A world-leading debate on immigration?

Sometimes it can be hard to keep up with the flow of pro-immigration articles in the Herald.  At the moment of course, even they tend to be written with a defensive, more than celebratory, stance.

On Monday, the academic sociologist, Paul Spoonley –  who leads CaDDANZ the MBIE-funded academic immigration advocacy and research programme –  was out with a piece headed Xenophobia not welcome in migrant debate.     Hard to disagree with that.  Of course, not all fears are irrational, and political debate rarely occurs at the rarefied level of the fabled academic seminar room, but “deep-rooted fear towards foreigners” (the OED definition) doesn’t seem a particularly good basis for New Zealand’s immigration debate.  But what was a bit puzzling when I read the article, and then re-read it, was that Professor Spoonley offered no evidence that “xenophobia” was what was at work here.  And that’s good.  Presumably if there was such evidence he’d have mentioned it.

And despite generally being a champion of New Zealand’s non-citizen immigration policy, Spoonley himself has come to the conclusion that current immigration levels are “unsustainable” and some changes are needed.  Presumably he didn’t reach that conclusion based on “xenophobia”?

As it happens, most of the proposals he puts forward are pretty mild, or not even policies at all.

There is a case for revising aspects of the recruitment and approval of immigrants. The low value courses and qualifications offered by some educational providers puts New Zealand’s reputation at risk.

One could add that it is, in effect, an industry granted big export subsidies.   We’d sell more of any specific good or service, if doing so came attached with work rights or residence points.     Curiously, export education isn’t even that successful a subsidised industry.  The total number of people granted student visas in 2015/16 was only around 4 per cent higher than at the previous peak in 2002/03.

A more proactive regional focus. Canada and Australia allow regions to set their own targets and to recruit the skilled immigrants needed locally – without undermining local workers or wages. Up to a third of the points required for approval for permanent residence can be granted by regions.

This is even more daft, and dangerous, than the existing (quality-diluting) policy of giving additional points to people with jobs outside Auckland.  And since most local councils can’t even do well stuff they are already responsible for –  not making urban land unaffordable – I’m not sure I’d want to trust them with immigration policy.

Social cohesion. Positive settlement outcomes for both immigrants and host communities would benefit from a greater investment in helping transition immigrants to life in New Zealand – more generous provisions for English language acquisition, for example, would help.

Of course, we could spend even more taxpayers’ money, or we could simply require that people settling here –  refugees aside –  actually speak pretty good English.  These days, most really highly-skilled people –  the ones we might actually benefit from –  do.

And his final proposal

Let’s have a debate about population – its growth and distribution – as a context for decisions about immigration. And let’s not see immigration as a single causal factor or as a simple solution.

This is rhetoric rather than policy, but by all means have the debate.  I’m pretty wary of “population policy” myself, but some serious study of whether policy-driven rapid population growth over most of the period since World War Two has helped lift the material living standards of New Zealanders, or productivity in the New Zealand economy, would be a worthwhile subject for academic researchers.

In the end, Spoonley is mostly playing distraction.  He flings around the charge of “xenophobia,” without any substantiation, and then his own suggestions would make little useful difference in responding to the economic challenges, except by some tightening of rules around student visas (something the government has not yet addressed at all).

But the column that really grabbed my attention was one from the Herald business editor Liam Dann, headed Let’s lead the world on immigration debate.  A worthy aspiration no doubt.  But not, unfortunately, one the column contributed to. Instead, it is riddled with questionable claims and false comparisons, and at one point represents another example –  this time not from a government minister but from an acolyte –  of just making things up.

There is the weird opening.

It looks like immigration is going to be a big election issue.

That’s a shame.

He doesn’t like the way the debate has occurred in some other countries, so seems to think we should take some sort of self-denying ordinance, and not debate one of the larger government economic and social policy interventions there is.   Non-citizen immigration is, after all, far bigger here than in the UK, the US, or France.  Has been for a long time.

There have been a series of record highs for about a year. The numbers exceed even the great colonial influx into New Zealand in the 19th century.

On a per capita basis they exceed what the UK was experiencing pre-Brexit.

This is all rather misleading.   Considered per capita, the net inflow over the last year (New Zealander and non-citizens) hasn’t even exceeded levels seen 15 years ago, let alone at the peaks in the 19th century.  And, by contrast, every single year the number of non-citizens we let in far exceeds (per capita) the inflows to the UK.  So the analytical and policy issues shouldn’t be about this year’s PLT flow, but about the numbers (and terms on which) we allow non-citizens to settle and/or work here.

According to Dann

So we are vulnerable to populist political hijack.

Any world-leading debate on these topics would recognise that the essentials of our immigration policy haven’t changed much for 20 years at least.  Broadly speaking, we moved back to being a high (non-citizen) immigration country in the early 1990s.

I’m not even sure what “populist political hijack” really means, other “than some politician I really don’t like, responding to an issue of real public concern”.   Sounds like democracy to me, messy as it often is.

Funnily enough, Dann also thinks there are some real issues that need addressing.

Immigration policy of the past decade is not sustainable. Our infrastructure is under pressure and we are woefully behind in building to catch up. That’s not the fault of immigrants, of course. It is the fault of politicians and voters.

Not sure how this is all the fault of voters.   We were never asked if we wanted to have record rates of population growth, even though those in office knew that (say) the urban land markets were dysfunctional etc, so that importing lots of new people was only likely to exacerbate house price problems.

And, of course, the issues aren’t just about house prices or road congestion.  There is the small matter of the continuing poor productivity growth in New Zealand (none in the last five years), the shrinking (as a share of GDP) export sector, or the realities of living in a country at the ends of the earth where, for 40 years (with cyclical ups and downs) the natives have been leaving, pursuing better opportunities abroad.   Oh, and the highly misleading descriptions of the immigration programme –  we’ve repeatedly been told it was a skills-focused programme, helping lift productivity etc, and now MBIE’s own numbers show than more than more than half those applying for residence don’t have skills that command even $49000 per annum in the New Zealand labour market.

Dann continues

In other words, it’s our fault. We have been trying to have our cake and eat it too.

No, it isn’t “our” fault.  Voters didn’t ask for this.  Political leaders –  from both sides, but National is now in office –  made it happen.  And there is no “cake” for New Zealanders as a whole, only some nasty sectoral redistributions, and an overall economic performance that continues to underwhelm.   But apparently

One thing lost in the immigration debate at the moment is how successful the policies have been for New Zealand.

Really?

Economically, we have outshone our international peers. We have skipped the economic pain that most of the world felt after the global financial crisis.

That’s not all down to immigration but it has played a big part.

This is just making stuff up.  As I showed yesterday, we’ve done no better than the United States, which was the epicentre of the crisis –  and that despite having about three times the rate of legal immigration the US has (and other bonuses like a record average terms of trade).   We had a nasty recession, that took a long time to recover from –  and actually immigration policy in the “bust” period wasn’t materially different than it had been in the earlier “boom”.   We’ve underperformed Australia too.

real gdp phw dec 16 release

Sure, there are places that are worse still –  much of the euro area most notably –  but there is just nothing to back this claim that we have “outshone our peers”,  let alone that immigration policy has enabled us thus to shine.  Saying it often enough won’t make it true.   In fact, sometimes reality breaks through and even Dann seems embarrassed about channelling this stuff.

When you crunch the numbers on per capita GDP growth it has been far less flash.

Indeed. And it is things like per capita income growth and productivity growth that count.   Even on the labour market side of things, the SNZ release this morning shows that most of the OECD countries that control their own monetary policy have lower unemployment rates than we do.

Culturally, too, New Zealand has grabbed global attention in a way unimaginable a generation ago.

This country used to be largely unknown outside the Commonwealth, where we were acknowledged as a backward British colony that was good at sport and had lots of sheep.

Since we still hold the record low test cricket score, racked up in the bad old days when we had some of the very highest material living standards in the world, I’m not even sure about that “good at sport”.

But, frankly, what is he talking about?

100 years ago, before the First World War, people flocked here – and not just from the Commonwealth – to study New Zealand’s economic and social reforms.  And they often marvelled at what had been created, so quickly, so far from the centres of the world ( including (but not limited to) the best material living standards in the world).

Actually, 30 years ago, before the great immigration resumed, people abroad were fascinated by New Zealand’s economic reforms.  It was a darker story by then, trying to pull back from decades of decline, but the interest was real nonetheless.

Does anyone remember Dame Edna’s tragic Kiwi bridesmaid Madge Allsop? She summed up our image pretty well.

Personally, I don’t remember this character, but I’m sure Dann isn’t trying to suggest that Australians have stopped making fun of New Zealanders (accent and all), or vice versa.

So what is he talking about?  Does he know?   Allegedly….

Against all odds, New Zealand became cool.

Where is the evidence?  What does “cool” mean in this context?  And what does it do, even if it is true, for the living standards of ordinary New Zealanders?  Dann doesn’t tell us.  And yet somehow

Our place in the world has changed and that warrants debate about the immigration policy settings we have in place.

Actually, if one takes any sort of longer view of modern New Zealand history, our place in the world is in decline.  That is more or less inevitable.  We were once one of the handful of (very successful) offshoots of the most powerful empire in the world.   100 years ago there weren’t many independent countries, and few as successful as we were.  Since then,  many more countries have emerged, and quite a few have got a lot richer.   The UK’s global position has declined, and even the US is no longer what it was (in say the decades from 1940).  We are neither powerful nor important –  no longer with automatic access to counsels of the great and powerful we once had –  and, worse, we aren’t even that successful economically any more.  That has real implications for our own people, especially the poorer of them.

So, I really have no idea what Dann is on about.  Perhaps he is thinking of some references in once-hip publications like Lonely Planet guides?  But to what end?  As I ‘ve shown previously, our exports of services –  the lure of tourism, export education etc –  are lower now as a share of GDP than it was 15 years ago, in an age when international trade in services globally has become ever more important.

Leaving aside the detached-from-reality rhetoric, Dann tries to come back to specifics

The Government has belatedly started to recognised that with policy tweaks that have not yet had time to show results.

We could go further and look at more fundamental changes – such as how we set the criteria for residency.

