Not much parliamentary scrutiny

This was the post I was planning to write this morning to mark Orr’s final day. That said, if the underlying events – deliberate attempts to mislead Parliament – were Orr’s doing, the post is more about the apparent uselessness of Parliament (specifically the Finance and Expenditure Committee) in holding him and the rest of the Bank (other MPC members, Board) to account. This is just one small example.

I was brought up – 7th form and university history – on the courage of the likes of Hampden and Pym in the House of Commons, resisting over-mighty acts of the executive, but I guess these days too often too many MPs seem more focused on becoming part of the executive themselves.

A few weeks ago one Saturday afternoon I wrote a short post about a letter I’d sent to the chair of the Finance and Expenditure Committee (in that capacity), cc’ed to the senior opposition member, about what seemed a (and yet another) pretty blatant and deliberate effort by the Governor at his most recent FEC appearance to mislead (or worse) the Committee. Orr had done so with two of his senior managers, and fellow MPC members, sitting either side of him. They’d done nothing to clarify and correct what Orr had told the Committee. I suggested that perhaps the Committee could consider inviting the Bank to verify the Governor’s claim that the RBNZ had been one of the first central banks to tighten and one of the first to ease.

The letter had been sent on Friday 28 February (so while Orr was still at work, before any of us had any hint of a forthcoming resignation) and more than a week later I’d heard nothing (the chair’s auto-reply had indicated he’d respond within 3-5 working days).

(I could add here that I’m not in the habit of writing to parliamentary committees or ministers. OIA requests aside, I think I’ve written one letter to a minister in 10 years, and the odd submission on legislation had been my only contact with FEC itself. I’ve occasionally exchanged notes with, and even met, some members of FEC, but only at their initiative.)

Anyway, the post seemed to have been brought to the attention of the two MPs.

On the following Monday morning (10 March) I heard from Barbara Edmonds’ email account

And that was that.

From the committee chair, Cameron Brewer, there was a little more. He sent me an email on the Tuesday afternoon (11th). In that email he claimed that he hadn’t wanted to respond while research was underway, and implying that his office really should have sent me a holding reply.

What research? Well, it seemed that he had asked the parliamentary library staff to look into the matter. He even sent me a copy. This was first bit of it (highlighting added)

It was pretty clear that the research hadn’t been requested the previous week, but at – what seems like – very short notice indeed. So short that the poor parliamentary staff hadn’t even had time to check all the OECD central banks, even though it takes about 30 seconds to do each one. And, by their reckoning (having left out 10 of the relevant central banks), the Reserve Bank had indeed been third (of their sub-sample) to tighten (and something like sixth to ease).

Brewer passed this along, apparently content that it seemed to vindicate the Governor (and if so I guess there was no need to do anything so awkward as bother the Bank). But he did add “If this information falls short of your expectations, I’m happy to put your email formally to the committee for them to acknowledge receipt or action further.”

I went back to Brewer the following day, pointing out that parliamentary staff had simply not checked a large group of OECD central banks, drawing the distinction between euro-area and other central banks (thus there were only about 20 independent sets of monetary policy), and repeating the listing I’d referred him to in my first letter, showing that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand had been roughly middle of the pack (by date) in both tightening and easing. I noted that the parliamentary research had not identified any mistakes or errors in my listing, and so it wasn’t clear how – incomplete and all – it shed any useful light.

(Note that the issue has never about macroeconomic significance – there is none in the rank ordering, when every country faces its own unique set of macro circumstances and inflation risks/threats – but about a senior public official appearing to deliberately mislead Parliament, aided and abetted (by their silence) by senior colleagues, all with no apparent consequences.)

As to where to next, I was a little torn. It was pretty clear that Brewer wanted the issue to go away, and of course Orr had announced his resignation (while still being in office until today) between me writing the letter and him responding. So, assuming it would be the last I heard, I ended my email back to him pretty emolliently.

“Quite how you choose to pursue (or not) this matter is of course over to you.  Given that parliamentary committees routinely ask follow up question of government agencies that appear before them, my suggestion had been that at least you ask the Bank for the evidence and/or argumentation to back the claims made by the Governor.”

But, there was more to come. I got this reply.

“Thanks Michael. Good points. Let me put it back to them. Appreciate your comprehensive work in this area. I honestly did not know our international rankings on monetary tightening and loosening during that period, hence expressed no opinion and appreciate your response (as I sought unvarnished from you in my last email) to the Parliamentary Library’s paper.”

It was a bit odd, since my concern wasn’t with the Parliamentary Library staff, but with the Reserve Bank (the senior public officials who had actually misled FEC).

I went back to Brewer thus

“In some respects the specifics of my original email to you (28 Feb) has been overtaken by events (Orr’s unexpected early resignation), and obviously it is up to you and the committee whether you want to pursue it any further (given that other RB managers sat silently by).  That said, in some respects the thing I’d urge you to think about more is how under the (soon to be appointed) temporary Governor and then a new permanent Governor you will hold the Bank to account and ensure you are consistently being given straight answers.    Ideally, of course, the character of the new appointees will be such that no further serious issues of this sort arise.”

Anyway, they must have given the Parliamentary Library staff a bit more time this time as I heard nothing more until last week.

In the meantime, as I’ve previously highlighted on Twitter, a reader had drawn my attention to a new OECD report which (p 32) actually addressed the timing matter directly (at least as far as easings) in a summary table

Contrary to what the Governor had told Parliament, the RBNZ was (of course) not among the first to ease.

