Coronavirus economics and policy: 25 March

Typing the date I notice that in the Christian calendar today is the Feast of the Annunciation –  the announcement of a coming Saviour and Redeemer – and that today it is nine months until Christmas.  One can only wonder how things will be, here and abroad, on Christmas Day 2020.

But what about current policy and related issues?  First, to get out of the way a couple of important, but less central or immediate issues.

The first is around accountability.  Personally, I’m uneasy that Parliament is simply closing down for the time being, in the middle of one of the most severe crises in our history, with an unprecedented usurpation of power by the executive.  But whatever the shorter-term questions, challenges etc (that the planned Select Committee is unlikely to do much about) there will be a need for a serious reckoning with how the authorities, political and official, handle all stages of this pandemic –  those past and those, perhaps over many many months –  still to come.  After the 1918 pandemic, the New Zealand government set up a Royal Commission, which reported back within about six months.  The report is here.   It seems like a good model for a variety of purposes: accountability, documenting issues and experiences, and learning from what worked well (and what do not) for future pandemics.     It would be a welcome commitment to openness and accountability if the Prime Minister would now commit that once the pandemic is passed such an independent and powerful Royal Commission will be established (in case there is a change of government before then, ideally that would be endorsed –  or done jointly with – the Leader of the Opposition.

In the meantime, a serious commitment to accountability and openness –  around contentious and highly uncertain re effect policies (and even choices not to act) –  would be enhanced if the current government would commit to the pro-active release of all Covid-related papers going to Cabinet, to Ministers, and to government agencies and officials who have either independent policymaking power or delegated authority to set operational policy on these matters,  (There might perhaps be a few  – very few exceptions – around national security, but openness builds trust –  or exposes weaknesses, which in turn is a basis for correcting and improving things.)

The second is around economic data.  New Zealand’s official data are pretty mediocre at the best of times –  one of only two OECD countries with only a quarterly CPI, badly lagging GDP numbers, no monthly read on the unemployment rate, and so on.   It is hard not to imagine that the official data will only get much worse this year, with long delays even if adequate numbers are finally able to be patched together.  It would be helpful for analysts if Statistics were to give an early outline of their plans and contingency plans.

But in the meantime, it would also be highly desirable if the authorities (whether SNZ or economic agencies like MBIE, the Reserve Bank or the Treasury) and getting together a timely public dashboard of high-frequency administrative data.  Things it might cover could include, for example:

  • daily or weekly new welfare benefit applications,
  • weekly bank credit data
  •  weekly data on electronic payments
  • daily or weekly arrivals data

These –  and no doubt others –  would be valuable not just now as we tumble into the abyss, but through all the inevitable ups and downs –  perhaps quite volatile ones –  in the coming months.   If/when we eventually get official data it will be good for the economic historians (and the Royal Commission) but for now we need a range of timely high frequency data (no doubt all stuff that could be compiled by people working from home).

What I really wanted to focus on today is the announcement by the government and the banks (and the Reserve Bank) yesterday afternoon.   There were very few details in the announcement, but what we know is this:

The package will include a six month principal and interest payment holiday for mortgage holders and SME customers whose incomes have been affected by the economic disruption from COVID-19.

The Government and the banks will implement a $6.25 billion Business Finance Guarantee Scheme for small and medium-sized businesses

The scheme will include a limit of $500,000 per loan and will apply to firms with a turnover of between $250,000 and $80 million per annum. The loans will be for a maximum of three years and expected to be provided by the banks at competitive, transparent rates. The Government will carry 80% of the credit risk, with the other 20% to be carried by the banks.

The Reserve Bank has agreed to help banks put this in place with appropriate capital rules. In addition, it has decided to reduce banks ‘core funding ratios’ from 75 percent to 50 percent, further helping banks to make credit available.

Take the “payment holiday” first.  I guess it was always likely for customers that were only fairly modestly indebted and had a fair amount of collateral to offer –  indeed, in those circumstances the willingness to offer such an extension is obviously sensible and mutually beneficial.

But do note that this offer by the banks  –  how much was it a genuine offer, and how much were they coerced into it –  includes (or seems to) all existing residential mortgage and SME borrowers.  Just on the mortgage side, that includes those who will have taken on loans in the last year or two with LVRs well in excess of 80 per cent.  It seems highly likely that market-clearing house prices will be falling at present, perhaps really rather a lot, even if the market is highly illiquid and there won’t be any open homes for the time being.   And although people don’t have to stump up with the cash for the next few months, interest is still accruing.  Floating first mortgage rates are still around 4.5 per cent, and on a $500000 mortgage a household will  run up perhaps another $12000 of debt in the coming six months.    An 80 per cent LVR last month could easily be a 100 per cent LVR next month, and worse than that if the security had to be realised in the near future.   Typical business lending interest rates are higher than those for residential mortgages.

I am not, of course, suggesting that banks should waive the interest.  But these continued high interest rates just reinforce the absurdity of the Reserve Bank Monetary Policy Committee simply refusing to cut the OCR any further, having cut it by only 75 basis points in the biggest economic slump of our lifetimes.  Setting monetary policy in a way that delivered, say, zero per cent low-risk retail lending rates would deliver real sustained relief to borrowers, and treat depositors as is appropriate at present (time having no value, or even negative value).

And what of the business loan guarantee scheme?  It looks relatively attractive to the banks, especially as (at present) there is no sign of any guarantee fee, however modest, and will enhance/underpin to some extent and for some classes of customers their willingness to lend a bit more.  Since banks know their own customers they still need to make decisions about which firms are likely to survive, with enough prospect or security that the bank is likely to get its money back.

But I doubt it will be that attractive to many businesses at all, and they may be something of an adverse selection problem in those who actually seek to use it.    And those interest rates –  the official statement says “competitive transparent rates”, while RNZ this morning referred to them as “normal commercial rates”.  Time has little or no economic value at present, at least across the economy as a whole.  Risk-free rates should be negative in a deflationary slump like this, and normal commercial rates –  which always carry a risk margin – probably should be pretty much zero.  That is hundreds of basis points less than firms are, and will, actually pay.  Fixing that would provide real relief, and perhaps a bit more willingness to take on a bit more debt, but the Minister and the Governor simply refuse to do anything about it.

But if debt service relief –  real relief, not just delays –  would be of considerable help, the real issue remains the dramatic slump in revenue many firms have already seen and that many more are just now beginning to experience.   And there is extreme uncertainty about (a) how much worse things might get (bounded at zero revenue I guess, but often with fixed outgoings), and (b) when, and how strongly even then, things might improve.  No one knows, and certainly your typical owner of a modest-sized business doesn’t.  Many of them won’t have much collateral, and they will have low profit margins at the best of times (Martien Lubberink at Victoria yesterday highlighted that The Warehouse group seems to fit that bill), and for many it won’t be obvoius why it is worthwhile to borrow, rather than to simply close down now and perhaps get lucky enough to be among the earlier people to realise any remaining assets.  Even if there is a robust business there five years hence, it won’t be so for the current owners if they take on lots of new debt in the interim.

It may get a bit tiresome to keep reading it, but the government’s approach still does not seem to recognise –  or if it recognises the point, be willing to do anything serious about it –  that the biggest issues around the survival of firms is dramatic income loss and extreme income certainty.  While they avoid confronting that more and more businesses will close by the day.

Which, of course, brings me back to my income guarantee proposal, guaranteeing households and firms (to the extent they maintain paid employees) 80 per cent of last year’s net income for the coming year.    It is the sort of national economic pandemic insurance policy we might well have signed up to if we’d thought seriously enough about the issue 20 years ago (experts have always advised that a really severe pandemic would be along one day).   We can’t –  or shouldn’t –  go offering that level of comfort indefinitely, but given the position successive governments have kept net public debt to (zero per cent on the best OECD measure), we can –  and should –  certainly do it for a year.  It buys both firms and households (borrowers) and banks a reasonable amount of time.  If, perchance, economic life looks like returning to normal in six to nine months, it would have served its purpose, and avoiding many liquidations and insolvencies.  If there is still huge uncertainty, or worse, by then, everyone can start adjusting further.  It isn’t a policy that will or should save every firm, or perhaps even every household, but it would offer a valuable affordable buffer –  one that we’ve either paid the premium for in the last 25 years (getting/keeping that low debt) or could do so over the 25 years after the crisis in over.

And we should back it up with a 20 per cent (legislated) temporary cut in wages (and probably rents).  There are plenty of households that are going to do just fine economically this year, even as the economy’s capacity to generate returns has slumped dramatically.  It is about fairness, shared sacrifice, (and perceptions thereof) and about actually easing the burden on some of those firms (whose “profits” are now deeply negative) everyone wants to hold together if we can.  Complement it with a windfall profits tax if you like for the few firms that might do exceptionally well through all this.

I really hope it doesn’t take much longer before the government is finally willing to confront that “income loss and extreme uncertainty” nexus, and be prepared to take steps that meaningfully address it, in ways that help stabilise for now (and to the extent possible) firms, households, and (thus) underpinning the ability of banks to lend.

Oh, and what stops them just getting on and doing the little it would take to dramatically cut interest rates?

Coronavirus policy and economics: 24 March

And so the die is cast and the motley crew (of, I’m sure, well-intentioned people) that make up our government have decided on a lockdown  Liberties are shredded, but I guess people will still be free to shop at The Warehouse.  It seems a curious business.

We must hope the strategy “works”, but the problem seems to be that (a) it isn’t clear there is a strategy (just another tactical choice), and (b) it isn’t really clear what “works” means here.    The Prime Minister yesterday referred to those standard worst-case types of death numbers, that have been around pandemic planning for years.     And she talked in terms of how the lockdown should probably dampen the local outbreak.  But there was no sense of how we get from a four-week lockdown to the end, when the virus is no longer a threat (whether the hope of a vaccine is realised, or because a less-lethal version just becomes part of the normal mild perils of winter).  In particular, there is no sense of how many lives any particular set of policy responses are credibly likely to save, in a world population with no underlying immunity.   I guess the only honest answer is that no one knows, but it would be good to have sense from the government of the central estimates they are working with, and the confidence bands around those estimates.  Without anything like that it is all but impossible for citizens to reach a view on the merits of any planned set of interventions, or a strategy.