But it would be a terrible thing for the debate to play out here the way it has in other parts of the world.

Quite what does that mean?  You might approve or disapprove of the Brexit result (I approve), but the process was an open one, there were no riots on the streets, and views differ on quite how large a role immigration policy played anyway.

I reckon Donald Trump is fundamentally ill-equipped to be US President.  Then again, the choice was a poor one.  I couldn’t have voted for him or his principal opponent.  And is a physical wall a good solution?  Quite probably not.   But it was an open and democratic election, and there were plenty of other issues at play in the election.  And –  unlike us –  the US really does have a large stock of illegal migrants in the country.  

Alternatively, and optimistically, New Zealand is in a position to lead the world on the immigration debate. We could do this right.

But simply flinging around, as slurs, references to Brexit or Trump isn’t really a great start to the sort of debate Dann claims to want to have in New Zealand.  After all, if immigration is an issue in those countries, there are good reasons why it could be a much bigger issue here (we simply take more people, per capita).

We could pay close attention to the data, we could look at economic impact studies and we could have a frank and open discussion about the kind of country we want to build.

That would certainly be a novel (but welcome) approach.  Perhaps Dann could point us to the New Zealand specific studies illustrating how New Zealanders, and New Zealand productivity levels, have been raised by decades of large scale immigration, much of it simply not that skilled?  Other champions of immigration policy haven’t been able to.    There is plenty of theory, but not much grounded analysis that takes specific and detailed account of the circumstances of New Zealand.

Dann doesn’t like the idea of Labour promising to do something to markedly cut the non-citizen immigration flow.

It is difficult for Labour because the politics are polarising. Labour wants power, it sees a rich vein of discontent but in the current topsy-turvy political environment, it has to make careful choices.

Retaining a traditional, optimistic liberal view leans towards free and open borders. That now puts them on the side of the neo-liberal globalists – not a fashionable place for the centre-left these days.

But campaigning to radically slash immigrant numbers by unspecified amounts puts them in the camp of angry nationalists like Winston Peters, Donald Trump and Nigel Farage.

It would certainly be good to see some specifics from Labour –  it is after all only four and half months until the election.  But it is not as if Labour has always been some sort of “open borders” party.  It was the Labour icon, Norman Kirk, who in the 1970s put in place the biggest post-war adjustment to immigration policy, depriving people from the United Kingdom (then far and away the main source country) of their automatic right to move here.

For the last few decades, Labour and National have had much the same immigration policy –  believers, apparently, in the rhetoric of lifting productivity through immigration, and in the skill shortages, that never seem to ease no matter how many decades we wait.

Suggesting that Labour would cut immigration by tens of thousands certainly needs something concrete behind it –  and soon –  but I’m afraid that comparisons between Andrew Little (or Jacinda Ardern, Grant Robertson, David Parker and Phil Twyford) and Donald Trump simply aren’t worthy of a serious journalist, and especially not one making the high-minded call for a world-leading immigration debate.

Dann starts to come to the end of his column

We can’t let the politics become emotive. This is fundamentally about economics. It should be boring.

Not sure I entirely agree.  Politics is about conflicting world views and values.  There are, and inevitably will be, emotional dimensions about that.  Personally, I’m angry at the decades of failure by a succession of political leaders to really grapple with New Zealand’s economic underperformance.   And pretty upset about the apparent (practical) indifference to the housing disaster, all politically wrought.    But Dann asks

Can we quantify how much value immigrants add to the economy?

How does the added value compare with the economic cost of new infrastructure that we need to cope with increased population?

It isn’t really a fiscal question, but the honest answer to his first question is that “no, no one really has”.  It has been a programme based on faith and theory, and often the short-term self-interest of employers (especially those in the non-tradables sector).    The government does not know if large-scale immigration has added to New Zealand’s productivity over time.      For such a large experiment, that is an extraordinary failure.

Distributional issues matter.

The harder question is trying to understand how the value and costs are distributed.

Some established citizens will be bigger beneficiaries than others. There are different geographic impacts.

Given we’ve had an immigration policy that favours wealthy immigrants it is self-fulfilling that our policies have increased wealth in this country.

But they may also have exacerbated inequality

Again, he has lost me.  Most of our immigrants aren’t very skilled or wealthy at all –  most can’t even earn $49000 a year, the starting salary for a primary teacher with a basic degree.  So there is no automatic presumption that the country is wealthier as a result (again, per capita, the only measure that really counts).  And it shouldn’t really be news to the business editor of our largest-circulation paper that inequality hasn’t materially changed in New Zealand in the last couple of decades (at least if the distorted housing market is excluded).   The New Zealand Initiative, rightly, point it out repeatedly.

I’m all for a good quality debate about New Zealand’s immigration policy.  One is certainly well overdue.  But when Dann’s call for such a debate is so riddled with errors, misconceptions, and slurs, it is hardly a good start.      In the end, it is hard to avoid a conclusion that what Dann really wants is just a continuation of the status quo, with a few more houses and roads built, and the column is mostly an attempt to avoid the real debates.   It certainly isn’t the start of a world-leading debate, especially not one that engages seriously with the decades of serious economic performance, or with the revealed choices of New Zealanders –  for 40 years now –  to leave.

A government that simply makes things up

Perhaps all governments these days eventually do it, but one of the things that I’ve come to dislike most about our current government is the way they and their acolytes simply make stuff up.    I could, I suppose, understand them not actually doing anything much.  After all, they didn’t promise to do anything much.

But the endless spin, and stuff that is just made up, sickens me.  Apart from anything else, I try to bring up my kids heeding the biblical injunction to honour those in authority over us.  I don’t read that as suggesting people won’t disagree with those who hold office, but there is something quite sick about the political process –  and perhaps about a society that tolerates this stuff –  when so often one reads comments from senior ministers or the Prime Minister to which one can only  explain to kids interested in such things that “they are just making it up”.    We should expect much better than that.

I’ve written before about the current and former Prime Ministers’ dismissal of housing or conjestion problems as “quality problems” or “signs of success“.  And there are the repeated claims that New Zealand’s economy is doing better than almost any other advanced country –  a suggestion ably challenged in an article by journalist Graham Adams yesterday.   But today, since it is the day Murray McCully leaves ministerial office after a very long period in ministerial roles in two governments. I wanted to focus on an unfounded claim in a recent speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs by the outgoing Minister of Foreign Affairs.

He begins with an unexceptionable observation

The key feature of the past decade has been the rise of China, in terms of both our bi-lateral relationship, and as a regional and global power.

Not just of the past decade, but the past several decades.

And, as the Minister notes, there has been a big growth in bilateral trade (goods and services).

In my eight and a half years in this role I have seen our exports to China increase from around $2 billion to nearly $10 billion, and visitor numbers more than quadruple from under 100,000 to over 400,000.

But then he dramatically over-reaches

Had it not been for the dramatic expansion of trade and economic relations with China in the early years of the Key Government, New Zealand would have suffered a long and sustained recession, and all of the associated social challenges that we have seen in some European nations.

There is simply no support for this proposition anywhere in the rest of the speech.

The implication, of course, is that New Zealand has done well over the term of this government.  But here is a chart of real GDP per capita for New Zealand and the United States, both normalised to 100 in the December quarter of 2007, just prior to the recession.

real GDP pc NZ and US

The United States, you will recall, was the epicentre of the financial crisis, and had a very nasty fall in house prices.  The United States cut interest rates as far as they then thought they could go.

New Zealand, by contrast, had a relatively modest home-grown financial crisis (localised in the non-systemic finance companies), never reached the limits of conventional monetary policy, and had a much stronger fiscal position going into the recession than the US (or most other advanced countries had).  Oh, and we the big bonus of a sharp fall in interest rates, as a country that had borrowed heavily from the rest of the world.

And yet look at the chart.  The initial recession was certainly a little deeper in the US than it was here –  but China wasn’t a significant influence on what was happening here in 2008/09.  But then we had a double-dip recession in 2010.

For a couple of years it looked as though we might be doing a bit better than the US, at least on this metric, but even that optimistic possibility has now faded away.  Over the nine years shown, real GDP per capita has grown almost exactly as slowly in New Zealand as it has in the United States (average growth rates of barely 0.5 per cent per annum).   You’d have to know economic data pretty well to be able to tell apart the US and New Zealand lines for the last six years or so.

So we had a pretty nasty recession, which we took years to recover from.  On some metrics – eg the unemployment rate –  we still haven’t.  And all that even though China took up a larger share of our exports.  It is so even though in those “early years of the Key government”, China was a big source of demand driving activity in our biggest trade and investment partner, Australia.

The Minister seemed to be telling a trade and exports story –  certainly those are the numbers he quoted.    But here are exports as a share of GDP for the two countries, again back to December 2007.

exports to GDP US and NZ

In both countries, exports took a hit during the recession – in the US’s case it was mostly volumes, while it our case much of it was prices (the fall in export prices).   But, despite all that additional trade between New Zealand and China, our export share of GDP has fallen quite a bit over the last few years, while that in the US (always much lower, given that the US is a large country) has held remarkably steady.

Perhaps this fawning “China our saviour” line went over well when the Premier of China was visiting recently, but it really doesn’t amount to much at all.  The country composition of our exports has changed –  and for a couple of years perhaps high prices out of China for milk powder lifted farmer incomes –  but as a share of the overall income, exports have been shrinking.  We produce stuff (mostly bulk commodities), and someone buys it.  In recent years, China has been a more important buyer –  although Australia remains our largest export market –  and the free trade market with China is likely to have been helpful, but it has hardly transformed our economic fortunes.

There are other differences between the US and New Zealand experiences.  The US unemployment rate went up much more than ours did during the recession, but then came down much more sharply and is now a bit lower than ours.

U rates in floaters

But one striking difference over the last few years is in the estimated population growth rates.

population US and NZ

Overall, ours is a story of little or no productivity growth (none for the last five years), of an economy that –  going by the headline statistics –  seems increasingly inward focused, reliant on population-fuelled (and earthquake rebuild fuelled) domestic demand.   And it is a pretty poor performance all round.

