I’m yielding to no one in my low view of the Reserve Bank Monetary Policy Committee. I’ve been writing about the problems – structural and personal – since the new Potemkin-village model (designed to look shiny and new, but to change little) was set up three years ago, and it was (for example) one of my Official Information Act requests that got the written confirmation that the Minister, Governor and the Bank’s Board had formally agreed that no one with ongoing expertise in monetary policy or macroeconomics, or likely future interest in researching such matters, would be appointed (as an external member) to the new Monetary Policy Committee (three relevant posts here, here, and here). It was a simply extraordinary exclusion, which reflected very poorly on all involved, but which never seemed to get the scrutiny from media or MPs that it deserved. In no other modern central bank would such an approach be adopted.

But, for all that, I thought Eric Crampton’s op-ed in the Herald today overbalanced in the opposite direction. The column is behind a paywall, so I’m not going to quote extensively, but the gist seemed to be that you need a PhD in macroeconomics AND to be actively engaged in ongoing research to serve on the MPC. Crampton and an Otago university academic then report the results of a little survey they’d run of New Zealand academic macroeconomists to find out who those people thought should be appointed to the MPC, when the terms of two of the current externals expire shortly. It wasn’t noted that the most favoured candidate – one of the incumbents, Bob Buckle – does not have a PhD in macroeconomics, and has presumably taken a self-denying ordinance not to do any relevant research or analysis now or in the future (or otherwise he’d fall foul of the exclusionary rule, see above).

I don’t want to run commentary on all the individuals reported on. One or two might well be excellent additions, one or two would probably be dreadful, but none should be disqualified in advance simply because they might keep thinking about the issues, or writing about them in future. Even if the pickings are fairly slim, that far I agree (strongly) with Crampton. Of course, at present none of it probably matters much as management enjoys a permanent majority on the MPC, and the Orr/Robertson approach has been to prevent external members from speaking in public or even having their views recorded in the minutes. Three years sightseeing aside, it is difficult to know why really able people would seek, or accept, appointment at present. Management appointees matter much more, and the most recent appointment – the new executive deputy in charge of macro and monetary policy, with not a shred of relevant experience – suggests things are heading in the wrong direction there too.

But I think the “cult of the PhD” can be carried too far, at least when it comes to policy roles (as distinct from, say, staffing the Economics Departments of our universities). Don Brash had one, but had been primarily a banker and intellectually curious as he was (and is) had no demonstrated ongoing interest or expertise in macroeconomic research. Alan Bollard had one. Graeme Wheeler didn’t. But little or nothing about how well or badly those individuals did their jobs – and reasonable people may debate each – came down to how complex an NBER paper they could each critique (let alone produce). I’ve noted several times over the years that of the Reserve Bank’s chief economists over my working life, about half had PhDs and half did not. But there was no obvious correlation between those who did (or didn’t) and effectiveness or intellectual energy. Some (one?) of the best did, some (two?) of the best didn’t, but one who did was almost surely the worst of them. In English-influenced countries even 30-40 years ago it wasn’t particularly common for even the most able people to pursue PhDs unless they wanted an academic career. A couple of the more published researchers at the Reserve Bank in the last decade or so either didn’t have a PhD, or got one only rather belatedly (having already published quite a bit).

Or we could look around the world. Alan Greenspan was an economist but didn’t have a PhD (Update: thanks to the reader who pointed out that he acquired one well into his policy career). Jay Powell was a lawyer and private equity executive. Glenn Stevens, the previous RBA Governor, seemed to do a pretty reasonable job, and had neither a PhD nor a research track record. I’m not a great Lagarde fan, but she’s a lawyer and politician. Andrew Bailey has a PhD – in history – but spent his career in banking-oriented roles at the Bank of England. On the other hand, Phil Lowe, Mark Carney, Ben Bernanke, and Stefan Ingves have economics PhDs, even if not always with much sign of ongoing research interest.

