Quigley, Orr, and the RB board: edition number 965

This morning as the Quigley/Orr/Board saga rumbles on I wanted to touch on three items:

  • the latest comments from Board chair Neil Quigley (and the Minister’s comments on and to him)
  • a reminder of where this all started, with the Board unanimously approving a budget last year far in excess of what had been approved under their then-current Funding Agreement, and
  • outstanding OIAs.

Quigley

When I wrote my post yesterday morning I’d seen only Quigley’s extraordinary jaw-dropping comments to interest.co.nz suggesting that he had been deliberately (to say the least) economical with the truth and actively misleading the public because they had no right, or particular need, to know. And when Brunskill suggested that this was perhaps inconsistent with the Bank’s oft-boasted commitment to transparency, Quigley let loose with the classic line that “I’m not interested in having you question me like you’re a lawyer”. A journalist doing his job would have been more like it…. It was, sadly, consistent with the Quigley who has long acted as if public affairs are matters only for the chosen and that the great unwashed should really pipe down and be grateful.

Then I saw another story from Brunskill in which he recorded that in a follow-up email Quigley had said that an agreement with Orr limited “the communication we could offer on March 5”. Which may well have been true, but doesn’t take us any further since

(a) it was Orr who resigned, and there were presumably standard resignation terms in his contract,

b) even if they had mutually agreed that the only comment on 5 March would be the agreed official press release i) Quigley did not need to agree to content that actively misled the public (reread the statement it is clearly designed to give the impression of “nothing to see here”, but perhaps suggestive of a long-serving CE who was tired and had accomplished what needed doing), and ii) it was Quigley who chose to give the press conference later that afternoon in which he clearly went well beyond the press release, trying fairly explicit to suggest that it was all just personal reasons – but not conduct or anything of the sort – and more or less explicitly denied it had anything to do with (the emotional overreaction to disappointment around) the forthcoming Funding Agreement.

Then the Minister of Finance entered the picture, giving a press conference at Fieldays (account here)

Which was a good start, although re that final paragraph note that the Board (Quigley) chose what to agree to in the exit agreement. It seems to have been Orr who wanted out. Quigley should have been acting to protect the interests of New Zealanders, including in transparency and accountability.

And then a few hours later a statement emerged from Quigley himself. It came via the Bank’s standard email advisory list (link here to a website version). I really don’t think it helped (and from people I’ve talked to I’m not the only one).

He started with this

“Late” doesn’t even begin to describe it. The bundle they have released – while interesting and revealing in itself – hides as much as it reveals, including almost everything about Quigley’s role, and does not even touch on large chunks of my request (not sure about others but my impression from reading coverage is that others are similarly underwhelmed). And the law is the law, and they knew from day 1 (well actually from when Adrian first said he was going) that there would be intense public interest in this and should have been pro-actively positioned to provide a comprehensive response early, for public and for staff.

As for that 3rd para, as noted above while Orr’s employment contract was a given, it was Quigley who decided what sort of non-disclosure restrictions to accept/impose.

Note that in the early afternoon of 5 March, just an hour before the resignation statement went out, Orr was planning to front the conference the next day and “discuss today’s news”.

As it happened, going through some old articles this morning I found one from 5 March when Dan Brunskill had door-stopped Quigley and asked him about the conference (“Quigley said he did not know whether Orr would still host the central bank’s monetary policy conference”) He had sorted that out by the time of his ill-starred press conference later in the afternoon, but none of it feels like some advance commitment that Orr would disappear in utter silence and no answers would be given for months.

The second bit of Quigley’s statement was this

On the first para:

  • even if there had been an agreement that the only public comment on 5 March would be the official agreed press release (a not unreasonable approach in itself), a) Quigley had a great degree of control over what was (and wasn’t) said in any statement, and b) why then did he seem to go off-reservation with a press conference where again and again he seems to have actively misled the public (acknowledging to Brunskill on Wednesday that he had done so deliberately?
  • the fact that the Funding Agreement hadn’t been finalised is really just distraction. The Minister had already said in public the previous week that she was looking for cuts, documents released show even Orr was reconciled to a lower level of spending than they’d initially asked for (even if not to what the Board was willing to go to to reach agreement with MoF). What stopped them saying “negotiations between the Board and Minister on the next funding agreement are progressing. In straitened fiscal times it is unsurprising that the Minister is looking for cuts. The Governor did not believe that the scale of cuts sought was appropriate and chose to resign”. Sure, it would have been uncomfortable, but….that is what real accountability and transparency means. (And anyway, the Funding Agreement was published in mid April and we got no disclosure until 11 June.)

As for the second para, their treatment of their staff seems to have been particularly egregious. Recall this from their internal Q&As for managers to use with staff.

They lied. They – Board and remaining senior management – had known for weeks at least (it is the released documents) that staff cuts were going to be necessary. That is more or less what public sector budget cuts meant across the board. Staff are adults. They know that. Sure, the final budget numbers hadn’t been determined but it would have been perfectly possible – they had days to do it – to have crafted a message for staff that said “it is now certain that our funding next year will be materially lower than this year’s operating budget. We do not know how much lower but the implications will certainly include staff cuts this year”.

Or, slightly less bad perhaps than the way they actually treated staff, they could just have stonewalled and said “no comment, no comment, no comment” when staff asked what was going on.

Can Quigley survive? He certainly shouldn’t but who knows. When a journalist asked me last night I noted that since I didn’t adequately understand why Willis had reappointed Quigley for a final two year term last year, one couldn’t be confident she’d do the right and necessary thing, but I still reckoned that within a month there was a better than ever chance he’d be gone. Victoria University’s Martien Lubberink suggested on Twitter last night that he was buying a lettuce. The original lettuce outlasted Liz Truss. I hope this one lasts longer than Quigley. Any good he did in his 15 years on the board seems long long past and there needs to be change at the top now.

Budgets

I was in a meeting yesterday and chatting over lunch with people who aren’t very focused on central banking or government finance issues, and a couple asked “what was Orr planning to do with all that money?” My response was simple: it wasn’t what he was planning to do in the future, but rather that the money had already been spent. And in breach of the Funding Agreement they’d signed with the Minister of Finance in mid 2023 (an agreement that covered the 23/24 and 24/25 financial years, amending the 2020-25 five-yearly Funding Agreement).

All the details of this are in a post I wrote last month. But to quickly summarise:

  • in that 2023 amendment the Bank had been allowed to spend about $154.4 million on (within scope) operating expenses in 2024/25,
  • the Bank’s Board adopted on operating budget for the same (within scope) items for 24/25 of $191 million, 23 per cent above the level of operating expenses Grant Robertson had allowed them for 24/25. This Budget was adopted unanimously by the Bank’s Board last June (and overall budget numbers were included in the Statement of Performance Expectations published then),
  • the Bank’s bid in respect of its next Funding Agreement, also adopted unanimously by the Board, involved a 7.5 per cent cut from that $191 million level (with a bit of sleight of hand in proposing to move some more things out of scope).

If you doubt the story, here it is in their own words

Spend up hugely, far beyond what the Minister of Finance had allowed – something no other government agency or department could do – and then offer up modest savings relatively to that grossly inflated (and improperly authorised level).

Consistent with this, they’d increased staff numbers from, 601 to 660 between 30 June last year and 31 January, and the documents revealed Orr talking of a plan to take it as far as 742.

It really was that simple, that extraordinary. And if it represents an abuse of office in respect of New Zealand taxpayers, it was almost worse in respect of their own staff. People had taken on new jobs in those last few months as the empire continued to be built even as Board and management were (at best) deceiving themselves about the fiscal environment and the sort of restraint that might reasonably be expected from them (as most other public agencies).

Now, there are still a couple of puzzles around the role of the Minister and Treasury. As my detailed post documents, the Minister of Finance had to be consulted on that Statement of Performance Expectations (containing the budget). We do not yet know whether she ever pushed back strongly at that stage (just after last year’s government budget).

And then there was this, spotted in the recent (government) Budget Summary of Initiatives document

The savings are good, but it looks as though Treasury had included in the HYEFU numbers much much higher levels of spending than the Minister eventually accepted, and more in line with the Bank’s opening bid. Why did they do that, when those higher levels were well above the previous Funding Agreement? Had conversations with the Minister in the second half of last year indicated that she was then fairly relaxed? We do not know (but really should).

So, it was never a bid for even more, it was about consolidating most of the extraordinary growth in spending and staff in recent years, the last and most egregious bit (in 24/25) having happened without any ministerial authorisation, quite inconsistent with the statutory instrument governing Bank spending, the 2025-30 (amended) Funding Agreement.

Outstanding OIAs

I saw a serious observer on Twitter the other day note that he’d had several OIAs in with the RB since February (clearly not Orr resignation related) and had not yet had a response.

My experience isn’t that bad, but…..

On the spending levels and the Minister’s involvement, I still have this outstanding

All this will have been readily accessible. If Quigley is serious about sharpening up the Bank’s OIA act, perhaps he could get them to address this one rather more promptly.

And then there was my request regarding the Orr resignation events. I didn’t put one in until quite late, and deliberately touched on only some specific aspects. This was lodged with them on 14 April

In their official response to me on Wednesday they claimed that the document dump dealt with this request.

It didn’t. I had already pointed out to them that the first request had almost nothing to do with the Governor’s resignation (and of course nothing in the release dealt with that). This morning I went back to them as follows

It is as if they either can’t/won’t read, or somehow think the Official Information Act doesn’t apply to them. I’m not optimistic of getting anything more (well, at best this side of 2028 if it involves the Ombudsman), but they can’t get away with claiming they’ve responded to OIAs they’ve chosen to ignore.

And then there is this outstanding from The Treasury, which should be due in the next few days.

Why is Neil Quigley still RB board chair?

In my post yesterday, I documented a whole series of ways in which Neil Quigley, Reserve Bank board chair (appointed by the Minister of Finance) appeared to have actively misled the public (and overseen the misleading of Reserve Bank staff) on the day Adrian Orr’s resignation was announced. Some of that material is here

Since writing that post, I’ve seen the excellent brief piece by Dan Brunskill of interest.co.nz who had taken the initiative to ring up Quigley and ask about what appear to have been deliberate and active misleading.

Just breathtakingly awful. From the chair of a powerful public sector board: the public had no right to know, and he wasn’t going to be questioned by a journalist doing his job (“like a lawyer” apparently).

In this morning’s Post their political columnist Luke Malpass has a particularly trenchant take on another angle of the whole debacle (which is probably too kind a word, as all of this was done consciously and deliberately by very highly paid people supposedly working in the public interest). This was the attempt to sell us all on the story that the resignation was just a “personal decision”, with no deeper meaning or significance. The headline is “Orr omnishambles redux: the “Personal decision” that wasn’t.” and this is just a sample

Or “the worst sort of media management bends or has little regard for the truth, treating the public or customers like morons. After the past few years of inflation and hip-pocket hurt, the last thing the Bank should have done was not to be honest with both its staff and the public….”

You might find this surprising after my commentary in recent years but I’ve always been reluctant to believe the worst of Quigley (we used to have quite a bit to do with each other) but we are now at the point where, after yesterday’s disclosures, it is impossible to take at face value a single word he says, at least on Reserve Bank matters (for which he is earning a cool $200000 per annum for a part-time job).

You might be wondering why the board, and particularly its chair (Quigley) are still in office after this shambles (which started from the blowing the previous Funding Agreement spending limit so badly this time last year).

It isn’t easy to dismiss members of the Board. One can debate the merits of that (relative to other government boards) but this is what the law says about grounds

One could mount a case that that standard has now been met, but as a purely legal matter it might be arguable and (more messily) contested.

The same standard does not apply to the Board chair, who can be removed pretty much at will by the Minister

(Having been removed the former chair would still be a board member)

So it is quite clear that the Minister can remove the Board chair for any reason whatever (although needs to consult him first), and probable that she could not formally dismiss board members.