There are various efforts around to attempt at least sketch outlines of a cost-benefit analysis (though typically of “policy intervention” defined very generally).  Some people simply object to such exercises as somehow immoral in the face of the threat.  I disagree.  I think they can help frame some of the discussions society has to be having.  Even if, say, you or I might give everything (if necessary our very lives) to save our children, that simply isn’t the way public health policy (or any other area of public policy for that matter) actually works.   We make choices about costs and tradeoffs, whether it is about speed limits, food safety or (closer to this blog) bank capital.

A few weeks ago, I tried to tease out, in a back of the envelope sense, some of how one might like to think about the issues (towards the end ofthis post).   A couple of extracts

According to the Treasury’s CBAx spreadsheet, the value of a statistical life (price community would pay to avoid premature death) this year is just on $5m.   25000 people at $5m each is $125 billion.  However, the evidence so far – including the Chinese data –  is that the deaths are very concentrated among older people.   On the Chinese data –  which may have its weaknesses –  the median age of those dying looks to have been as high as the late 70s, whereas the median age for all New Zealanders last year was 37.3. Remaining life expectancy at 80 seems to be about a quarter of that at 37, so we can chop down that maximum possible saving (from avoiding premature deaths) to no more than, say, $31 billion.

But, of course, even that is too high, since the implicit assumption is that all those lives could be saved with appropriate policy responses.  And from everything I read that seems incredibly unlikely.  Often people seem to talk about using policy measures and costly private actions (distancing etc) to spread out peaks and reduce the intense, perhaps overwhelming, peak pressures on the health system, and thereby (a) reduce the number of deaths and (b) make the whole experience less intolerable for those who would die anyway and those who, while sick, live.   Obviously I have no idea how many lives might be saved in total, but no one seems to seriously suppose it is anything like all of them.  If it was half, it would –  all else equal – be worth spending $15 billion or so to avoid those premature deaths.

Of course, there are other potential benefits to be added, including any sustained impairment of health (eg lung functioning) for some of those who recover.

Probably three weeks ago $15 billion seemed a really big number.  Sadly, now it is chicken-feed relative to the output losses New Zealand will suffer this year.  The loss in the June quarter alone could end up getting on for doubling that, if the lockdown gets extended much.

But in any such discussions, it is also worth bearing in mind that we need to think about marginal effects on both sides of the “equation”.   How many lives will be saved over the next couple of years by the planned set of interventions vs the additional economic cost from the New Zealand’s government’s interventions.  Both what the rest of the world’s governments do, and what the wider public (here and abroad) do anyway isn’t, in principle, relevant to the calculation.    And a great deal of the economic losses we are now facing, and about to undergo, are already baked-in.   There would be no tourists anyway, as just one example.  There would be massive investment uncertainty.  There would be increased physical distancing and postponement of events, and so on.

It is hard to put numbers on any of these items, but the discipline of writing the assumptions down, expressing realistic confidence intervals, articulating the basis for your judgements on each line item, and then disclosing that material to the public should be a part of what is going on now  It is also at least partly about accountability, for some staggeringly big choices governments are making now, and look set to continue to make in some form or another for some time to come.    I don’t have a strong view myself –  interesting question to ask is whether, if there was a referendum today you would support the lockdown – but confidence in judgements being made is only likely to be enhanced if there is good, robust analysis underpinning those judgements.

(And here we should make only little allowance for the mad rush; they’ve had two months to learn from Wuhan and prepare and yet in all too many fields of government it is increasingly clear how little that time was used for serious bad-case planning and preparation.  That seems particularly evident –  perhaps just because it is my focus – in the economic policy area.)

Of course, the more immediate issues now are around economic policy.   The interviews on the morning shows this morning suggest an announcement from the Minister of Finance later today around credit.   Unfortunately, there is still no hint in any comments from the Governor or the Prime Minister that they are yet willing to do what is really needed.   Simply being willing to extend credit to firms might be helpful, but it isn’t really the issue, because for many firms it simply won’t be worthwhile to borrow, taking on more debt against the totally unknown horizon at which something like normality might resume (hint, it isn’t after four weeks).     We need a comprehensive system of income guarantees (80 per cent of last year’s net) for individuals and for firms that stay fully staffed and capable, for the year ahead.   Just possibly, the guarantees would not prove to be needed for that long, but that is really beside the point now: what matters now is uncertainty and expectations, and not just for the next few weeks (still what the wage subsidy is doing).  (My macro-stabilisation package here.)

This sort of guarantee is the sort of policy (“ACC for the whole economy” as someone put it to me) that will help buy a reasonable amount of time, and give firms some confidence in a willingness to take on debt (while still leaving each firms’ owners to make their decision about likely future viability).  Is such a scheme likely to be expensive?  Sure, but in a sense we paid the premium already, in that low public debt over the last few decades.  We should expect the (unwritten, implicit) policy to be honoured, not obviously as some matter of law, but of charity and good economic sense.

The other thing where there is no progress evident at all is on securing a substantial easing in monetary conditions, and substantial relief of servicing costs (not so much the cash outlay as the legal liability) of borrowers.  On RNZ this morning the Governor was talking up all his tools, but it all really amounts to almost nothing.  He can do large scale asset swaps, and in doing so ease some pressures in specific markets.  But monetary conditions are tightening and they need to be loosening a lot.  He talks of the further tools he has at his disposal, but apart from easing specific stresses, they simply don’t amount to much, nothing like the scale of the need (and one of his own MPC, his chief economist) told us that just before the crisis really intensified).

Interest rates need to come a lot further down.  Business and household borrowing costs at present probably should be no higher than zero.   Even getting towards that would require the OCR to be set significantly negative.  That can quite readily be implemented.  It really needs to be done, and the indifference – and bluster, bordering on outright misrepresentations –  from central bankers, including our own, on the failure to adjust interest rates is frankly quite incredible, ie almost literally unbelievable.  OCRs don’t stop being effective at zero, it is just that too many central bankers stopping trying (while doing lots of handwaving).

A former colleague, from mostly a banking supervision background, left a comment yesterday disagreeing with my call for negative rates.

geof m

I’m sure (well, know) he isn’t the only sceptic, here and abroad, but that isn’t going to stop me championing an idea whose time is long overdue (after all, the near-zero bound only exists because of government regulatory restrictions and monopolies –  it isn’t a given of nature).

What to make of Geof’s specific arguments?

First, I don’t accept that it would be destabilising to the financial system at all –  if anything, at the margin it would assist financial stability by shifting the burden from borowers (increasingly indebted in most cases) to depositors (time is offering no real return right now).

I also don’t belief that there would be anything like the sort of flight to Australia Geof suggests.  After all, exchange rates –  even NZD/AUD are volatile enough and transactions costs high enough – to swamp any possible small interest gains.   Perhaps more to the point, in a floating exchange rate system, unless there is a run to physical cash – and recall that under my model cash would be more expensive to purchase/withdraw –  the total deposits in the banking system do not shrink because someone seeks to withdraw money.    For every seller of NZD there has to be a buyer.  And, frankly, the more people wanted to sell NZD at present, the better –  a materially lower exchange rate is one more helpful part of the stabilisation package.

Finally, Geof also notes that lower interest rates won’t do much to boost spending right now.  That is, of course, true and a point I’ve been making throughout.   The point of policy right now is not to boost spending (the time for “stimulus” will be later) but, in this case, to ease servicing burdens materially, and to help stabilise and reverse the falls in medium-term inflation expectations that risk materially complicating the recovery phase, by starting us off with higher real interest rates than those we went into the crisis with,

There is always resistance to paradigm shifts, and too many central bankers and the like are operating within a paradigm that simply isn’t open to negative interest rates –  even though in New Zealand we went for years with substantially negative real rates a few decades ago.  That really now needs to change, and fast.  Our Reserve Bank could show the way.  Our economic policy position, our stabilisation options, would be improved if they did.

UPDATE: I remembered that I meant to mention an idea a reader passed on this morning.  Since many many businesses will fail anyway, and in many cases that may involve personal bankruptcies, in respect of personal guarantees of business borrowings, in this exceptional climate is there a case for considering cutting in half the period in which someone who goes bankrupt is unable to be involved in running a business.  Like everything in this crisis, there are risks, but it might be an option worth some officials thinking about.

Self-imposed constraints (the latest from the RB)

The Governor of the Reserve Bank had an op-ed in the Sunday Star Times yesterday, and I’d intended to use it as the basis for post today.   The column is quite as complacent, relative to the fast-unfolding reality, as anything we’ve had from Orr since first we heard from him on the coronavirus topic at the mid-February Monetary Policy Statement.  Even last week he was telling Mike Hosking that his level of concern wasn’t really that high (“six out of ten” was his line, and none of it sounded like simply an attempt not to spark a panic, and he told RNZ’s Kathryn Ryan that it was ridiculous to compare what was unfolding with the Great Depression (of course the specific causes are differerent, but when people make those comparisons they are typically highlighting the scale and severity of the drop in output and/or the  –  largely self-imposed –  limitations of monetary policy).  Everything Orr has said on the subject has sounded as if it might have been reasonable 10 days earlier, but not when he actually said or wrote things.   Complacency has been the best description, in a climate in which it is the last thing we can afford from our powerful, but barely accountable, head central banker.

But I’m not going to waste time unpicking the latest column, which it isn’t even clear why he wrote.

Before moving on, this is the standard real GDP estimates for New Zealand for the Great Depression (there are no official numbers that far back, although there were a lot of partial indicators).

nz depression

Real GDP in New Zealand is estimated to have fallen by about 15 per cent, peak to trough, over three years ( as a reminder it had fully regained those losses, though not got back to the previous trend, before Labour’s icon Michael Savage took office in December 1935).

Any bets on how deep the fall will be in New Zealand’s GDP over even just the first half of this year?   It depends a bit on how intense any lockdown is, but if someone forced me to put a number on the likely fall (June quarter GDP relative to last December quarter’s) it would probably be 25-30 per cent (similarly numbers are bruited about by serious people in the US, with the risks skewed to something worse.

And, reverting to the Great Depression, what got things going again then?  Well, the UK –  our major market, and less hard-hit than many countries – went off the Gold Standard in September 1931 allowing a substantial easing in monetary conditions.  And we, without yet having a proper currency of our own, further devalued against sterling in January 1933  (the US threw in some monetary policy easing later in 1933 as well).  In other words, letting off the previous self-imposed shackles of monetary policy made a great deal of difference for the better.

