Anne-Marie Brady has been at the forefront of identifying, and highlighting, the ways in which the People’s Republic of China, through the Communist Party’s United Front work programme, appears to have been attempting to influence, and interfere with, public life in New Zealand –  both among the local ethnic Chinese community, and more generally.  Her Magic Weapons paper remains required reading, and for all that apologists have attempted to brush aside the issues raised in the paper, no one has made any serious efffort to engage with, and refute, the concerns she has raised.

Most other New Zealand academics, with familiarity with the Chinese language, have stayed silent.  But another person –  with Chinese language –  who has written, quite extensively, about the New Zealand situation is the author of the pseudonymous blog Jichang Lulu.    He has a new and substantial piece (if characterised by an idiosyncratic style) on the United Front activities in New Zealand, which is likely to repay reading for anyone interested in these issues.  Whoever the author is, his usual focus is regions far from New Zealand (Nordics) but has been paying a lot of attention to the New Zealand situation in the last year or so and appears to be quite well-connected.   I linked the other day to his detailed piece on PRC efforts to attempt to bring Norway and Mongolia to heel.

Much focus in recent months has been on National Party list MP Jian Yang.  But, of course, National is in Opposition at present. Jichang Lulu has raised specific concerns about senior Labour backbencher Raymond Huo, who also appears to have close connection to the PRC regime.   From his latest post

According to a source with knowledge of the matter, recent requests from a CCP-unfriendly NZ Chinese organisation to have ministers send Chinese New Year greetings were reportedly redirected to Raymond Huo, effectively making the ruling party’s leading United Frontling, whose PRC-consonant views are well–known, the government’s gatekeeper to contacts with the Chinese community. In contrast, ministers and other politicians didn’t hesitate to attend celebrations with PRC diplomats. In other words, the Party-state, through its local advocates, can vicariously veto official support for something as apolitical as a calendrical festivity, at least when the persons seeking such support happen to have Chinese surnames.

Huo currently chairs Parliament’s justice committee –  responsible for the triennial review of the election, and for handling new electoral legislation more generally.  And the way governments typically turnover their members, there has to be a pretty significant chance that he’ll be a member of the executive before this parliamentary term is out.  Much focus in recent times has been on past and present ties of senior National Party figures to PRC interests.  But with Labour in government –  and their party president an effusive public supporter of Xi Jinping –  it is about time harder questions were asked of the new government.

Another thing worth reading (although behind a paywall) is an article in The Australian today under the heading Cold War: Freeze on China Ties.  It builds on reports last week that

university leaders were concerned about Chinese government attempts to dissuade ­students from coming to Australia to study. In an escalation of the pressure on universities, school visits have been cancelled, senior educational meetings in Beijing have been “postponed” and messages warning of the dangers of studying in Australia have been posted on the website of the ­Chinese embassy in Canberra.

claiming that

China is putting Australia into a diplomatic deep freeze, stalling on ministerial visits, deferring a trip by our top diplomat and putting off a broad range of lower-level ­exchanges to pressure Malcolm Turnbull over the new foreign ­interference laws and naval challenges to disputed Chinese claims in the South China Sea.

Government sources are reported as conceding that “there is a diplomatic and ­bureaucratic stalling over a range of visits, as Beijing voices its ­displeasure at foreign-­interference laws”.

I guess this is the sort of thing that the subservient apologists in our own political, bureaucratic and business establishment worry about.  But perhaps it should prompt them to think again about the nature of the regime they want to cosy up to.    The PRC might have some capacity to hurt individual New Zealand economic sectors –  as, say, the Mafia or organised crime might in other countries – but our prosperity as a nation is simply not based on those firms’ trade with China.   And sometimes, just occasionally, there are advantages to distance: Korea, Vietnam, or the Philippines (let alone Taiwan) have to live with the PRC on their doorstep.  We don’t, and it is surely time to reflect on what manner of regime they abet, whether actively or by silence.

The other day, New Zealand Prime Minister gave her first major foreign policy speech.  As far as I could tell, it was better than it could have been on the PRC.

China’s global influence has grown along with its economic weight.  Its leadership on issues like climate change and trade liberalisation could add momentum to our collective efforts in those areas.

Naturally, there are areas where we do not see eye to eye with China.  My government will speak honestly and openly with our friends in Beijing.  Whether it is about human rights, pursuing our trade interests, or the security and stability of our region.

Taking that approach isn’t about singling countries out, , but about taking a consistent approach on the issues and principles that matter to us.

It wasn’t very grovelly –  none of the nonsense Murray McCully was using just a few months ago about China saving us through the financial crisis of 2008/09 –  although anyone who thinks China is somehow at the forefront of global trade liberalisation hasn’t looked very closely (or doesn’t wish to).

By contrast, here is Julie Bishop quoted in that same Australian article

After Mr Trump said he would “love” Australia to join the US in military passages through Chinese disputed territorial waters, Mr Turnbull refused to say in advance when an operation would take place. Such an operation, which the US has conducted in the past, would contradict ­Beijing’s claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea and assert the right of free passage for international shipping.

In Australia, Ms Bishop said: “We have been traversing the South China Sea for many years in accordance with international law and we will continue to do that. Australia is an upholder and defender of the international rules-based order. We believe strongly in the principle of freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight, and we will continue to traverse the South China Sea as we have in the past”.

I’m no great fan of the current Australian government more generally, but there is a degree of realism about the nature of the regime, and its external threats, that seems deliberately absent from the utterances of our own leaders, of whatever party.

Prompted by the events of the last few days, I wonder whether journalists might consider asking a few questions of some of our political leaders:

• what do the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs think of the PRC actions in recent days to remove the term limit on how long Xi Jinping can serve as President?  One might hope that any answers would be somewhat more serious –  more engaged with the level of international unease – than suggesting, say, that, after all, we have no term limits, and our head of state reigns for life.
• since National Party president Peter Goodfellow and Labour Party president Nigel Haworth (and former Prime Minister Jenny Shipley) have quite recently been effusive in their praise of Xi Jinping and his approach (links in the Jichang Lulu piece), how do they view this latest step?  It is no good attempting to say “oh, we are just party functionaries we do the organising”: if you are willing to praise the foreign leader of an aggressive dictatorial state, that increasingly threatens not only the human rights of its own people but other nations, you owe us your take on this latest step.
• and since Bill English refused ever to engage seriously on the issue of Jian Yang –  the former PLA intelligence official, who now concedes he misrepresented his past to enter New Zealand, and who maintains very close ties to the PRC authorities –  perhaps they could ask Simon Bridges, the new National Party leader.  Is he comfortable having such a person in his caucus, and (reportedly) as one of the party’s leading fundraisers.   Most likely, Bridges would fob journalists off as English did whenever anyone asked, or fall back on the slurs his shadow Attorney-General has relied on.  But even if he did, at least we would have a clearer steer on the character of the man, and the nature of the new generation of New Zealand’s political leadership.

 

 

The New Zealand China Council was established by the government a few years ago.  It exists primarily as an advocacy body, using (mostly) taxpayer money

in support of deeper, stronger and more resilient links between New Zealand and China.

It has been very close to  the government.  The Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the chief executive of New Zealand Trade and Enterprise are both ex officio members of the Executive Board.  The Council is chaired by one former Deputy Prime Minister (Don McKinnon), and another member –  with considerable ties to People’s Republic of China institutions – is former Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley.   The Advisory Board, another 20 people, includes as members several of those about whom questions have been raised in recent months (Jian Yang, Raymond Huo, and Naisi Chen)  –  as well as, somewhat surprisingly, a senior journalist.