However, in the face of this “omnishambles” and active deceit of the public, how plausible is it that if the Minister were to communicate to the Board and chair that the government no longer had confidence in their stewardship (not on grounds of policy differences – where it is important to respect operational independence – but on basic stewardship and obligations of integrity, accountability, and dealing with staff in good faith) that any half-decent board member would refuse to resign. And if they were to refuse to resign, the government would be in a very strong position to call out and shame them in public for the conduct for which they’ve been responsible. This stuff matters, both because of the disgraceful stuff that has already happened – and that barefaced refusal of scrutiny yesterday by Quigley – but because of the key gatekeeper role the Board plays in selecting which name goes forward to the Minister as nominee to be next Governor. Can anyone have confidence in them to do that sort of selection after all this?

Of course, it has long been a mystery why Willis reappointed Quigley last year. But a whole new series of questions need to be asked now. I hope, for example, Brunskill took that dismissive answer from Quigley to Willis and asked her if she considered that was acceptable behaviour in the chair of the board of a powerful public entity.

And, of course, there is that other utterly supine and useless body, supposed to be holding public agencies and their boards/managements to account, Parliament’s Finance and Expenditure Committee. But they weren’t even bothered when Orr repeatedly lied to them, so I suppose we shouldn’t expect them to care when Quigley and the rest of the Board actively misled the public, seemed (in Quigley’s) case to be proud of it, and then refused to even take questions.

The Orr story (well, part of it anyway)

Months after various OIAs had been lodged on the question of Adrian Orr’s sudden departure on 5 March, we finally got a partial dump of documents this morning.

(Sufficiently mishandled that at 10:04 this morning they’d send an email to OIA requesters saying they’d email out the response at 10:45 and then have it on their public website at 11 (it being usual to give requesters at least some advance notice)). Then it seems they changed their minds because the emails didn’t come until after 11. And then it turned out – they emailed us again – that they’d sent only a near-final version of the Summary Statement they were releasing, not the final version that is on the website. There are material differences between the two – see below.)

I noted above that this was a partial release. Why do I say that? Because what is released today contains:

  • nothing of advice to or communication with either The Treasury or the Minister (or her office),
  • nothing of any discussions between the non-executive members of the board and Orr, including reactions/responses when he first intimated his intention to resign,
  • no records or summaries of any meetings or conversations among non-executive directors

And those are just the omissions that I reckon were covered by my OIA on this matter (mine was only one of a number they claim to have responded to with their omnibus release this morning).

But, to the substance:

Strangely, and after months of speculation, these comments from my post the morning after the resignation ended up looking closer to accurate than I had recently supposed.

We have known for some time now that they had actually bid for a big increase in Funding Agreement resources over the levels allowed them by Grant Robertson just prior to the last election (and their statutory roles hadn’t changed since then), justifying this on the – simply extraordinary – grounds that it was in fact a modest cut relative to their own 2024/25 Budget; the one in which they had set out to spend far far in excess of the amount Robertson had allowed them for the last year of the previous Funding Agreement.

Both that 2024/25 Budget and the $1 billion funding agreement bid had been unanimously adopted by the Board last year (Orr himself was a board member). Details of all that are in this post.

Here is the text from the Summary Statement released (in error it appears) to OIA requesters this morning

For a start, this description seems odd. First, the Governor works for and to the Board not vice versa, so why the talk about Board members negotiating with Treasury “under the direction of the Governor”? But, second, all this paragraph talks about the Governor having a view as to what future budget resources were needed, but never mentions that the Bank’s bid had been adopted by the Board itself (the Funding Agreement is an agreement between the board – as the Bank’s governance body – and the Minister). Maybe Orr led the non-executives by the nose when the Funding Agreement bid was signed off last year, but in the end it wasn’t his call.

Then the Board seems to get blamed for bowing to reality. Too little has yet emerged of the Funding Agreement process documentation, but it seems likely that Treasury and the Minister had made pretty clear that a Funding Agreement that involved a large increase in funding relative to what Grant Robertson had approved just wasn’t going to be acceptable in these straitened fiscal times. It isn’t clear when the Minister or Treasury finally pushed back, but eventually they did, and the Board – recognising that ultimately choices about acceptable resources levels were for the Minister – had adjusted to that reality. Orr, by contrast, didn’t.

Here is the version of the Summary Statement that is now on the website (where there have been changes)

Note the attempt to shift the emphasis away from that meeting with the Minister of Finance on 24 February (the one that has already had quite a bit of coverage, with the Minister’s press secretary having to advise her to avoid answering a question about whether the Governor had ever shouted at the Minister).

Either way, what we are left with is a hotheaded Governor who finally came face to face with reality….and could not cope. And a Board which seems to have been as worse-than-useless as had been widely supposed since most of them were appointed in 2022, but who – in the end – could actually face reality.

Look at those descriptions about “The matter was distressing for Mr Orr” (or “This caused distress to Mr Orr”). It is a bit like a bloodless description of a moody teenager having lashed out in the playground.

Fiscal restraint has, in fact, been the order of the day for (most) central government agencies since the change of government. Many chief executives probably had had grand visions for how much additional growth their agencies needed, and even perhaps a belief that in some sense the national interest demanded it. But almost all of them – perhaps MFAT aside, which wasn’t asked to – faced reality, and got on and implemented the budget cuts that were demanded of them. Not one seems to have thrown his or her toys out of the cot and stormed off with no notice. They acted like adults, people who’d developed the resilience we like to help shape in our children as they grow. But not Orr.

And that is why I don’t think it is at all correct to characterise his departure as just a dispute over budgets. Plenty of people have conflicting views on budgets, and it wasn’t as if – even when the final Funding Agreement decisions were made – the Bank was being asked to operate with very material cuts at all relative to the last spending level approved by a Minister of Finance (a big-spending one at that). He just wasn’t going to get to grow his empire even bigger (you may recall from earlier posts that the Bank had grown staff numbers from about 600 on 30 June last year to about 660 on 30 January this year, and in the documents there is a note from Orr dated 5 Feb talking of having wanted to get up to 742 FTEs.)

It really looks to have been a toxic combination of headstrong volatile chief executive (who’d been lying to Parliament again just days prior to that critical meeting with the Minister), weak or non-existent accountability from his Board, and an utter lack of resilience or perspective which you’d only really expect to see from someone at the end of his tether. That is reinforced by that line in the final official version about how “the impasse risked damaging necessary working relationships”. Not among decent disciplined people – the Funding Agreement was a matter for the Board and the Minister (primarily the latter) and the Governor’s job as employee and chief executive was primarily to implement the agreement and manage within approved resources, and to do so in an effective not petulant way. After all, the reduced budget wouldn’t even come into effect until 1 July (so perhaps a resignation effective 30 June?)

Let’s grant (charitably) that Orr really really believed that the Bank’s statutory functions could only be performed with the $1 billion budget (and 40 or so senior managers). In those circumstances, perhaps the best thing to do was to move aside and let someone else take his place. But normal people – normal chief executives (see, eg the Vice-Chancellor of Auckland University today) – give notice, and work out that notice, enabling the governing body to do a thorough careful search for a permanent replacement. They don’t storm off with no notice, having engaged senior lawyers to negotiate an exit (presumably there were conventional resignation provisions in Orr’s contract already), offering no explanation whatever, despite holding one of the most powerful public sector positions in New Zealand.

If Orr emerges really badly from this Statement and document dump, he isn’t the only one.

Take the Board (Quigley and the other non-executives) for example.

It remains beyond belief how they (a) signed off on a budget last year so far in excess of the Robertson-approved levels, and b) how they ever imagined that it was appropriate to treat that unauthorised level as some new-normal base against which they could then offer up tiny cuts. Did any of them ever push back against management and insist that the Governor stress-test for them a range of alternative budget scenarios? (If so, there is no sign in the published minutes).

And where was the Board in controlling the process at the end? Why did they let the Governor simply leave office the day of the announcement, rather than insisting on him working out notice? Why did they grant him (presumably paid) “special leave” for the period 5 March to 31 March (rather than, say, making him take annual leave if his resignation was going to be legally effective until 31 March). And why did they allow such a pig’s breakfast of a communications debacle to (a) occur, and b) persist for months?

To be sure, both the Board and the Minister were put in a difficult position by the Governor’s petulant walk-off. They hadn’t, as at 5 March, finalised the Funding Agreement (indeed, the Minister’s later releases on that subject suggest some continuing back and forth over the coming weeks), so they probably couldn’t release the whole picture.

But as it was they actively misled both their own staff and the wider public.

On staff, this is from a set of internal Q&As given to managers the day after Orr’s resignation to use with staff.

When in fact, on their telling now, it was all about looming significant budget cuts (relative to the Bank’s own budget, if not relative to the previous Funding Agreement) the Board had, perhaps reluctantly, accepted and the Governor has refused to (and petulantly stormed off).

As for the wider public, Neil Quigley – the Board chair, with an unfortunate reputation now for not being straight on RB things, but somehow succeeding to keep getting reappointed – held a short press conference late on the afternoon of the resignation.

In it, he told us that he (he avoiding answering for the Board) had still had confidence in Orr? How is that possible when your chief executive stormed out the door apparently because he couldn’t live with not getting a further inflated Funding Agreement and reckoned he couldn’t work effectively with the Board and/or Minister?

Then he was asked whether Funding Agreement issues played a part. Accordingly to the transcript I was kindly sent his response was

“we are working through some views about the funding of the bank, the board is in the process of finalizing its submission to the Minister about our next funding agreement. So that conversation about funding has involved the normal challenge that you would expect, and has been constructive. So the board is managing that process”

Which is just utterly at odds with what we have learned today.

(The very next question Quigley was asked was what about the big conference the next day, and the thought that the resignation might overshadow it. He responded “with the decision that Adrian had made, he decided actually that it was better not to be in front of the conference, having made that decision himself”. Which is weird – if not overly important – as in today’s document dump there is an email from Orr, at lunchtime on 5 March, less than an hour before the resignation went out, talking about how he’d be proudly opening the conference the following day, “there to discuss today’s news”….)

The press conference went on

Q: Reserve Bank governors don’t just up and resign? What has been the precipitating factor to what you call this personal decision

A: I think you have to remember that the job of the Reserve Bank Governor is one where you face unrelenting critique of your actions. You know, no matter what you do, there are near alternatives that other people say that they would have taken. And so there is a time when you think having achieved what you wanted to achieve, that’s enough.

And I guess that isn’t inconsistent with an emotional end-of-his-tether story, but….it is rather at odds with today’s revelation that the Board had accepted budgetary reality and the Governor had simply refused to.

And finally

Q, Had the government, had the government communicated to you or Adrian any issues that triggered him coming to you in the last few days?

A. No, there’s no, been no direct communication officially from the government on anything that I could think of in that.

Except that that is just evidently not true, given a) the meeting with MoF on 24 February and b) the now official statement that by the Board meeting of the 27th it was clear that the Board and Minister were willing to agree a number the Governor could not accept. The initiative for cuts was not, it is pretty clear, coming from the Board but the government.

We were actively misled (some would use stronger words). If you weren’t willing to give honest answers, why would a decent person hold a press conference at all? No one compelled him to.

And, a final question for the Board, why did not insist that straight answers be given weeks ago? If it was difficult to do so on 5 March, there can have been no possible excuse once the Funding Agreement itself had been agreed between the Board and Minister (published 16 April, almost two months ago now). The public was owed straight answers as soon as reasonably practicable (which also happens to be the OIA legal standard). The Board, and/or the acting/temporary Governor, seems to have been unbothered. But accountability is about things that are awkward or uncomfortable for you, not just the things you want the public to know.

Incidentally, the Minister of Finance also seem to have abetted keeping the public in the dark (if, perhaps, less directly responsible than the Board). This came out in an earlier Herald OIA, reported here

She must have been advised – assuming what the Bank today told us is true – that actually funding agreement issues were at the heart of the departure.

To wrap up, neither Orr nor the Board emerge with much credit from this affair – Orr none at all, having led the drive to the bloat and loss of focus, failed to read the (fiscal times), and then with so little self-discipline and without the sort of maturity one should be able to take for granted in someone holding high office as Governor, and the Board only a modicum for having very belatedly bowed to reality and accepted that the funding agreements weren’t going to go on rising forever.