This is a quite different, but for now much more severe, sort of shock.    It seems unlikely that we can envisage even beginning much of any economic recovery until the virus situation is more or less sustainably under control, not just here and abroad.  Neither monetary nor fiscal policy will stop the deep drop in GDP going on right now, and probably shouldn’t even think to try right now (we are deliberately closing things down as part of fighting the virus).

But that doesn’t mean significant monetary policy easing would not still be helpful.  There are those worrying falls in inflation expectations, and more immediately there are the still-high servicing costs of a rising stock of private debt.  Public and private debt overhangs were a big issues, including in New Zealand, in the Great Depression, exacerbated then by the sharp fall in the price level.    It is pretty unconscionable that in this climate, where time has no value, floating rate business borrrowers are still paying 5 , 6 or more per cent interest rates.  That is almost solely because the Governor and the Bank refuse to do anything about significant negative interest rates possible –  it is this generation’s Gold Standard (there was a real aversion to moving away from it, and yet doing so finally made a huge difference for the better).

The Governor likes to claim that the Bank still has lots of monetary policy leeway within his own refusal to take the OCR negative (even though his chief economist told the public two weeks ago that it really wasn’t so)

yuong ha

Really just “a little”.

And I think it is safe to say that we have had fairly confirmation of Ha’s (generally not very controversial point) this morning.  The Bank and MPC issued a statement in which they committed to buying $30 billion of government bonds over the coming year.

It was a pretty feeble programme, even if the headline number was big.  A year is a very long time at present.  And whereas the RBA the other day announced an asset purchase programme centred around targeting government bond yields of three years to maturity at 0.25 per cent, it isn’t really clear what the goal of our MPC actually.  Settlement cash balances –  which is what banks get when market participants sell bonds to the Reserve Bank –  aren’t the binding constraint on anything.

And what did this large asset purchase programme announcement do?   The yield on a 10 year government bond fell by 50 basis points.  That is a big move for a single day, but……that still leaves the 10 year bond rate materially above the lows reached after the MPC’s cut in the OCR last Monday.  Quite possibly, without this action bond yields and corporate credit spreads would have spiked still higher.  So I’m not opposed to the action, but all it has done is to stop monetary and financial conditions tightening further, when what the circumstances demand is a really substantial easing of monetary conditions.    It isn’t as if there was a great deal (much at all, it seems) of an easing in the exchange rate either.   And this was the MPC’s preferred unconventional tool……as I said last week, if they are going to refuse to go negative it really is game over for monetary policy, at just the time when adjustment is most needed.  Recall the 400+ basis point cuts in retail rates we typically see in a New Zealand downturn, all of which will have been less dramatic than what we are now experiencing.  Central banks huff and puff and wave their hands to suggest lots of action, and they have done useful stuff on liquidity (again to stop conditions tightening) but the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is not alone it seems in playing distraction, to divert attention from what little monetary policy is doing given the self-imposed (wholly self-imposed) constraints.

(All of which said, even relative to the RBA, our MPC is not doing as much as they could.  As noted above, they could explicitly target and securely anchor government bond yields.  They could also still cut the OCR, even without going negative: the headline rates in both countries are 0.25 per cent, but in New Zealand that is the rate we pay banks on deposits at the Reserve Bank, while in Australia the deposit rate is lower again.   These are small differences, of course, but there is no sound analytical or systems reasons for not using all the leeway even their self-imposed constraints allow them.

Of course, the much more immediate huge issue is what the government is going to do to underpin the credit system and support a willingness of banks to lend and firms to borrow.  The only secure foundation for that remains some mix of grants and income guarantees (which will become grants).  I can only repeat that the most useful way of thinking about these thing is as the national pandemic economic policy we would have adopted twenty years ago if we’d thought hard enough, been serious enough, about what could happen: undertake to underpin all net incomes at 80 per cent of last year’s for the first year (reducing after that if the issue is still with us).    The fiscal costs are easily manageable for New Zealand: if guaranteeing 80 per cent of incomes than even if full year GDP fell 40 per cent, it would still only be a fiscal commitment of 20 per cent of GDP, and we are starting with net government debt (properly defined) of zero per cent.   It isn’t the exact dollars that really matter at this point, let alone trying to distinguish good and bad firms, but the certainty such a guarantee –  ex post insurance policy –  would provide in capping the extreme downside risks, individually and collectively for the first year.  It wouldn’t stop all exits –  some have already happened, some firms are likely to think it not viable to come back even with a grant/guarantee –  but it is the best option to help stabilise the economic damage, and to ensure that banks are able and willing to play a strongly facilitative part.

On Q&A yesterday the Minister of Finance suggested more announcements very shortly. I hope so but what worries is that once again whatever they do will be inadequate and not really get ahead of the issue. There is an opportunity now, but time is running down fast.

Another sobering chart

On Saturday I showed the then-current version of this chart.

aus 22 march

As I noted on Saturday morning

It is much the same locally-exponential pattern we’ve seen in so many other countries.  If current rates of increase continue then by the end of tomorrow Australia will have per capita numbers akin to those in the US or UK yesterday.  That is the sort of impact exponential growth has.

Australia now has as many, slightly more, cases per capita than the US and UK had on Friday.

What about New Zealand?  In this chart I’ve shown the Australian numbers divided by five (to put them on the same per capita basis as New Zealand).

nz and Aus

Perhaps at a very first glance, New Zealand doesn’t look too bad.  But look across the chart not up and down.  Our latest observations are where Australia (in equivalent population terms) was just a week ago. There is no evident or obvious reason to expect that in a week’s time we wouldn’t be something like where they are now  (or if there is such a reason no political ‘leader’ has been willing to try to articulate one).

And yet our government continues to pretend to believe there is no community transmission, confirmed or not.  It is simply extraordinary.  Reversing the presumption now – in light of what has happened in ever other similar country, but most notably in Australia with whom until almost now we’ve had a Common (travel) Virus Area –  seems much the safer option.

Sadly, it seems on a par with how the government and the Ministry of Health have treated the threat from the start.  It was, after all, only about three weeks ago that the Ministry was tweeting, on its official account, that there was more to fear from rumours, stigma etc than from the virus itself.  Nine days ago, on their website they asserted that the risk of outbreak was low.  And presumably acted/advised accordingly?

And then there is the elected government and the Prime Minister in particular (the Minister of Health has been largely invisible and apparently irrelevant).   Because it is so easy to lose track of what was said even a few days ago I went back and read the transcripts of her post-Cabinet press conferences since the start of the you (28 January was the first).  Admittedly the questioning was often equally lethargic, but it was truly startling just how complacent the Prime Minister had consistently been.  There was no apparent sense of urgency, no apparent recognition that significant spread globally was –  if not a certainty – a very high probability against which the whole of government and the private sector should be preparing, and no attempt to get out in front and alert the public to the serious threat that was looming.

Now, you might argue that our Prime Minister wasn’t much different to those abroad, and from what one sees that might be a fair comment.    But it isn’t exactly an excuse for any of them is it, with the full horror of Wuhan already in view by the end of January.   You might also argue that few/commentators were sufficiently alarmed either, which is probably also fair.   But the government is the government –  hugely well-resourced by any other standards, and fully linked in to the intelligence and threat assessments of other countries.  On the economic side, it is not much more than two weeks ago that the Prime Minister was playing down the risk of recession – laughable, if not so serious, even then –  when now we are heading into the deepest (and they are all temporary) and most sudden deep slump in New Zealand history.

When they have finally taken actions, they’ve usually been like knee-jerk reactions (often a mere day or so after denying any intention of anything of the sort, going all the way back to the first China travel ban, which they were bounced into by Australia a day after telling the Chinese foreign minister they’d do no such thing).   And, most concerningly to me, there is simply no evidence of a strategy, and no willingness to engage the public on the options, choices and risks around threats and policies that have huge huge economic, social, and civil liberties implications for us all –  not for days, but potentially for months or a year or more.  It is simply inexcusable, and almost beyond belief (even as we have to watch it day by day).    The four-stage scheme they rolled out on Saturday is certainly no strategy, and although it might have been a welcome start six weeks ago, coming out with no substance in a much-vaunted Prime Ministerial address on Saturday, it had all the feel of having been dreamed up on the back of an envelope on Friday afternoon.  There is no evident strategy.  There is no evident exit strategy for anything done so far, or anything they have in mind.   Some of the specifics even look untenable, notably the detail of their schools policies.

In fact, the more I’ve reflected on the issue over the weekend, the more I wonder how much relevant planning has been done at all.    I was recalling the huge effort that went into pandemic planning in the public sector in abour 2005/06, which I had quite a lot to do with (the economic dimensions of).   The problem with that work, as I reflect back now, is that it was mostly based on something like a re-run of 1918, where a huge proportion of the population was off work sick, or caring for the sick, but that the country was never “locked down”, and it envisaged the pandemic passing through perhaps in waves, but pretty concentrated ones, as in 1918/19.  I don’t recall anyone giving any serious thought to the idea of closing the border indefinitely (short closures sure), to locking down the economy and social interactions for many months at a time.  Perhaps in the subsequent decade, official agencies revised their planning – I hope so, but I was in public sector economic agencies until 2015, and never heard a hint of that.     And given how lethargic the whole of government was in January and February you have to worry that officials, in our greatly diminished public service are just now making it all up as they go along.

One specific dimension that got my goat was the PM lecturing (and that was her tone, repeatedly) the country about stocking up in supermarkets.   She assures that everything not only is  fine now, but always will be, no matter what stage of the crisis we get too.

First, looking backwards, one of the supermarket chain heads at the weekend said buying last week was just ahead of that in the run-up to Christmas, “but for Christmas we have a long time to prepare”.  That seemed like a fair point for him to make, but why had the Prime Minister and the government not been working with supermarkets weeks and weeks ago to emphasis the fast-building threat and urging them to increase production to cope with possible surges in demand.  Such demand was entirely foreseeable, conditioned on a recognition of the risk.  The public shouldn’t be hectored by the PM for what is her failure and that of her government.

But the bigger issue is forward- looking where she has been grossly over-promising.  It might be reasonable to suggest people slow down for a few days and let the supermarkets restock (having herself been neglectful from the start), because it probably is reasonable to assume that supermarkets will remain stocked in the early days of any lockdown.

But the Prime Minister seems not to recognise at all that in such a climate many people will prefer to avoid supermarkets if at all possible, and to have inventory in the home rather than in a public place.  That will be especially so if and when the health system becomes overloaded –  as people warn it may within a month or so –  and people reasonably fear that if they and their families get sick they may not be able to get decent treatment.

