Tangled webs

Yes, Orr/Quigley/Willis again. For everyone’s sake now – well, perhaps except her own – one can only wish that the Minister of Finance would finally decide, more than six months on, to make a full and complete disclosure of what actually went on around the exit of Orr and the aftermath.

Instead, the snippet by painful snippet process continues. Since my post yesterday we’ve learned some more things:

First, questioned by Barbara Edmonds in the House yesterday, the Minister finally gave the gist of texts between her and Iain Rennie on 27 Feb re the commencement by the Bank’s Board of an “employment process”.   She and Treasury have withheld these texts for many months, long after she herself was the first to formally disclose (to FEC on 18 June) that there had indeed been an “employment process” prior to Orr’s departure.   That in turn lead her to realise – what she’d have known if only she were an assiduous reader of this blog! –  that in fact on 18 June she had also told FEC, three times with Rennie sitting next to her, that she’d first heard from him about the “employment process” on 24 February.   Last night just before the House rose she made a personal statement correcting this point.   No doubt it was an honest, if careless, mistake in June, although it doesn’t reflect very well that there was no earlier correction (when Rennie must have known, or suspected and should have quickly checked afterward, that his minister has mis-spoken).

Second, and much more importantly, just prior to 2 this afternoon Treasury finally released the set of texts in full. There are a couple about the funding agreement stance from 14 Feb, which are useful but don’t materially add to the information we already have (although do make clear that Rennie had only spoken to Quigley about the funding agreement bid on the morning of the special 14 Feb board meeting).  There is a mysterious one from Willis to Rennie on 17 Feb “Are you coming to the 230”, which has no obvious significance but Treasury must think it is somehow in scope.   And then there are the crucial 27 Feb texts.

 

The first of those adds nothing new, but the second does (going beyond what Willis told the House yesterday).    Note that fourth sentence: “Neil’s current thinking is that you could receive recommendation later next week unless decision is taken to go down voluntary exit route”.   In context –  and given the range of the Minister’s power –  this could only be a possible recommendation to dismiss.    So not only did the Board envisage their process culminating in a dismissal recommendation (NB an interesting pre-judgement before hearing Orr’s response), but the Minister was fully informed of that (and actually tossed in the observation that the board would need good legal advice, apparently approving of the lawyer Rennie advised her the board was using.  (Incidentally, she would also have needed good legal advice had it come to a recommendation to dismiss, given that any decision could have been challenged in the courts).   This completely undercuts the line Willis herself has run for months about how it was all nothing to do with her because it was an “employment process” when, as I’ve stressed and the Board, she, and the Treasury clearly knew, she was the one with the (hiring and) firing powers, and only her.

Text messages between Nicola Willis and Iain Rennie Feb 2025 re Orr released by Tsy 10 Sept .

The third development was a question to Willis from Edmonds in the House this afternoon.   She asked whether the Minister considered that Quigley’s characterisation of the exit from 5 March (and beyond) as “a personal decision” was misleading.    The Minister said that she had relied on Quigley’s judgement that that was all that he could say.     Edmonds could have strengthened the question, because Quigley also said on the day that “the Governor had got inflation into the target range and felt it was time to go” and denied that there were any conduct, policy, or performance disputes at the heart of the exit.    The Minister is just making up stuff if she believes that any of those lines were really satisfactory, unless “satisfactory” involved keeping the substantive truth from the public.   We still do not know –  and MoF claims not to either –  what NDA provisions there actually were, and nor do we know why the Minister (operating in the public interest supposedly) did not insist on (a) finding out in advance, and b) tightly constraining them so that the public was not misled.

Edmonds moved on to ask why the Minister also didn’t correct the record on/after 11 June (the Bank’s deeply misleading selective release and statement, which tried actively to avoid suggesting there had been any employment issues –  even though it was implicit in the existence of an exit agreement).  The Minister responded that she had not been aware of the Board’s specific concerns, or of Orr’s responses, or of the terms of the exit, she did not want to expose taxpayers to legal risk, and (supposedly highmindedly) did not “want to politicise a sensitive employment process”).  None of this really stacks up.  As it is, on 18 June, at FEC (but barely if at all reported at the time –  I hadn’t noticed it) she noted, what Quigley had sought to obscure, that there had in fact been an “employment process”, and of all the answers she didn’t have she could –  and probably should –  have insisted on them.   She was aware the Board was driving the Governor out but had no idea what the concerns were?  Yeah right.   And, of course, decisions around funding, and decisions to fire the Governor were –  by Parliament’s design – ones made by politicians.   Willis concluded that she had relied on Quigley and he should have done better.  Well, of course, but he was her man, and she covered for his approach for months, deceiving the public in the process.

On the final question, Edmonds asked if (rhetorically no doubt) if Willis really believed New Zealanders could trust her when she had withheld information, had known she might receive a recommendation to dismiss etc and (with a final flourish) when it fact it was Willis who had driven Orr out.    Willis attempted (rather laughably) the high road, suggesting that Edmonds was free to be the great defender if Orr if she wished, but as for her (Willis) she wouldn’t deign to “politicise” Orr’s exit.

And those were the new developments.

But there are so many questions still outstanding.  For the Board, at what point did they engage external counsel to advise on a process that (it is finally clear) they envisaged leading to an unprecedented recommendation to dismiss the central bank Governor?  And was this prompted mainly by Orr’s behaviour at the 20th and 24th meetings or had it been brewing even before that?   Also for the Board, given that clear direction, how can any of them with any integrity remain in office having been collectively responsible for the 11 June release, which was now even more clearly deliberately deceptive (under a guise of pseudo-transparency).   