There are, of course, worse places among the advanced countries, and if that is all the Minister had wanted to say, no one could disagree.  But instead he over-reached, suggesting that somehow we’d done well.  We haven’t.  And mostly that is down to our own choices –  or, more specifically, those of the government in which Mr McCully has been a senior minister.

What (e/im)migration data to use when

I was having a conversation with someone the other day, trying to explain both what data there were on movements of people into (and out of) New Zealand, and which data was useful for what purpose.  Reflecting on that afterwards, it seemed that a post might be useful.  This follows on from my post last week on the Herald’s misleading article on “work visas”, but is intended to be much general, not aimed at anyone  or any recent comment in particular, and to be something I can refer (others) back to.

For those who find my discursive posts a bit trying the quick summary is that if you want to talk about immigration policy –  something that only affects non-citizen movements –  use the MBIE data.  MBIE, of course, could and should make it much easier to do so.

Being an island a long way from anywhere, it is pretty easy to count pretty reliably the number of people coming into or leaving New Zealand.   Perhaps there are a few illegals who never declare themselves, but even if so it is a trivial issue for us.

And, of course, when you enter or leave New Zealand you have to fill in, and hand over, an arrival or departure card before you can continue with your journey.  We know exactly how many people come in and go out.  In principle, the data could be available daily, but in practice monthly is just fine.  Statistics New Zealand publish that data.

But these data often aren’t that useful for anything.     Even seasonally adjusted, this is what the quarterly data look like  (in all chart in this post, I’ve annualised any quarterly or monthly data, so that you can implicitly benchmark it against the headline net annual inflows people are most familiar with).

net arrivals

There is a huge amount of short-term volatility, and any new quarter’s information has almost no information value at all.   After the event you can see the big net inflow periods around 2002/03 and over the last few years, but it takes a lot of time to discern any trends.   Some of the volatility relates to identifiable one-off events: one can readily see the short-term inflows for the last Lions tour in 2005, and for the Rugby World Cup in 2011.  Much of the rest of the volatility can’t easily be pinned down, or adjusted for, at all.  So mostly (but see below) people don’t pay much attention to this series.   Using total movements data is made even harder by the fact that SNZ don’t publish a breakdown by citizenship (even though they have the data).

The permanent and long-term migration (PLT) data are a (largely successful) attempt to look through the noise, and provide a reasonable timely indicator of (changes in) the number of people coming and going fairly permanently.   If you say on your arrival/departure card that you are intending to come (or be away) for more than 12 months you end up in the PLT category.    This is what that data looks like (quarterly seasonally adjusted, and then annualised).

net PLT arrivals

There are still big cycles in this series, but the short-term volatility is much less than in the net total arrivals chart above  (and it would be even more obvious if the scale on the second chart was not much more compressed than that on the first chart).

What is more, SNZ publish this data by citizenship.  That enables us to separate out movements of New Zealand citizens, (who don’t permission at all to come and go), Australian citizens (who do need permission, but have been given ex ante blanket permission) and all other citizens, who need specific approval from the New Zealand government to come and stay.     I showed the chart of New Zealand and non-New Zealand citizens a week or so ago.

plt by citizenship apr 17

Both those series are also quite smooth.  Usually, it takes only a few quarters to see if the trends in these series have been changing.

That can be really useful, at least in principle, for some purposes.  If you are the Reserve Bank, trying to keep tabs on housing market pressures or overall pressure on resources, it is useful additional information.  It is more important here than in many countries both because immigration flows are so large, but also because the scale of the cyclical variations –  relative to the size of the economy –  are larger than in most advanced countries.

It is also useful information if you want to comment on the behaviour of New Zealanders (coming and going), because it is all the data we have.  New Zealanders don’t need permission to come and go  (it is also the only data on Australian citizen movements, but the size of those flows, and the variation in them, is quite small).

But the PLT data aren’t ideal by any means –  not even for the movements of New Zealanders.  As we’ll see below, they probably pick turning points quite well, but for levels they can at times be quite seriously misleading.

And that isn’t because of ill-will or malice on anyone’s part.  It simply reflects the fact the data rely on self-reported intentions.   Sometimes people aren’t sure of their plans, but even when (probably mostly) they are, plans change.   Plenty of New Zealanders head off to Australia, in particular, planning never to come back.  But some won’t find a job, and others will just miss friends and family, and they’ll be back within 12 months.  Others go, planning to be a way for only a few months, but they find they like it, a temporary turns more permanent, or perhaps they just fall in love.   And if they ever come back, it will be an absence much longer than 12 months.    And, even for New Zealanders, this all works in reverse: people come home, intending to stay, but actually…they miss the bright lights or whatever and are gone again a few months later.

Plans also change for non-citizens.  After a few months, some find New Zealand isn’t all it seemed on the brochure, and some go home again.  For others, they might have come for a few months, and then found opportunities for a work visa, or even eventually for residence.

You might think the differences/errors would be small, but often they aren’t.  They probably don’t much affect the usefulness of a single quarter’s data, compared with that for the prevous quarter, and for macro forecasters that might be almost all that matters.   But over very long periods, the differences can be massive (and unpredictable).    Here is a chart showing the cumulative net arrivals for the last 20 years or so, from both the PLT data and the total migration data.

net immigration

With this particular starting point, the cumulative gap isn’t that large at present.  But at times it has been very large.   (And the big differences at times aren’t just changes in the stock of tourists in New Zealand, or New Zealand tourists abroad.)   Cumulatively, over this 20 year period we’ve a bit more actual permanent and long-term migration than the arrival and departure cards suggested.   But in the last decade or so, it has been the other way round (as the gap between the two lines has materially closed).   It isn’t easy to get a sense of how much of the differences are changes of plans by New Zealand citizens and how much by non-New Zealanders.

Statistics New Zealand recognise that the PLT numbers they publish –  and which they themselves use in publishing quarterly population estimates for the periods between censuses –  are no more than approximate indicators.  Prompted by the Reserve Bank, a  couple of years ago they published this note on work they had done on Alternative methods for measuring permanent and long-term migration.

Here is their opening chart, which highlights (in particular) the big gap between total migration (net passenger movements) and recorded PLT in the 2002 and 2003 period.

Graph, Comparison between net passenger movements and recorded net PLT migration, year ended June 2000 to 2013.

They identified three possible methods of working out (later) who actually was away for, or in New Zealand for, more than 12 months.  Those methods produced impressively consistent results

Graph, Comparison between net recorded PLT and alternative net PLT migration methods, year ended June 2000 to 2013.

As is clear in the chart, the actual PLT inflow over 2002 and 2003 was much larger than had been suggested by the reported intentions of travellers in the published PLT data (in fact, since New Zealand’s population was quite a bit smaller then, the net inflow as a share of population at peak was a bit larger than what we’ve seen  –  according to published data –  in the last year or so.)

The limitation of these alternative methods is that they can be done only after a year has passed since the initial arrivals/departures happened.  That is no small point, but it is hardly unique to immigration data. Our official GDP series are regularly revised for several years after the quarter to which they relate, as better annual data come available to Statistics New Zealand.

Unfortunately, Statistics New Zealand apparently has no money to update or report these better estimates on an ongoing basis.  That seems quite extraordinary –  although perhaps par for the course in underfunding important statistics in New Zealand –  for data that plays such a significant role in economic monitoring and public debate in New Zealand.

The alternative methods don’t invalidate the use of the published PLT numbers for short-term cyclical analysis.  Even though these are only annual charts, you can see that the turning points in the series are much the same as in the published PLT data.  But if the absolute level of the net numbers can be out by so much –   as SNZ themselves recognise in completing this analytical work –  so, inevitably, will the absolute levels of the many of the derivative series drawn from the PLT numbers.  Use the overall PLT numbers by all means for some short-term purposes (is the rate of population growth right now accelerating, slowing or holding roughly steady), but it is crucial to recognise the limitations of those data.

Perhaps the new Minister of Statistics could look at securing some budgetary funding for Statistics New Zealand, to enable them to move those alternative methods into becoming a regularly-published and updated part of the suite of official statistics?

But if you want to have an informed discussion about immigration policy –  the choices by the New Zealand government as to how many non-citizens to allow to live and work here, under what terms and programmes – the PLT numbers really aren’t very useful at all.    After all, the PLT data only capture visa types rather loosely, and many people change the visa they are on while onshore (including more than 70 per cent of those eventually granted New Zealand residence visas).

More importantly, we can use –  what surely government officials advising ministers on immigration policy mostly use –  direct administrative data generated by MBIE itself on the numbers and types of visas granted, and to whom they are granted.  MBIE administer the immigration programmes, and grant the visas that are issued.  They know exactly how many they have issued, and to whom.  And they know when those visas are cancelled, and thus can tell you how many are outstanding.     It is immeasurably superior data for discussions of immigration policy.

The problem is that although MBIE has this data, and presumably could update it every single day from its own systems, it is really quite hard for the public –  and even analysts –  to use it on a timely basis.

Once a year they publish Migration Trends and Outlook, chock-full of interesting charts and tables.  And at the same time they provide accompanying detailed summary spreadsheets of the annual data both on the residence approvals programme –  the centrepiece of our immigration policy –  and on the numerous temporary visa programmes.   Those tables are great.

But these publications are available only with quite a lag.  Last year’s report, for the year to June 2016, came out in late November.  Presumably the next issue is now at least six months away.  For some purposes it isn’t a problem.    For others, it is serious problem.  Analysts cannnot simply go to the MBIE website (let alone the Statistics New Zealand website, where much of this should be accessible) and find easy to use summary data on a monthly or quarterly basis, seasonally adjusted where appropriate.    Consider another set of administrative data.   Building permits are also granted by government entities: Statistics New Zealand collect them from 70 or TLAs and make the data available, readily usable, by the end of the following month.   Since only one agency issues visas, there is really no excuse for not having at least as good data (coverage and timeliness and accessibility) on immigration approvals.