Orr has gone, and you might think (hope) that after such an astonishing display he would struggle ever again to get a top-tier job.

But the Board – hardly changed at all over the last year – remains, and in particular Neil Quigley continues (reappointed by this government) as chair for another year. In that role, he drives the selection process for a nominee for the new Governor. This is the person with a track record of actively misleading the public on RB matters even before this last blow-up (remember his assertions, contradicted by both documents and his colleagues, that experts had not been blackballed from the first MPC), but who, more importantly, was responsible for driving the reappointment of a Governor so out of control and personally undisciplined that he couldn’t live with some budgetary restraint (recall that the final level MoF imposed represents pretty minor savings relative to Robertson’s last approved levels) and couldn’t even manage a disciplined and tidy no-drama exit. To add to which, Quigley was Board chair when that egregious 24/25 Bank budget was set. Every day he remains in office diminishes our central bank, and it is astonishing that the Minister of Finance has done nothing to force the issue, to make clear that the government no longer has confidence in Quigley to chair the Board, particularly given the vital role the Board has in the selection. We simply cannot afford another appointee – from Quigley and his board – even half as bad as Orr.

(There is more material in the documents released – including a 14 Feb email from Quigley to Orr suggesting that a deal was likely to be done with Treasury in the following few days – but that is enough for now.)

UPDATE: A response to this OIA should also be due shortly

Advertising for a Governor

If you want to be Reserve Bank Governor, think you have what it takes, (and haven’t yet been approached by the Board’s recruitment company) you will need to get moving. Applications close on Friday.

As a reminder, much of the process (unusually by international standards) is controlled by the Bank’s Board, most of whom were appointed to their positions by the previous government. The Minister of Finance (and Cabinet) will finally make the choice, but they can only appoint someone the Board nominates. The Minister can reject a nominee – either before or after the (now required) consultation with other political parties represented in Parliament – but cannot impose her own candidate. I’m not aware that a recommended nominee has ever been rejected [UPDATE: I’m reminded that Michael Cullen rejected the Board’s nomination of Rod Carr], although in 2002 after Don Brash resigned it was understood that Helen Clark had made clear that she was not going to have a “Brash clone” appointed (hard luck for the acting Governor Rod Carr, who in those days had not really begun his migration to the left).

In practice, things can be less mechanical than the statutory model sounds (and, I believe, was intended to be). There is nothing to stop a Minister of Finance engaging with the Board before they advertise and making clear what sort of person s/he (the Minister) would or would not be looking for in an acceptable appointee. To me, that sort of engagement seems entirely proper. Much more questionably, there isn’t anything to stop the Board offering the Minister a menu of candidates and inviting her to pick one (this happened when the first external members were appointed, where the same statutory appointment process applies). How receptive the Board might be to such influence will, no doubt, depend. Stubborn Boards, with a strong sense of their own legitimacy, might be inclined to play by the letter of the law. Boards largely appointed by a previous government and having presided over things at the Bank going less than well, perhaps less so. It would be interesting to know what, if any, consultation there was with the Minister of Finance on the job description used to support the advert for the vacant Governor position.

(My own preferred model – a much more internationally conventional one – is that the Minister (and Cabinet) should be able to appoint her own person as Governor, taking advice no doubt from the Board and from her principal economic advisers at The Treasury. The government cannot escape responsibility for the Bank, and the powerful impact of its (good or bad) choices, and should be free to choose, not constrained by any Board, let alone one (a) appointed largely by the previous government, and b) with such a demonstrably poor record.)

These are key competencies etc they claim to be looking for

Might we guess that that third item, in particular that reference to “drivers of competition” might have come from – or been included to anticipate – the Minister? It is an odd one otherwise, given that promoting (or otherwise) competition isn’t really a part of the Bank’s responsibilities (think monetary policy, prudential regulation, and monopoly issue of notes and coins). But if they want someone to encourage the reintroduction of banknote competition it would be obscure, but I’m all for it.

I guess we should be encouraged that subject expertise seem to rank high on the list of required competencies, even if “strong understanding” may be weaker than it sounds, especially when contrasted with the “detailed knowledge” required on the subjects in the third bullet.

But the items that really caught my eye were further down the page.

First, there was that experience criterion “preferably at CEO level”. Since the Reserve Bank was given operational autonomy, three of the four Governors had had previous CEO experience (Wheeler was the exception). Internationally, I think it is less common (over the same period I think one of four of each of Bank of England and RBA Governors had previous CEO experience, and perhaps 2 of 6 at the Bank of Canada). Highly successful organisations tend to build the capacity to promote from within, which militates against past CEO experience while favouring actual subject expertise, but the last internal appointee to the Reserve Bank Governor role left in May 1984.

Second, there was this: “Have the personal resilience to cope with adverse and stressful circumstances and to withstand both justified and unjustified criticism.” It could hardly have been more pointed in its contrast to Orr, and I suppose it speaks to the credit of the Board that they (apparently belatedly) recognised behaviours they had tolerated. I guess they could have added explicitly “the integrity not to actively mislead, or worse, Parliament, or to abet such behaviours from a superior”.

Third, there is that odd requirement (odd to make it so explicit) about reviews, with the explicit expectation that the appointee “respond in an open-minded manner to any recommendations received”. Pretty basic stuff you’d have thought, but…..not from Orr.

And then there is the woke stuff. Of course, it might be a trick question – the Treaty of Waitangi is not mentioned in the Reserve Bank Act at all and perhaps not all applicants would have done their homework sufficiently to know, but it is probably just a continuation of the whims and preferences of Orr/Quigley and the former Labour government. Among other things, it might be thought to discourage really able overseas applicants (even if in the end it is unlikely to be make or break for the Board in coming to nominee to send to the Minister).

I also took a look at what the Board had advertised for in 2017 (post here), bearing in mind that Neil Quigley was chair of the Board then too. Arguably the 2017 advert was a little more ambitious in the quality of the person being sought, although as I quibbled then with some of the points they’ve now taken out I wouldn’t make much of it. Perhaps the only point worth making is that instead of someone with “outstanding intellectual ability” and “gravitas” they gave us Orr. The 2025 advert is broadly enough framed that really almost anyone could end up chosen. And neither advert put any sort of emphasis on change management or a vision for a different and better-performing Bank.

I note here just briefly again how extraordinary it is that Neil Quigley is still driving this process. When you were responsible for the nomination and reappointment of the previous Governor who did so poorly on multiple fronts and then walked off with no notice, when you were responsible for the Bank (a) setting budgets last year far in excess even of what Grant Robertson had allowed them, and b) bid for that to be new baseline, despite a climate of wider spending restraint on most agencies, you really shouldn’t be driving the selection of the next Governor. Oh, and when you were responsible – with the previous Governor – for keeping experts off the first MPC, and then later actively misled Treasury and the public about that blackball. It remains beyond comprehension why Willis reappointed him last year – although only for two years, clearly not envisaging that he would drive the performance of the next Governor – or why she has not prevailed on him more recently to step aside. The government has been advertising for two new Board members, but it seems unlikely they will even be in place before much of the winnowing process – including the guidance to the search firm – has already happened.

But who might emerge?

We haven’t seen much media commentary for a couple of months now. I haven’t seen any new names for quite some time (well, apart from the smart person who has tried a couple of times to convince me that Bill English will end up as next Governor). In one of my earlier posts, shortly after Orr resigned, I had these names from various newspaper columns and my own speculations:

(I think I also saw Karen Silk’s name in one article, surely only because someone was uneasy that there were no other women on any of the lists).

If you search this blog you can probably find posts with thoughts on McDermott, Archer, and Bascand. I won’t repeat that here.

All have had some background at the Reserve Bank, and quite a few at overseas central banks or central banking related institutions (IMF, BIS). Four (Grimes, Bascand, McDermott, Hansen) have some chief executive experience.

I don’t think any of these people would be ideal for the role now, but a lot depends on what the Minister really wants, and how much she cares about a better performing Bank. And several of these people may have no interest whatever in the role – whether from age, or inclination (better things to do with your life than 70 hours a week, endless meetings and bureaucracy, lot of travel etc). Archer – who would probably be very much the sort of candidate of bold and far-reaching change, backed by intellectual rigour etc – has lived abroad for more than 20 years now (we share the dubious responsibility of being trustees of the ill-governed Reserve Bank superannuation scheme). In key public sector appointments to date, the government has more often tended to recycle established figures.

Several of those names might count as, or risk being, establishment or status quo candidates. One could think of Bascand, probably not interested, or Gai (appointed to the FMA Board by the previous government, appointed to the MPC by this government, and while undoubtedly able has never once expressed even a jot of public concern through the Orr years, despite all that “critic and conscience” role of academics). And Hawkesby.

Hawkesby is, at present, the temporary Governor (six month stint while the permanent appointment is made). The last long-term acting Governor (Rod Carr) never made it to Governor, and left the Bank within a year of missing out. Hawkesby’s day job is Deputy Governor and head of the Bank’s burgeoning financial stability and regulatory functions. He has some things in his favour. First, the Board knows him (and will have seen at least a couple of months as acting Governor, including having wielded the knife to shrink the badly-bloated top management group). Second, he is a decent person, and it is very unlikely that he would be found repeatedly actively misleading FEC or the media (last week’s appearances, after Orr, were a breath of fresh air). And, third, he has an interesting range of relevant background (Reserve Bank in two stints, Bank of England, Harbour Asset Management – was that 3rd bullet put there for him?) And, fourth, he is closer to the age one might ideally be looking for in a longer-term Governor (I think appointees in their late 60s would be less than ideal).

All that said, I think it would be a bad appointment, for multiple other reasons. First, there is little or no sign of any real intellectual or policy depth (check out the various speeches he has given since rejoining the Bank in 2019). We have little or no insight on how, or what, he thinks (if anything) beyond the wholly conventional. Second, he has served on the MPC for its entire six year term so far, and was Assistant Governor responsible for monetary policy, markets, and macro during the height of the pandemic period, when the huge policy misjudgments (LSAP and the length of the period when the OCR was left well below neutral, even as inflation was blowing out) were made. Third, he was Orr’s handpicked deputy (the vacancy was never advertised when Geoff Bascand announced his resignation), through a much wider range of mistakes and misjudgements (down to and including last year’s budget and the last gasp big expansion in staff numbers). Fourth is a related point: no one survives in Orr world if they challenge him or disagree materially with him. Hawkesby survived, presumably by (at best) just keeping his head down, or at worst going along with it all (inappropriate jokes – per Paul Conway – and all). He sat alongside Orr on various occasions when his boss actively misled FEC, and never said a word of correction or clarification. Hawkesby has ability, but my view has consistently been that he was appointed and served at one level above his actual capability at the time (thus, when Orr headhunted him to be the Assistant Governor for monetary policy and markets, he might have been a very good appointment as Head of Financial Markets). He may be appointed Governor, but if it happens it will be a mark that neither the Minister nor the Board really care much about a world class central bank. But, as I say, he probably wouldn’t lie to FEC. A low bar, but we have to start somewhere.

What of other people? I rule out the Bill English suggestion (yes, former Ministers of Finance have become central bank Governors elsewhere, but usually when they’ve previously been well-regarded economists, and it would be highly desirable to have an appointee the political parties in Parliament were broadly comfortable with and confident in). But there must be people out there with stronger private sector experience, and yet some of the skills/experience one might normally look for in a central bank head. Craig Stobo, for example, is currently the chair of the Financial Markets Authority and is thoughtful on economics and markets issues (even if weirdly running commentary on The Platform on all manner of other policy and economic topics, including last week’s MPS). Or Andrew Bascand (Hawkesby’s former boss at Harbour, and ex RBNZ and BOE)? Or…..or…..or? (Just not Orr or Orr-like, please…….)

Remember, applications close on Friday. In several months’ time we’ll know who has got the nod.