And I trust the government to keep supermarkets open in some form or another throughout, and am moderately confident the basics will be kept available –  perhaps intermittently at times, and for some goods.  New Zealanders should not starve (Irish peasants used to have adequately nutritious diets of milk, potatoes and oats).  But, frankly, most people want more than milk, potatoes and oats.  And none of us knows (a) what production the government will deem essential, (b) what factories will still be adequately staffed (and distribution channels have to hold up), and (c) what other countries will deem essential. Because, you see, although the PM talks blithely of international trade in goods continuing, that only means much if international production of things New Zealand imports continues.  As just one example, I just had a look at the back of the dishwasher powder container, and was surprised to learn it comes from……..Poland.  Hard to imagine production of dishwasher powder would be an essential in Poland if/when they are in lockdown.  It is quite plausible that lots of non-basic non-perishable goods could rapidly become quite hard to get.  Buying extra now is utterly and totally rational, whatever the Prime Minister says.  To not do so would mean putting a great deal of faith not just in the good intentions and words of the government, but in some tail-event optimistic scenario about how everything will work in a period –  that as even the Minister of Finance put it –  could last for months.

Personally, I simply have no confidence in anything they say or do anymore.

(And, please note, nothing in this is advocating any particular set of anti-virus policies now.  There are genuinely hard choices.  My kids are still at school this morning (we had the conversation yesterday).  But there is no evidence of strategy, there is no evidence of engagement with the public re what the future holds, there is no evidence they’ve thought through the limits of the state (as Matthew Hooton put it on Twitter the other day, there are some things more important than public health, but what does the PM think those are?) and so on.   It is a pretty egregiously bad performance so far, all compounded –  this is an economics blog –  by the manifest inadequacies of the economic policy response to date from government and the Reserve Bank –  and yes, I have just seen the latest RB release.)

 

 

 

A sobering chart

It astounds me that I have not seen this chart once in the New Zealand media (or from any of our political and bureuacratic officeholders –  I hesitate to call them “leaders”).

aus cases 2

Australia confirmed their first “community outbreak” case on 3 March, when there were 33 cases in total (just fewer than we had yesterday).

It is much the same locally-exponential pattern we’ve seen in so many other countries.  If current rates of increase continue then by the end of tomorrow Australia will have per capita numbers akin to those in the US or UK yesterday.  That is the sort of impact exponential growth has.

There was routinely a lot of trans-Tasman travel.  There is, apparently, still a lot of travel this way as people try to get home.  And while in the last few days self-isolation was supposed to be practiced, there are numerous stories of it simply not being following consistently.  My worst one was a story someone told me the other day: they’d gone to the hairdresser, who was young and pregnant. The hairdresser passed on the story of a customer who’d come in the previous day and commented that while she was in self-isolation she really needed to get her hair done.  The hairdresser, perhaps unsurprisingly burst into tears.

All this means that one can think of New Zealand and Australia as having been essentially a Common Virus Area –  what is mine is yours, and what is yours is mine.  Since we haven’t been doing the sort of aggressive mass testing that some have called for –  although the pace has stepped up in the last few days –  it seems simply irresponsible for the government to be running policy on the presumption that we do not have community out break here.  No one can be certain, but the question has to be what is the safer assumption to make decisions on right now.  Given the rest of the world, given Australia, given the lags (when you confirm community outbreak you should wish you’d acted a couple of weeks earlier), the only sensible approach now is to assume presence, and act accordingly.  But apparently in an interview on Newshub this morning, the government’s chief official on health matters said they were still assuming the opposite, staking a great deal on their view being right.

I see the Prime Minister is to speak at midday.  We’ll see what she says.

For me, I’m less interested in specific announcements or new rules, but on whether there is evidence that (a) they are going to break with the past and actually take the public into their confidence and engage on the issues, options, costs and risks, (b) whether they finally are willing to front with the public on the severity of what is to come, health or economics, (c) whether there is any sign of a developed stable framework for thinking about policy responses through time (d) whether they any sense of an exit strategy for whatever approaches they adopt, (e) whether there is any sign they have identified what things they belief to be more important than public health in this specific situation, and (f) whether they have thought through seriously how sustainable, economically or socially, whatever strategy they adopt is, or whether they are still just attempting to buy “a bit more time” and risking lurching again before long.

These are difficult issues, and few leaders here or abroad seem to be handling them at all well, but no one made any of them take office.

I had been planning to write a post today prompted by the economic and other policy choices and trade-offs implied by the very useful Imperial College paper published earlier in the week, but I might now come back to that –  and particularly questions about whether suppression strategies are worth the costs to the economy and society and its freedoms and values, if anything like what the Imperial College authors suggest it implies were to be an accurate representation of the issue.

UPDATE: Unfortunately, the PM’s statement did not seriously or adequately address any of the sorts of issues raised in the paragraph a couple above.

Reserve Bank still behind the game

There was a new announcement from the Reserve Bank this morning.  The two key elements, as summarised by Westpac are

       A Term Auction Facility. The RBNZ will lend to banks for up to 12 months, taking Government bonds, residential mortgage-backed securities, and other bonds as collateral. This basically ensures banks will be well-funded for the foreseeable future. This will prevent an increase in the cost of bank funding, which in turn will help ensure that short-term interest rates for businesses and households remain low.

–       FX swap market funding. Banks sometimes borrow money from offshore and swap the debt back to New Zealand dollars. In recent days the cost of performing this swap has exploded. Left unchecked, this could have caused an increase in the cost of funding New Zealand banks, which in turn could have led to higher interest rates in New Zealand. The RBNZ has essentially offered to facilitate some of those swap arrangements, which will keep the cost of overseas funding contained.

Both initiatives seem sensible, as (for that matter) does the rest of the statement (although the new Fed USD swap line is surely of symbolic significance only, recognition that we are a real advanced economy, since New Zealand banks tend not to have an underlying need for USD.

I’m guess the fx swap market activity will make a useful difference. But I wonder how much difference the Term Auction Facility will make though.  I recall conversation with bankers at the height of the 2008/09 crisis who observed that their boards simply would not look at Reserve Bank funding –  however reasonable the term –  as a particular secure foundation on which to maintain, let alone expand (as it hoped for this time), their credit.  Time will tell, but the Reserve Bank of Australia announced a much more aggressive package yesterday afternoon, including provisions explicitly allowing banks to borrow more –  at very low fixed rates –  to the extent they increase business credit this year.

There were also indications in the statement that the Bank has been dabbling in the government bond market

Supporting liquidity in the New Zealand government bond market

The Reserve Bank has been providing liquidity to the New Zealand government bond market to support market functioning.

But, as Westpac notes,

However, the amount of liquidity provided seems tiny so far, and has had little effect on longer-term Government bond rates.

Funding rates through the fx swaps market aren’t transparent to you and me.  But bank bill yields are readily observable.  As I noted in yesterday’s post they had moved much further above the OCR than one we normally expect (especially when the Bank has committed not to change the OCR itself).    On this morning’s data, that gap is still 42 basis points (a more normal level might be around 20 basis points.   When the goal is supposed to be abundant liquidity and interest rates as low as possible (consistent with MPC’s self-imposed floor on the OCR), there is simply no need or excuse for these pressures.  Surely they aren’t worried about some spontaneous outbreak of inflation?

Similarly, here is the chart for the 10 year bond

il

In other words, barely below the levels at the start of the year, before any of us had heard of the novel coronavirus, let alone had our economies shredded by it.   The 10 year rate appears to have dropped a little further this afternoon, but it is still well above where it probably should be.

The Reserve Bank of Australia yesterday announced a significant bond purchase programme designed to cap three year government bond yields at 25 basis points (with flow through effects on the rest of the curve.  Our Reserve Bank has still done nothing of substance on that front –  and our shorter-term government bonds yields are well above 25 basis points.  Why not?  Well, there is no obvious reason for the lethargy –  inflation isn’t about to be a problem –  other perhaps than that Orr and Hawkesby went so strongly out on a limb with their complacency about the situation, as recently as last week and this, and Orr has never been one to be willing to concede he might have got things wrong (despite being in a game where such errors are, from time to time, inevitable).

Ah, but perhaps inflation and inflation expectations are just where we want them.  But no.  These are the New Zealand inflation breakevens (difference between nominal and indexed 10 year government bonds.

breakevens mar 20

Recall that the target is 2 per cent, and these are 10 year average implied expectations.  Things were not that great anyway –  not averaging much above 1 per cent in the last couple of years –  but now we are down to 0.65 per cent.  (It isn’t quite as precipitate as the fall seen in the US, but hardly comforting even if the data are harder to interpret than usual.)   This risk –  inflation expectations falling away, raising real interest rates all else equal –  used to worry the Governor.  Nothing has been heard of the line from him or his offsiders since it became a real and immediate threat.

There isn’t really much excuse for the MPC’s sluggishness and inaction.    After all, they talked about bond purchases being next cab off the rank, and then markets went haywire, their peers in Australia acted, and they did nothing.  Of course, it doesn’t help that it seems the Reserve Bank was seriously unprepared.  You’ll recall that as recently as Tuesday last week, we had 19 pages of high level stuff on alternative instruments from the Governor, with the clear message he thought we were well away from needing them.  We were promised a series of technical working papers “in the next few weeks” but despite the crisis breaking upon them almost two weeks later we’ve seen nothing.  All those years they had to prepare, and it seems all too little serious preparation was actually done (as we now know –  because they told us so –  despite all the talk of negative interest rates as an option, it now turns out they’d taken now steps to ensure banks’ system could cope).

But none of that need stop the Reserve Bank launching a large scale bond purchase offer (or auction programme).  It isn’t operationally complex.  The Bank transacts these securities in the normal course of its business, and each year buys back bonds approaching maturity.    There won’t be any systems implications.

I wonder if one other reason they are reluctant to act is a sense that then people would see how little the alternative instruments they favour actually offer.  While they don’t act, there is a pretence that there is a big bazooka.   But only while they don’t act.

As I’ve noted previously, I think there is fair consensus on the last decade’s unconventional policies in other countries: at times there were some real and significant benefits in case of specific market dysfunctions, but beyond that the beneficial effects were relatively limited.  Asset purchases, with a policy-set OCR floor, have no mechanisms that would lower interest rates to bank customers.  They’ll cap government bond rates, probably with some benefit to interest rate swaps rate, but the biggest effect will simply be to flood bank settlement accounts with a lot more settlement cash.  And since that is a rock-solid asset (now) fully remunerated at the OCR itself, it won’t prompt material behavioural changes.