MBIE do put out quite a lot of data on a monthly basis.  But it is a series of enormous (eg half a million lines long) spreadsheets here.    You could, if you wanted, produce your own summary tables, formatted along the lines of MBIE’s annual tables, on a monthly basis.  You could, if had the technical capability, seasonally adjust the data yourself.    But to do so is a major hassle for any ordinary analyst (public sector, media or whatever), the more so when one is used to statistical agencies providing accessible summary data, in usable formats and seasonally adjusted where appropriate.     As I noted the other day, it took me an hour or so to generate 10 numbers on how many Essential Skills visas had been granted to nationals of various countries in the last year.  By contrast, it took less than two minutes to download the comparable data for earlier years (from the MBIE summary tables).

It isn’t good enough.    The outgoing head of MBIE, David Smol, and the Minister of Immigration should really make it a matter of priority to get this data out there, in readily usable form, on a high frequency and timely basis.   It is inconceivable that it would cost much to do so, and by doing so they would help contribute to a much better informed debate on actual immigration policy.   It isn’t as if, as in some countries, immigration policy is minor matter in New Zeland –  like or not, even MBIE recognise that we have one of the largest per capita immigration programmes of any advanced country.

Now, it is true that for many of visa programmes, neither the numbers approved nor the make-up of those who receive approvals, change very much from year to year.    Mostly, if you want to know about how many people, and what sort of people, we are approving, whether as residents, students, or the various classes of work visas, looking at the last annual numbers will give you a reasonable picture.  There just isn’t that much noise in the series –  and I commend the Migration Trends and Outlook tables to those, perhaps including those in political parties, wanting to offer deeper analysis or policy alternatives.  But year old data simply isn’t good enough, when much more timely data are available internally –  and could readily be formatted to be more widely usable by non-government analysts and commentators.   Nature abhors a vacuum, and when it is so much easier simply to fall back on timely PLT data then, with all their limitations, too many people will do so.  And the debate will be the poorer for that.

It can easily be done.  For example, Education New Zealand gets the student visa data, apparently within a few days of the end of each month.   They in turn transform that data into a fascinating monthly “dashboard” (an example is here).   There is no reason why we couldn’t have official detailed tables, and a Hot off the Press from Statistics New Zealand, for these and the other visa categories.  After all, immigration policy is (concretely) about how many visas we issue, to whom, and on what terms.   When people want to talk about how many work visas have been issued, and to whom, they shouldn’t be going anywhere near the PLT data.  They should turning automatically and instinctively to accessible data from the visa-granting agency.

And when people want to debate the medium-term contribution of immigration policy to New Zealand population growth, again they shouldn’t be going anywhere near the PLT data, but turning to the rich data MBIE has, going back a large number of years now, on the total numbers and the various possible breakdowns (age, nationality, sex, occupation, approval stream etc).   These are people who will, in most cases, be future New Zealanders.  By comparison, PLT arrivals data will shed almost no useful light at all.

(Sometimes, of course, like all statistics, if they can’t be used for actual illumination the PLT numbers can still be (mis)used for support).

Because you can’t easily get it from MBIE, here is the table I ran last week on one breakdown of residence approvals for the year ending March 2017 (with thanks to the reader with MS Access who did generated them).

Residence Approvals: Year ended 31 March 2017
Application Substream Application Criteria Number approved
Skilled Migrant Skilled Migrant 25,357
Work to Residence Talent – Accredited Employer 1,464
Investor Category Investor 2 Category 1,404
Entrepreneur Category Entrepreneur category 740
Work to Residence Long Term Skill Shortage List Occupation 527
Investor Category Investor 1 Category 154
Partnership Deferral Skilled Skills/Business deferral 142
Work to Residence Religious Worker 122
Work to Residence Talent – Sports 27
Employee of businesses Employees of businesses 3
Business / Skilled Sub-total 29,940
Refugee 1,902
Samoa Quota 1,008
Pacific Access 607
Other Ministerial direction 295
Other Victims of Domestic Violence 28
Section 61 Section 61 133
International / Humanitarian Sub-total 3,973
Family Tier 1 & 2 Family Parent Tier 1 2,555
Parent Family parent 457
Sibling Family sibling 397
Adult Child Family child adult 47
Sibling Family sibling 2
Parent Sibling Adult Child Stream Sub-total 3,458
Partnership Partnership 9,439
Dependant Child Family child dependent 1,861
Partnership Partnership – Partner of an Expatriate 1,247
Parent Retirement Parent Retirement 37
Partnership Deferral Family Partnership deferral 23
Dependant Child Family Child dependent – Dependants of an Expatriate 11
Partnership Partnership 3
Uncapped Family Sponsored Stream Sub-total 12,621

And here is my own (time-consuming) table of the top 10 countries for people getting granted Essential Skills work visas, updated to include the year to March 2017.

Essential skills visas granted, by country
2006/07 2015/16 12mths to Mar 17
Philippines 1695 5,408 6174
India 1943 4,812 4904
UK 4692 3,686 4086
Fiji 2145 1,973 1756
China 2749 1,823 1801
South Africa 2003 1,382 1807
Ireland 481 969 824
Brazil 1376 923 1066
South Korea 1145 828 767
United States 1493 820 837
Total all countries 31015 31766 32775

You should really be able to get those, and so much more, readily from MBIE. Sadly, you can’t.

As a result, the debate –  whichever angle you find yourself inclining towards – is poorer than it could, and should, be.

UPDATE: I can also recommend Alex Tarrant’s amusing piece on some of the data issues.

Brash vs Gould vs Brash

Former UK Labour MP (and academic administrator) Bryan Gould, and former Reserve Bank Governor (and political leader) Don Brash have been engaged in a fairly robust exchange of views in the op-ed pages of the Herald.

Gould began it a couple of weeks ago with a column, initially prompted by some combination of the initiatives from both the Minister of Finance, and the Labour Party, that may lead to governance reforms at the Reserve Bank, and Sonny Bill Williams’ Islam-inspired objections to interest, and hence to sponsorship by the BNZ.   The politicians being not very radical at all, Gould pointed us to Williams.

Sonny Bill, however, has succeeded, if we are thoughtful enough to recognise it, in throwing a spotlight on the entire role of the banks in our economy and our society.

Gould’s specific concern?

It is the willingness, not to say keenness, of the banks to lend on mortgage that provides the virtually limitless purchasing power that is constantly bidding up the prices of homes in Auckland and, now, elsewhere.

It is the banks that are fuelling the housing unaffordability crisis, a crisis that is leaving families homeless and widening the gap between rich and poor.

Gould isn’t keen on operational autonomy for the Reserve Bank, whether on monetary policy or banking regulation, at all.

Why should the Government be able to hide behind the Governor of the Reserve Bank and duck responsibility for a policy of the greatest importance to so many Kiwis? Why should ministers not be held to account in Parliament and to the country for failing to deliver outcomes they were elected to deliver?

And actually, I have some sympathy with him on that.   Banking regulation should be administered by the Reserve Bank, but approved by the Minister of Finance or Parliament itself.

But Gould’s argument isn’t some abstract one about the optimal assignment of powers within the Reserve Bank Act.     His concern is that banks create credit, and in so doing create new deposits, as a profit-making business.

They lend you money that they themselves create out of nothing, through the stroke of a pen or, today, a computer entry.

The banks make their money, in other words, by charging interest on money that they themselves create. Not surprisingly, they are keen to lend as much as possible.

In fact, most businesses are keen to increase volume, at least for as long as they can make money on the marginal addition to their sales.   Supermarkets are typically keen on selling you more groceries, health food shops on selling you more health food, fashion outlets on selling you more clothes etc.  But Gould’s bugbear is banks (and, presumably, other lending institutions).   To read Gould, you’d think that banks crammed money down the throats of unwilling borrowers.  There doesn’t seem to be any role for demand in his story (let alone for the regulatory restrictions that artificially inflate urban land values).  Banks, as currently structured, don’t appear to serve any socially useful purpose.

As you might expect, Don Brash –  a former Governor, a former ANZ director, and currently chair of one of the small Chinese banks in New Zealand –  disagreed.   Writing of Gould he notes

He then goes on to blame this money creation for the housing affordability crisis which Auckland now finds itself in, and to attack the Government for washing its hands of this aspect of the housing crisis.

Mr Gould is not alone in peddling this nonsense, but that certainly doesn’t make it correct.

Don Brash isn’t disputing the rather obvious point that the banking system, in the course of lending, also create deposits.  As he says

The banking system does create money.

But at this point he rather veers away from the substance of the issue (Gould’s claim that bank credit creation at the root cause of the housing affordability problems – dismissed by Brash as “peddling this nonsense”) to make a correct, and useful, but in this context perhaps subsidiary, point.    What is more or less true of the system as a whole, just isn’t true for any individual bank.

If individual banks really could create money by “the stroke of a pen or a computer entry”, as Mr Gould contends, why do they bother paying interest on deposits, why do they borrow funds from parent banks overseas, why do they borrow funds in the international market, why do they need to hold some funds in government securities as a liquidity reserve, why do some banks occasionally run out of money when customers lose confidence in them?

….I now chair the small New Zealand subsidiary of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China….. It would certainly make life very much easier if we could, “by the stroke of a pen or a computer entry”, simply create the money which we lend out to New Zealand borrowers. Unfortunately, we can’t.

Individual banks, and their managers and boards, have to worry (sometimes a lot) about the funding side of their balance sheets.  If Don Brash’s bank increases lending to New Zealand borrowers, that process will indeed create new deposits for the New Zealand banking system as a whole.  But there is no guarantee any of those deposits will come back to his bank.  In the immediate term,  if one bank increases lending more than other banks do, that will lead to a loss of liquidity from the lending bank.  In boom times, it might be easy to fund such rapid lending growth.  In times of crisis, funding can be almost everything.  I was heavily involved in these issues in the midst of the 2008/09 financial crisis, and recall banks telling us then that no matter what initiatives the government or the Reserve Bank took, they’d be reluctant to increase lending if they couldn’t count on secure on-market funding.  Their Boards just wouldn’t let them.

But in a way, Brash’s response didn’t actually deal with Gould’s point –  that for the banking system as a whole, deposits don’t usually constrain lending. Rather the two typically grow as part of a simultaneous process (with some exceptions about changes in the current account deficit etc).  If so, perhaps the credit creation process could be the root cause of the (housing) problem?