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

I’ve put the full advert and job description text below for future reference (since the link at the start of the post will no doubt be taken down in the coming weeks).

Recruitment process for new Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand

The Board of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Te Pūtea Matua has started the search and recruitment process to identify a new Governor.

Published:

23 May 2025

Recruitment process

The Board’s statutory responsibility is to nominate a candidate to the Minister of Finance, who then makes a recommendation to the Governor General for appointment.  

The Board has engaged the executive search firm Heidrick and Struggles to help with the search and recruitment process.

The advertising and search activity will run throughout May and June, with interviews and assessments in July and August, followed by a nomination to the Minister of Finance. The Minister will then consult with political parties and make a recommendation to the Governor General for appointment. See Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 2021.

While this process continues, Christian Hawkesby remains Governor of the RBNZ

Application process

The requirements for the role are set out in the job description (PDF, 157KB).

To express interest in the role, please contact RBNZGovernor@heidrick.com before 6 June.  

Position Description for the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand

Key functions and responsibilities
The Governor performs the role outlined in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 2021 (the Act). In
particular, the Governor is the:
a. Chief Executive of the Reserve Bank
b. a member of the Board of the Reserve Bank
c. Chair of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).
The Governor is responsible for performing and exercising functions and powers delegated by the
Board.

Chief Executive role

The extent of the Board’s delegation to the Bank is outlined in the Board’s current Delegation
Policy; however, it is anticipated for the purposes of this job description that the Board:

  • Will delegate the management authority to the Governor for the day to day running of the
    Bank.
  • Will delegate regulatory statutory powers to the Governor.
  • The delegation of day-to-day management authority will exclude any matters the Board
    reserves to itself for decision making.
  • The delegation of regulatory statutory powers will be subject to a framework laid out in the
    Delegation Policy for the referral of particular matters to the Board for either decision or
    guidance.
  • The carrying out by the Governor of any powers, functions, duties, authorities or
    discretions (or the carrying out by preapproved people he or she sub delegates to) must
    all times be consistent with policy and frameworks set by the board and any applicable
    Bank policies.
    The Governor is responsible for ensuring that relevant and sufficient information flows to the
    board and to support the board and its individual members in fulfilling their collective and
    individual duties outlined in Part 2, Subpart 4 of the Act.
    The Governor will be a key spokesperson and representative for the Bank in its external relations
    and carries significant responsibility for effective communication by, and the image and standing
    of, the Bank.
  • Board member role
    The Governor is a Board member of equal standing to other Board members and shares the
    collective authority and responsibility of members as outlined in section 24 of the Act.
  • Chair of MPC
    The Governor is the Chair of MPC with the responsibilities outlined in the Act, Charter and Code of
    Conduct. These responsibilities include convening chairing meetings of the MPC and being the
    official spokesperson for the MPC.
  • Criteria for appointment / key competencies
    The Governor will:
  • Have a strong understanding of monetary economics and monetary policy.
  • Have a strong awareness and understanding of financial policy and regulatory frameworks.
  • Have a detailed knowledge of domestic and international financial markets and drivers of
    competition.
  • Be familiar and up to date with best practice risk management frameworks applicable to
    the Reserve Bank.
  • Have advanced relationship management, influencing and communication skills, sufficient
    to successfully manage relationships with the Minister of Finance and other senior
    government ministers, opposition political parties, media, leaders in supranational financial
    institutions and peer central banks and regulators, regulated entities, other public agency
    CEOs, Iwi leaders and all members of the community.
  • Have a sound understanding of public policy decision making processes.
  • Have the ability to lead the effective deployment of the Reserve Bank’s resources and
    demonstrate performance achievements in a public sector environment.
  • Have a successful record of setting and leading a strategic path for a complex, multi
    faceted organisation. Have in-depth management experience of a substantial entity,
    preferably at CEO level.
  • Have the personal resilience to cope with adverse and stressful circumstances and to
    withstand both justified and unjustified criticism.
  • Have the capability to periodically commence external reviews of aspects of the Reserve
    Bank’s functions (including monetary policy), responding in an open-minded manner to
    any recommendation received and implement change processes as appropriate.
  • Highly developed cultural capability, particularly concerning Te Ao Māori, and awareness
    of the role of Te Tiriti O Waitangi
  • Demonstrate exemplary leadership skills:
    o Undoubted integrity.
    o Empathy and emotional intelligence.
    o Sound judgement and decision making.
    o Openness to new ideas.
    o Highly developed inter-personal skills.
    o Ability to develop human capital of an organisation.

Hard to believe really

Take a scenario, just as a thought experiment for now.

A new government gets elected, amid a lot of rhetoric about excessive increases in government spending and public service numbers. They pretty quickly move to require government departments – typically funded by Parliament through annual appropriations – to cut their spending. Typically these agencies were being expected to make cuts of 6.5 per cent or 7.5 per cent.

You are part of the governance structure – Board member, CEO, perhaps other top tier managers – of a powerful public agency, one that doesn’t really do “frontline services” types of stuff, but also one that isn’t directly funded by Parliament. Instead, by law every few years your agency agrees with the Minister of Finance how much you can spend for each of the following few years. When the government changes there is still a little more than 18 months to run on your latest agreement – itself in fact a variation agreement made just a few months earlier, just before the election, that had substantially increased how much your agency could spend over the remainder of the agreement period.

How would you react in such a situation? (How do you like to think you would have reacted?)

One other big agency in New Zealand, not directly funded by Parliament either and not directly subject to the new government’s savings target, early on decided that they really needed to move with the spirit of the new environment. They (Board and CE presumably) adopted a 6.5 per cent cut themselves, telling the media that while they weren’t within the formal government plans “there’s a very clear expectation that we’ll make material cost saving”.

It is the sort of way I hope I’d have behaved had I been in their shoes.

Of course, there is another approach. After all, under the law governing this agency, they get to set their own annual budget. Remember that there is an agreement with the Minister, but actually there is nothing in law that forces them to actually spend in line with that agreement, and no direct consequences if they fail to do so.

So, another possibility, knowing that your agreement has 18 months or so to run, is simply to ramp up your organisation’s budget for the final year of that old agreement – perhaps to levels well above what is approved in the agreement – and then when it comes time to negotiate with the Minister of Finance on spending levels for the following five years, you simply offer up a 7.5 per cent saving from the hugely increased budget you yourself had set just a couple of months previously (all while shuffling a few more costs into the out-of-scope category to reduce even further the extent of the proposed “savings”).

And that, readers, is the story of what Adrian Orr, Neil Quigley, and the Reserve Bank’s Board did. It was simply extraordinary. Quite shameless really. Longstanding readers will know I have not been a fan of the Orr/Quigley stewardship of the Bank but…..I wouldn’t have guessed, without seeing it in writing, that their approach would be quite so openly shameless.

I wrote about the Bank’s new Funding Agreement quite a bit last month. The final and most comprehensive post was here. There are still lots of unanswered questions, but in early May – just before I headed off to PNG – the Bank released on its website a redacted version of the initial bid they had put in to Treasury, as adviser to the Minister of Finance, in September 2024 (NB: Thanks to the RB comms person who got in touch to draw my attention to this document.) This was the bid for $1 billion or so ($981 million opex and $50 million capex, both over five years), for things that would be covered by the Funding Agreement (quite a lot wouldn’t). I only got back to reading it this week.

To recap, in September 2023 Grant Robertson had agreed to a (further) increase in the Bank’s Funding Agreement spending for the last two years of the 2020-2025 agreement. For the year to 30 June 2025, the amount of core operational spending Robertson had approved was $149.44 million. In that previous funding agreement there was also a separate line item for direct currency issue expenses and Robertson agreed that if they underspent that they could use the balance for general operating expenses. That gave them perhaps another $5 million.

So as the Bank’s Board and management approached the setting of the 2024/25 Budget those were the parameters they were supposed to be working within. But they also had information from the Minister of Finance about future intentions. On 3 April she had sent the Board her annual Letter of Expectation, which contained these points

In the general

And the specific

A responsible Board member would surely then have read the times and concluded that (a) they really needed to ensure that the 2024/25 Budget was, at worst, no higher than what Grant Robertson had allowed (bearing in mind that most agencies were getting those 6.5 to 7.5 per cuts even in 2024/25) and b) that any bids for the new 2025-30 Funding Agreement should be kept no higher (whether in real or nominal terms) than the 2024/25 approved level of spending. The focus was clearly intended to be reprioritisation, not further increases (in an organisation whose operating spending and staff numbers had already increased massively in recent years).

That is what a responsible Board member, looking to the public interest etc, would have done.

It wasn’t what the actual Board and senior management did. Instead, they adopted and published a budget for operating spending (captured by the Funding Agreement) of $191 million for 2024/25. Recall the spending that Grant Robertson – Mr Big Spender himself as Minister of Finance – had allowed the Bank for 24/25: $149.44m plus (on their budget) $5.5m from the underspend of their direct currency expenses allowance. The approved budget for 24/25, on items covered by the Funding Agreement, was 23 per cent in excess of what Robertson had allowed them, having already had those counsels of restraint from the Minister of Finance in her April letter. (As I noted in earlier post, there are mysteries around whether the Minister raised any objection at the time – she had to be consulted – which maybe an outstanding OIA will shed some light on, but that isn’t the focus of this post.)

That Budget was approved in June 2024 and in late August the Board approved the Funding Agreement bid (note that the current “temporary Governor” while not then a full Board member himself was in attendance throughout the relevant Board meeting). It was sent off to the acting Secretary to the Treasury, signed by both Orr and Quigley, on 13 September. And here from the second page of the covering letter (with a 40+ page document) was how their bid was sold, in blaring headline

In the body of the document it is repeated: “this approach would achieve savings of 7.5 per cent from our baseline operating expenditure, as requested by the Minister of Finance” [a footnote here refers the reader to the 3 April Letter of Expectation].

Ramp up the budget to 23 per cent above (previous Minister’s) authorised levels…..and then graciously offer a 7.5 per cent “cut” from that level. Really quite breathtaking… In fact in the previous paragraph they carefully noted that they had “had regard” to the Minister’s stance in her Letter of Expectation. Read, thought about, and then ignored would seem a more accurate description, all while attempting to spin Treasury and the Minister of Finance (nowhere in the document do they claim, for example, that the previous Funding Agreement levels were inadequate and needed to be increased. They simply take their own budget as the starting point, claim to have heeded the Minister, and end up “offering” a level of spending well above (in real and nominal terms) what even Grant Robertson had approved.

There is more sleight of hand when it comes to staff numbers. The government had seemed to be looking for agencies to be slimming staff numbers. In the year to June 2024 the Bank had increased staff numbers by 18 per cent (another 90 people), and in their Funding Agreement bid you get the sense that the “current headcount” was, in their view, roughly adequate for the things they had to do. And in fact later in the document they suggest that their preferred option would involve a net headcount reduction of 19 people. But what they didn’t point out to Treasury (or thus to the Minister) is that at the very same time they were handwaving about potential savings, they were going hell-for-leather to further increase staff numbers. We know this because the paper the Minister of Finance finally took to Cabinet in March tells us that the Bank increased staff numbers from the 601 at the end of June 2024 to 660 (FTE) by the end of January 2025. So they had no intention of actually cutting staff numbers, just of slightly slowing the rapid further increase they were already recruiting for. Now, sure, acute readers must have realised that such a huge operating budget increase in 2024/25 must have involved further increases in staff numbers, but….they were left to work it out for themselves. In a political and public spending climate in which Orr and Quigley and all the rest of them were only too well aware of sensitivities around rising staff numbers.

It is all pretty disreputable, shabby, and borderline dishonest (I didn’t spot an actual verifiable lie in the document; it was all in the self-serving misleading framing). Among the ongoing mysteries is why, when Treasury received this bid, they didn’t take a quick look and send it straight back with a demand that the Board revise the starting point back to (say) the previously approved (by Robertson) level of opex, not the Board’s own inflated budget which bore no relation to what the previous Minister of Finance had approved them spending. It wasn’t until March this year, after Orr’s departure, that there was finally a revised (much lower) submission.