You needn’t just take my word for it.  Last Friday in the Herald  the Bank’s chief economist (and MPC member) Yuong Ha (who had spent some years monitoring financial markets in his previous role), was talking about alternative instruments (bond purchases, intervention in the interest rate swaps market and so on).   He was quoted this way

yuong ha

These tools “give you a little more headroom, a little more time and space”.  In some circumstances “a little” might be all the situation demands.  In these circumstances it is grossly inadequate and simply no substitute for failing to act on interest rates.

That is part of why I think they should get on now and do the large scale bond buying, or even buying foreign exchange assets.  With an interest rate (OCR) floor in place it just won’t make much macro difference, the emperor’s new clothes will be exposed for what they are(n’t), and perhaps we might finally get some focus on the crying need to get retail interest rates lower.

Recall the Bank’s claim that bank systems aren’t ready.  For a start, this should be challenged, and some naming and shaming should go on.  Apparently some banks aren’t ready, but others are.  Name them.  Second, at least for wholesale products all the big banks must be finel –  lots of financial products abroad have had negative interest rates for several years, and our own inflation-indexed bonds were trading at negative yields at times in recent months.   Perhaps as importantly, actual retail rates –  and it is probably the retail components of some banks’ system that are the issue –  are still well above zero, both term deposit rates and retail lending rates.  If the OCR –  a wholesale rate – could be set to, say, -2.0 per cent (without triggering conversions to physical cash on a large scale), term deposits might still be only around zero, and retail lending rates higher again.  There is a lot of space the Bank could use to drive retail rates down without even having to envisage negative rates for the main retail products.  In times like the present every little helps. (As an example of the issue, the Australian banks today announced a scheme to freeze debt repayments for SME borrowers for six months, which is fine, but those borrowers are still paying an interest rate of perhaps 6 per cent, in a climate where time –  which is what an interest rate is mostly compensating for –  currently has no, or perhaps negative, value.)

Perhaps the Bank, The Treasury and the Minister of Finance are now cooking up some decisive intervention to support the credit system as a whole  rather than just extending government loans to the iconic and politically connected Air New Zealand.  Such an intervention is sorely needed, and once again the government is behind the game.  The credit system is probably the most pressing point right now, but it is no excuse for the MPC, an independent operator, to be not doing its  job.  The times demand a large easing in monetary conditions, including in real interest rates.  The Bank is delivering almost nothing, all while playing smoke and mirrors with the suggestion that its next instrument offers much more potential than is really there.

Once more our key decisionmakers fall short.

There would be nothing to lose now by bold and decisive action.  Nothing.

Retail interest rates fall substantially in recessions…

I’m out of town today, so just something short.

I’ve noted in various posts recently that in past recessions in New Zealand since we liberalised in the 1980s the OCR (or prior to 1999, the 90-day bank bill rate) had fallen by around 500 basis points in a typical (median) recession.   Small sample and all that, but it was a reasonable stylised fact (and happened to around the same size adjustment as you see in the longer run of US data).

But, of course, the OCR isn’t a rate paid by anyone –  technically in fact it is the rate the Reserve Bank pays banks on their settlement account balances.   In thinking about the experience of firms and households one has to look at retail interest rate and how they changed.  In the 2008/09 recession, for example, there was quite a widening in the margin between the OCR and retail deposit and loan rates.

One can identify five reasonably material downturns in the interest rate data on the Reserve Bank’s website.  Here are the changes in floating first mortgage interest rates in each of them.

Floating first mortgage new customer housing rate Six-month term deposit rate
percentage point chg in downturn
post 87 crash -4.3 -4.3
1991 -6.2 -4.9
1998 -3.1 -3
2001 -1.8 -1.9
2008/09 -4.6 -4.6
Median -4.3 -4.3
Now -0.8 -0.1

Not all of those events were particularly significant for the New Zealand economy, and the 2001 interest rate falls combined the effects of the northern hemisphere economic slowdown that year and the precautionary cuts the Reserve Bank implemented after 9/11.

But across this sample, the median reduction in both deposit and residential mortgage rates was 4.3 percentage points.  For the two deeper recessions, 1991 and 2008/09 the changes were larger still.

I’ve also shown the adjustments we’ve seen this year to date.   The main banks all lowered their floating mortgage rates on Tuesday by the full 75 basis points of the Reserve Bank’s OCR adjustment.  But retail deposit rates have only just begun to fall.

And in even The Treasury’s view, this recession “could” be bigger than the 2008/09 one (more realistic would be to view 2008/09 as tiddler by comparison, even if one allowed for nothing more than the elimination of our international tourism industry).

And then there are two problems to ponder:

  • first, the MPC has pledged not to change –  raise or lower –  the OCR for at least a year.  So if one believes they will keep their word, what you see now is all you get.  Retail lending rates aren’t going any lower, and retail deposit rates will take a while to catch up but probably won’t fall more than 75 points either.  75 basis points is a great deal less than 430 points, and
  • second, while it was probably good PR for the banks to cut point for point on Tuesday, actually it looks as though they’ve ended up with squeezed margins.  Here is a chart showing the 90 day bank bill rate less than floating first mortgage rate, up to yesterday

bill rate

The 90 day bank bill rate is usually a bit above the OCR, and fluctuates mainly with shifts in sentiment re future OCR adjustments.  When the OCR is expected to be cut imminently the 90 day rate drops below the OCR.  That had happened recently. But note what happened after Tuesday’s cut: the margin between the bill rate and the OCR is now higher than at any time in the last two years.  That would usually only occur if the OCR was expected to be raised, but that clearly isn’t the story as the MPC just pledged not to change the OCR for at least a year.  In fact, it points to liquidity pressures in the local market (details not known to me).    The Reserve Bank’s liquidity operations would usually be able to ease such pressures, and it is a bit surprising they haven’t already done so.

But the key point remains: there is no prospect of further retail interest rate reductions in the middle of the most severe adverse shock of our lifetimes.  75 points is it.     It is a ridiculously small adjustment.  But that is what you get when (a) the Reserve Bank fails to do anything about removing/easing the effective lower bound, (b) fails to ensure banks’ systems were ready for negative interest rates, and (c) pledges not to cut the OCR any further anyway. It really is Alice-in-Wonderland stuff.

Even in circumstances like the present where we aren’t –  or shouldn’t be for now – trying to stimulate aggregate demand, low interest rates play an important role in managing economic downturns.  First, they help lower debt service costs, including for existing flexible rate borrowers (and most New Zealand debt reprices fairly frequently), and do so by transferring some prospective income from depositors to borrowers, consistent with the idea that time is temporarily less valuable.  Second, at a wholesale level they help to weaken the exchange rate, which also typically plays a significant part in buffering adverse shocks.  And third, the flexibility to adjust rate, actually exercised, helps to support and stabilise medium-term inflation expectations.

Did I mention the exchange rate?  In the 1991 recession, the TWI fell by about 10 per cent. In the 1998 recession, the TWI fell by 17 per cent, and in the 2008/09 episode the fall was in excess of 20 per cent.

And this time?  Well, the TWI yesterday morning was only 5 per cent lower than it had been at the end of December, despite the adverse shock being much greater than in any of those earlier events.    This week, we have had the extraordinary sight of the New Zealand dollar approaching parity with the Australian dollar.  I’m sure a variety of factors help explain that, but an unexpected commitment from the MPC not to lower the OCR further can’t have helped.  The TWI appears to have fallen overnight and perhaps before long panic and flights to cash/flights to home will mean the TWI will fall a long way, but monetary policy so far has been an obstacle in the road.

The economy is already in deep strife, and the problems are going to get a lot worse.  We shouldn’t settle for the complacency of central bankers talking up their adjustments, their alternative instruments etc, and all the while retail rates have barely moved, relative to the scale of change seen in most past (smaller) downturns.

The Minister of Finance should simply insist that the Bank sort it out, including getting bank systems fixed post-haste.  There is no conceivable way in which on OCR with a positive sign in front of it makes any sense in today’s New Zealand economy.  Retail deposit rates really should be negative, and retail lending rates probably should be too.

A programme for macroeconomic stabilisation

On Monday afternoon I put out a post under the heading “A radical macro framework for the next year or two”.   There were four, intended as mutually reinforcing, strands to what I was proposing.  Those strands were, with a few marginal refinements relative to Monday’s post:

  • urgent action, legislative if necessary, to ensure that the OCR can effectively be cut to at least -5 per cent with substantial flow-through to retail lending and borrowing rates,
  • in the meantime, the Reserve Bank should stand in the market to buy any government bonds on offer (at 0 per cent yield for bonds with less than five years to maturity and perhaps 0.5 per cent for longer-term nominal bonds),
  • passing legislation to cut all wages by 20 per cent temporarily – at present for the next year (and probably reviewable rentals too –  the principle being fixed price contracts other than interest rates, separately dealt with above),
  •  urgent legislation (or, as a second-best, use of the Minister of Finance’s guarantee powers in the Public Finace Act) guaranteeing that all tax-resident firms and individuals would enjoy net income for 2020/21 no less than 80 per cent of that for 2019/2020. (For firms, that guarantee would be scaled to the extent staff numbers dropped below pre-crisis levels.)

Of these, right now something like the fourth measure is the single most important: to remove much of the downside income risk, in a legally-binding way, such that banks (and other financial institutions, but mostly only banks matter here) should be willing to (a) continue with current credit exposures, and (b) extend further credit as required to accommodate the net revenue shortfalls many businesses and lots of households will face.

No matter how much banks say they want to support customers, and probably genuinely mean it, banks are businesses too.  At present, there is no readily discernible date at which banks can assume either business or household net revenues will be back to normal, and no certainty about the nominal environment we/they will face at that point, having gone through a huge deflationary shock.    It won’t be problem if someone with a residual mortgage of 10 per cent of their house needs credit, or a firm with little borrowing and substantial physical assets.   I’m sure banks will be only too happy to accommodate such customers.  But plenty of household borrowers have large mortgages,  house prices will be falling (in a highly illiquid market), and many business customers won’t have much to offer by way of collateral at all.  In the latter case, the Crown guarantee would be structured to serve as such an asset.