Last week, I heard back from Brewer’s EA. 

….we have compiled a more extensive report, noting your concerns. Again, I strongly emphasize that this comes from Cameron in his personal, and induvial [sic] capacity as an MP. Formal matters would need to be raised with the committee itself.

We will leave the findings to your expertise, and hope you find it helpful. We will leave this with you.

Many thanks for taking the time to write.

I was rolling my eyes at this point. Did writing to the committee chair, explicitly in that capacity, cc’ed to the senior Labour member of the committee, somehow not count as “raising it with the Committee itself”? And “we will leave the findings to my expertise”, when the issue was never the data – which anyone could track down with an hour’s quick internet searches – but whether MPs were bothered about being lied to. They apparently weren’t.

But Brewer’s EA did send me the Parliamentary Library’s new piece…..which told me exactly what I already knew, and had raised with FEC, that the Reserve Bank was not among the first to tighten or the first to ease. In fact, here is their table.

The Parliamentary Library (now) know that Orr was simply making stuff up. So does the OECD. So, in fact, does anyone who even bothered to check. So, it seems, now does the chair of FEC. But he and his members simply don’t seem at all bothered. And that, it seems, is Parliament for you.

I was overseas last week and was recounting this experience to a colleague over dinner. He was, understandably, a bit flabbergasted. After all, he noted, surely Orr’s initial claims were just factual and easily verified (or otherwise)? Well, indeed. And why would a parliamentary committee not be bothered about having been lied to? Well, there I couldn’t really help him. I explained that the timing of the resignation perhaps eased any pressure they might otherwise have felt, but it didn’t seem even close to a decent explanation, since (as I had noted to the – new – FEC chair) this was only the last in a long series of Orrian efforts to mislead the committee, his senior colleagues had sat by silently (again) while he did it, and if we are looking (as the law says we must) to the Bank’s Board to lead the selection of a new Governor, surely asking them questions about their past Governor’s egregious behaviour might have shed some useful light.

But instead we live in the age of Donald Trump, Pete Hegseth, and Karoline Leavitt where truth and straightforwardness in public officials seems at best an optional extra…..even, it seems, in New Zealand.

(And, to be clear, had Brewer come back to me the day Orr announced his resignation and said something like “thanks for raising those concerns, which do seem a little troubling, but since the Governor has now resigned there probably isn’t much mileage in us pursuing this specific any further”, I’d probably have gone “fair enough, that’s life” and moved on.)

UPDATE: Cameron Brewer, the chair of FEC, has commented below in response to this post. Readers are encouraged to read his comments. On specifics, I will have to take his word on when the first lot of information was requested from the Parliamentary Library, but assuming that is so it leaves a number of questions, including why Brewer or his EA didn’t go back to the Library staff straight away and ask them to check the rest of the central banks (might have taken them another 20 minutes). Or, indeed, ask the Reserve Bank to verify the Governor’s claim (given that this initial request for information was before Orr’s unexpected resignation).

Farewell to Orr

Today is the last day in office for the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Adrian Orr. Of course, he hasn’t been in the office since 5 March when, on the eve of his major international conference, his resignation was announced and he stormed off with no (effective) notice and no explanation.

I’m not going to waste my time or bore readers with a retrospective assessment of Orr’s overall tenure. I recently reread the couple of substantive posts I wrote on prospects at the time he was appointed, and although I was probably more openly sceptical than most, I wasn’t nearly pessimistic enough. But if the initial appointment was (perhaps) pardonable, he should never have been reappointed, and his departure now is both welcome and long overdue.

When Orr’s resignation was announced, we were told that his deputy would be acting Governor for the rest of the month and were led to believe that from 1 April a formal “temporary Governor” (explicitly provided for in the Act) would be in place. Here is the extract from the Bank’s statement

and this is from the Minister’s statement

But then this appeared in The Post this morning

It may be legal (although the RB spokesperson appears to have the details wrong as the Act does not seem to impose a deadline on the Minister, only on the Board, and – if Orr’s resignation really is effective only from today – they’d appear to have another 28 days even to make a recommendation)

but it certainly isn’t what we were led to expect on 5 March in either announcement (see above). There doesn’t seem to be any good reason for the Bank’s Board not yet to have made a recommendation to the Minister. They’d had more than three weeks already.

As per earlier posts, I think it is quite inappropriate that board chair Quigley is still in office. The government should have prevailed him to do the decent thing and step aside so that someone new can lead the search for a new permanent Governor. But even if the government were so minded, it isn’t a good reason for not getting a proper temporary Governor in place, and for not having a recommendation on the Minister’s desk already. Probably most people expect Hawkesby to be appointed as temporary Governor, and if that was the Board’s inclination it should have been quick and easy to decide on that recommendation. Of course, it is always possible that the Minister has in mind something different and is in back-channels and unofficial conversation with the Board about just who they might nominate (“back-channels and unofficial” since the Act is clear that the onus is on the Board to nominate and on the Minister only to accept or reject).

It all seems rather sloppy and lackadaisical (dating right back to those 5 March press releases, which perhaps had to be churned out in a hurry). And one reason countries typically give long (and fixed) terms to central bank Governors is precisely so that Ministers of Finance cannot do what the Stuff journalist suggests and make decisions about short terms based on whether someone makes monetary policy decisions to the Minister’s satisfaction (not that I am suggesting Willis will). And if this process is sloppy and lackadaisical it only compounds the bad impression made about a country and its central bank when the incumbent Governor resigned with no notice and not a word of explanation.