And although the Orr/Quigley initial submission had strongly suggested that the Bank needed every one of the proposed billion dollars to function, reality seems to disagree. Just a couple of weeks ago the “temporary Governor” completed a restructuring of his top tier, in which the number of (very expensive) roles was reduced from about nine to four. Not hard to economise when you try (when the Minister’s choices finally compelled it). The Governor has gone of course (he’ll eventually be replaced), as have Assistant Governors Smith (finance), Kolich (data), Robbers (strategy, governance, and sustainability), Strategic Adviser Prince, and the grapevine reports that another of the Orr hires, Assistant Governor Owen (risk and legal) has also resigned. It is really only a start, since Board chair Neil Quigley and all the board members who approved and endorsed this egregious funding bid are still there (although the terms of two expire next month). And are we really to believe that all along the Deputy Governor, Hawkesby, hadn’t been endorsing the approach?

And then, of course, there is the lack of transparency. In that Funding Agreement bid they explicitly told Treasury that once a new agreement was reached “our intent is to publish the final version of our Funding Proposal on our website”. Which sounds quite good, but…. the new Funding Agreement was published on 16 April. It is now 20 May, and although they have published a redacted version of the first proposal (which is a start) there is no sign of the final revised March bid. In fact, I have an OIA request in for it

Just yesterday I heard back from the Bank

Of these:

  • the first relates to the question of whether the Minister ever pushed back on the proposed 24/25 budget
  • the second covers two specific and easily identified documents (the first now released – see above), and
  • the third is to shed light on whether the Board pushed back at all on what management was proposing (is the final version different in any material extent to what went to Treasury.

None of these documents will take any particular effort to find, and at least one they promised Treasury nine months ago they’d publish. But…..in the way of public sector obstructionism, they’ve just taken another six weeks to respond to a fairly straightforward request. Isn’t that convenient for them.

It really is staggering that a government-appointed Board chair could try it on quite as egregiously as Quigley did (in league with Orr) and still hold his very well-paid role ($200000 for a part-time role), including leading the process of selecting a nominee to be the next Governor.

A bit more unpicking of RB spending and the Funding Agreement

[See update note at the very end of this post which means that some parts of this post – re 24/25 spending – need correcting and reframing]

In yesterday’s post I tried to present the Reserve Bank Funding Agreement for 2025-30, as approved by the Minister of Finance and the Bank’s Board, in the context of the previous agreement, and the variation to that agreement signed up to by Grant Robertson a few weeks before the last election (which hugely increased the amount available for operating expenditure). Against that benchmark, yesterday’s agreement didn’t seem to display much restraint at all, even on the headline figures.

The Minister of Finance had sought to make much of (a) how much lower the agreed numbers were than the first bid made by the Bank last September (a total of $1.03bn over five years for both capital and operating expenditure – capex being only $50m in total), and b) relative to a number we had never seen before, what she described as the Bank’s operating expenses budget for 2024/25 of $200m. This latter was the basis for the much-publicised 25% cut claim.

I was a bit dismissive of that presentation, and what seemed mostly to be spin (unlike the RB’s own press release).

So I’m now going to try to step through it all fairly painstakingly and more slowly/carefully than I did yesterday.

First, here are the operating expenditure numbers for things covered by the 2020 Funding Agreement, showing both the original agreement and the August 2023 variation.

There were really big increases granted in that 2023 variation (far more than, say, implied just by the inflation surprise). Note too that spending for 23/24 was allowed to be much higher than in 24/25. I’m pretty sure we never got a specific explanation for that, but it probably related to some major new initiative.

By law, the funding agreements are required to specify maximum expenditure for each single year (the Bank can’t just pick and choose, transferring money from one year to the text on a whim). However, in the 2023 variation Grant Robertson explicitly allowed the Bank to treat the last two years as a single aggregate pool (apparently he had done the same for the last two years of the previous agreement). In principle, I have no particular problem with that (although of course most government agencies would have to come to Parliament and get a fresh appropriation each year) but it opens up a number of risks.

And here are the old and new Funding Agreement opex numbers, expressed in constant 2024/25 dollars (for each year I’ve used the level of the CPI for the average of the relevant Dec and Mar quarters).

There are a number of ways to look at that series. One way is to compare spending in 29/30 with the average allowed (over the full five years) under the previous Funding Agreement. Those two numbers are almost identical.

Another might be to compare 29/30 with the approved Funding Agreement level for 24/25. That implies a cut of about 6 per cent in real terms.

If we wanted to be slightly partisan about it (Willis can only be held accountable for stuff that has happened on her watch), approved opex for 2029/30 will be a little over 10 per cent higher in real terms that what was approved for 22/23, the last full year of the previous government.

In each of those comparisons note that the fresh exclusions from what is covered by the Funding Agreement mean that 2025-30 numbers are understated relative to the numbers for earlier years. It is pretty unsatisfactory that neither the Bank nor the Minister (nor Treasury) has provided any sort of reconciliation table to provide a clearer sense of magnitudes.

But all of those comparisons are between Funding Agreement approved numbers for each year. What about comparisons with what the Bank has actually done, or planned to do, in the current (24/25 year).

In the Bank’s Statement of Performance Expectations, published in the middle of last year and fully adopted by the Board (signed by both Quigley and Orr), these were the Bank’s financial forecasts for the current year.

Total operating expenses were forecast then to be $231 million. That was an increase from $186 million the previous year, and $105 million as recently as the year to June 2021.

As it happens, and shortly after the Statement of Performance Expectations came out I wrote a post about some aspects of their numbers

It was pretty breathtaking stuff. What I don’t think I’d noticed by then was that the Minister of Finance had already, in April 2024, set out this is her annual Letter of Expectation to the Board.

That seemed pretty clear. $149.4 million was the baseline for what they were allowed for (Funding Agreement covered) opex in 2024/25, the Minister seemed to be pretty clearly encouraging them to focus on reprioritisation not bids for more and yet (a) the Board signed up to a massive increase in opex for 24/25 (well ahead of the Funding Agreement number for that specific year) and b) then in September bid for a big increase in real opex spending allowances for the coming five years (roughly a 25 per cent real increase).

But how does that $231 million number compare to the $149.4 the Bank was allowed under the then Funding Agreement for 24/25? There we get some hint from a helpful table in the Bank’s 2023/24 Annual Report

Now, this has to be read carefully too. You will notice that the Funding agreement: annual allocation number ($177m for 2023/24) isn’t the same as the Funding Agreement number in the first table above. That is because in the 2020-25 Funding Agreement there is a separate category for “direct net currency issue expenses” (currency is, after all, a profit centre for the Bank so there is some logic in treating it separately). In the year to June 2024, $13.5m was allowed for that set of expenses (subtract that from $177m and you get the $163.5 in the table above).

You will also notice that of the total operating expenses ($186m that year), $28m were for items not covered by the Funding Agreement at all (these exclusions matter, and as noted above they are growing).

So lets go back to that $231m budget for 2024/25 that the Board approved in mid 2024. Of that, $14.5 could have been for those direct currency issue expenses (that was what was allowed in the Funding Agreement), but another table in the Annual Report suggests that in 2022/23 and 2023/24 actual net currency issues expenses had only been $5-6 million per annum, and the Minister’s Cabinet paper says that the latest budget for currency issues expenses for 24/25 is $9m. In absence of further information, and with a little extrapolation, we’ll allow $30m as having been for things not covered by the Funding Agreement at all. Subtract those two items and you are left with $192 million, which is a lot larger number than the $149.4 million allowed for 24/25 in the Funding Agreement (2023 variation).

Now, you will also note in the table – penultimate line, although not clearly labelled – that in 2023/24 the Bank had underspent the Funding Agreement amount by $19m (some mix of currency and other opex), and so – per the Robertson agreement mentioned above – they could in 2024/25 spent up to $19m more than what had been specified for that year alone. That would take the permissible limit to $168.4. Even that number is still a long way short of what the Bank was actually budgeting for the year (see previous para), and it relied scope for one year’s spending that shouldn’t have been prudently used for anything other than one-offs, since a new Funding Agreement was just about to be negotiated, in a period of straitened fiscal circumstances, and when the Minister had already warned them about the future. And yet they were planning a 21 per cent increase in staff expenses in a single year – the final year of the old agreement.

As noted earlier, in the Minister’s Cabinet committee paper – and her press release – she referred several times to an (apparently revised) Reserve Bank operating expenses budget for 2024/25 of $200m. If we take off $30 million for spending not covered by the Funding Agreement and $9m for currency expenses that would get us back to $161m, still substantially more than the $149.4 allowed for that specific year, although lower than what would have been allowed in that year from carrying forward the previous year’s underspend.

You have to wonder at what point the published budget was revised so sharply (down 13 per cent for the full year). Perhaps Treasury had some input when the saw how far out of line the published budget was?

It wasn’t as if this big increase in opex for 2024/25 looks to have been all about one specific project. According to the table in the Cabinet paper, in 2024/25 there is a 40 per cent increase in spending on the core functions (monetary policy, markets, and financial stability), following a 48 per cent increase the previous year. And the support functions (now running at more than four times the level of spending in 2017/18) also see spending rise 17 per cent this (24/25) year.

The Minister’s Cabinet paper, released yesterday, told us that total staff numbers (FTE) had reached 660 by the end of January. Last year’s Annual Report tells us that as at 30 June last year – only 7 months previously – they’d had 601.3 FTEs. It is staggering increase in the last year of a five year Funding Agreement – relying for that year’s Budget on a big underspend the previous year, and despite the Minister’s warning of coming fiscal stringency.

It seems pretty clear that Orr, Quigley and the rest of the Board were engaged in a strategy designed, in effect, to try to bounce the Minister into agreeing to a new higher baseline spending number that (probably) would have been even higher in real terms for the next five years that what they were spending in 2024/25. If so, and it is difficult to read what happened any other way (given that we know what the Bank bid for last September) it is really pretty inexcusable conduct all round (and frankly pretty poor behaviour vis-a-vis staff, since it was a risky high-wire act and if it didn’t come off it was likely to be staff who paid the price.

All the exclusions (and changes in exclusions – for example, those net currency expenses now have just a five yearly total cap rather than annual provisions) mean it is difficult to know with any certainty how much the Bank is really being cut back relative to this year’s spending

Take that $200m budget for 24/25, subtract $30m for spending excluded even in the previous Funding Agreement and $10m for net currency expenses and you are back to $160m. The new Funding Agreement allows for spending in 2025/26 of $155m BUT there are new exclusions. There is this one, which is at least quantified

That might be $5m per annum. In addition (and as mentioned yesterday) spending around the CDBC project is also newly excluded and there are a number of other items. Subtract those of the $160m budgeted on Funding Agreement covered items and you get pretty close to that $155m. Even allowing for a couple of per cent of inflation, there isn’t much sign of real spending cuts – in an organisation that had massively increased spending as recently as, well, this current year.

For the period beyond that there looks to be somewhat more restraint imposed on the Bank but it is nothing very dramatic, in an organisation where spending and staff numbers have blown out in recent years, and kept doing so in 2024/25. (And as noted in yesterday’s post, the Minister rejected Treasury’s push for lower numbers.) Actual real spending later in the Funding Agreement period remains – per table near the start of the post – well above what was spent in the last full year of the previous government.

There are a lot of numbers in this post, and several at least are uncertain. But the bottom line seems to have been one where the Bank’s Board and Governor tried it on, with their preposterous bid for much higher Funding Agreement operational expenditure. Thankfully that made no headway with the Minister. No one seems to emerge with much credit, and if you were inclined to make an allowance for The Treasury there is the mystery of how that huge operating expenses budget ($231m) happened in the first place. Surely they were aware before the thing saw the light of public day?

As for the Minister of Finance, the attempt to claim a 25 per cent reduction relative to this year’s budget looks even more disreputable than I realised yesterday. At least 20 per cent of that budget seems to be on items that weren’t even covered by the (previous) Funding Agreement.