As for really heavily indebted firms or households, some would probably just prefer to close down/liquidate and protect whatever equity the owners still have rather than take on large new debt for an indeterminate horizon of income loss.   For a firm with large fixed commitments, the need for additional credit (net cash outgoings in a climate of quite limited revenue) might be really large.  The underlying business might be sound, but it simply wouldn’t be worth it to the owners (and it isn’t as if M&A activity is likely to be buoyant in the coming months).     Banks know all this.   Bigger business borrowers will know it all.  Smaller ones will realise it quite soon.

If the goal is to avoid widespread, somewhat indiscrimate, closures and perhaps forced liquidations –  leaving the institutions of the economy not too badly positioned to pick up not far from where they left off in perhaps a year or two’s time –  the government needs to offer this sort of certainty –  ex post pandemic insurance (paid for later in higher taxes across the board).  Drip-feeding cash will not cut it, because expectations –  looking ahead –  matter to all involved.    And, of course, there is no serious way the government can directly lend, remotely responsibly, to hundreds of thousands of individual companies.

Is it ideal?  No, of course not.  But it might not be too far from the sort of model we might have chosen to pay for ex ante  had we properly faced up to the nature of pandemic risks decades ago (although even then each pandemic has its own idiosyncrasies, so I don’t really feel the need for us to lament that we did not have such established arrangements in advance).  Are their moral hazard risks?  Yes, no doubt.  There will be pandemics again, but if this one proves to have been a 1 in 100 year event, we may not need to worry too much about the moral hazard point (and frankly, I’d be more worried if what actually happened was that lots of firms went to the wall and the system just bailed out those who happened to be very politically well-connected or able to effectively play up the consequences of letting them in particular fail.)

I regard decisively dealing with the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates as also very important, but for different reasons and (in the particular circumstances of this crisis slightly less urgent).   As I’ve pointed out repeatedly in the typical recession in recent decades, the OCR (or equivalent) has been cut by 500 basis points or more, and this recession is likely to be much more severe than any of them.  75 basis points just does not cut it.  Similarly, the exchange rate usually falls deeply, and it has not moved that much at all so far –  not helped by the Bank promising not to cut further.   And, related to both of these, stabilising medium-term inflation expectations is vitally important in the face of a severe deflationary shock if we are not to complicate (perhaps greatly) the eventual recovery phase.

There are nuanced arguments about whether the limited experiments with negative policy rates in Japan and various European jurisdictions have done much good (it was surprising –  even more so in hindsight –  that the Governor did not even touch on this debate in his speech last week).   I find the fairly fragmentary evidence at best inconclusive, but more important not terribly enlightening.  These experiments have been adopted in relatively normal economic times (low interest rates to be sure, but economies have generally done okay in the last few years) and they have involved very small changes, still bounded by the risk of large scale conversions to cash.  There do seem to have been some psychological hurdles to facing retail customers with negative rates, and in many cases banks did not bother (there wasn’t that much in it).

But we are in quite different times at present.  On the one hand, depositors have few practical useful options in a climate of extreme uncertainty, high volatility, and generally declining (variable) asset prices.  And on the other, I am talking not about 25 basis points here and there, but about the ability to cut the OCR –  and comparable rates in other countries –  by another 500 basis points (and even that wouldn’t be exceptional: in the last US recessions some models suggested the Fed funds rate needed to have been able to be cut by 1000 basis points, not the 500 points the Fed actually cut by.   We need this policy leeway  –  to markedly ease servicing burdens of existing borrowers (this tends not to feature in a US context where there is so much fixed rate lending), to help drive down the exchange rate, to support medium-term inflation expectations, and (in time) to help set the scene for a robust recovery in spending and investment.     Enable the OCR to be effectively set at -5 per cent and retail interest rates will soon follow.  If necessary, given the exceptional nature of the time, I would be happy to see regulatory power used to jolt them down collectively.   If we do nothing on this front, we not only leave an enormous vacuum where stabilisation policy used to be, we really jeopardise those medium-term expectations (which appear to have been falling a lot in bond markets, overseas and in New Zealand – albeit accepting that the inflation breakevens are harder than usual to interpret).

The third strand –  assuming no instant action on fixing the effective lower bound –  would be to have the Reserve Bank standing in the market buying bonds at predetermined yields.  The main advantage of this is signalling –  absolute determination to keep medium-term inflation up in the face of the most powerful deflationary shock since the Great Depression –  but the real advantage (partly in contradiction to the first) is to demonstrate, including to the Governor, that these alternative instruments he talks up (even as his Chief Economist was talking them down) are no adequate substitute for lower interest rates, and will not do much themselves to lower private market interest rates when 0.25 per cent is a floor on the OCR.  There is no credible transmission mechanism in the current context that would make much difference, including little or no relief for borrowers –  in a climate where time has largely (and currently) lost its economic value.  But give it your best shot, quickly, and then got on with fixing the real stuff of monetary policy.

The fourth strand probably appeared rather odd, or even quixotic.  I was accused on Twitter of being some sort of right-wing stooge wanting to beat up on workers.    In a typical market economy, workers (implicitly) pay firms to accept risk.  Wages are contracturally fixed and unless you are laid off or the firm fails you can count on your wages each fortnight. Profits on the other hand are highly variable, down as well as up.  It is a good system for most of us, almost all the time.  But this year the economy is going to be really substantially smaller than anyone imagined when, for example, they contracted for a price at which they would hire/supply labour this year.    It is no one’s fault (at least from the juncture of 2019 –  who knows what could have been done differently about pandemic risk in earlier years).  We could simply let the losses lie where they (legally) fall.  In that world, lots and lots of firms will fail, and lots and lots of employees will lose all their income (and have fewer other options for the time being).  Not only that, but large chunks of their fellow citizens –  beneficiaries and NZS recipients, and public service employees face almost no income risk at all.

Part of getting through this crisis is going to require a secure (through time) sense that there is some fairness about who bears the losses –  and the losses are now large and unavoidable in aggregate.  If we’d been told three months ago what this year looks like, almost no private firm would have contracted for this year’s labour at the current price.  What I’m proposing –  a statutory wage cut of 20 per cent –  simply acts as a coordinating device, that allows everyone to lose something (and know that people in similar positions are making similar sacrifices).    Of course, in the immediate sense those who benefit from such cuts are firms –  unit labour costs are cut –  but actually it won’t generally be a transfer to capitalists because of the guarantee I promoted earlier (it is likely to be binding for a majority of firms).   In practical terms, the wage cut will probably mostly benefit the Crown finances, and enable the government to deploy resources aggressively as required at different phases of this process.   In the current phase, more private sector demand is not what is sought anyway (we are closing down much of the economy).  In the recovery phase – which might yet be more than a year away  – it will.

The wage (and rent) cut isn’t vital to the rest of the package in narrow economic terms. It is about perceived fairness and sharing the load.  I can’t see a world in which large chunks of private sector employees lose jobs, while almost all the public sector sails securely onwards (and, as I noted the other day, our household’s main income is a public service salary, so when I talk about fairness here I really mean it).

Various people who read my post on Monday –  often rather quickly –  responded by challenging me as to why we should not just adopt a temporary UBI, as even some establishment figures on the right in the US (notably Mitt Romney) have advocated.   My answer is really quite simple: in these particular circumstances, a UBI is shockingly badly targeted, and would disburse huge amounts of money while still not addressing the main presenting issues.  It would be startlingly unfair –  all those secure public servants, for example, would get even more money on top of their secure incomes, in a climate in which the whole country is quite a bit poorer.  It would discourage retained labour market attachment (this might be a marginal effect, but it still works the wrong way).  And it is focused on maintaining or boosting spending at a time –  the present –  when that is about the last thing we want to be doing.  Recall, we are deliberately shutting down much of the economy more or less rapidly in an attempt to suppress the virus –  and that includes not putting more people in shops, restaurants, theatres or whatever.  And it would do nothing for medium-term inflation expectations.

Basic income support for those whose jobs won’t exist or be able to be done should of course be provided.  That is why we have a benefit system, currently with no stand-down periods.  But for most people shortage of cash coming in won’t be the immediate issue –  they will barely be able to spend what they are getting anyway.   The big focus has to be, first, on those guarantees that keep credit going and help hold firms –  and employment –  together, reinforced by actions to stabilise medium to long term expectations.  But the focus now has to be on stabilisation and relief, not on stimulus –  trying to lift the level of activity –  per se.

Again, as I’ve said before the time for stimulus will come.  If we really fix the lower bound we might not need too much additional fiscal support –  the government accounts will have taken a deep (but appropriate) hit during the crisis itself –  but if fiscal support is helpful then, there are plenty of options, at a time when people are likely to be showing renewed interest in spending.  I’ve touted a temporary cut in GST.  I’ve also noted the possibility of a temporary cut in one of the lower income tax rates (which would deliver a similarly-sized boost to most people).  But straight lump-sum payments to individuals or households could well have a useful place then –  after all, for those who think these things are just playthings of the left, George W Bush used that approach early in the 2008/09 recession.

There are probably some other points/emphases in Monday’s post, with which this could be read together.    But action really is urgent, and that need isn’t conditioned on quite how few or many coronavirus cases we happen to have –  as I heard one smart medical-oriented person argue this morning –  but on the increasingly bleak outlook, as it will appear to banks, firms, and households.   Expectations really do affect behaviour, in economies even if not in viruses.  Providing a secure foundation for credit is vitally important.  Now.

 

 

The curate’s egg

It was a poor package.  On so many counts.  And my sense of that has only strengthened overnight.  Perhaps at best one might label it as a curate’s egg –  and rather more in the original meaning than the colloquial one.

It had the feel of a package that started as one thing, perhaps relatively small, two or three weeks ago when the government was still focused on the coronavirus as a China issue –  things that had happened, but which would now gradually if slowly sort themselves out – and on the small range of sectors materially directly affected by the China experience.  They were backward looking, and they refused to face up to what was clearly coming –  and it was as clear as day at least a week ago.  So then rushed changes were made to the package on the fly, including efforts to bulk it up to look enormous –  presumably solely for political reasons –  regardless of whether the components were relevant at all to the times or to the specific needs in responding to the situation that is upon us.   And at the same time, whether because they were caught by the momentum of their own process, or because they are still reluctant to front the severity of what awaits us, most of the really pressing issues were barely even addressed.