Gould returned to the fray in a column in yesterday’s Herald.   But, oddly, he doesn’t attempt to defend his view that banks are the cause of the housing problem.  Rather he tries to teach the former Governor to suck eggs, offering lay lessons in monetary economics, and suggesting that Brash doesn’t really know what he is talking about.

In fact, he first misrepresents what Brash said

…..I said the vast majority of new money in circulation is created by the banks “by the stroke of a pen”, and they then make their profits by charging interest on the money they create.

If this is “nonsense”, the “peddlers” include some very distinguished economists.

But, as you can see from the quotes above, Brash seems to be mostly using the “peddling nonsense” phrase to respond to the housing affordability argument.  Moreover, he explicitly states (see above) that the banking system creates money  (personally, I’d prefer he’d used “deposits” rather than “money”).

In fact, in the entire latest Gould column there is not a single mention of the housing issue.  Instead, there are extensive quotes from a very good –  but entirely conventional –  Bank of England Bulletin article from a few years ago on how the credit and deposit creation process actually works, and how that process is quite different from the very stylised approach that often lingers in elementary economics textbooks.     In fact, our Reserve Bank made many of the same points in an article in their Bulletin a few years earlier.  A (then) Reserve Bank senior manager was making these points in a speech 15 years ago.  But the Bank of England article is very good.    Then again, recall that the Bank of England runs things pretty much exactly the same way our Reserve Bank does.    There simply isn’t any stunning fresh insight in the BOE piece to up-end how best to think about monetary policy and banking regulation.

So when Gould quotes the BOE piece

They then go on to say, “Another common misconception is that the central bank determines the quantity of loans and deposits in the economy by controlling the quantity of central bank money – the so-called ‘money multiplier’ approach…[but that] is not an accurate description of how money is created in reality.”

They go on. “Banks first decide how much to lend depending on the profitable lending opportunities available to them – which will, crucially, depend on the interest rate set… It is these lending decisions that determine how many bank deposits are created by the banking system.

Anyone who knows anything about this stuff is simply drumming their fingers, and going “yes, yes, tell us something we didn’t know”.   But do notice the mention of interest rates in that second paragraph.  The way central banks choose to manage the monetary system these days relies on adjusting an official interest rate, not on attempting to directly manage quantities (of base money, lending, deposits or whatever).   Demand for credit matters quite a lot, and the interest rate is a key rationing device.     When overall demand is weak at any given interest rate –  as has been the case for the last decade –  interest rates tend to fall, and official interest rates are typically cut.  Banks can’t just generate new demand out of thin air.

Gould concludes

But the capacity they [banks] have is hugely important. I concluded by asking whether it was wise to entrust such wide-ranging powers – so significant in their impact on the whole economy – to the banks, and then to arrange that the only person able to regulate that impact was himself a banker – the Governor of the Reserve Bank.

Reasonable people can differ on the extent to which banks should be regulated, and even on who should do the regulation (one should always cautious about the risk of capture, of bureaucrats/ministers by those they are supposed to be regulating).

But in his two articles put together, Gould has done nothing (at all) to substantiate his claim that banks are the prime (or even just a key) source of the housing affordability problems.    Simply describing the way in which credit and deposits are created, across the banking system as a whole, contributes little.

I would grant one point.  If banks could not create credit – in the process (simultaneously) allowing young generations to borrow from older ones – house price cycles would look rather different.  Perhaps house prices would be a little lower.  But the biggest change would probably be not in the level of house prices, but in who owned the houses.   Even more young people would be unable to purchase their own home, and more of those homes would be owned by those not constrained by access to credit (be it the evil “investors”, cashed-up foreigners, or institutional vehicles such as pension funds).  Systemic credit risks might be lower, but at what cost to individual families etc?  The fundamental factors that create (artificial) scarcity  –  land use restrictions running hard into rapidly rising population-fuelled demand –  wouldn’t have changed at all.

And for believers in the idea that the banking system is the source of the problem, it is often worth pointing them to the United States.    It has the same sort of banking system we do –  the banking system simulataneously creates loans and deposits –  and yet vast swathes of the country, including big cities often with quite rapid population growth, have had no problems with unaffordable house prices (as a resource on this, try this excellent interview with leading US housing academic Joseph Gyourko, which almost deserves its own post).  The private banking system isn’t the problem.  Land use and housing supply restrictions are.    The banking system certainly enables some people who would otherwise be squeezed out completely to purchase (in fact that is what it always did for first home buyers –  whether the “bank” was a private one, or the State Advances Corporation).  If house prices ever do fall back a long way, some borrowers might well regret having borrowed.   But in all sorts of areas of life, hindsight is like that. For now, they’ve made the best decisions they could for themselves, with the information they have,

Monetary reform ideas have a long tradition –  sometimes advocated by some pretty prominent economists (eg Laurence Kotlikoff, who came through New Zealand a few years ago).  Usually, there is (a lot) less there than the advocates make out.  Sometimes – as with Social Credit –  the analysis is simply misconceived, or even straight-out nutty.  I suspect Gould is in the former camp.  We could, if we wanted to, have a quite different system of monetary management.  I think we’d mostly be worse off if we did.  And since our system is the same system adopted now across virtually the entire world, the burden of proof should surely be on the advocates of change to demonstrate that the outcomes of their alternative visions would be demonstrably superior.  Gould hasn’t done that.  And it is no use simply going ‘but the 2008/09 crisis was so awful, anything has to be better’ without a great deal more supporting analysis, of the causes and consequences of those crisis episodes, than is on offer here.

 

When Australia’s unemployment drops, more people will go there again

I had things more interesting (at least to me) to write about today, but I heard the Minister of Finance on Morning Report talking up the alleged strength of the New Zealand economy, noting that we were now – in some way or another –  doing what south-east Queensland had done previously, becoming all that we always wanted to be, and so New Zealanders weren’t fleeing the country any more.  He was careful not to suggest that the diaspora is coming home –  they simply aren’t, and haven’t at any time in the 40 years since the large trend net outflow began.    As if it is somehow relevant to current New Zealand immigration policy debates – and recall that immigration policy is about non-citizens – he and others keep telling us “but they could”.    It can happen.  It did to some extent in Ireland, but it happened there after they structurally transformed their economy and successfully lifted their productivity performance.  There is no sign of such a successful transformation here, whether under this government or the long run of its predecessors.

I’ve run this cartoon before
richardson

As I noted, since this was first run in early 1991

…. we’ve had Bill Birch, Winston Peters, Bill English, Michael Cullen, and Bill English again, and although we’ve had plenty of cyclical ups and downs, never at any time have we looked like successfully or sustainably reversing our relative economic decline.

And now we can add Steven Joyce to the list.

But what about those net migration flows to Australia that the Minister was talking about?

net PLT to Aus

Going back 1978/79, I’ve shown three different measures of net outflow here:

  • New Zealand citizens only
  • New Zealand and Australian citizens (the group not requiring specific approval to move trans-Tasman)
  • all citizenships

Mostly the patterns are all but identical, and dominated by fluctuations in the movement of New Zealand citizens.  That makes sense: New Zealanders are free to move, and New Zealand has been materially poorer than  Australia throughout this almost 40 year period.     And over that period, there is no very obvious change in the trend –  just large average outflows, but very large cyclical fluctuations in those net outflows.

It is interesting that right at the end of the chart there is some divergence.  Over the last year, for the first time in 40 years, there has been a net inflow of around 2000 non New Zealand/non-Australian citizens from Australia.  I’m not quite sure why that is, but it is broadly consistent with the theme of this post.  Given a choice between going to Australia or staying in New Zealand, not many people tend to go when the Australian labour market is weak.     Over the last 12 months, a net 4206 New Zealanders left for Australia, but that is a lot lower than the average of around 25000 in a typical year.

In that chart above there have been five episodes when the net flow to Australia (on any of the measures shrunk a lot for a period).  The peaks were around:

  • 1982/83
  • 1991
  • 2002/03
  • 2009/10
  • the present.

And here is a chart of Australia’s unemployment rate.

Aus U

It  shouldn’t be any great surprise that all those temporary reductions in the net outflow to Australia coincided with periods of increased unemployment in Australia.  If anything, the Australian unemployment rate looks more important as an explanatory factor than, say, the difference between the New Zealand and Australian unemployment rates.   In 1991, for example, both countries had very high unemployment  –  and at present both countries have unemployment rates well above pre-recession levels.

The greater importance of the Australian unemployment rate shouldn’t be a surprise.  New Zealanders don’t need to have a firm job offer, or advance approval, to move to Australia.  They can do so “on spec”, looking for work once they arrive.   But a typical person will be much less likely to take that risk if the search process in Australia is going to be long and arduous and might fail altogether.  And the risks have increased over the years, as Australian first tightened access to welfare for New Zealanders living in Australia, and then as people become more aware of the rather limited entitlements New Zealanders have there, even if they have been in Australia for some years.

It isn’t a mechanical relationship of course.  And the Australian unemployment rate now –  at around 6 per cent –  is a lot lower than it was in those 1983 and 1991 peaks.  But since the wage gaps between New Zealand and Australia haven’t narrowed at all, and the productivity gaps have continued to widen,  it seems only prudent to assume that as and when the Australian labour market improves, the net outflow to Australia will resume in something like full historical numbers.

In the repeated burble from the government about the alleged strength of the New Zealand economy, it is often overlooked that while our unemployment rate is not high in absolute terms it is still well above what we experienced pre-recession, and more so than is the case for most other advanced countries that have control of their own monetary policy.   And Australia is in much the same position,

U rates in floaters

And even most of these countries largely ran out of conventional monetary policy room.  Neither New Zealand or Australia did.   Neither labour market is that strong.  Against that backdrop it shouldn’t really be surprising that the outflow to Australia has temporarily slowed.   It doesn’t reflect any credit (or discredit for that matter) on our government.  It looks like mostly a cyclical issue in Australia.  An easier stance of policy by the Reserve Bank of Australia  –  which would have been warranted with inflation persistently below target – would probably have seen rather stronger outflows even over the last couple of years.

UPDATE:  Just to reinforce the point about Australian unemployment, here is an ABS chart from a few months ago highlighting how their underemployment measure has not fallen even as the official unemployment rate has.