The Minister of Finance appeared on RNZ this morning and from the resulting story it appears that she wanted to emphasise a message that “New Zealanders are doing it tough…..We expect you to show some restraint. Focus on your core statutory requirements”. Which is good stuff as rhetoric, but the reality seems to be one where the funding the Minister has approved will only stop the Bank continuing to expand further (having already expanded for one more year than almost all other government agencies), and do little or enough to ensure they are focused on the core stuff. That’s a shame, and I’m sure most New Zealanders would prefer a few more (say) kidney transplants than cementing-in very high levels of spending – far far above pre-Orr levels in real terms, and above even levels late in Labour’s term – at the central bank.

Perhaps it is only a few geeks and nerds who really care about the law being followed in these obscure matters, but as a reminder

There is still no sign of a budget (let alone a nice to have like a proper reconciliation table).

UPDATE:

Here is another way to try to look at it

The blue bars are actual (real) operating spending by the RB on things covered by the Funding Agreement, with the 24/25 numbers being per the Bank’s budget disclosed in the Minister’s Cabinet paper. On the headline new Funding Agreement (and allowing for 2 per cent inflation) we get the red bar. Allowing $7 million for the new exclusions – $5m for the Deposit Takers Act implementation (see above) and (somewhat arbitrarily) just $2m for the rest – we get the yellow bar. If the yellow bar is roughly right, real spending (like for like) in 25/26 would be 4.4 per cent lower than in 24/25 and barely lower at all than the actual for 23/24 (more than half of which year was under the current government).

Because we do not know the precise value of new exclusions, the yellow bar is illustrative only, but the direction is pretty clear. All the other numbers are from RB documents or the Minister’s Cabinet committee paper.

UPDATE 19/4: There is a mistake in this post, in interpreting the 2024/25 budgeted spend. A full post, revising and amplifying the story, will follow on Tuesday.

What was the story re Orr’s resignation?

It is almost six weeks since the shock announcement early on the afternoon of Wednesday 5 March that the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Adrian Orr, was resigning effective 31 March, and that in fact he had already left and an acting Governor was already in place. Orr had been (controversially) reappointed in late 2022 to a second five-year term that still had a little over three years to run. In his seven years in office he’d been a near-constant figure of controversy, not least for his role as chair of the Monetary Policy Committee which had not only let inflation run out of control then needing to bring about a (mild) recession to get back in check, but for the $11 billion of losses the Bank had sustained punting in the government bond market. His relationships with anyone but sycophants and yes-men seemed strained – whether the rapid turnover of senior managers, his treatment of external critics, or the very evident rather dismissive and at best frosty relationship with the current Minister of Finance when she was in Opposition. On many occasions – including at numerous select committee hearings – his relationship with the truth also seemed tenuous.

It is good to see the back of him, but it really isn’t adequate that we’ve had no explanation at all for the sudden departure, sufficiently precipitate that he simply walked off the day before he was due to host a research conference, with speakers of the eminence of Ben Bernanke, to mark 35 years of inflation targeting. Orr’s own comments – the only ones being in the official statement (linked to above) – shed no light at all on the reasons for his resignation or for the precipitate departure. Neither the Bank’s Board nor the Minister of Finance has shed any light at all, including on why they allowed their employee to simply walk off with no (effective) notice whatsoever. What were the relevant provisions in his contract, and were they enforced? One can think of circumstances in which an employer might want an employee- senior or junior – out instantly (eg if there were serious behavioural issues or if someone was resigning to take up a position that involved a direct conflict of interest – eg when Don Brash left the Reserve Bank to go into politics, or if Orr had resigned to go and work for a bank or funds managers), but generally people expect to (and are expected/required to) give a decent amount of notice and to work out that notice. As just one example, when the Deputy Governor resigned a few years ago he gave four months notice. Why wasn’t Orr working out a decent length of notice?

I’ve been looking back through articles etc from 5 March, and what limited material has emerged since. The line that caught my eye was from Infometrics’ Brad Olsen on the day of the resignation:
“Let’s be very blunt. The Board of the Reserve Bank needs to front, they need to front urgently, and they need to be open and transparent. Anything less is just not acceptable”

And yet “anything less” is just what we have got. No straight answers from either the Board or the Minister of Finance. The Bank likes to boast of its commitment to transparency, but as I’ve had cause to observe numerous times over the years while they are very open about things they want us to know, they are consistently obstructive about much of the rest. Serious transparency involves openness even when it is uncomfortable or embarrassing. Anything else is really just PR/spin.

Early candidates for the explanation for Orr’s departure were disputes with the Minister of Finance over either (or both) the Bank’s budgets and (forthcoming new) Funding Agreement or bank capital etc regulation. It had been only a week previously that the Minister had finally confirmed publicly that she would be looking for savings from the Bank.

Neither of those factors ever seemed adequate to account for what we knew. After all, despite suggestions that the Bank had actually been bidding for more funding, pretty much every government agency had had to live with budget cuts in the last year, and no other chief executive is known to have tossed his/her toys and stormed off in protest. The Bank and Governor must have known that fiscal restraint was going to come for them too. And the Board chair told us that while discussions were ongoing nothing had been finalised by 5 March. And even if the Governor had concluded that in his best professional opinion the Bank couldn’t do its job on the level of funding the Minister and/or Treasury were proposing, why storm off with no notice (around a not-yet-finalised agreement) when the new Funding Agreement was not even due to come into effect until 1 July this year? Giving notice that he’d be going on 30 June would have seemed to (relatively) mature and responsible approach had fiscal concerns been the key to Orr wanting to leave.

Much the same goes for issues around bank capital regulation. The Minister has been quite open that she had been taking advice on possible changes to the legislation to allow her to determine key prudential policy parameters. Reasonable people can and do differ on that. A central bank Governor might have regarded such changes, had they been confirmed, as simply unacceptable and not a regime he/she would be willing to work under. But there do not seem to have been any confirmed decisions, legislation takes time to put in place, and again…..3-4 months notice would have been quite reasonable if the Governor had concluded that someone else should pick up the baton for the years ahead. There is nothing of such apparent urgency to account for simply walking off with no effective notice at all.

Same goes if the Governor had simply come back from his summer holiday and decided he no longer has enough “gas in the tank”, was tired, and thought it was time to go. Plenty of people do come back from holidays thinking it is time for a change (plenty of them then settle back into the routine of the year), and look around for another job and/or give notice and move on. People might even sympathise with a senior official who got to that point. But it doesn’t make sense of Orr’s departure….with no effective notice at all.

If anything, the mystery – and a sense that the Board and Minister are keeping important stuff from us – was highlighted by the OIA response obtained from the Minister of Finance by the Herald’s assiduous Jenee Tibshraeny, as reported here. (I’m guessing she probably has a similar request in with the Bank itself, but is probably being obstructed and delayed there.)

Those documents suggest that Orr had last met with Willis on 24 February. By 27 February, Board chair Neil Quigley had been in touch with Treasury Secretary Iain Rennie about Orr, and Rennie advised the Minister of this conversation (substance of which was withheld). Most strikingly, the documents show that on the morning of 5 March “Reserve Bank staff sent Willis’s staff a draft press release for the resignation announcement, dated 10 March” (the following Monday, and after the inflation targeting conference was out of the way). And yet by 1:30pm on the 5th the resignation announcement went out – Orr himself was already out – with staff (on both sides of Bowen St/The Terrace) having scrambled to finalise press releases.

Something must have happened that morning. It simply cannot have been developments around either the funding agreement or bank regulatory policy (and although I can’t verify these claims I have heard a couple of times from people I trust that (other) people very close to the situation have confirmed that neither was the explanation for either the departure or the suddenly expedited announcement and no-notice nature of the exit).

Then there is the other document reported in the Herald article: some proposed Q&As for the Minister prepared by her press secretary. This particular press secretary must have been particularly averse to openness, suggesting that in response to a question “Did you ever have disagreements with Adrian Orr” she answer (in essence) “no comment”, when surely almost any minister and agency CE worth their salt would have disagreements, including on policy issues, from time to time.

Then there was this one

Which has to be the ultimate answer designed to deflect, and yet in the process suggested there really was something there. David Farrar picked up on this issue thus

It would be pretty extraordinary for a senior official to raise his/her voice with a minister (sadly, vice versa is not unknown), and although Orr was not formally a public servant, it would still be pretty grossly unacceptable behaviour from such an official and something the Board should have been alerted to. Unfortunately, Orr’s impulsive and undisciplined nature means that raising his voice at the Minister sounds all too plausible.

But, even if so, still not an adequate explanation for why the resignation was brought forward at the very last minute.

The Herald article also reports that (a) the Minister told her press secretary not to give out the purpose of the 24 February meeting (not exactly committed to transparency is she?), b) wasn’t briefed by her press secretary on answering questions re bank capital (presumably the press secretary didn’t think that was the story), and c) Willis was advised to say “not that I’m aware of” if asked if the resignation had anything to do with either the funding agreement or her opposition to his 2022 reappointment.

So where does it leave us? We – the public – are clearly being stonewalled by both Willis and the Bank’s Board (while Orr, now no longer a public official is saying nothing at all). The usually supine Finance and Expenditure Committee – currently launching an inquiry into improving performance reporting and public accountability – is living down to form.

Faced with the set of facts (the unquestioned known ones), and applying something like Occam’s Razor, most reasonable people would deduce that something pretty serious and potentially scandalous must have gone on. The facts?

  • resignation with no-effective notice (out of the door by the time the announcement hit the screens (Quigley told questioners that the acting Governor had been in place from “lunchtime today”)
  • resignation on the eve of a significant and fairly prestigious conference, where CEO level hospitality would normally have been expected,
  • resignation accelerated at the last minute (10th brought forward to the 5th),
  • person resigning not indicating anything about (a) a new job, and b) even general new career directions,
  • other proffered stories (funding, bank capital) making no sense of the stylised facts, even from an undisciplined and volatile character like Orr.  (Health hypotheses also don’t work, as even a short non-specific mention of health as the explanation would have quickly allayed questioning and resulted in widespread sympathy.)

There are, of course, problems with a conduct/scandal hypothesis.

Specifically, Neil Quigley appears to have denied it at his hastily-called short press conference later on the afternoon of 5 March.   Someone who was there kindly sent me a transcript, which this draws from.

Quigley’s first answer on this point might appear to have wriggle room.  Asked if there were “any conduct issues outstanding”, Quigley replies with a simple “No”.  But, of course, it isn’t exactly unknown for questionable conduct to be dealt with by way of quid pro quo: someone resigns and an issue is taken no further.  Once the resignation is lodged and accepted (as it clearly was by late on 5 March) there wouldn’t be any conduct issues “outstanding”.

But a later question seemed to allow less wriggle room: asked whether there were any “policy, conduct and performance issues which are at the centre of this resignation”, Quigley responded “we have issues that we’ve been working through, but there are no issues of that type that are behind this”, and in a follow-up clarified that the issues they’d been working on had been the policy/funding issues.   But was he then primarily answering about “policy” rather than the other limbs of the question?

There is also a final question, where the transcript isn’t fully clear.  Quigley appears to have been asked if there are “current issue with Adrian” and if there had been “any complaints”.   He is recorded as responding “I’m not going to go into that because that’s history”, and something about “some things that have made as a public record’ [perhaps past concerns about Orr’s treatment of people like Roger Partridge and Martien Lubberink] “but I don’t intend to go into those now” before he walked off and terminated the press conference.

Quigley also stated that Orr had still had his (Quigley’s) confidence, while avoiding answering a question that was about the Board’s continuing confidence.

The problem is that Quigley (a) doesn’t seem to be giving straight answers, and b) has form.   Thus, if the only thing you read was the transcript of his press conference you’d get the sense that the story was somehow about Orr feeling the job had been done and it was time to move on.   But that makes no sense of what we now know (the rush to bring forward the announcement to that afternoon), and he provided no compelling explanation when asked why Orr hadn’t just stuck round long enough even just to be hospitable at the conference.   And even what he did say doesn’t make much sense of a “time for a change” story, noting that he and Orr had been in discussion on “this and exactly how it would play out over a few days”. 