The government then has the gall to talk of a new round of measures in the Budget –  two months away –  allegedly to be focused on the recovery phase.  There is (a) absolutely no way they can wait until the Budget to do a lot more, and (b) the recovery phase is much more likely to be something to think about in next year’s Budget.  Remember the comments from Prof Michael Baker reported in the Herald a day or so ago: anyone who thinks this will be over by Christmas hasn’t thought hard enough.  Or, as he went on to rephrase, perhaps Christmas 2021.

I want to focus mostly on the economics, but the politicisation by the government was also unfortunate.   Crisis times, all in this together etc.  But there were the silly boasts that somehow this package was bigger than was done in 2008/09 –  which is true but irrelevant since (a) this is quite different sort of shock, (b) there was huge fiscal stimulus already put in place in the 2008 Budget, oblivious to what was just about to break, and (c) there was room for 575 basis points of interest rate cuts (and the exchange rate fell sharply).  There was, in fact, no discretionary fiscal stimulus in New Zealand during the recession itself: it wasn’t needed.   Then there were the attempts to wrap themselves in the cloak of Michael Joseph Savage –  Labour’s icon –  in “responding to the Great Depression”.  At least some of them are presumably historically literate enough to know that Savage didn’t take office until the worst of the Depression in New Zealand was long past and recovery was well underway.   Or the silly attempts to boast that their package was bigger than some others when (a) as we shall see, for coronavirus purposes a lot of their numbers were simply irrelevant, and (b) the scale of interventions globally is rising by the day (those other packages were last week’s news).      It isn’t exactly confidence-inspriring re the seriousness of the Prime Minister’s leadership in a crisis when she goes on TV to claim this would be the biggest package she announced, and then it becomes very evident that the numbers were simply cobbled together in a way that produces just barely that result – headline-grabbing rather than substantive policy.

What would have been much more welcome was evidence that the Minister and Prime Minister clearly understood what was going on, what the key issues were, what the relevant horizons were, and so on.  But there was little or none of that.

To get specific, this is the table summarising the package

package

We’ll get the easy bits out of the way first.  No one is going to argue with more resources going to health, although (a) some have asked why it wasn’t more (is that really all the sector can really use if we face 18 months of suppression strategies?), and (b) why this hadn’t been done at least six weeks ago.

And there probably isn’t much to quibble about (at least for now) re the sick leave and self-isolation support.

I didn’t see any details of the “redeployment package” although in his speech Robertson did make some comments, including mention of a package for Gisborne to be announced in the next few days. I guess the amounts are small, but mostly it seems to be a waste of time –  most likely before long hardly anyone (well apart from the health system and a few online retailers) will be taking on any new staff, and that could be the case for many months.  Face to face training doesn’t seem likely either.  It looks like just a legacy of where the package began weeks ago.

There is nothing to say about the “initial aviation support package” because they’ve said nothing about it, except that it apparently doesn’t include an Air New Zealand bailout.  Other than that, it isn’t entirely clear why this line item exists in the package, but I guess it bulked out the headline number.

And then we started getting to the big bucks.  Unfortunately, many of the big bucks are scheduled to be spent in several years time, and have nothing whatever to do with the coronavirus, whether stabilisation or recovery.   Because the thing that doesn’t get much attention in public consciousness is that the $12.1 billion number is total additional spending over four fiscal years.    That is an approach that makes sense in normal times (recognises the ongoing implications of new commitments) but it bears no relationship to the support provided for the coronavirus situation this year.

Thus, the business tax reforms they announced seem generally sensible.  I’ve argued against the previous government’s abolition of depreciation on buildings ever since the National Party adopted the policy in 2010. It was daft and without any good economic foundation, so I’m really glad to see it being scrapped.  Probably this was planned for this year’s Budget anyway (I hope so).  But it has nothing whatever to do with coronavirus, with stabilisation, or even with recovery.  And the bulk of the spend will be in future years.  It is simply in here to (a) bulk up the numbers, and (b) as some sort of political counterpoint to the next item, welfare benefits.

Raising welfare benefits permanently also has nothing to do with coronavirus.  Again most of the spending (at least $1.8 billion of it) won’t even be in the March 2021 fiscal year, and of the remaining billion probably only $700 million will be paid out in the next six months (largely the “winter energy payment”).  Raising welfare benefits permanently has long been a cause of the Green Party and probably much of the Labour Party.  There is talk that this too was going to feature in the (election-year) Budget.    If so, it is just in this package to (again) bulk out the headline number.

But the increase in welfare benefits now is much more pernicious than that.  Life on a benefit isn’t easy (and before anyone scoffs about what do I know, that isn’t just rhetoric: I have a close family member living on a long term benefit).   But what beneficiaries at least had going for them this year was certainty of income: the government was not going to default or closedown, unlike many private sector employers (with the best will in the world on their part).  They and public servants were safe.  And yet the government chooses to lock-in a permanent boost to its spending commitments (a) to those with the least degree of income uncertainty now, and (b) when the country is in the process of becoming a lot poorer and scarce resources need to be used wisely.   Raising benefits might or might not have been a reasonable luxury in settled times.  It is simply irresponsible and evidence of fundamental unseriousness to do so now.  (And before anyone tells me about the high marginal propensity to consume that beneficiaries have, let me remind you that now is not the time for stimulus or encouraging people to spend more: instead we are entering a phase of deliberately choosing to shrink the economy to give us the best hope of fighting of the effects of the virus).  Oh, and the unemployment rate is going to rise a lot, and one of the big challenges after this is all over is going to be reconnecting people with the labour market, at a time when wage inflation will have been depressed anyway.  In that context, higher benefit replacement rates (relative to wages) is really the last thing that makes sense in getting the economy back on track.

All of which leaves us with the centrepiece of the strategy, the wage subsidy scheme.  It is probably reasonable enough as far as it goes, but “as far it goes” is no more than a very short-term holding action, not remotely enough to really address much at all (it runs til June, the crisis will not, banks (for example) and other creditors will know that. So, before long, will most households).

But again there is a strong suspicion of political vapourware in the numbers.   The scheme is estimated to pay out $5.1 billion in the next three months.  That is a lot of money.

It is paid out at a rate of $7029.60 per full-time employee.  That means they expect to pay out for about 725000 fulltime equivalent employees (there is a lower rate for part-time employees).   That sounds like a lot.

In the latest HLFS, there were 2.6 million employees in total (including the self-employed). Of them 2.1 million were fulltime.  Applying the same ratio the package does (part-time staff are paid for at 60 per cent of the fulltime rate) to the 519000 part-time staff produces a full-time equivalent number of employees of 2.44 million.  In other words, the headline budget figure is premised on paying out in respect of 30 per cent of all employees in the coming quarter.   And this is even though the payment is capped at $150000 per employer, equivalent to compensating for only up to 21 staff.  And you can only get the payment is your monthly revenue is down 30 per cent year on year

Now, sure, there are lots (and lots) of businesses with fewer than 21 staff.   But lots of employees (by number) work for big organisations, both in the public and private sectors.  All those universities who were moaning about foreign students a few weeks ago could only each get $150000 (if total revenue had even fallen 30 per cent) even though they employ thousands of people each.

I am not saying that the $5.1 billion total is impossible.  But it seems unlikely.  And in particular it seems inconsistent with (a) the political messaging about the severity of the economic shakeout (even yesterday the Minister still wouldn’t accept that a recession was a done deal), and (b) the preliminary Treasury forecast the Minister was happy to wave around suggesting that at worst we’d have only about a 3 per cent fall in GDP.

I reckon I have been consistently one of the most pessimistic commentators about the economic effects.  It isn’t that hard to envisage GDP falling 5 per cent in the June quarter alone (reality could be a lot worse than that if suppression really comes to New Zealand), but that isn’t the sort of message the government is giving New Zealanders.   Either they aren’t being honest with us, or they’ve just bulked up the headline numbers (it isn’t as if any underlying assumptions about any of the forecasts have been released).

So for all the talk of a 4 per cent of GDP package etc, it would probably be more realistic at this stage to think in terms of immediate additional outlays (next few months) of no more than half that (and not even all that will be helpful).  Those are still big numbers: 2 per cent of annual GDP is 5 per cent of four months’ GDP.    The Minister released a chart suggesting the package will boost annual GDP itself by 2 per cent over the next year, but that too seems optimistic (but hard to tell how much without Treasury releasing their assumptions/workings).

But for whatever immediate good some elements of the package might do, it still largely fails to address the real and pressing issues.   In particular, in typical recession debt service costs for borrowers (new and existing, at least for floating rate borrowers) drop sharply, and returns to depositors drop sharply.  That reallocation is a natural and normal part of the rebalancing and stabilisation process.  Despite the spin from central bankers (abroad as well as here), 75 points just does not cut it: 500 points has been more like it in recessions (over a period when none has been as bad as what we are facing now).   Between a central bank that refuses –  adamantly promises –  not to cut further, and a failure to ever deal with the lower bound issues, nothing is on the way.  That has to change.  The government could and should simply insist on it changing now.   (Related to this, what fall in the exchange rate we’ve seen –  also a natural part of shock absorption –  is tiny compared to the usual recessions.)

And even more pressingly, in this unique sort of shock, the package does nothing about stabilising income expectations for firms or households in a way that would support banks being willing to (a) maintain existing credit exposures, and (b) be willing to significantly extend credit to cover the gaping net revenue holes that will be opening up for many firms (and households).    That needs urgent action.   With the best will in the world, and much harassment from the Governor and the Minister, banks are businesses too and have shareholders to answer to (primarily) and their own future existence to protect.   They can read things like this week’s Imperial College paper arguing that suppression strategies may need to be kept in place for most of the next 18 months.  If so, with no income guarantees –  and not even any certainty about what subsequent emergence looks like – as a bank you would often be in breach of your duties to extend more debt in many cases.  And many people –  firms and households –  would be reluctant to borrow more.   Better to manage and minimise exposures early, to whatever extent one feasibly can.

Of course, governments could lend direct.  But that simply isn’t realistic on any sort of scale.  Much better to think hard about the sort of idea I advanced in a post on Monday where the government passes emergency legislation guaranteeing –  in legally enforceable form (perhaps it could even just be done under the guarantee powers of the Public Finance Act, but better to get parliamentary sanction) – that no firm or household/individual would have net income in 2020/2021 (and perhaps even the following year) less than 80 per cent of that for the last year (for firms, the guarantee would be scaled to the extent they retained staff).   Doing so would give a floor –  and thus remove much of the variance in expectations – for households, firms, and for actual/potential lenders.  It should help underpin a willingness to extend credit.  It should also serve as an underpinning if we find ourselves adopting shorter-term expedients –  as say France has done –  of temporarily suspending utlilities bills or mortgage payments:  utility companies could themselves get bridging finance if banks knew household would still have most of their income, and banks themselves wouldn’t face the need to record impaired assets etc.