The public face of the Council seems to involve relentless optimism about things that don’t obviously seem to require taxpayer-funded advocacy (eg the several tweets about the first New Zealand avocadoes into China) and rather gushy, one-eyed, takes on the PRC/New Zealand relationship, always extremely careful never to utter a critical or sceptical word about the PRC.  More recently, in response mostly to the issues raised by Anne-Marie Brady (and the Jian Yang story) they seem to have been pushed somewhat onto the defensive.

The Council employs a part-time Executive Director, Stephen Jacobi.  He spent considerable time at MFAT, but from his own account his focus was Europe and North America (including as our deputy high commissioner in Canada) and in trade negotiations.  Since leaving MFAT in 2005 he has run his own consulting firm, and been employed as the public face of various trade-related bodies, including serving as Executive Director of the NZ US Council from 2005 to 2014.  He is articulate and readily available to the media, but has no specialist expertise in China or (indeed) on the workings of New Zealand democracy.   That isn’t a criticism –  after all, neither do I –  just to note that his arguments, and evidence, need to be reflected on and carefully examined, perhaps having regard to the interests that are paying him, not as coming from an expert authority in the area.

I’ve written previously about one of Jacobi’s speeches, given late last year at a regime party to mark the PRC national day.  Those were pretty brief (and obsequious) remarks, albeit to a PRC audience.  And so it was interesting to see that last week he had delivered a much more substantial address, Dancing with the Dragon – Opportunity and Risk in the New Zealand China Relationship, to the Nelson branch of the New Zealand Institute for International Affairs.  There is also a much shorter op-ed by Jacobi in the Herald today, headlined on the China Council’s own website as “Anti-China narrative not the Kiwi way”.   I’m not going to comment specifically on that piece –  it covers mostly similar ground to the speech – except perhaps to suggest that deferring to vested interests (business and political) who want us to hurry along and simply accept that there is nothing to see here shouldn’t be “the Kiwi way” either.

What of the speech?

The first couple of pages (of eight) is reasonably unexceptionable.   There are lots of statistics about the growth in trade between New Zealand firms and Chinese ones –  curiously, only about exports, and barely a mention of (the benefits of) the imports.   There is some nonsense about New Zealand alleged heavy reliance on China in the ‘global financial crisis”, but on the other hand a welcome acknowledgement that the New Zealand – China trade agreement isn’t the only factor explaining the growth in two-way trade and investment.  Of course, there is no acknowledgement that the interest of the entities exporting to China –  many represented around his board table – might not always be the same as those of New Zealanders as a whole.

But then he turns towards addressing the (quite limited) New Zealand public debate on issues around the activities of the People’s Republic of China and the Communist Party which controls it.  Part of Jacobi’s rhetorical strategy  appears to be to imply that anyone raising concerns about the Chinese regime and the Party that controls it, is somehow anti-China/Chinese more generally.  It is never quite put that like  –  just insinuations –  but the impression is pretty clear. Mention the poll tax, for example, to play up the guilt, but never mention that we and China (pre-Communist) fought on the same side in World War Two.   And never, ever (that would be job-ending for Mr Jacobi no doubt), note that across the Taiwan Straits is a highly succesful, prosperous, free, and non-threatening ethnic Chinese democratic state.  Never, ever, mention the unease apparently felt among numerous New Zealand citizens of ethnic Chinese origins –  some of whom migrated here to escape the party-state and its evil –  about the effective control regime-associated groups have over most of the Chinese language media in New Zealand, and many community groups.

Around the world there has been growing unease –  including in such impeccably liberal circles as academics –  about the growing number of Confucius Institutes established as part of many Western universities.  With PRC funding comes PRC restrictions, on hiring and on the sort of issues lecturers are allowed to address.   There are several of these institutes in New Zealand universities – Canterbury, Victoria and Auckland  In various places overseas there has been a pushback and some major universities –  notably Chicago – have closed their Confucius Institutes.   I’m sure no one has a problem with the PRC government subsidising Chinese language learning in New Zealand –  any more than with Alliance Francaise or the Goethe Institute –  but not as part of New Zealand universities, subject to a foreign governments controls and constraints.

Why do I raise this?  Because Jacobi included this line

There has been pleasing progress in the number of primary schools teaching Mandarin, especially with the help of the 150 Chinese language assistants in New Zealand, but this has not followed through at secondary and tertiary level.

I presume this is a reference to things like the Confucius Classrooms programme (or here) .  By this means PRC-funded and chosen people are operating directly in our school classrooms.  One can only imagine the awkwardness if a student asks about Taiwan or Tibet, the rule of law, or freedom of speech.

Can anyone imagine us allowing Soviet funded teaching in our schools in the 1970s, or German-funded teaching in the 1930s?  But Mr Jacobi, and his government-funded council, simply avoid ever confronting the nature of the regime.  (I’m sure they are quite aware of it, but if the public ever got concerned it might threaten the Council’s easy life, and the business and personal opportunities of some of its members.)

And then Jacobi turns directly to the recent debate, such as it has been.

Public debate about the relationship is to be welcomed in a robust democracy like ours, although care needs to be taken to ensure that public debate remains civil and properly focused on the issues.

And who is going to disagree?  But then perhaps Mr Jacobi could point us to examples of where the debate has been less than civil and not “properly focused on the issues”?  I can think of the former Attorney-General at an election meeting attacking Anne-Marie Brady as somehow “anti-foreigner”, but then I’m pretty sure he and Mr Jacobi are on the same side.    I’ve heard various claims that people raising issues are being “racist” or anti all things Chinese, but I’m pretty sure that not once have those sorts of slurs –  the stuff Jacobi purports to dislike –  been backed up with arguments and evidence.  In this speech, Jacobi certainly makes no attempt to.  For a taxpayer-funded body it is a pretty poor show really.  But then, unfortunately, it is par for the course.    Neither politicians, nor outfits like China Council, have made any attempt to address seriously and directly the issues raised in Professor Brady’s Magic Weapons paper, or the issues around the background and ongoing associations of National MP Jian Yang.

Jacobi notes that occasionally the New Zealand government and the PRC disagree

While we do have occasional public disagreements, these have not detracted from the momentum in the relationship.

If so, presumably because when such “occasional public disagreements” matter, politicians and diplomats scurry round and assure Beijing it will never happen again.  It is hardly news that the New Zealand government has operated a policy of avoiding do anything that might upset Beijing.  Nor that the PRC is not some typical country which recognises that the possibility of robust differences of view characterises real mutual –  as distinct from subservient – relationships in this world.

Politically, even while we receive occasional Chinese naval ship visits, we continue to maintain close defence and intelligence relationships with our Western allies.

I’m pretty sure we never welcomed naval vessels from the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany.  But even setting that to one side, Mr Jacobi simply never addresses the  unease our traditional Western allies –  including through Five Eyes –  have reportedly come to feel about the New Zealand government’s relationship with the PRC.  And he does not even seek to address the PRC’s own strategic interests, which might include a fostering a more semi-detached relationship between New Zealand and the countries which share rather more of our “fundamental values” [Jacobi’s own term].

And then there is the attempt to play distraction, with the suggestion that all that is going on is “soft power”, and “everyone does that”.

New Zealand itself uses soft power with great effect when it seeks to portray a positive view of our country overseas, including by funding visits by journalists and other “influencers” to New Zealand.

Although Americans, Europeans and Japanese all use soft power, it is the Chinese use of soft power that is being questioned today.