And, as to Quigley’s “form”, regular readers will recall his denial –  and putting Treasury in a place where it went public with a denial –  that there had ever been any sort of blackball on expertise when the first MPC members were appointed five years ago.  Not only did personal testimony contradict him (people who were told by Quigley himself they would not be considered because they were active experts), but so did the documentary record (OIAs), and comments from one of his own fellow Board members who’d been actively involved in the selection process back then.

One final straw in the wind is that just a few days after Orr left, a release quietly appeared on the Reserve Bank’s website advising that one of Orr’s several deputies, an Assistant Governor responsible for Information, Data, and Analytics, had resigned.  There was no indication of any other job to go to, and the departure date was less than three weeks from the date of the announcement (by contrast, another Assistant Governor resigned last year, offering more than two months notice).    Perhaps there is no connection to Orr’s departure.   But the coincidence in timing, with no specific job to go to, should at least prompt some questions.

We (the public) still have no idea what actually happened.  And that really isn’t good enough from either the Board or the Minister about the holder of such a consequential office.    But what we do know is enough to lead a reasonable interpreter to fear that it really may have been something around Orr’s conduct.   If not (and one genuinely hopes not) a straightforward explanation could set the record straight very quickly.  And if so, people shouldn’t be able to hide behind private commitments to secrecy that might serve the interests of some of the powerful, but are hardly likely to serve the public interest.

Farewell to Orr

Today is the last day in office for the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Adrian Orr. Of course, he hasn’t been in the office since 5 March when, on the eve of his major international conference, his resignation was announced and he stormed off with no (effective) notice and no explanation.

I’m not going to waste my time or bore readers with a retrospective assessment of Orr’s overall tenure. I recently reread the couple of substantive posts I wrote on prospects at the time he was appointed, and although I was probably more openly sceptical than most, I wasn’t nearly pessimistic enough. But if the initial appointment was (perhaps) pardonable, he should never have been reappointed, and his departure now is both welcome and long overdue.

When Orr’s resignation was announced, we were told that his deputy would be acting Governor for the rest of the month and were led to believe that from 1 April a formal “temporary Governor” (explicitly provided for in the Act) would be in place. Here is the extract from the Bank’s statement

and this is from the Minister’s statement

But then this appeared in The Post this morning

It may be legal (although the RB spokesperson appears to have the details wrong as the Act does not seem to impose a deadline on the Minister, only on the Board, and – if Orr’s resignation really is effective only from today – they’d appear to have another 28 days even to make a recommendation)

but it certainly isn’t what we were led to expect on 5 March in either announcement (see above). There doesn’t seem to be any good reason for the Bank’s Board not yet to have made a recommendation to the Minister. They’d had more than three weeks already.

As per earlier posts, I think it is quite inappropriate that board chair Quigley is still in office. The government should have prevailed him to do the decent thing and step aside so that someone new can lead the search for a new permanent Governor. But even if the government were so minded, it isn’t a good reason for not getting a proper temporary Governor in place, and for not having a recommendation on the Minister’s desk already. Probably most people expect Hawkesby to be appointed as temporary Governor, and if that was the Board’s inclination it should have been quick and easy to decide on that recommendation. Of course, it is always possible that the Minister has in mind something different and is in back-channels and unofficial conversation with the Board about just who they might nominate (“back-channels and unofficial” since the Act is clear that the onus is on the Board to nominate and on the Minister only to accept or reject).

It all seems rather sloppy and lackadaisical (dating right back to those 5 March press releases, which perhaps had to be churned out in a hurry). And one reason countries typically give long (and fixed) terms to central bank Governors is precisely so that Ministers of Finance cannot do what the Stuff journalist suggests and make decisions about short terms based on whether someone makes monetary policy decisions to the Minister’s satisfaction (not that I am suggesting Willis will). And if this process is sloppy and lackadaisical it only compounds the bad impression made about a country and its central bank when the incumbent Governor resigned with no notice and not a word of explanation.

On the way ahead

In my post last Thursday I offered some thoughts on changes that should be initiated by the government in the wake of the Governor’s surprise resignation. (Days on we still have no real explanation as to why he just resigned with no notice, disappearing out the door and (eg) leaving his international conference in the lurch, but this post is entirely forward looking.) Here I want to elaborate on three points, having benefited from a few days to reflect and a few useful conversations/exchanges:

  • the position of the Board chair, Neil Quigley,
  • policymaking on bank (and related) regulatory matters,
  • the Funding Agreement.

Board members, including the chair, of the Reserve Bank cannot be removed at will by the government. That puts them in a different position than the boards of many other government agencies. Whatever the pros and cons of that model (and there are both) it is the law as it stands.

Last year the government – for reasons never made clear – extended the term of the chair of the Board, Neil Quigley, for another and apparently final two year term. Quigley has been on the board for a very long time now, and has been chair since 2016. By usual standards of corporate governance that would really be too long anyway, even allowing for the fact that the role has changed over time. But it was pretty clear when the reappointment was done last year that with Quigley getting another two years but Orr having (then) almost four years to run, the government expected – and appropriately so – that a new chair would be in place to lead the search for, and transition to, a new Governor (Governors are now limited to two terms).

It should be untenable for Quigley lead the search (and transition) process now. He drove the selection and appointment (and reappointment) process for Orr in the first place. And frankly, however Orr appeared to the interviewers in 2017, that did not turn out well, and did not end well. The Board – and especially the long-serving Board chair – has to take some responsibility for that (including the chaos of last week, including Quigley’s own unconvincing belated press conference, which one person put it to me was bad enough to warrant dismissal for cause – sadly, not really a statutory option). In addition, Quigley – whose responsibilities have been to the public and the minister – has had the back of the Governor throughout his term, and there has never been the slightest hint in any Board Annual Report of any concerns at all. Worse, it appears that Quigley championed that blackball back in 2018 which – unlike any serious central bank in the world – saw anyone with current or future research interests in or around monetary policy banned from consideration for appointment to the Monetary Policy Committee (and yes, there is chapter and verse on this). Much more recently, whether deliberately or through careless forgetfulness (and failing to check records) he actively misled Treasury and, in turn, the public on this matter, claiming there’d never been such a ban (see, eg, here and here).

It is time for Quigley to go, and for cleaning house to begin in earnest. Quigley can’t be dismissed, but it shouldn’t be beyond the wit of the Minister of Finance to have it made clear to him that it isn’t tenable or appropriate for him to lead the next stage. Quigley himself is a wily political operator and could no doubt read tea leaves were they presented to him. And he seems still to want that medical school. Willis also has an existing board vacancy to fill now, and 2 more positions become vacant on 30 June.

(Assuming she isn’t willing to amend the Act to make the appointment of the Governor wholly a choice for her and the Cabinet), Willis should be looking to move in short order to put in place a new Board chair, someone not compromised by the Orr years, someone of stature (appointments need to be consulted with other parties in Parliament), but also someone trusted to be sympathetic to the general direction the government wants to go with the Bank. (If that seems threatening or politicised, it isn’t intended that way, but we are a democracy and governments, in Parliament, get to make the big picture policy and organisational directional calls). In any case, the Minister should look to issue a new letter of expectations to the Board making clear what she is looking for as regard budget discipline, policy priorities, and the qualities to be sought in a new Governor.

What about prudential regulatory policy? In most areas of government, policy is set by ministers, and implementation is done by agencies, including Crown entities, operating (implementing/applying) at arms-length from ministers. That is both efficient (ministers have limited time etc) and consistent with good governance generally – we really do not want ministers playing favourites for their donors or mates in the application of the standard rules, and we really do want accountability to Parliament and public for policy choices.

In prudential policy in New Zealand things are different. For the most part, the Reserve Bank itself gets to set the rules (big picture social risk tolerances and all) and apply them. Prudential regulators of course tend to like such a model, and there is plenty of literature from sympathetic former regulators, and from academics, in support of it. On the other hand, it looks pretty dubious through a democratic accountability lens. I’ve written here previously about former Bank of England Deputy Governor Paul Tucker’s book on delegating power, including but not exclusively so, to central banks. Bank regulatory policy simply does not pass the test – the various sensible principles Tucker lists – for being delegated to technical experts. And, as it happens, in New Zealand the power doesn’t even rest with technical experts, but with the Reserve Bank Board, which has been very light indeed on expertise or experience in these areas.

It has become clear that the government is unhappy with elements of Reserve Bank policy choices in these areas. Some of the apparent discontent – eg last year and the secretive advice re remuneration of settlement account balances – doesn’t make sense. Some other counts seem weak, and others rather more persuasive. But here’s the thing: the government is the government and, hand in hand with Parliament, is supposed to make our laws, and be accountable for them. The government, for example, sets the inflation target (while delegating OCR calls needed to deliver inflation near target).

It seems highly likely that prudential policy issues are going to be front of mind in choosing a new Governor (all that ongoing select committee inquiry and all). Which is fine, but a much more direct way to do things would be to seek a simple amendment to the Deposit Takers Act to make clear that in setting prudential standards the Reserve Bank first needs the consent of the Minister of Finance (at present, the Bank needs to inform her – not consult – and even failure to inform doesn’t invalidate the new rule). Then the government could be confident that whoever became Governor would be (a) providing advice, and b) ensuring the implementation of the rules, but that policy itself would be being set by the government. People we can toss out. We shouldn’t want a yes-man (or woman) as Governor – it shouldn’t be in the Minister’s interests either – and it is critically important that the Minister gets robust, technically expert, advice from the Bank (informed by research and critically-reviewed analysis) before making prudential policy decisions. But big picture policy calls should be for the Minister.

I’m not a parliamentary process expert so perhaps it might take a few months to make such an amendment. It is likely to take a few months to appoint a new Governor anyway, but any appointment could then be made with the new Governor knowing that those would be the terms on which they were taking the job.

The final of my three points is about the Funding Agreement, widely believed to be one of the factors that led Orr to storm off. As a reminder, the Reserve Bank isn’t (but probably should be) funded by annual parliamentary appropriation (yes, we want operating autonomy but we still fund the Police that way), but through an agreement that determines how much of its profit the Bank gets to keep and spend. This is a deeply flawed model – a legacy of late eighties disputes. Not only does Parliament not get a say at all (with hundreds of millions of operating spending involved) but the Bank does (government departments simply get told by ministers what their appropriation will be). But worse it is not compulsory for there even to be a Funding Agreement, and the law states that if there isn’t one the board simply has to use its best endeavours to keep spending no more than in the last year of the previous agreement. Which, I suppose, caps further growth in bloat and budget, but could be used to simply to refuse to accept a cut in budgets (when almost every other government agency has had or faces cuts). I’m not suggesting the Bank would negotiate in bad faith, but….the law is the law, and it gives them much more power and formal leverage than most agencies have. It should be changed, and in short order, to ensure that if the five year funding model remains, a) the Minister sets the amount, and the allocation among Bank’s statutory functions, and b) that all is subject to parliamentary debate and ratification as other government spending is.

Changing tack, who might eventually be chosen as the new Governor? There isn’t any obvious standout candidate – which may be a poor reflection on how our system has worked, including the way successive Reserve Bank Boards have operated over the last couple of decades. Various articles have listed a reasonably predictable list of possible names, including Arthur Grimes, John McDermott, Christian Hawkesby, and Prasanna Gai [UPDATE: and Dominick Stephens was also on those lists]. I tossed into the mix on Twitter the other day the name of former Government Statistician and (more recently) Deputy Governor, Geoff Bascand. One name I have been a bit surprised not to have seen mentioned – casting the net necessarily wide – is Carl Hansen, who was appointed to the MPC last year, but who has both Reserve Bank and Treasury experience, and chief executive experience.