Graph 1, Unemployment and Underemployment rate, November 1980 to November 2016
Graph: Graph 1, Unemployment and Underemployment rate, November 1980 to November 2016

 

France and some near-neighbours

After a run of posts on immigration, or indeed on Reserve Bank issues, I often feel like something completely different.  No doubt that is a relief to readers, but it also helps remind me that I intend to write about what takes my fancy and interests me, and not primarily pushing particular causes.

And it is not as if I want to weigh in to the Herald vs Winston Peters contretemps, in which (at least on my reading) the Herald was using numbers that were accurate but seriously misleading (whether with an agenda, or just because they weren’t famliar with the better data, or some combination of the two, I have no idea), while Winston Peters was also, as far as I can tell, factually accurate but really rather distasteful.

But France is coming towards the end of a fascinating election campaign, which (for political junkies) has meant lots of fascinating articles about French politics, French society, and so on.   It has resolved to a race between two unconventional candidates, neither with strong parliamentary support, and so potential challenges in governing.  And if, as seems likely, Macron wins, the challenge to the “globalist” establishment seems unlikely to go away any time soon.

No doubt there have been some articles around on the French economy, but I must have missed them.   So I decided to download some data, mostly from the IMF World Economic Outlook database, and amuse myself by looking at a few comparisons between France on the one hand, and Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany on the other (with a sideways glance at the rather different UK economy from time to time).  They seem like good comparators for France, as Australia often is for New Zealand.    References to New Zealand will be few and far between, but just note that these are all countries with materially higher real GDP per capita than New Zealand has.   And the productivity gaps –  using real GDP per hour worked –  are much larger again.    For those four continental countries, the OECD estimates that average GDP per hour worked is now more than 60 per cent higher than that in New Zealand.

First up is a comparison of real per capita GDP growth, in national currency terms (although of course all four continental countries use the same currency now) since 1990.

real GDP pc growth Fr etc

Over that full period, France has been clearly the worst performer, but interestingly that has only been clear since about 2010.   Until then, on this measure Germany and France had been tracking very closely together.

And some of the difference with Germany may still “just” be cyclical (things that economists put “just” in front of can still matter quite a bit in elections).  Here are the IMF estimates of the respective output gaps.

output gap fr

There is materially more excess capacity in France than in the other four countries.

Consistent with this, the unemployment rate is materially higher in France than in the other countries.  It is about 10 per cent in France, compared with a range of 4 to 6 per cent for Germany, Netherlands and the UK (with Belgium in the middle). France probably has a higher NAIRU.    But here is the IMF estimate of this year’s unemployment rate, less the actual unemployment rate for 2007, the last year of the previous boom.

U rate FranceFrance is, again, the worst performer.

The government debt position is pretty poor too (although not that much worse than the UK’s).

govt debt fr

I’m never quite sure why people think Germany should increase government spending and increase its government debt –  especially in a country with little or no population growth.   France’s numbers –  among the very highest in any advanced country –  don’t look like something to emulate, no matter good the resulting school lunches might be.

govt spending france

Current account numbers aren’t that easy to interpret without lots of context, but even for an advanced economy with modest population growth, surpluses the size of Germany’s (or the Netherlands) look, at very least, anomalous.   There isn’t anything inherently virtuous about France’s near-balance position, but it typically wouldn’t be an indicator of serious trouble either.

CAD Fr

With a bit more demand and a stronger cyclical position – hard to engineer with such high public debt, and no national monetary policy – the current account deficit would no doubt be a bit wider.

It isn’t all a bad news story.  Here, for example, is total investment as a share of GDP.

investment fr

The investment share of GDP in France last year was higher than that of any of these countries –  far higher, for example, than in cyclically more-stretched Germany.   At least some of those big, really successful, global French companies must have been seeing some good opportunities at home.

Despite all that government spending and generous welfare provision, nothing really stands out about the French national savings rate either.

savings fr

Even within common currency areas, real exchange rates can move – at times quite considerably. We saw that a lot in the run-up to the crisis, with real exchange rate appreciations in peripheral countries (such as Ireland) relative to core euro countries. Perhaps such movements help explain, or mitigate, France’s disappointing relative performance?

These are the BIS’s broad real exchange rate measures for France and Germany.

exch rate fr

The two countries’ real exchange rates have moved all but identically ever since the creation of the euro.    It isn’t clear why there hasn’t been more movement (especially in recent years) but it isn’t hard to suspect that if the franc and mark were again different currencies, we wouldn’t have seen anything like as strong a common trend.

Over the longer-term, it is hardly as if France is some hopeless case.   If we look at meausures of labour productivity, real GDP per hour worked (in PPP terms)  in each of France, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany are among the highest anywhere, averaging something very similar to the US numbers  (the UK is quite a bit lower).   The OECD’s series for that data goes back to 1970.  Here is how France has done relative to the other three continentals.

fr real gdp phwFrance caught up over the first few decades and has largely held its own since, at least relative to these comparators.

Of course, one of the striking things about France is how little labour input is used.

employment rates fr.png

Since, as we saw above, the French unemployment rate is higher than usual, the picture is slightly exaggerated at present.  but the difference between France (and Belgium) and the other three countries is stark.      (In New Zealand, by the way, the employment rate in the same quarter was 66.9 per cent, while the US is similar to Germany, Netherlands and the UK.)

The differences are just as stark, if not more so, if we look at hours worked per capita.  Here I use the Conference Board’s Total Economy database.

hours worked per capita Fr

The average French person –  man, woman, child, young middle-aged and old –  worked around 600 hours last year.  The average New Zealander worked more than 50 per cent more –  and still managed clearly the lowest real GDP per capita of any country in this chart.   So little output for so much input.

There are lots of stories about the possible connections between hours and productivity.  If, for example, you impose tough regulations and make employing labour very expensive, firms will have to adapt such that the people who are employed are highly productive (they have to earn their keep).   The less productive firms and people are simply priced out.   But higher taxes –  certainly than somewhere like New Zealand –  and provisions of retirement income policies also play a part in discouraging French working hours, and not just from the unproductive.  Plenty of very capable people have long holidays, shortish work weeks, and relatively early retirements.   As a result, French GDP per capita is lower than those of the other continentals in this sample, even though productivity per hour worked is very similar.

I don’t have strong lessons to draw from this post –  it was a discursive tour, as much out of curiosity as anything.  But I’ve long been a sceptic of the euro and –  disruptive as a break-up or withdrawal inevitably would be –  it isn’t obvious that French voters could look on the single currency as any sort of unalloyed blessing for them, and their country, especially in the years since 2007.

There are good reasons to be glad not to be in France –  Islamic terorism among them. But when one looks as these data –  not just for France but for each of the continental countries here –  from a New Zealand perspective, aware of all the regulation and high taxes etc in France, it is a reminder of how much location really does seem to matter.  I’m in the middle of reading a wonderful new book by a leading academic expert on trade, convergence etc –  which I expect I will write about here soon.  As he notes, technological innovations made extensive trade in goods possible from the 19th century, and then trade in ideas (all that ICT), but if anything face-to-face contact now seems to matter more than ever, and firms and global economic activity seems increasingly concentrated in cities and regions like those of northern Europe (or east Asia, or North America), not in the isolated peripheries.

 

Which countries did Essential Skills visa grantees come from in the last year?

As I’ve said, MBIE do release approvals data monthly, but it is hard to use (at least for a lay person with a spreadsheet). The temporary approvals spreadsheet is some half a million lines long.

But I decided to brave it anyway.  The spreadsheet contains approvals up to the end of March 2017.  And I was curious as to whether there was anything in the Essential Skills approvals (those for some of the more –  supposedly –  skilled roles) to back the suggestions being made by the Herald and Professor Paul Spoonley.  To minimise my effort –  and the last column of this little table took the best part of an hour –  I focused just on approvals of people from the 10 countries that were top of the list in the latest summary MBIE data (that for the year to June 2016).

There is some overlap in the last two columns.  The first two columns are June years (the basis of MBIE’s summary data) and the final column is a March year (seeing as it is still April now).

Essential skills visas granted, by country
2006/07 2015/16 12mths to Mar 17
Philippines 1695 5,408 6174
India 1943 4,812 4904
UK 4692 3,686 4086
Fiji 2145 1,973 1756
China 2749 1,823 1801
South Africa 2003 1,382 1807
Ireland 481 969 824
Brazil 1376 923 1066
South Korea 1145 828 767
United States 1493 820 837
Total all countries 31015 31766 32775

But there isn’t much sign of the patterns having changed in the most recent year.  Of the European countries, UK approvals are up a bit, but still below where they were a decade ago, and Irish approvals are down a bit, but still above where they were a decade ago.  And by a clear margin, approvals of people from the Phippines and India top the list.

Two other things caught my eye.   Total approvals haven’t changed much  –  in the last year, or in the last decade (although they did dip during the recession).  And approvals for people from China have been tailing off.  The peak year for Chinese approvals was, in fact, 2004/05.

 

Work visas outstanding – a simple chart

To repeat my point in my earlier post, I don’t greatly care which country our economic immigrants come from.  The skills and ideas they bring are what matter most in terms of the prospect of economic benefits to New Zealanders.  The data suggest that typical skill level is a lot lower than successive governments have suggested.

But in this chart I simply take the annual MBIE data on the country of citizenship of holders of outstanding work visas (all types of work visas, but not including students here on student visas but with work rights) and group the countries by continent.   The data are all from MBIE’s Migration Trends and Outlook tables.

share of work visas

Over those years, the number of outstanding work visas increased from  94,370 to 132,781.

The advantage of these data is that they show outstanding stocks, so remove all those who have come and then gone again.   The disadvantages are that:

  • the most recent data relate to the year ending last June.  However, as the chart suggests, the patterns don’t seem to change that much from year to year.  The chart is unlikely to be misleading about the current position,
  • the chart includes people on working holiday visas.  Ideally, we would look at them separately, but for those focused on the Asia vs other split the working holiday vias numbers are dominated by European countries (UK, Germany, France, with only South Korea and Japn in the top 10, well behind the big three)
  • the chart doesn’t include those here on student visas exercising their legal rights to work.    Those numbers will be totally dominated by people from Asian countries.