If the PRC wants to subsidise artistic or cultural displays in New Zealand, to foster a positive view of the regime, probably not too many are going to object very loudly.

But that isn’t the sort of influence that Professor Brady was writing about, and Mr Jacobi is well aware of that.    We don’t have (for example) formerly-French members of the New Zealand Parliament, constantly liaising with the French Embassy, and in front of whom former diplomats are careful of what they say.  And even if we did, there is a much greater commonality of “fundamental values” between,  say, France and New Zealand than there is between the PRC and New Zealand.  The British government doesn’t attempt to control the English language media in New Zealand.    The US government (and government-controlled entities) doesn’t dangle post-politics opportunities in front of former senior politicians.  No other government I’m aware of attempts to exert tight control over the students’ associations of its overseas students, in the way that the PRC does with the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA).

Jacobi goes on

Some prominent members of the Chinese community have faced intense criticism about their past and present connections with the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party.

Chinese community networks have been described as being a conduit for Chinese representatives to promote a positive view of China and to subvert local decision-making.

The funding of New Zealand political parties has also been highlighted.

Some of this criticism appears to be linked to a similar debate in Australia, although I would argue that the situation in Australia is quite distinct – although we share many things, we have a different political culture, we are not a military ally of the United States and we see our role in the world differently.

In all that, there is just nothing specific at all.  Jacobi doesn’t, for example:

• address why it is appropriate to have as member of Parliament in New Zealand a former Chinese intelligence official, former (at least on paper) member of the Communist Party, someone who now openly acknowledges misrepresenting his past on forms to gain entry to New Zealand (apparently because that is what the PRC regime told people to do),
• address the PRC control of the local Chinese language media, and associated (and apparently heightened) restriction on content,
• address how it can be appropriate for the Mayor of Auckland to receive anonymous donations (from China) of $150000 for his mayoral campaign.

He asserts that the situation in Australia is ‘quite distinct’, but makes no effort to back his claim.  If anything his three points reduce to little more than “we’ve decided to just ignore these things, and that’s the way we do things in New Zealand”.    There is an increasing volume of material on Chinese influence activities in a range of countries, and if the situation here is not that of, say, the Maldives, or Cambodia or even perhaps the Philippines, there is little to suggest that things are materially different here than in Australia, or Canada, or a variety of European countries.

Jacobi response is

Recent allegations here in New Zealand have sought to identify ‘smoking guns’ but mostly without the proof or evidence to demonstrate culpable wrong doing.

Everyone in New Zealand is innocent until proven guilty.

If there has indeed been misbehavior or unwarranted interference, a higher standard of evidence needs to be provided so that this can be investigated by the proper authorities.

Innocent until proven guilty is, rightly, the criminal standard.  If crimes have occurred, they will need to be proved to that standard to secure a conviction.  But as Mr Jacobi knows very well (a) someone in authority needs to take an interest for anything to be proved to that standard, and our leadership appears to have an active lack of interest in doing so, and (b) plenty can be inappropriate or threatening that need not be illegal.    I’m not aware, for example, that anyone has suggested that Jian Yang’s membership of the New Zealand Parliament is, or should be, illegal (unless concerns about his citizenship application come to something).    The argument is that it is highly inappropriate in the specific conjunction of circumstances (PLA and Party background, deliberate misrepresentation of his past, continued close association with regime representatives in New Zealand, failure ever to say anything critical about the PRC regime, and so on).   Perhaps Mr Jacobi has a compelling and specific alternative perspective?  If so, it would be very interesting to hear it, but that would require engagement, rather than lofty disregard (“someone else’s problem”).    Perhaps next time he talks to Jian Yang he might suggest that in an open and democratic society, making yourself available to the local media for a searching interview is the way things should be done.  As it is, Yang has not made himself available for a single English language interview since the story first broke in September.  And this is an elected MP, paid with public money.

Jacobi has a brief discussion of trade ties.

I was struck by a comment on Twitter this week which suggested that China could if it wanted to “paralyse New Zealand’s economy at will”.

I’m not sure why China would ever see it in its interest to attempt to do such a thing

As I’ve noted in various posts, China can’t paralyse our economy.  We make our own prosperity.  But they could make a great deal of difficulty for specific industries.

And they have form in this regard.  Specifics around experiences of Norway and Mongolia are here, and the PRC was active in using sanctions on specific sectors on firms in South Korea last year over the deployment of the THAAD missile defence system.  So for Mr Jacobi to say “I’m not sure why China would ever see it in its interests” to do such a thing in respect of New Zealand is either simply deliberately avoiding actual recent experiences with this particular regime, or saying “so long as we never upset Beijing” we have nothing to worry about.  (Of course, in Norway’s case, it wasn’t even the government that upset Beijing, but a (prominent) private entity, the Nobel Prize     committee).   Surely we deserve better than this from taxpayer-funded mouthpieces?

There is plenty more questionable material in the speech

Chinese economic policy is changing too – a move away from investment-led growth to consumer-led growth and the realisation that a significant and growing share of the economy is now in the hands of the private sector rather than state owned enterprises.

A new generation of Chinese leadership is in office – President Xi Jinping has consolidated his power at the recent Party Congress.

The leadership knows the old style of economic management cannot continue, but it looks at the ravages the global financial crisis caused the Western economies and is determined not to see the same thing happen in China.

Globally we see China’s economic weight continue to grow and the mantle of leadership pass from an increasingly inward-looking United States to a more confident China.

China has some way to go to “walk the talk” of openness and inclusion, particularly in terms of the way it regulates its economy, but the language from Beijing these days is more appealing to many than what we hear from Washington.

China too is grappling with the demands of a growing middle class becoming more impatient with the restrictions on human rights and personal freedoms.

All of which is clearly designed to suggest that things are improving in the PRC, when demonstrably they aren’t.

For example, the economy might largely (and formally) be in private hands, but Mr Jacobi –  and his MFAT funders –  know very well that the Party has been increasingly extending its tentacles directly into private sector entities, domestic and foreign, and that no business in China can be considered much apart from the regime.

And China “has some way to go to ‘walk the talk’ of openness and inclusion”?  Is there any evidence  –  even a shred –  of an intention to adopt a culture of”openness and inclusion”?  The environment for people less than enamoured of the regime just seems to be getting tougher as Xi Jinping’s power is further consolidated.   (Nonetheless, it doesn’t stop the presidents of the National and Labour parties gushing about Xi and the regime.)

And the “middle class becoming more impatient with restrictions on human rights and personal freedoms”.  Perhaps they are, perhaps they aren’t.  But really what matters is the regime, and its resolve.  At present, that doesn’t seem to involve more freedom.  The chilling new “social credit” control scheme is just another example.  But you hear nothing of any of this from Mr Jacobi, and his supporters, who just want to keep the deals flowing.

Some modest political/societal convergence might have been a plausible narrative 15 years ago.  It isn’t now.  And really I’m sure Jacobi knows it, as he’ll know the expansionism in the South China Sea, the military stand-off over the Senkaku Islands, the suborning of various regional governments, and so on.

Perhaps the most chilling sentence in the entire speech was this one.

A second consequence is that as China’s confidence grows they will become less willing to accept challenges to their political system and their own decision making processes. This will require careful handling on the part of New Zealand

Quite possibly, Jacobi is descriptively accurate, but it doesn’t lead him to suggest that we might be increasingly wary of the PRC regime, or uneasy about the power projection (including into New Zealand) that accompanies this greater confidence. It doesn’t lead him to point that true friends – and genuinely self-confident people  –  live happily, and embrace –  challenge, debate and scrutiny.  Nothing about self-respect.  Nothing about the shared interests of like-minded countries.  No, apparently for Jacobi we should simply double-down and “engage even more with China, not less”.