As for the Minister (and Treasury) it remains inconceivable that we have had the whole story.  You, as senior minister, don’t just get a text out of the blue suggesting the part-time (mostly Labour appointed) board might recommend firing the Governor without wanting to know more, unless of course you already knew more.  It is beyond belief that there were no discussions after Orr’s walkout from the 24 Feb meeting, and not very likely that –  given that Rennie was being used as the comms intermediary (why?) – that no one at Treasury was looking into legal processes, grounds etc.

And, of course, why did she take no steps to ensure that a reasonably honest (not necessarily full or complete) statement was given to New Zealanders on a) 5 March, b) 11 June or c) at any other time up to and including the Ombudsman determination a couple of weeks ago?  Whose interests was she serving then?  Was her stance more about distancing herself from a process than legitimate legal/privacy issues for Orr?

Someone who doesn’t follow these things much commented to me recently “how can anyone now trust anything the Reserve Bank says?”   A good question, but as information continues to seep out from Willis, much the same might, unfortunately, be asked about her.   I remain convinced the ousting Orr was well-warranted and welcome, to her credit given the opening Orr’s behaviour created.  But not the cover-up, the active misleading, and the obstruction.  Or the lack of full disclosure to this day.

9 thoughts on “Tangled webs

  1. I was no fan of Orr, obviously, and regularly critiqued his sub-par performance in public writings from almost when he was first appointed. However, what I believe is the truth, that Willis is desperate to hide, is that the big banks wanted big bear Orr out. He stood in their way on banking regulation and capital requirements. He’d already had ill-tempered public fights with them on this very issue.

    So my theory is that the reason why Willis oddly – bizarrely – reappointed Quigley to Chair 18 months ago was that she needed him – a National Party ally – to oust the Governor.

    Willis was keen to get rid of Orr – that desire came from her – not the Board. It had little to do with regular style “employment issues”. But she needed Quigley there to do it.

    The motive was to remove an obstacle that was frustrating the banks. Get in the way of a banker and a billion bucks and you got trouble. So my hunch is that there has been a Water-Willis Gate style cover-up. The funding cut argument was a ruse to provoke big bear Orr. It worked. My Nat Deep Throat sources support this version of events. Once Quigley had served his purpose, he too was jettisioned by Nic. Politics. Note since Orr left Nic has got everything she wanted out of the Bank. How about that, huh?

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    • Interesting argument. I’m sceptical, in part because unlike 2019 the Governor was no longer in the controlling seat re bank regulatory/capital issues but rather the board was, and Willis had done little/nothing to either keep the board fully manned or to appoint people clearly aligned with her policy preferences in that area. Plus, why reappoint Neil with all his evident faults, when she could have put in a new strong figure with no ties to Orr.
      All of which is not to dispute that bank capital issues, incl Orr’s approach to critics or alternative perspectives, help form the environment in which Willis had long preferred to be rid of Orr. Or to dispute that bankers on both sides of the Tasman will have been among those (including me, probably you too) whose spirits lifted when they heard the news that Orr was gone.
      I suspect she just wants to hide the (probable) fact that her hands will have been all over events of the last 10 days of Orr (even if, as is likely, little or nothing of it will have been written down).

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      • Thanks. Altho as I say to people who ask me why I don’t write a book about this or that “who’d buy it, you, me and….50 other people”! Have just written a substantial piece on the current saga for the Central Banking magazine: people abroad must just stare in incomprehension at this year’s ongoing debacle.

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      • Eric, shouldn’t the name of the book be about the Orr Error (that is, not the Orr Era) with apologies to Taylor Swift who ran the pun with her Eras world tour? Everyone in the NZ econ “industry” like me and Eric knew Orr was screwing everything up going back even to 2019. What is out of this world are the answers to the questions, “Why was he reappointed by Robertson and Quigley?” & then Quigley also reappointed afterward by Willis when the entire RBNZ had been turned into a pigs breakfast? The answer is that Wellington has become am inbred village where meritocracy is out the window and acting for the good of NZ is no longer the aim. Wind the city up and move the ministries to Christchurch and Auckland. Stop the rest of NZ subsidizing this failing dump.

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      • And if you ask around town, there were warning signs from his tenure as Deputy Governor that ought to have been noted prior to appointment too.

        I’d love to know what actually went on at the Board level when they were getting warnings about the Governor’s behaviour. They had a very weak board. It’s possible that Quigley just didn’t have the numbers to be able to do anything until he had a supportive MoF. But that’s just one of many potential hypotheses.

        Spectacular failures at every level.

        The book would be a case-study in how Wellington goes wrong.

        Just not sure it’d be possible to get the detail needed to distinguish among competing hypotheses. Anyone in that set with ongoing aspirations in Wellington may be reluctant to say anything that might signal unreliability and indiscretion that could kill future appointments to future boards (or even just litigation risk).

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      • I’d say there were warning signs well before even his DG tenure but….. I’m reluctant to be too critical of the initial appointment when I reread my own posts at the time which were more sceptical than i think anyone else was in public, but still not out and out negative (esp given the limited credible pool by the time the process got near its end – the board had kicked out earlier applicants who could have been much better, but who might have looked to Wgtn establishment figures to be riskier than Orr (10 yrs a CE, former DG etc).
        The right person might be able to tease out a lot more – recall that Jenee got Eichbaum to go on the record re Neil’s own record a couple of years ago, and a fair few will have retired.

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