To repeat again, I’m interested in the policy settings, and the overall (including distributional) economic effects.   But it is still worth clearing away attempts to muddy the water, and the Herald’s suggestion, using inadequate PLT data, that temporary migrants on work visas are not dominated by people from Asian countries, is misleading at very best.

Questionable Herald analysis

I wasn’t going to write about immigration  today at all, but a radio station rang up last night and invited me to go on their show this morning to discuss an article in today’s Herald that runs under the headline Top source countries for migrant workers are not Asian.

Since I had to get up early anyway, and since the article gives me the chance to make two points, I thought I’d respond.

Perhaps my key point is that flawed articles like this really should reinforce the message to MBIE, that I made in a post the other day,  that while MBIE’s annual immigration approvals data are good and useful, they are only available with a long lag,  and the monthly data they provide is limited, little-known, difficult to use, and therefore largely overlooked.    If people can’t readily use that – accurate, official, adminstrative –  data they will use what they can easily get.  In this case, that is the permanent and long-term migration data derived from arrival and departure cards, and reliant on the self-reported intentions of people when they cross the border.  It is published monthly and hogs the headlines, but for actual analysis of immigration policy (which affects non-citizens) it just isn’t very good at all.

The Herald builds an article around this opening

A rise in work visas has been the driving force behind record immigration numbers but the main source countries are not from Asia.

A Herald analysis into immigration data found work visa arrivals increased from 16,787 in 2004 to 41,576 last year.

The top five source countries for work visas last year are the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, South Africa and the United States of America.

They get those numbers not from data on the number of work visas issued, or outstanding, but on the basis of PLT arrivals data.   When people arrive at the airport they complete an arrivals card, indicate whether (at that time) they intend/expect to stay 12 months or more, and the reason for their visit.    The “reason for visit” isn’t tightly mapped to the various different visa classes, and all the non-New Zealand arrivals are grouped under four main headings (Residence, Student, Visitor or Work) and a small “Other” category.

So these data are correctly reported by the Herald, but:

  • SNZ only publish the data by previous country of residence, not country of citizenship (although they must have the latter data).   The Herald should have been a little wary when they noticed Australia high up on their list, since Australian citizens don’t need work visas to live and work here.  Published data don’t let us work out which country (citizenship) those people were actually from, but if someone worked in Australia for a couple of years and then came on to New Zealand there is no meaningful sense in which they are “Australian”.
  • The PLT data only attempt to capture the visa people held at the point they crossed the border.   Huge numbers of people change their visa while here –  more than 70 per cent of residence visas are granted to people who were already living here.  Perhaps more importantly in this context, many people who come on student visas –  probably almost all of those in the PLT (more than 12 months) category –  now have work rights while they are here.  And when they complete their qualification, many can acquire a “study to work” work visa.  So if we are trying to understand which country the migrants (temporary or permanent) who are working here come from, the PLT numbers are barely any use at all.

In fact, MBIE knows exactly who has an outstanding work visa (which doesn’t include students working while on a student visa), and which country those people are citizens of.  They now publish the data each year.  Here are the top 10 countries as at 30 June last year.

Outstanding temporary work visas by country, as at 30 June 2016
India 25,479
United Kingdom 15,040
China 12,192
Philippines 11,980
France 6,126
Germany 5,011
Fiji 4,912
United States 4,431
South Korea 3,443
Japan 3,102

The UK is still important, but it is swamped by people from India, and China and the Philippines aren’t far behind the UK.   We only have this particular data since 2009, but back then the UK was the largest source country for people with outstanding work visas.  Since then the UK numbers have only increased a little, while the Indian numbers have more than trebled.     And all that is so even though these stock numbers include the numbers here on working holiday (work) visas, where European countries (Germany, UK, and France) dominate the annual approvals numbers.

What about approvals data?  Here are the top 10 countries of people granted Essential Skills work visas in 2015/16.

Essential skills visas granted, by country, 2015/16
Philippines 5,408
India 4,812
United Kingdom 3,686
Fiji 1,973
China 1,823
South Africa 1,382
Ireland 969
Brazil 923
South Korea 828
United States 820

A decade ago, the UK was clearly the largest source country.

And here are the top 10 countries of people granted Family work visas (note, work visas –  these aren’t the residence approvals).

Family work visas granted, by country, 2015/16
India 7,720
China 4,012
Philippines 3,216
United Kingdom 2,566
Fiji 1,895
South Africa 1,407
United States 1,186
South Korea 865
Brazil 643
Sri Lanka 584

Again 10 years ago the UK was the largest single source country.

MBIE don’t provide this breakdown for those granted “study to work” visas, (even though the number of those visas granted has increased from around 6000 in 2005/06 to around 22000 last year.   And since student visa numbers are totally dominated by people from Asian countries

Student visas granted, by country, 2015/16
China 25,931
India 19,920
South Korea 4,888
Philippines 3,996
Japan 3,604
United States 2,914
Thailand 2,176
Brazil 1,961
Fiji 1,886
Germany 1,850

…we might reasonably assume that almost all of the study to work visas have gone to citizens of Asian countries.

And finally, of course, there is the residence approvals programme.     The overwhelming bulk of these approvals are granted to people already living in New Zealand, who arrived on one or other of the temporary visas programmes and eventually qualified for residence.  Here are the top 10 countries, for 2015/16 and for 2005/06 , 10 years earlier.

Residence approvals by source country
2005/06 2015/16
China 6,773 9,360
India 3,334 8,498
United Kingdom 14,674 4,934
Philippines 1,252 4,614
South Africa 4,033 2,970
Fiji 2,366 2,230
Samoa 2,188 2,156
United States 1,838 1,288
South Korea 2,260 1,125
Pakistan 140 882

Total approvals didn’t change much over that decade, but the composition (by source country) did.  One forgets I suppose, but I was a little surprised to realise that even 10 years ago the UK was still far and away the largest single source country.

Which country our temporary or permanent migrants come from isn’t a big concern of mine, and has never been a focus of my analysis of the possible connection between immigration and economic performance.  I don’t much care where migrants come from, but about what skills and talents they bring.   That said, I was interested in the new study by Harvard researchers that I linked to a few weeks ago, suggesting that if there were economic benefits from immigration (and that particular study reckoned there were) they were most evident when the migrants were from countries that are richer than the recipient country, or from countries with a degree of cultural similarity to the recipient country.   Perhaps that result won’t stand up to close scrutiny over time, but it does make quite a lot of intuitive sense.   On that residence approvals list, only the UK and the US are richer than us.

And as a final note, I repeat my plea to MBIE to markedly improve the availability of such summary data on immigration approvals (and outstanding visas).  They hold all the data, and there is no reason why these data could not be available, and easy to use, on a monthly or quarterly basis within a few days of the end of the relevant period.     Debate about immigration policy is often difficult enough, but it is made more so when the good timely data just aren’t made easily available, and people fall back on what they can find, inadequate for purpose as it often is.

Immigration thoughts over 40 years

Readers might suppose that I have always been sceptical of large scale immigration to New Zealand.  It would be more accurate to say that for most of my life I never gave it much thought.

I first remember being aware of immigration as a political issue when I was at intermediate school in Auckland in the early-mid 1970s  That was a period of very high immigration, and about the time of the big policy change initiated by the Kirk Labour government which removed from British citizens the automatic right they had previously had to settle here.  Pacific island immigration was also an issue.  But despite being a bit of a political nerd even then, my only perspective on it was that of a South Islander reluctantly resident in Auckland: I recall advocating a cap on Auckland’s population and forcing incomers to move elsewhere in the country.

There wasn’t much non-citizen immigration to New Zealand over the following 15 years, although the developing exodus of New Zealanders was an issue.   And even as policy changed in the late 80s and early 1990s, the high rate of unemployment still meant that non-citizen immigrant numbers were low.    As late as 1992 there was a net inflow of only around 13000 non-citizens.    I don’t recall immigration data ever getting much discussion around the Reserve Bank Monetary Policy Committee table, although the modellers had interesting equations to explain, in particular, the trans-Tasman flow.    I was the manager of the Bank’s forecasting team for a while, and I also don’t recall us ever paying much attention to immigration data then either (anyone else who was there can correct me if my memory is faulty).

I went overseas for a couple of years and when I came back we were in the midst of the first big inward wave of non-citizen migrants since liberalisation.     Those flows put a lot of pressure on house prices, especially in Auckland, and also on the economy’s real resources.    We were a bit slow to understand what was going on, but eventually appreciated (as our predecessors had in earlier decades) that the demand pressures from increased immigration typically exceeded the boost to supply, at least in the short-term.  Being the Reserve Bank we didn’t have much interest in (or any responsibility for) the longer-term issues, and certainly didn’t have an institutional view on whether in the longer-term large non-citizen immigration was of economic benefit to New Zealanders.

It was the 21st century before the issue came back to the fore again, with the sharp increase in non-citizen immigration numbers around 2002/03 –  some of it the increase in foreign students in response to the exchange rate.    The Bank was a bit gun-shy by this time, at having made some material monetary policy mistakes in the late 1990s, and I remember arguing (I wince at the memory) that there was a case to “look through” the net excess demand effects of increased immigration, because they were likely to be ‘one-off” in nature.  I certainly didn’t have a view, or much of an interest in, the longer-term issues.    Being a central banker, I was probably only interested in the monthly PLT numbers, and wasn’t even aware there was a residence approvals programme and a numerical target/”planning range”.

To cut the story short, I had little interest in the issues until I was involved with the 2025 Taskforce, set up to advise the government on why the large income and productivity gaps to Australia had opened up, and to recommend a policy programme that might close the gaps over the following 15 years.   I was seconded to Treasury at the time, and there was also quite a bit of interest there in why New Zealand’s interest rates were so high (relative to those abroad).   The 2025 Taskforce did not –  as readers might expect –  come out in favour of high rates of immigration.  One of the Taskforce members was the Australian economist Judith Sloan, who had lead the Australian Productivity Commission’s 2006 report on immigration.   She persuaded the Taskforce to adopt a line, consistent with that earlier report, suggesting that immigration was unlikely to offer much, if anything, in boosting medium-term GDP per capita (or productivity).