I want to come back, in a further post, this afternoon to my overall proposed package, including answering some of the questions/objections.  I still believe it is the best and fairest approach to take, complementing some of the other shorter-term cash income support measures (which would be nested within the guarantee).  But whatever the precise form of what they do, the government simply must act very quickly to ensure that credit is available. (And on that score the Reserve Bank temporary suspension of the scheduled increase in capital requirements is of second order significance, not remotely the main game.

Finally, I can only repeat a point I’ve made in various posts and numerous tweets over the last week: this is not the time for encouraging new private spending.  There will come a time for that, and it is likely that fiscal policy will have a significant role to play then.  But this is a time when we are deliberately scaling back the economy –  quite possibly savagely for months at a time – and discouraging spending in many areas.   We need to ensure have the income to live on, but for now much the most important economic priority is some set of guarantees –  supported by the strong Crown balance sheet – that means households are able to borrow, existing businesses are able and willing to borrow, and banks are genuinely willing to maintain and increase lending…..in the face of the most hostile and uncertain economic conditions of the lifetimes of almost all of us.

The government now needs to get serious and get down to real economic policy work.  It would be also good if they started authoritatively fronting with New Zealanders about just how tough things are going to get.    A lot of New Zealanders, who don’t obsessively follow the news or events abroad, really still have little no idea.

 

 

Coronavirus economics: 17 March

The apparent complacency of our key economic agencies is almost beyond belief at this point.

Thus, the Prime Minister told us yesterday that The Treasury’s advice “at the weekend” was that the economic impact “could” be larger than the recession of 2008/09 (as she loosely termed it “worse than the GFC”).  As various articles have pointed out, real GDP fell by just over 3 per cent over five successive quarters in 2008 and 2009.  The unemployment rate rose from a one quarter trough of 3.3 per cent to a one-quarter peak of 6.7 per cent (looking at the quarter-to-quarter volatility it is probably fair to talk of a three percentage point increase).

If that is – or even on Saturday was – still Treasury’s view, it is quite seriously worrying.  Whatever the outcome for the March quarter –  which still has two weeks to run, weeks that are likely to be pretty bad –  it isn’t at all hard to envisage a fall in the June quarter alone that will swamp the entire fall in real GDP in 2008/09.  Just remember the international tourism sector. We used to have one.

Recall that the Secretary to the Treasury is an observer on the Reserve Bank Monetary Policy Committee, and attended the meeting on Sunday where they agreed to cut the OCR 75 basis points and to commit not to cut in further for a year.  This was the same meeting the Governor emerged from to tell the press conference yesterday that only on “some scenarios” would there be a recession in New Zealand.  Surely, if the Secretary to the Treasury –  who unfortunately has no national policymaking experience or background –  thought differently she’d have conveyed that view pretty forcefully in the meeting.   Or are the Governor and the Secretary on the same pages.

But that was yesterday.   This morning three interviews with senior RBers, each members of the MPC, have become available.  I missed most of Orr’s on Radio NZ so may come back to that when it is available on the website.  So for now, lets just stick to comments made by Chief Economist, Yuong Ha on RNZ this morning and an interview Deputy Governor Geoff Bascand gave yesterday to interest.co.nz.   Complacency, combined with lack of any evident framework for thinking about and responding to the challenges, seemed to me to sum things up.

Yuong Ha was quoted saying that the Bank has given a considerable stimulus yesterday, with the 75 basis point interest rate cut.  But surely one could only judge “considerable” relative to the scale of the shock.   And in typical downturns, the OCR has been cut (or bill rates fallen pre-OCR) by 500 basis points or more –  in that 2008/09 downturn that the Treasury says this “could” be worse than – we cut the OCR by 575 basis points.  This MPC has cut by 75 basis points, and has committed not to cut any further for a year.  Ha claimed to be quite unbothered at the inability to take rates negative –  because bank systems can’t cope –  despite the Bank having given us no previous hint of such a problem, including in the Governor’s speech last week.  After all, he said, “we have lots of other ways to add stimulus”.

His favourite, and that of the Committee, appears to be large-scale purchases of government bonds.  That, all else equal, will greatly boost settlement cash balances at the RB, but so what?  That doesn’t lower servicing costs or returns to depositors,  and there is no identified transmission mechanism where it makes much difference to anything. I’m not opposed to such purchases –  as I said yesterday, the Bank should probably now stand in the market to buy any government bonds at 0% yields –  but on their own they won’t do much (recall that normal 500 points of easing).

Ha was then asked about the exchange rate, partly about where it is at now and partly about options to lower it by direct fx intervention.     Remarkably –  or sadly, perhaps what we have come to expect from this MPC –  he expressed himself quite pleased with the exchange rate and the buffering it was providing.  But again, he seems to forget –  or more likely chooose to skate over –  the fact that in serious downturns exchange rate buffering often involves, for New Zealand, 20 per cent plus falls in the exchange rate.     In TWI terms, that was almost exactly the extent of the fall over 2008/09.   And this time?   The TWI averaged 70.1 in the second half of last year (71.1 for the month of December) and, according to the RB website, was 68.7 yesterday.     It has barely fallen at all.

So the Bank can’t or won’t cut interest rates, (perhaps not entirely unrelatedly) the exchange rate hasn’t fallen much, and yet even The Treasury accepts this “could” be bigger than the GFC-associated recession.  But Ha isn’t bothered.  Government bond purchases will  do the job apparently.   Almost unbelievable.   (The same Ha whose comments from last week I quoted yesterday, suggesting that asset purchases could really only do a little, at the margin.)

But that performance was almost trumped by someone who, with much more media (and policy) experience, the Deputy Governor Geoff Bascand.   He wasinterviewed on interest.co.nz, video footage and all.

And he just seemed extraordinarily complacent.   Bank funding was just fine and would be for months he thought.  There was no sense, for example, of suggesting that banks might want to tap markets while they still can just to be on the safe side (as one courageous NZ bank treasurer actually did in early 2008).

But this is the bit that really got my goat

But for a number of them, their IT systems “aren’t ready and can’t cope with negative rates”.

“New Zealand hasn’t really contemplated negative rates in the historical period that we can think about. It’s a bit like a Y2K thing in a sense that they’re all set up to be positive, zero, or positive numbers,” Bascand said.

“It doesn’t mean that you couldn’t create some work-arounds eventually, or adjust this, but right now [this] doesn’t seem to be the key thing to do.

“We’ve got other ways of putting stimulus into the economy if we need to. Taking on additional risk of doing something that may or may not transmit, or work properly, doesn’t seem like the smartest thing to do.”

Take first that “other ways of putting stimulus into the economy if we need to”.  It reveals both a complacency about the economic shock, a misunderstanding of quite what easier monetary conditions do right now (would mostly ease servicing burdens and redistribute burdens), and that belief in other mechanisms which is simply belied by the evidence –  and by the comments of the Chief Economist only last week.

But it was the unreadiness of systems bit that really takes the cake.    He blithely tells us is “like a Y2K thing”, but never seems to recognise a profound difference.  Under some mix of commercial imperatives and central bank and other official pressure, there was a huge expensive effort undertakem to ensure that the financial system was ready for Y2K (I was heavily involved at the time, including the policy precautions).   The issue was recognised several years in advance and appropriately prioritised.   As it happens, Adrian Orr was the Bank’s chief economist at the time (although I guess it wasn’t an issue that much involved that bit of the Bank).

And then he claims

“New Zealand hasn’t really contemplated negative rates in the historical period that we can think about.

which is simply false.  As I mentioned yesterday, at the height of the euro crisis, in the dying days of his governorship, Alan Bollard set up an internal working group (which I chaired) to look at monetary policy issues and options should short-term interest rates get near-zero.  That report, to the (then-internal) Monetary Policy Committee, explicitly canvassed the possibilities of negative rates, including the wider (physical currency conversion) risks and limits, including in the light of international experience to date.  That report explicitly identified -0.5 per cent as appearing likely to be a true floor, and identified system constraints as a potential issue.

As a result, among the recommendation were three specific ones on that score: that we ensure that the Bank’s own internal systems (banking system, NZClear etc) could cope with negative rates, that we liaise with the Treasury to ensure that the DMO could handle negative interest rates, and that the Bank’s prudential supervisors should liaise with banks as to whether their systems could adequately cope with negative interest rates.

That report was dated 31 August 2012.  I do not recall anyone disagreeing, or refusing to accept, those recommendations.

Now, to be sure, that particular eased and passed.  But negative rates did not become less of an issue for advanced country central banks, with notable examples of countries with extensive experience in recent years being Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and the euro-area.

And yet today the Reserve Bank of New Zealand can blithely tell us that banks’ systems aren’t ready.  This despite the Bank’s proud repeated boast of the advantages of having monetary policy and bank supervision in the same organisation.  I’m simply staggered at this failure, this utter lack of preparedness –  all the more so because past Bank publications had openly talked of negative rates as a policy option for New Zealand.

And who bears responsibility.  Well, in a few days time, Adrian Orr will have been Governor for two years.  Plenty of time to ensure the Bank was ready for  a crisis even if his predecessor had been a bit slack (crisis preparedness is really core central banking –  the crash fire brigade that needs to be excellent, even as you hope they are never needed at all).  And, even more so, Geoff Bascand has been Head of Financial Stability (responsible for the whole supervisory and regulatory side of the Bank, as well as sitting on MPC) for almost three years.  (Oh, and then there is the small matter of the Board, who are supposed to have held the Bank to account, including ensuring things like crisis preparedness: Quigley has chaired the Board for more than three years now).

And yet, with not a hint of apology he blithely tells us banks aren’t ready and –  perhaps as egregious –  it isn’t really worth making it priority to fix that now.

It is simply breathtakingly inadequate.  They become more incredible –  literally hard to believe, impossible to have any confidence in, by the day.

UPDATE: For anyone here looking for views on the government’s economic package today, I suggest having a look at my Twitter feed (here).  A more considered post on the package will be forthcoming tomorrow.