There was the, surely laughably deluded –  but perhaps just an attempt at distraction –  invocation of his former MFAT colleague’s argument.

Former New Zealand Ambassador to China Michael Powles has written recently about the need for New Zealand to “develop the already strong relationship with China to increase the prospects for New Zealand to have influence with China as it wields increasing regional and global power”.

Michael writes that New Zealand has a lot of experience in being a “small friend to a great power” ie with Britain and the United States – co-operating actively but also discussing differences frankly.

In what plausible world does any of this make sense?  Set aside the fact that to the extent that we were ever a “small friend” to great powers the US and UK, it was based on shared values, shared heritage, largely common interests etc.  Friends, even brothers, don’t always agree, but they share crucial commitments or interests.  There is simply no sign that the sort of values the PRC regime lives by  –  increasingly so at present –  are ones most New Zealanders any part of.  And nor is there any reason to suppose that China would be likely to heed New Zealand’s counsel around the exercise of its rising “regional and global power”.      New Zealand’s policy, after all, seems to be premised on not upsetting Beijing, and the PRC are better placed than we are to know what will upset them.

At the very end of his speech, Jacobi returns to one of his early themes

With this engagement invariably comes public debate – it is a debate worth having, but we are a better nation if we respect the people about whom we speak.

Frankly, I don’t respect Xi Jinping, or the PRC regime, or the Chinese Communist Party.  The Party has been a great force for evil in its own country –  depriving tens of millions of liberty, and even life, and presiding over a system that can’t even produce prosperity (unlike, say, Singapore or Taiwan, or South Korea or Japan).

I don’t have much respect for Jian Yang either.  He may be a perfectly pleasant person, may even have been a competent academic.  But that isn’t the issue.  He served –  voluntarily –  an evil regime, in its military intelligence system, he misrepresented that past to get into New Zealand and into Parliament.  And if he has ever had a Damascus Road experience –  now deploring the evil he once served –  the public has heard nothing of it.  Oh, and despite being an elected member of Parliament –  on the list, elected by all National voters –  he simply refuses to front the media.   You can avoid searching scrutiny in the PRC, but you shouldn’t seek to (and shouldn’t be able to) here.

I don’t have much respect for those who’ve, apparently successfully, managed to exert regime control over Chinese language media here.

And I have even less respect for the New Zealand politicians, and party leaders, from every single party (so it appears), who simply let this stuff go by, and try to pretend there isn’t an issue.

Oh, but those weren’t the people Jacobi was meaning?   I guess probably meant ethnic Chinese New Zealand citizens. But as a group, they simply aren’t the issue anyone (including Professor Brady) has been raising issues about in this debate.   If anything, part of the issue is about protecting the rights and freedoms of these people –  fellow New Zealanders –  from the PRC regime interventions, and attempt to exert influence and control.   But it suits those who want to avoid the real issues to pretend that the debate is about ethnic Chinese in New Zealand more generally, rather than about the activities –  some probably illegal, others just threatening or flat-out wrong – of a heinous regime.

I’ve been reading a lot about the interwar period recently.  As I’ve done so, the more apparent the similarities between the current situation vis-a-vis the PRC and that of the 1930s.  Parallels are never in the nature of exact mirror images.  And perhaps in the end the differences will prove greater than the similarities.     But the same expansionist tendencies, the same denials of personal liberties, the same making trouble among diasporas, the same border disputes, perhaps even (in the long term) the same economic weaknesses, and (on the other side) much the same –  India aside this time perhaps –  desperate desire to appease and pretend there is nothing much to worry about.  As I say, perhaps the parallels are overblown, but I suspect we’d get much more value from some serious engagement on those sorts of topics, rather than more taxpayer-funded efforts to pat the public on the head, suggest there is nothing to worry about, and bat away any critics –  expert ones like Professor Brady –  as somehow insufficiently civil or respectful.

On which note, where are the rest of the genuine China experts in New Zealand?  Presumably many of them will have perspectives on these issues?  I wonder if the media have approached these people –  mostly academics paid with public money, partly to advance knowledge, public debate etc.  If they won’t talk, one has to wonder why not, and what that would say about our self-respect as a society, and our willingness to nurture and cherish what made countries like New Zealand what they were at their best.

At very least we deserve rather better, and more substantial, engagement with the issues and concerns from our elected leaders, and from their paid voices (such as Mr Jacobi).

To their credit, the Herald yesterday ran a substantial op-ed from Professor Anne-Marie Brady on the influence-seeking and interference by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Communist Party that controls the state, in New Zealand.

Professor Brady has been in the headlines in recent days over a burglary at her Christchurch home in which several laptops, phones etc (but nothing else of value) were stolen, the burglary occurring after she had received a letter warning that she was being targeted by the PRC regime.   The media has –  rightly –  sprung to her defence, suggesting a need to get to the bottom of just what is going on.   Another article in yesterday’s Herald suggested that the Police weren’t doing much about the break-in until the Prime Minister herself expressed concern.  In general, it is a bad look (and bad practice) for ministers to be putting pressure on Police to investigate, or not investigate, particular cases.  But perhaps on this occasion the end might almost justify the means.

Professor Brady’s article ran under the heading ‘We could be the next Albania’,  a reference to the reported observation last year by a senior Chinese diplomat that (in Brady’s words) “favourably compared New Zealand-China relations to the closeness China had with Albania in the early 1960s”.    Having fallen out with the Soviet Union, Albania sought refuge in ties with the PRC (a relationship described by one Western scholar as “one of the oddest phenomena of modern times: here were two states of vastly differing size, thousands of miles apart, with almost no cultural ties or knowledge of each other’s society, drawn together by a common hostility to the Soviet Union.”) before later also falling out with them.

Brady reports, and presumably is in a position to know, that this “startling and telling analogy…disconcerted New Zealand diplomats”.   She perhaps over-eggs the Albania point, arguing that

In the late 1970s the relationship ruptured over China’s failure to deliver economic development assistance. By the end of the Cold War era, Albania had become one of the poorest, most politically divided, and most corrupt of the former Eastern Bloc states.

Perhaps, but if we look at Angus Maddison’s collection of historical estimates of GDP per capita, Albania had long (well before the Communist era) been one of the poorest of those countries and had not exactly been a byword for political stability either.  Their failings were their own.

But I guess the real point –  and probably the one the Chinese diplomat was getting at –  was that New Zealand was seen from Beijing (with perhaps just a bit of exaggeration for effect) as small, remote (clearly both true), somewhat detached from its former allies, and diplomatically and economically subservient.   True or not, the suggestion will have put MFAT noses out of joint.

Brady goes on

Xi Jinping has been emboldened to pursue an increasingly assertive foreign policy and insisting that its strategic partners such as New Zealand fall into line with its interests and policies.  Accompanying this more assertive foreign policy has been a massive increase in the CCP’s foreign influence activities. China did not have to pressure New Zealand to accept China’s soft power activities and political influence: Successive New Zealand governments actively courted it. Ever since PRC diplomatic relations were established in 1972, New Zealand governments have sought to attract Beijing’s attention and favour. New Zealand governments have also encouraged China to be active in our region.