I came away from involvement with the Taskforce pretty supportive of the list of measures, and way of thinking about things, that they proposed.     But the more I reflected on the issues, the more it started to seem like a list of measures that, while useful, was unlikely to make a large enough difference to close the gap.   And as our exchange rate rebounded after the 2008/09 recession, I began to focus again on trying to understand why our real interest rates were still so high (relative to the rest of the world), noting that as a result of those high interest rates, the real exchange rate had averaged far higher than relative productivity underperformance might lead one to expect.   I was involved with a Treasury working paper published during this time arguing that the explanation for the high interest rates seemed most plausibly to lie in things affecting aggregate savings and investment preferences (demand for and supply of savings) in New Zealand.

It was only out of all that experience –  mostly down to the good fortune of the secondment to Treasury –  that my current way of thinking started to develop.  That was as recent as 2010.   I was fortunate enough that the Savings Working Group – another government appointed working group –  got interested in an early version of the ideas, and reflected some of them in their report.   And I was able to push them a little further in discussant comments, and then in a paper, in two conferences on macroeconomic and exchange rate issues sponsored by the Reserve Bank and Treasury.    But it wasn’t an issue that was of much interest, or importance, to the Reserve Bank (reasonably enough), and in fact the Bank became increasingly uneasy about my involvement in the area.  Immigration policy inevitably had political dimensions, and it wasn’t an issue the Bank was ever likely to take a preferred policy position on.

Through this period, my focus was very high-level and macroeconomic in nature.  I kept being told –  by Treasury and MBIE – that our immigration programme was one of the best in the world (and there were papers to prove it).   I didn’t have any reason to disagree (I didn’t have the detailed knowledge and my background was macroeconomics), but as I always stressed, if my argument/analysis was valid, it was so broadly speaking regardless of the quality of the individual immigrants.   Persistent excess demand pressures, in an economy with a pretty moderate savings rate, would put pressure on real interest rates and the real exchange rate and skew the economy away from business investment more generally, and that in the tradables sector more specifically.  It was simply cleaner to take as given the received notion among public sector economists that the quality of the immigration programme was pretty high.

The last couple of years, outside the public sector, have certainly been an eye-opener for me, on just how mediocre our immigration programme has actually been.  It may well be that our average non-native born worker has among the highest skills of any of those in the OECD.  It may even be that our immigration programme is better than those of most  –  in many ways it should be, as we have full effective control of our own borders.  But it simply isn’t very good.  Even on those OECD numbers, the average non-native born worker (immigrants past and present) has skill levels below those of natives (the latter being among the most skilled in the OECD).   There have been many very able migrants, but averages are averages, encompassing the excellent and the poor.  The average isn’t impressive.

We’ve seen quite a bit of that over the last few years:

  • only around 60 per cent of our residence approvals are to skilled or business migrants (and their spouses/partners/children), and all too many of those granted approvals in recent years have been in occupations that don’t strike most people as particularly highly-skilled –  not what people think of when they hear that MBIE sees our immigration programme as a “critical economic enabler”,
  • there were fairly large numbers of approvals granted to middle-aged and elderly parents and siblings of other migrants (people whose skills/qualifications would not qualify them directly), unlikely to make much contribution to New Zealand economic performance.
  • then there has been the big upsurge in student arrivals, concentrated in the lower-level private training establishments, the timing not coincidentally related to increased work rights for students in New Zealand.   Again, relative to our universities, the PTEs aren’t typically training the people most people have in mind when they think of highly-skilled foreigners.

And the disillusionment –  stripping away of the old illusions and official stories –  has continued even in the last week or two.

At a broader policy level, MBIE released data last week showing that

The Ministry undertook a random sample of more than 600 Skilled Migrant Category applications being considered as at 1 March this year. We found that 42.5 per cent of applicants earned over the New Zealand median income of $48,859 a year while 14 per cent of applicants earned over $75,000. These results have a margin of error of plus or minus 5 per cent.

57.5 per cent of those applying for residence under the Skilled Migrant category –  the most skilled bit of the residence approvals programme –  were earning less than $48859 per annum.  No doubt some of them would have been turned down, but the rejection rate of applications that get to this stage isn’t high.    On policy to date, a huge proportion of the so-called skilled migrants can’t even command that much income in the New Zealand labour market (and recall that 80 per cent of all residence approvals are granted to people already onshore, and I suspect that share is higher for the SMC category).

Perhaps I’m naively optimistic, but a week or so after these data came out, I’m still shocked at how low a skill level they reveal.   Our ministers and officials have repeatedly grossly misrepresented the programme and the number and sort of “skilled” people New Zealand is granting residence to.   If it were similar data on any other policy or economic topic, I suspect it would be front-page news in our media.

One of my readers (thanks Bob) took the huge unwieldy spreadsheet MBIE releases monthly and produced a summary of residence approvals over the 12 months to March 2017.  This table is in much the same format as MBIE uses in their annual Migration Trends and Outlook publication.

Residence Approvals: Year ended 31 March 2017
Application Substream Application Criteria Number approved
Skilled Migrant Skilled Migrant 25,357
Work to Residence Talent – Accredited Employer 1,464
Investor Category Investor 2 Category 1,404
Entrepreneur Category Entrepreneur category 740
Work to Residence Long Term Skill Shortage List Occupation 527
Investor Category Investor 1 Category 154
Partnership Deferral Skilled Skills/Business deferral 142
Work to Residence Religious Worker 122
Work to Residence Talent – Sports 27
Employee of businesses Employees of businesses 3
Business / Skilled Sub-total 29,940
Refugee 1,902
Samoa Quota 1,008
Pacific Access 607
Other Ministerial direction 295
Other Victims of Domestic Violence 28
Section 61 Section 61 133
International / Humanitarian Sub-total 3,973
Family Tier 1 & 2 Family Parent Tier 1 2,555
Parent Family parent 457
Sibling Family sibling 397
Adult Child Family child adult 47
Sibling Family sibling 2
Parent Sibling Adult Child Stream Sub-total 3,458
Partnership Partnership 9,439
Dependant Child Family child dependent 1,861
Partnership Partnership – Partner of an Expatriate 1,247
Parent Retirement Parent Retirement 37
Partnership Deferral Family Partnership deferral 23
Dependant Child Family Child dependent – Dependants of an Expatriate 11
Partnership Partnership 3
Uncapped Family Sponsored Stream Sub-total 12,621
Residence approvals Total 49,992

We now know how low the apparent level of skills has been in the skilled migrant category.  And that is the most skills-focused on any of these residence categories.  We can reasonably assume that the average skill levels across the other categories will be, perhaps materially, lower.

Of course, in some of the line items that shouldn’t be a concern.  We take refugees for humanitarian reasons, not domestic economic reasons.  But by and large our immigration programme has been sold as having an economic focus –  intended to lift productivity across the economy and benefit New Zealanders as a whole.    Standard economic theory will tell you that if the skill level of the migrants is low –  typically lower, especially at the margin, than the new native worker –  it could only benefit New Zealanders (on average) by driving down wages for relatively unskilled labour in New Zealand.    The evidence on whether it has done so is contested, but if it hasn’t, New Zealanders simply can’t have benefited.  And if we stand back and look at our productivity performance, business investment patterns, and tradables sector performance, there is no sign of such systematic benefits at all.

It looks increasingly like a costly sham.  New Zealanders have been sold the policy on one basis but –  whatever the merits of the policy they’ve been told we were running –  the actual policy looks to have been far worse than we were told.  And, I suspect, far worse than the people who first designed the more liberal immigration policy thirty years ago would have had in mind.

People will differ on how all this came to pass.  I’m not a conspiracy theorist, and suspect it mostly developed with the best of intentions all round (rather than, say, a deliberate attempt to drive up Auckland land prices and drive down lowly-skilled wages).   But good intentions don’t excuse shocking outcomes.  We simply don’t really have a skilled migration programme at all.  There are, and no doubt always will be, a few very highly-skilled people among the migrants –  and the issue here isn’t the migrants themselves (pursuing the best for themselves and their families) but the policymakers in successive governments –  but all too many have little to offer to benefit New Zealand.  For a country that hasn’t been doing that well economically for 50 years –  although there are cyclical ups and downs –  that simply isn’t an approach we can afford, if we want to offer our people some of the best material living standards in the world.  Perhaps it is partly a reluctance to accept that New Zealand just isn’t that attractive to very many of the sort of extremely able people we might genuinely benefit from.

And perhaps even more shocking than the skilled migrant applicant income data, was the news yesterday that our government is allowing someone who gained residence approval only five years ago, and has since committed several sexual offences, been in prison for them, made little apparent effort to rehabilitate, and remains (according to the experts) at high risk of reoffending, to remain in the country.  I’m not usually strongly sympathetic to “victims advocates” etc, or to those wanting to lock up even more people for longer, but I simply can’t believe that the government had let this chap stay.   Since such offenders don’t usually start offending in their 50s, you have wonder about the initial screening, but even set that to one side, how is this decision at all consistent with promoting the best interests of New Zealanders?   Individual decision it might be, but it looks too like a mentality in MBIE –  and their ministers? –  that simply doesn’t put the interests of New Zealanders first (whether in the economic aspects of the programme design and implementation, or others).      The specific decision might have been made by an official, but that person was operating only under the delegated authority of the Minister of Immigration.  The Minister now claims he’d have made a different decision, but if so perhaps he could release to us the guidelines he had laid down, that his officials were supposed to be working to when they made this egregious decision.    I’m quite sure Afghanistan would be an unpleasant place to be sent back too.    But Mr Akbari made his choices, breaking our law (and not simply traffic offences) not once but several times.  It isn’t clear why we owe him any further consideration, or why our people should be exposed to the risk of his further re-offending.   I don’t suppose Michael Woodhouse personally will be compensating future victims –  and of course with the best will in the world, he won’t be able to  put back together a life shattered by a further instance of such abuse by Mr Akbari.   Deportation then will be scant comfort to the victim.

As I like to stress, I try to be an equal opportunity sceptic.  Immigration policy has, for 30 years, been pretty much common ground between National and Labour.     The Donghua Liu case shouldn’t be quickly forgotten.