Which is by way of saying that despite my many criticisms of Adrian Orr, the fact that he doesn’t have a PhD doesn’t bother me in the slightest. And the fact that Caroline Saunders – another of the independents – has one, if in quite unrelated areas of economics, allays not in the slightest my concern about the weakness (and tokenism) of her appointment.

A parallel I sometimes draw with the MPC is with the Cabinet. As Crampton notes, the MPC makes decisions that are final. So, in many areas, does the Cabinet (and often individual ministers). Very rarely do we expect the Prime Minister or Cabinet ministers to be professional technical experts in any of the areas they are minister for, let alone with the whole ambit of policies for which Cabinet is responsible. It often isn’t even helpful to have had a health expert as Minister of Health, and I’m pretty sure that in all New Zealand’s history we’ve never had an economist as Minister of Finance (nor is it common in parliamentary systems elsewhere). That isn’t a problem. We expect there to be a distinction between professional and technically-expert advisers on the one hand, and decisionmakers on the other. When either group tries to do the job of the other, or the advisory expertise is lacking, things run into difficulty.

[UPDATE: Bill Rowling, Minister of Finance 1972-74, did have an economics degree.]

The parallel with the MPC isn’t exact. We want the Cabinet to be making intrinsically “political” calls, about preferences, priorities, values etc. But we also want them to be judicious people – not unduly swayed by the latest whizz-bang research paper or think-tank idea, or the latest data point. We want/need them to be thinking about communications, public acceptability and so on.

So I’m not suggesting an MPC made up of the first 10 names in the Wellington phone book, or a bunch of pleasant (or otherwise) political hacks. But there is a place for a balanced committee, served by a highly expert staff (research, analytical, policy, markets, operational – all quite different components of what a capable monetary policy function needs). It seems quite likely that some of those roles would these days naturally be filled by people with PhDs – key figures in the research functions, most often perhaps the Chief Economist – but technical research virtuosity (of the sort a highly productive PhD may still offer – many do, many don’t) is just one, important, part of the relevant set of skills. Even in that sort of area, a passion to make sense of what is going on, to interpret evidence and data carefully, to be open to new ideas and fresh perspectives, seem to me to be what we should be looking for. Qualifications aren’t irrelevant, but qualities matter at least as much. And in an MPC that is dominated by management (which also controls all the staff resources), the willingness to think independently and ask hard but realistic questions, to engage effectively with experiences in other times and other countries, are what are likely to add most value. Some functioning academic researchers may be able to do that well, and their particular talents and experience should add value to the Committee. But so, far example, might someone who’d spent decades at the interface of economics and financial markets, or even – and one wouldn’t want this type dominating the Committee – the sort of classic old-school corporate director who is not afraid to ask questions when things don’t make sense, and who may act as a really effective test for how well the expert arguments, analysis, and lines of reasoning may be received in wider public audiences (I can think of a couple of these types who were on the RB Board in years past). Temperament is often at least as important as virtuosity. And effective public communications – not always an academic (or bureaucratic) strength – is vital.

Of course, the bottom line at present is that almost every dimension of the Reserve Bank (and particularly its macro/monetary functions) is weak: little research, little transparency, weak senior management appointments, a Governor with the wrong temperament for the job, an MPC structured to be ineffective, and weak appointees to the MPC. The ban on people with ongoing research interests – almost laughably bad as it is – is more like a symptom of a weak institution…..and a Minister of Finance who seems just fine with all that. And not even, it seems, bothered when core inflation bursts out the top of the target range.

UPDATE: I’d been aware that several of the top figures at the Bank of England in recent decades, including Eddie George and Paul Tucker, had not had PhDs (the latter having gone on to write a very serious book about central bank governance etc), but when I wrote the post I’d been labouring under the impression that the most prominent and eminent such figure – Mervyn King – had had a PhD. A reader got in touch to point out that he hadn’t. I’ve disagreed with many of King’s views, including in posts here, but no one can doubt that he was (and is) a figure of considerable intellectual eminence and thoughtfulness, whose speeches (for example) read well and make one think. He would seem ideally suited for an MPC.