And not a word of scepticism is ever uttered openly, whether by politicians or by the (mainly government-funded) entities like the China Council and the Asia New Zealand Foundation.   No doubt, in most cases they genuinely believe their stance (quiescence) to be in the interests of “New Zealand” –  however those interests are defined.  In all too many cases, it also appears to have been in the personal economic interests of those involved.

The real point of Brady’s article appears to be to encourage the new government to think seriously about doing things differently.   As she highlights, the Australian government is taking these issues much more seriously   (for those still sceptical of the significance of these issues, in addition to Anne-Marie Brady’s main Magic Weapons paper, various of the submissions on the new Australian legislation make sobering reading –  for example, no 20 (by an academic whose new book on the subject –  already the subject of PRC threats –  is due out next week), or no 33 (from a national security academic at ANU) or no 32 (from an ethnic Chinese group, the Foundation for a Democratic China).

Brady appears to think there is a realistic possibility of change

In order to deal with the issue it can’t just attack the policies of the previous government, it also has to clean its own house. Significantly, unlike the previous National government, Ardern’s government has not endorsed Xi Jinping’s flagship policy the Belt Road Initiative, bringing New Zealand back in line with its allies and nearest neighbours.

It will take strenuous efforts to adjust course on the direction the previous National government set New Zealand. New Zealand has to address the issue, but the Ardern government must find a way to do so that does not invite pressure it cannot bear from the CCP, which is watching closely.

But is there any sign that this government is any different?  I’d like to believe that not having yet endorsed the Belt and Road Initiative (a sprawling massive geopolitical play, designed to extend PRC reach and in some cases load up poor countries with additional debts in ways that further extend PRC political influence) is significant.    But the New Zealand China Council –  largely taxpayer-funded, and with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sitting on its Council –  was promising late last year that early this year they would have a report out on how New Zealand can engage with the initiative.  And senior Labour backbencher –  chair of a major select committee –  Raymond Huo seemed right behind the initiative

Meanwhile, China-born legislator Raymond Huo believed the Belt and Road Initiative can help solve the problem of infrastructure development facing many developed nations.

“There is a dilemma. New Zealand, Australia and other developed countries including the US and Canada are all facing the same problem,” Huo told Xinhua.

“We haven’t done much upgrading, so we need money, we need capital, and we need the construction capacity. China has both,” he said.

Huo said he first realized the potential of Belt and Road Initiative when he attended two high-level conferences in China, and he believed New Zealand should seize the opportunities it offers.

Along with other experts on China and leading business people, he has established a think tank and foundation on the Initiative.

What other straws in the wind are there?

As recently as this week, interviewed on Radio NZ about the Brady break-in and other matters the Prime Minister refused to express concern at all about PRC influence-seeking and interference in New Zealand. At one level, it is fine to talk about being concerned about any foreign influence from any source (as we all should be), but there is a real and specific issue around the PRC, which needs serious political leadership to address.  But instead there is a void.

It isn’t just the Prime Minister of course. In a post late last year, I highlighted that her minister responsible for the intelligence agencies, Andrew Little, was specifically dismissive of concerns around the PRC activities.

Andrew Little, the Minister Responsible for the SIS, said he was not aware of any undue Chinese influence.
“I don’t see evidence of undue influence in New Zealand, whether it’s New Zealand politics, or New Zealand communities generally.

“We have a growing Chinese community. We have a strongly developing trade relationship and diplomatic relationship with China. I don’t think those things, on their own, connote undue influence.

“If there’s other things she says constitutes undue influence, we’d have to know what that is.”

It was documented in Brady’s substantive paper minister, a paper which has had substantial coverage around the world.

Then, of course, there was the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Out of office he had occasionally been heard to express concerns, including around National MP Jian Yang.   In office, at a New Zealand event marking 45 years of diplomatic relations with the PRC, he wouldn’t even address the issue, stressing how cordially he would raise (privately) any concerns he ever had, and went on to suggest that, after all, one had to break a few eggs to make a omelette, and really no should get too bothered about human rights issues in China either.

“Sometimes the West and commentators in the West should have a little more regard to that and the economic outcome for those people, rather than constantly harping on about the romance of ‘freedom’, or as famous singer Janis Joplin once sang in her song: ‘freedom is just another word for nothing else to lose’.

“In some ways the Chinese have a lot to teach us about uplifting everyone’s economic futures in their plans.”

And since the election, Labour president Nigel Haworth –  presumably with his leader’s knowledge and approval – hobnobbing with the Chinese Communist Part itself, has been effusive in his praise of Xi Jinping and the Chinese regime.

One could add to the mix the stony silence of the Labour Party leadership –  pre and post-election – on the succession of revelations around National MP, and former PRC intelligence officer, Jian Yang.  From anything they say (or don’t say) in public, the Labour Party, and their allies in the Greens and New Zealand First, seem quite unbothered about the presence in Parliament of someone who acknowledges misrepresenting his past in his residency/citizenship applications,  who is widely regarded (by experts in the field) as likely to still be a member of the Communist Party, who closely associates with the PRC embassy, and who has never once been heard to criticise the Party-state that is the PRC.  Recall, former diplomat Charles Finny’s line, that be was always very careful what he said around Yang (and Raymond Huo) since both were known to be close to the PRC embassy.    But is there any sign that any of this bothers our new government?

Professor Brady calls for the government to emulate its 1980s predecessor

the Fourth Labour government made a principled stand on a matter that affected our sovereignty and our values with the nuclear issue; then it passed legislation to back up these principles. Now is the time for the sixth Labour government to take another principled stand to defend our sovereignty and values and make legislative changes such as to the Electoral Finance Act.

In truth, and whether you supported the anti-nuclear stance of not (I didn’t and don’t, and certainly don’t see it as a matter affecting our sovereignty) this one is a great deal harder.  For a start there wasn’t really money at stake around the nuclear-free issue.

I presume one of the issues that will be exercising ministers, and their MFAT officials, will be the negotiations around the proposed upgrade to the preferential trade agreement with China.  It would be easy enough for the PRC to put those negotiations on a slow track, or simply halt them altogether.  Such agreements might not matter very much taken as a whole, but they might matter quite a lot to a small group of people (with good political connections).  In the Australian context, there already appear to be some signs that the PRC is reacting to tougher Australian stance (and new legislation) by damping down the flow of foreign students.  We’ve already seen here the apparent ability of the export education industry to see off for now Labour’s promised changes to student work visa arrangements.  Those would have mostly affected the lower-level PTEs.  But our more prestigious – and government owned/controlled – universities get a lot of PRC students, and several attract direct PRC funding for their Confucius Institutes.  Chancellors and vice-Chancellors will be very nervous that if the government actually looked like taking a stand, their flow of revenue might be disrupted.  And they will constantly be bending the ears of ministers and officials, if ever the government showed any sign of self-assertion, and a respect for New Zealand values (and the interests of New Zealand citizens of Chinese origins).  And then there will be Auckland airport and the tourism operators too.

I’ve noted previously that during the Cold War it was much easier to maintain a moral clarity.  Most Western countries –  including New Zealand –  didn’t do much trade with the Soviet Union, and so there wasn’t a major self-interested constituency in New Zealand (or the US, or the UK) for simply bending over and letting a hostile regime, practising a completely different set of political values, have its way.  I noticed yesterday a recent interview with former (Obama-era) US Defense Secretary Ash Carter making much the same point.

Last time we competed with or had a long difficult strategic relationship with a large communist country was during the Cold War, and our approach to that was simply not to trade with them. Now, one of our largest trading partners is in fact a communist country, and I don’t think that the economists have given us much of a playbook to protect our companies and our people.