All those people are economists by background. Neither the current head of the Fed nor the current head of the ECB is an economist. That is pretty uncommon these days, but both the Fed and ECB have deep benches of economics expertise in very senior roles. But might, for example, there be a case for a strong non technically expert change manager becoming Governor, perhaps with the intention of doing only 2-3 years (on the pattern of Brian Roche at PSC)? I’d be wary – perhaps a good Board chair could best do some of that – but….there is no standout candidate.

An obvious question is what about New Zealanders abroad or indeed foreigners (eg the Australian government has appointed a Brit, with no past ties to or experience of Australia, to the Deputy Governor role at the RBA). I used to be pretty staunchly opposed to a foreign appointment when the Governor was the all-powerful single decisionmaker, but legislative reforms have – at least on paper – spread the power. Someone with no past ties to, or experience of, New Zealand would still face a big adjustment hurdle, and it would be quite risky (and there are adverse selection issues: the most able globally might reasonably think their best opportunities were not in New Zealand). New Zealanders abroad might be more of an option, although one I used to champion as warranting serious consideration (including in 2017) – David Archer, former Assistant Governor, former senior official at the BIS – might have almost aged out by now (although is probably only about the same age as Grimes) and has been away for a long time. There will be others.

I’m not going offer my thoughts on the pros and cons of any of these individuals. Suffice to repeat that, and especially given the broad role as it is currently specified, there doesn’t seem to be a compelling candidate in any of the lists. Perhaps even more than usually, in coming up with their final pick, the Board and the Minister might want to be thinking in terms of a team at the top, the sort of people a possible new Governor would choose to fill the couple of most senior posts (policy and operational/administrative) around him/her.

Reading Reserve Bank plans and budgets

It isn’t something I’d usually recommend (or even do myself) but the useful new Twitter account @Charteddaily (basically one interesting New Zealand chart a day) posted a couple of charts drawn from the suite of Reserve Bank documents that were released last Thursday, and they piqued my interest (and, for reasons you will see below, concern).

But first, also on Thursday there was some attempt by the government to defend the extraordinary reappointment (yet again) of Neil Quigley as chair of the Reserve Bank’s board (which I’d written about, and lamented, here). The Herald’s Jenée Tibshraeny had got in touch with both the Minister of Finance and with David Seymour (both an Associate Minister of Finance, and leader of a party that had also firmly opposed Orr’s reappointment – something recommended by Quigley’s Board – and whose Finance spokesperson had only a few weeks earlier suggested that Orr (still supported by Quigley and his Board) was unfit for office). The article is headed “Nicola Willis and David Seymour confident in call to appoint…”. If you read the article carefully, Willis never actually explains why she did what she did. She says she stands by her previous criticisms of the Bank and of Orr’s reappointment – thus putting her clearly at odds with Quigley’s views – and the only new observation she makes (that Quigley played a “key role” in establishing the new RB Board) seems irrelevant (not only was that transition presumably why Grant Robertson gave him another two years in 2022, but the Reserve Bank itself shows no sign of any better performance now, whether Governor, MPC or more broadly).

I guess one should give credit to David Seymour for engaging more substantively (since he isn’t the responsible minister he could have just hidden behind Cabinet collective responsibility), but his more extended arguments simply don’t wash either. This was the bulk of his comments

None of this washes. I’m sure many people have heard the story of Orr once being pulled out of a Board meeting by Quigley to get him to calm down. That’s good, but what about the repeated active misrepresentations to FEC, or the dismissive approach Orr – Quigley’s man – routinely takes to any criticism or disagreement. And quite how losing 10 of your top 26 people in short order, several of whom had only recently been promoted by Orr, speaks to Quigley’s value I don’t know. And “chopping and changing”? Quigley has been on the Board since 2010, chair since 2016. Actually, turnover and fresh faces have value (as is widely recognised in other government appointments), especially when the institution has not itself done a good job (massive financial losses, serious inflation outbreak etc). When you can’t change the chief executive (and the government can’t until 2028) getting rid of the chair, at the end of his term, when the chair has backed the Governor all the way, was the way to signal a seriousness about wanting something different. On the evidence of the Willis/Seymour words and actions, this government – once in office – doesn’t.

And it isn’t as if the Bank – Orr or Quigley – is changing of its own accord. This was the first of the snippets that @Charteddaily had highlighted (drawn from RB Annual Reports and from the last two Statements of Performance Expectations).

That is a further 21 per cent planned increase in staff expenses in the year that began on Monday, on top of really large cumulative increases over the Orr era to date. It is just staggering, in a year when almost every other government agency is being expected to cut back, often quite materially. The Reserve Bank is funded through a five-yearly Funding Agreement, and the current one doesn’t expire until 30 June 2025, so the government couldn’t compel them to cut back immediately, but (a) there isn’t anything in the Minister’s letter of expectation (sent back in early April, only finally released last week) urging them to do so, and (b) it is in stark contrast to the voluntary savings in place by ACC, also not funded by direct parliamentary appropriations. The Orr/Quigley approach seems to be “hey, we are the Reserve Bank, we’ll just go our own way”. And there is not the slightest evidence that the Minister of Finance cares.

Then again, her government is throwing out new subsidies to fund Shortland Street.

And it is not as if they are throwing lots more money at improving their monetary policy and inflation research or analysis. Actually, comparing this year’s Statement of Performance Expectations to last year’s, in 2024/25 they plan to spend $46 million on monetary policy up just slightly from a planned $45 million in 2023/24.

So what are they spending their (well, our) money on. This was where I was really gobsmacked by a @Charteddaily tweet, trusting that the person behind that account read documents accurately but still not quite believing it.

Yes, you are reading that correctly: $35 million in 2024/25 on “engaging with the public and other stakeholders”. Since issuing physical cash (zero interest liabilities) is a highly profitable business (forecast net operating profit $483 million), this weird category of “engagement with the public and other stakeholders” is really their biggest item of spending.

I’ve been reading around their documents over the last day or so and I still find it incomprehensible, on numerous counts. First, one would normally have assumed that any costs – including communications costs – associated with the Bank’s various statutory functions (monetary policy, financial system regulation and oversight, foreign reserves etc) would have been allocated to those functions themselves. And you can see that when it comes to monetary policy there is a specific item for “Communication and implementation”. Promoting the institution itself, distinct from its specific statutory responsibilities and powers, is simply not a legitimate use of (very large amounts of) public money.

Here is a high level summary that I found on their website about this activity

But it doesn’t really help. The Reserve Bank, for example, doesn’t fund Parliament. Rather, like any public agency, it is required to front up when called, and the costs of providing information to FEC would, one would have thought, been (modest and) allocated to the respective functions (directly in the case of MPSs and FSRs, perhaps indirectly in respect of the overarching corporate documents).

Much the same goes for 6.1, with the added point that granting media interviews tends not to cost taxpayers anything. The Governor in particular seems to use his rare interviews to hand wave and distract rather than to engage with alternative perspectives or criticisms. As for speaking engagements, there is a bit of cost to them (getting out and around the country) but what has been noticeable for years is how few such engagements – at least on the record ones – they do; hardly any at all in the case of MPC members. And shouldn’t such costs be allocated to (in this case) the monetary policy function?

And so we are left with 6.2. What is proposed? Some massive advertising campaign, indirectly subsidising NZ media? Surely not, but then if not then what? A fair question for Treasury to be asking the Reserve Bank is something along the lines of what outcomes would be worse for New Zealanders if this line item was to be cut by 80 per cent?

The performance measures in the Statement of Performance Expectations are not really any more helpful

None of it tells us what they are actually spending so much money on (or why most of the costs are not allocated back to respective core functions).

There was some verbiage and effort at distraction in the Statement of Intent itself

Quite what any changes in the “media landscape” might have to do with the extent of trust people might repose in New Zealand’s central bank isn’t clear, but I guess playing distraction is better than identifying factors like:

  • presiding over the worst inflation outbreak in decades, and then trying to openly blame it on everyone than the central bank itself,
  • losing taxpayers $11.5 billion in a huge bond market punt, and then refusing to seriously engage on the extent of the loss and associated misjudgement,
  • everyone involved in these decisions (Governor, MPC members, Board chair) getting reappointed, only confirming that “accountability” has been emptied of all content,
  • the appointment of a DCE responsible for macro and monetary policy with not the slightest background in that area,
  • blackballing people with research expertise from the new Monetary Policy Committee, and then years later assserting openly that there never was such a ban,
  • a Governor who is universally known to be intolerant of debate or challenge/disagreement,
  • barely any (and then of no depth) serious speeches from key monetary policy figures through the worst inflation outbreak and period of greatest policy uncertainty in decades,
  • a central bank that shows little sign of being exclusively focused on the limited range of things Parliament instructs it to do, instead pursuing management/Board ideological causes.
  • and so on

But sure, try blaming the “media landscape”. Seems a bit more like an effort – at taxpayers’ expense, from public officials – at active disinformation.

And if you are inclined to doubt the point about loss of focus, I can only suggest reading the Statement of Intent itself. “Climate” gets more mentions than either “inflation” or “price stability”, and if that particular ratio is (much) less bad than it was in their previous Statement of Intent, what hasn’t changed is that while “inflation” gets five mentions, and “price stability” six, “Maori” features 52 times (pretty similar to the previous Statement of Intent). And, yes, I did check and it is not that they are publishing lists of all different ethnicities: neither Asian, Pacific, nor European get even a mention (and nor would you expect any of them to do so in a central bank actually focused on its mandate, which by its nature operates pretty pervasively across the entire economy, regardless of religion, ethnicity, sexuality or whatever).

But Orr and Quigley have a crusade.

I checked again the Reserve Bank Act. There is but one substantive reference to “Maori” in that legislation (in a “good employer” section) and none at all – again unsurprisingly – to the treaty of Waitangi.

But you wouldn’t guess it from reading the Statement of Intent. It starts – first substantive page – with the tree god nonsense Orr used to spout on about a few years ago (complete with dodgy economic history about the founding of the Reserve Bank). Their so-called Te Ao Maori strategy gets two whole pages, complete with links to their treaty of Waitangi statement, well before any serious discussion about monetary policy, the cash system, or the soundness of the financial system, none of it grounded in statute. It pervades the document.

Now, in fairness to Nicola Willis, her letter of expectations to the Bank’s Board is different than those from Robertson. There is nothing at all of the dubious ideological stuff that Robertson used to throw in. But what difference has it made? None, apparently, given that her letter is dated 3 April, all these corporate documents came out only last Thursday, and none will have been a surprise to the Minister, since she had to be consulted. And yet she and the Cabinet reappointed Quigley.

Just breathtaking.

I’m still at a loss to understand what they have included in that $35 million. Perhaps they will now stop stonewalling on OIAs, and stop trying to charge me for information they should have released 5 years ago (but then OIAs weren’t even mentioned in that “engagement” description). Pro-active openness also tends to be even cheaper than handling OIAs, but that is something the Bank seems totally averse to. Perhaps they could spend a bit on a better proofreader (the table that showed that $35m had a typo in its title).

But more seriously, we deserve to know what this total includes, and why they are spending so much of our money to try to make us like/respect them (when just doing their job well – and only their job – would do more of that, and have substantive benefits to us). I suspect – but can’t confirm – the $35 million includes a lot of spending on things that really can’t be tied at all to statutory functions: their climate advisers, their Maori advisers, their diversity and equity (so-called) people, their multi-national central bank indigenous network costs etc, although it is still really hard to see how it gets to $35m per annum (hard to tell how much of an increase it is for this year, as they have changed their presentation, athough a number from last year that looks to be similar is about $29m).

While pouring out lengthy bureaucratic documents they avoid real scrutiny, they don’t do their day jobs at all well (we are living with the aftermath of really bad misjudgements in 2020/21), never show the slightest contrition, and feel free to use large amounts of public money to pursue personal ideological agendas not even slightly grounded in their statutory responsibilities, they rarely engage substantively, publish next to no research, and so on.

And yet Nicola Willis (and her leader and Cabinet) seem quite unbothered and just went ahead and reappointed the chair yet again.

Then again, this is the government – that campaigned up hill and down dale on fiscal excess and waste – which yesterday announced big new subsidies for……keeping an old local soap opera going.