I’m not sure that economists can necessarily help much, except perhaps to repeat the point I’ve made here before: the PRC does have the ability to severely adversely affect the fortunes of individual firms/sectors (ask the Norwegian salmon industry, or some of the South Korea firms last year), but the PRC did not make Australia and New Zealand rich and it cannot, whatever unsubtle economic sanctions it attempted, make us poor.  Our prosperity, as a whole country, is very largely in our own hands.   And the very fact that we can worry about the possibility of such sanctions is perhaps the best case for making a stand now, rather than continuing to roll over, keep quiet, and hope that Beijing is happy.

But perhaps the other piece of economists’ advice might be, in this as in other fields, “beware of rentseekers”, people/institutions who will seek to use governments to advance their own economic interests, at the expense of the values, the freedoms, the self-respect, of the nation as a whole.  Governments have a poor track record of doing so, and there is little sign at this point that the current government will be any different.  As I wrote earlier

One of things we need to remember is that the interests of businesses (and universities) who deal in countries ruled by evil regimes, are not necessarily remotely well-aligned to the interests and values of New Zealanders.   Selling to China, on government-controlled terms, isn’t much different than, say, selling to the Mafia.  There might be money to be made.  But in both causes, the sellers are enablers, and then make themselves dependents, quite severely morally compromised.

Professor Brady’s Herald column seemed to build on an earlier (and somewhat longer) paper she produced shortly after the new government took office on things the government could do if it were serious about addressing the PRC political influence activities.   I wrote about it here (and here is the updated link to the paper itself).  In that earlier piece she had quite a list of things that could, or should, be done.

What should be done?  At an overarching level she says

The Labour-New Zealand First-Greens government must now develop an internally-focused resilience strategy that will protect the integrity of our democratic processes and institutions. New Zealand should work with other like-minded democracies such as Australia and Canada to address the challenge posed by foreign influence activities—what some are now calling hybrid warfare. The new government should follow Australia’s example in speaking up publicly on the issue of China’s influence activities in New Zealand and make it clear that interference in New Zealand’s domestic politics will no longer be tolerated.

Getting specific she calls on the government to

The Labour-New Zealand First-Greens government must instruct their MPs to refuse any further involvement in China’s united front activities.

That would be Raymond Huo I presume.

The new government needs to establish a genuine and positive relationship with the New Zealand Chinese community, independent of the united front organizations authorized by the CCP that are aimed at controlling the Chinese population in New Zealand and controlling Chinese language discourse in New Zealand.

And there is a list of six other specifics

• The new Minister of SIS must instruct the SIS to engage in an in-depth investigation of China’s subversion and espionage activities in New Zealand. NZ SIS can draw on the experience of the Australian agency ASIO, which conducted a similar investigation two years ago. 
• The Prime Minister should instruct the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to follow Australia’s example and engage in an in-depth inquiry into China’s political influence activities in New Zealand. 
• The Minister of Commerce and Consumer Affairs should instruct the Commerce Commission to investigate the CCP’s interference in our Chinese language media sector— which breaches our monopoly laws and our democratic requirement for a free and independent media. 
• The Attorney General must draft new laws on political donations and foreign influence activities. 
• The New Zealand Parliament must pass the long overdue Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism legislation.
• The new government can take a leaf out of the previous National government’s book and appoint its own people in strategically important government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) which help shape and articulate our China policy, such as the NZ China Council and the Asia New Zealand Foundation.

Most of those suggestions look sensible (although I’m no fan on AML/CFT legislation, with all its inane consequences –  goodbye ipredict, hello ID cards for 94 year olds changing banks).  There has been no sign of activity on any of these fronts.  Quite probably – based on what we saw in their BIMs, and Professor Brady’s mention of a Five Eyes discussion (itself repeated in the New York Times article last year on these issues –  our intelligence agencies themselves are worried).  But intelligence agencies can only apply the (current) law.  It is the political leaders who can bring forward legislation (on matters amenable to legislation, which not all of these are) and can display the leadership and moral standing that say “enough”  –  whether about Jian Yang, political donations, control of the Chinese-language media, university funding, PRC activities in the South China Sea, or whatever.   They could display such leadership, but there is no sign –  from any political party –  of anyone doing so.

I noted the other day that perhaps some journalist could ask the five contenders for the National Party leadership about their attitude to these issues, including (but not limited to) matters around Jian Yang and political donations.  A reader reminded me yesterday of Chris Finlayson’s arrogant and dismissive attitude before the election, when he was both Attorney-General and minister responsible for the intelligence services.  Finlayson still sits on the National Party front bench, and is still shadow Attorney-General.  Perhaps, five months on, someone could ask him if still thinks there is just nothing there, that Professor Brady is jumping at shadows etc.  Or is it that he just doesn’t want to know?

(I linked the other day to a couple of reports on PRC influence activities in other advanced economies.  For anyone interested –  including those doubting the seriousness of the PRC agenda –  I suggest searching out the (easy to find) serious articles about PRC involvement in places like the Philippines, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and Pakistan.  The issues aren’t primarily about the internal nature of the PRC –  domestic human rights etc –  but about external expansionism, power projection, and the attempt to have other countries including (in Professor Brady’s words) “New Zealand fall into line with its interests and policies”, policies that are generally hostile to open and free societies.)

UPDATE:  Interesting ABC article based on an advance copy of Clive Hamilton’s book on PRC influence activities in Australia (book to be published next week).

 

On Monday, just across the road from Parliament, Victoria University’s Institute for Governance and Policy Studies hosted a lunchtime lecture from Professor Anne-Marie Brady.  The lecture was built around her Magic Weapons paper on the extent of Chinese government/Party influence activities in New Zealand (and elsewhere), and her shorter policy brief with some specific proposals for the new government on how to deal with the issue (I wrote about that latter piece recently here).     (Radio New Zealand also had a good interview with Brady this morning, prompted by the new legislation announced yesterday by the Australian government, as part of its efforts to deal with this official Chinese interference.)

New Zealanders owe Professor Brady a considerable debt of gratitude for, first, writing her detailed paper, and secondly for deciding to put it in the public domain (it was done as part of an international project on Chinese influence-seeking activities globally, and the papers by other scholars have not yet been made public).    Her paper has found a receptive audience internationally (and she mentioned that Francis Fukayama has underway work for a similar paper on Chinese influence-seeking in the US).

Listening to her, one gets the sense that she isn’t that comfortable in the public spotlight.  Many academics aren’t.   In her lecture the other day she felt the need to include a photo of her Chinese husband and her three half-Chinese children –  no doubt a push back against the sort of despicable pre-election attempt to discredit her and her research tried by the then Attorney-General.  It can be a lonely position for an academic when her expert and well-documented research runs head-on into a wall of political indifference (or worse), vested interests, and a media which seems not quite sure whether or not this is a “proper” issue even to be talking about.    It is not as if (I’m aware that ) anyone has seriously sought to question the factual basis of her paper, or has demonstrated major flaws in her analysis and reasoning.   It seems as if there is just a desperate desire that she, and the issue, would go away.    Absent that, the political and business elites simply want to pretend it doesn’t exist.   I hope she doesn’t just retreat to her study.

Her Victoria lecture the other day covered pretty familiar ground (although many of the attendees indicated that they hadn’t read either of her papers so much will have been new for them).     There was:

• the active efforts (largely successful) of the Communist Party to get effective control of almost all Chinese language media in New Zealand (similar story in Australia) –  and thus the story of the issues she is raising goes unreported in that media,
• the efforts of suborn former senior politicians, with roles that align their personal economic interests with those of the Chinese authorites,
• concerns about political donations, especially from individuals/entities with close ties to the CCP, and the associated close ties between political party leaders and China,
• Chinese government interests in influencing New Zealand, both to stay quiet on issues of concern to China, and to detach New Zealand from its historical defence and intelligence relationships,
• China’s interests in Antartica,
• Confucius Institutes, funded and controlled by China, as part of New Zealand universities, complete with restrictions on what can be talked about,
• efforts to promote ethnic Chinese New Zealand citizens, with those ties to the Embassy/CCP, into electoral politics –  in New Zealand’s case, both Jian Yang and Raymond Huo.

Huo is now chair of Parliament’s Justice Committee – the same Huo who, as she pointed out, is responsible for Labour campaigning for the Chinese vote under a Xi Jinping slogan, and who – Professor Brady reports –  was present at a meeting in Auckland earlier this year in which Communist Party propaganda chiefs (“propaganda” is apparently a literal translation of the role/office) met with local Chinese language media to offer “guidance” on how issues of interest to China should be reported.   A serving member of New Zealand’s Parliament…….

Brady noted that the Communist Party’s United Front work has always been an integral element in how the Party works, but that the efforts are now being undertaken with an intensity and importance that is greater than at any time since 1949, when the CCP took power.  It is a China that has thrown off Deng Xiaoping’s injunction (post Tiananmen) that China should mask its growing power and bide its time.

When it came to the New Zealand government, in some respects I thought Professor Brady pulled her punches (although she was happy to note that she couldn’t understand how it was that National Party MP Jian Yang – self-confessed Communist Party member, former member of the Chinese intelligence services, and someone who has acknowledged misrepresenting his past on residency/citizenship application papers –  is still in Parliament).   I’m not sure how much of that is tactical –  giving the new government a chance, hoping to be heard by talking constructively.   I fear that any such hope is misplaced.

In just the last week we’ve had a couple of episodes that confirm that the new government is quite as craven –  indifferent, obsequious –  as its predecessor.

A month or two ago, at the time of the 19th Communist Party Congress, it came to light through the Chinese media that the presidents of both the National and Labour parties had been sending warm greetings and congratulations.   This last weekend, the Labour Party went one step worse.

The Chinese Communist Party held a congress in Beijing for representatives of such political parties from around the world (300 from 120 countries) as it could gather to its embrace.    Most of them were from developing countries.  Nigel Haworth, the President of the New Zealand Labour Party, attended.   Here is how one Chinese media outlet reported the event.

The CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High Level Meeting was the first major multilateral diplomacy event hosted by China after the recently concluded 19th CPC National Congress.

It was also the first time the CPC held a high-level meeting with such a wide range of political parties from around the world…..

During the closing ceremony, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi stressed that the meeting was a complete success with a broad consensus reached. He also said CPC leaders elaborated on the new guiding theory introduced by the 19th CPC National Congress.

“The innovative theoretical and practical outcomes of the 19th CPC National Congress not only have milestone significance for the development of China, but also provide good examples for the development of other countries, especially developing countries,” Yang said.

The Beijing Initiative issued after the meeting states that over the past five years, China has achieved historic transformations and the country is making new and greater contributions to the world.

It also highlighted that lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity have increasingly become the aspiration of people worldwide, and it’s the unshakable responsibility and mission of political parties to steer the world in this direction.

“The most important thing between the 18th and 19th CPC party congress was the belt and road initiative,” according to the Russian Communist Party’s Dmitry Novikov. “And the most important thing about the initiative is the economic cooperation among various countries. Such cooperation leads to the promotion of relations in culture and politics.”

And the President of the New Zealand Labour Party was party to all of this.    In fact, not just a party to it, but someone who was willing to come out openly in praise of Xi Jinping.

Here he is, talking of Xi Jinping’s opening speech  (here and here)

“I think it is a very good speech. I think it is a very challenging speech. I think he is taking a very brave step, trying to lead the world and to think about the global challenges in a cooperative manner.  Historically we have wars and we have crisis, but he is posing a possibility of a different way of moving forward, a way based on collaboration and cooperation.  Making cooperation work is difficult, but he think that’s a better way for mankind. I think we all share that view.”

It is shameful.     Probably not even Peter Goodfellow would have gone quite that far –  if only because there might have been some (understandable) rebellion in the ranks if he had gone that public.

This is the same Chinese Communist Party (and associated state) that

• flouts international law, including with its aggressive expansionism in the South China Sea,
• denies any political rights to its own people,
• that is directly responsible for the deaths of tens of millions of people (and which only just pulled back from its forced abortions practices),
• lets dissidents die in prison,
• has no concept of the rule of law,
• persecutes religious believers (Christian, Muslim, Falun Gong or whatever),
• actively interferes in the domestic politics of other countries in all manner of different ways,
• and so on.

In her lecture the other day, Professor Brady mentioned Haworth’s comments, but this was one of the places she pulled her punches.  She asked, rhetorically, if we could imagine a New Zealand political party president attending a Republican Party convention and making such public remarks.   Or even a Russian political event.    At one level it is a fair point –  Haworth’s participation in this CCP event, and his positive comments, have gone totally unremarked in the New Zealand media (or from Opposition parties), in a way that would be simply inconceivable in those other cases.    But at another, it falls into the trap beloved of China-sympathisers and people on the left (one such academic at her lecture attempted this), of drawing a moral equivalence between, say, the United States and the UK on the one hand, and Communist China on the other.    A much better comparison would be to ask if we could imagine a major New Zealand political party President attending Nazi Party congresses pre-war or Soviet Communist party congresses?  And whether, even if it had happened, we would look back now with equanimity at associating so strongly with such an evil.  Such is the CCP.   The fact that certain New Zealand firms make a lot of money trading with them –  or that our political parties appear to raise large donations –  doesn’t change that character.

Former National Party Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley, was apparently also at the meeting, speaking warmly of China’s One Belt One Road initiative (all about geopolitical influence).

Yesterday, we had yet more proof of how far gone the New Zealand authorities (and the new New Zealand government are).     As I’d noted a couple of weeks ago, Victoria University (specifically its China-funded and controlled Confucius Institute) and the New Zealand Institute for International Affairs put on a half day symposium (celebration?) of 45 years of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China PRC).   Not a word of scepticism or criticism was to be expected from the programme –  there wasn’t for example an opportunity for Professor Brady to present her work, and alternative perspectives on it to be heard.

Quite late in the piece, reportedly, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed to be a keynote speaker at this forum, his first major speech as Minister.  Winston Peters had, in Opposition, occasionally been heard to express some unease about the activities of the PRC in New Zealand, including the questions around National Party MP Jian Yang (recall that even Charles Finny, former senior diplomat, noted that he is always very careful about what he says in front on Yang and Raymond Huo, given their closeness to the PRC Embassy).   In office, the Rt Hon Winston Peters not just tows the MFAT line, repeating the same obsequious words as former National Party ministers, he takes it up another step.

There was the published text, which was bad enough.   In entire speech he could only manage this, that might be pointed to for a modicum of self-respect.

New Zealand supports a stable, rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region in which free trade and connectivity can thrive.  We urge parties to resolve disputes in accordance with international law, on the basis of diplomacy and dialogue.

New Zealand and China do not always see eye to eye on every issue; we are different countries and New Zealanders are proudly independent.  However,  China and New Zealand have a close, constructive and increasingly mature relationship.  Where we do have different perspectives, we raise these with each other in ways that are cordial, constructive and clear.

“New Zealanders” might be proudly independent, but it isn’t clear that our governments are.  At a New Zealand event –  so it wasn’t even a matter of talking politely in China itself –  our Foreign Minister can’t bring himself to name any specific concerns or risks (despite rising international unease, and the material documented by Professor Brady).   And if he ever has concerns he’ll raise them in “cordial” way………”cordial” and direct interference by a foreign power in New Zealand, undermining the freedoms of hundreds of thousands of our own people (ethnic Chinese) doesn’t strike me as the sort of words that naturally belong together.  At least in a country whose government retains any self-respect.

But then it got worse, at least according to the Stuff report of how Peters departed from his written text.

“We should also remember this when we are making judgements about China – about freedom and their laws: that when you have hundreds of millions of people to be re-employed and relocated with the change of your economic structure, you have some massive, huge problems.

“Sometimes the West and commentators in the West should have a little more regard to that and the economic outcome for those people, rather than constantly harping on about the romance of ‘freedom’, or as famous singer Janis Joplin once sang in her song: ‘freedom is just another word for nothing else to lose’.

“In some ways the Chinese have a lot to teach us about uplifting everyone’s economic futures in their plans.”

It is so remarkably reminiscent of the Western fellow travellers of the Soviet Union in decades past –  tens of millions might die, but not to worry, a new Jerusalem is on the way to being built.   Basic rights and freedoms might be trampled on, or simply not exist at all, but not to worry….what is freedom after all?

Personally, I don’t think the biggest issue in the China/New Zealand official relationship should be how the Chinese party/state treats its own people –  abominable as that is.  The issues people like Professor Brady are raising are about the direct, systematic, in-depth, interference by another country  –  a hostile power, run by a regime with mostly alien values –  in the domestic affairs of other countries.  Our own most of all.  International expansionism and defiance of the rule of international law might matter too.  And none of that has any connection whatever to improvements in material living standards in China.

And what to make of the nonsense claim that “the Chinese have a lot to teach us about uplifting everyone’s economic future in their plans”.  That is about as ignorant as it is offensive.

I’ve shown this chart before

Here is a chart showing GDP per capita for China, and a range of now-advanced Asian countries/economies.  I’ve shown each country’s GDP per capita as a percentage of that for the United States for each of 1913, 1950, and 2014, using the Maddison database for the 1913 observation and the Conference Board (which built on Maddison’s work) for the more recent observations.  Data are a bit patchy in those earlier decades, but 1913 was before China descended into civil  and external wars (from the late 1920s), and 1950 was the year after the Communist Party took control of the mainland.

What stands out is just how badly communist-ruled China has done economically, and especially relative to the three other ethnic-Chinese countries/territories.  Substantial re-convergence has happened in all the other countries on the chart, but that in China has been excruciatingly slow.  A few buoyant decades (the aftermath of which we have still to see) struggle to make up for the earlier decades of even worse Communist mis-rule.

Or how about this one, using Conference Board data for real GDP per person employed (they don’t have real GDP per hour worked for China, but estimates are very low)?

Even on official Chinese data, the record is pretty poor: China barely matches Sri Lanka which was torn apart by decades of civil war, and doesn’t even begin to match the performance of the better east Asian economies (none of which has anything like the waste, the massive distortions, of China).   Surely China is best seen as a (potential) wealth-destruction story?  Taiwan’s numbers might be a reasonable benchmark for what could have been.  Taiwan threatens no one.

Just to cap an egregious speech, the Opposition foreign affairs spokesman indicated that he didn’t disagree with what Winston Peters had had to say  (well, after his government’s track record of cravenness, he would, wouldn’t he).

I came home from Anne-Marie Brady’s lecture the other day and pulled off the bookshelf my copy of The Appeasers, written in the 1960s by Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, a heavily-documented account of British appeasement of Germany from 1933 onwards.    As I started reading, lots seemed to ring true to today.

Two situations are never fully alike.  For a start, New Zealand isn’t a “great power” and China is (as Germany was becoming again).    And Germany had little real interest in interfering in domestic British politics –  and there was no large German diaspora in the UK to attempt to corral and control.    But there is a lot of the same willed blindness to the evil that the regime represented.    In the 1930s, it wasn’t the bureaucrats who were the problem –  from the very first, British Ambassadors in Berlin recognised and reported on the nature of the regime, its domestic abuses and its external threats.     There were various forces at work it seemed –  a fear of Communism (and thus Nazism as perhaps some sort of bulwark against something even worse), unease and even guilt over some of the Treaty of Versailles provisions, the fear of new conflict (only 15 years after the last war), and often some sort of admiration for the order the new German government was bringing to things (and some philo-Germanism among many of the British upper classes).  As Gilbert and Gott summarise it

“Like alcohol, pro-Germanism dulled the senses of those who over-indulged, and many English diplomats, politicians and men of influence insisted upon interpreting German developments in such a way as to suggest patterns of cooperation that did not exist.”

Britain and France could (and should) have stopped Germany earlier.  New Zealand can’t stop China, of course, but we can assert ourselves, and reassert some self-respect, for our system, our freedoms, and for the interests of like-minded countries.    We can call out, firmly (not cordially) Chinese influence-seeking etc where we see it –  as the Australian government has been much more willing to do.  We can cease to pander to such an obnoxious regime that not only abuses its own people (including failing to deliver economically) but represents a threat to its neighbours, and which persists in seeking to interfere directly in other countries, whether in its neighbourhood or not, whether with large ethnic Chinese minorities (as NZ, Australia, and Canada) or not.  Our politicians shame us by their deference to such an evil power –  and frankly, one that has little real ability to harm us (as distinct from harming a few vested interests).

In her lecture the other day, and in her policy brief, Anne-Marie Brady called for our political leaders to insist that none of their MPs will have anything further to do with entities involved in the PRC United Front efforts.   That would certainly be a start –  though the Jian Yang stain on our democracy really needs to be removed altogether –  but it is probably a rather small part of the issue: we need political leaders who will recognise  –  and openly acknowledge –  the nature of the regime, and stop fooling themselves (and attempting to fool us) about the nature of the regime they defend, and consort with.   Perhaps our leaders are no worse than, say, British Cabinet ministers in the 1930s who enjoyed hunting with Hermann Goering, but if that is the standard they are comfortable with, New Zealand is in an even worse place than I’d supposed.   In their book, Gilbert and Gott quote from the former head of the British foreign service:

“Looking back to the pre-1939 era Vansittart wrote: “I frequently said that those who ask to be deceived must not grumble if they are gratified”

Indeed.

I said that I thought Professor Brady was inclined to pull her punches a bit.  Asked what New Zealand can do,  she began her response claiming that “Australia can be more forceful”.   No doubt Australia is, and will remain, more forceful –  we’ve seen in the DFAT Secretary’s speech, in the ASIO report, in the foreign affairs White Paper, and in the new legislation details of which were announced yesterday.  But “can” isn’t the operative word.   If trade is your concern, Australia trades more heavily with China than New Zealand firms do.  If distance is your concern, Australia is physically closer to Asia –  and the waterways of the South China Sea.  Our political leaders – National, Labour, New Zealand First, Green –  could speak out, could act forcefully.  But they won’t.

Shameless and shameful.

 

UPDATE: As I pressed publish, I discovered that I’d been sent a link to some other reflections on Peters and Haworth by China expert Geremie Barme.