(I was going to follow-up on yesterday’s post and the associated (and welcome) media and political reaction regarding Neil Quigley’s latest disclosed (mis)conduct, but a new statement from the Reserve Bank this morning has seen that overtaken by events.)

The egregious chair of the Reserve Bank Board, Neil Quigley, has been at it again this morning. The Ombudsman has been inquiring into at least some of the complaints regarding the Bank’s handling of OIA requests around Adrian Orr’s departure. Here I stress – in contrast to the Bank’s statement this morning – “some”, since I have a letter from the Ombudsman yesterday that they are still looking into parts of my complaint on these issues

The outcome of the inquiry that the Ombudsman has concluded was that a) the Bank was not obliged to release any other documents than the carefully selected and very partial group, designed as much to mislead as to illuminate, that they released on 11 June, and b) that the Bank has, on the Ombudsman’s recommendation, nonetheless released a (also rather partial) “summary timeline of events relating to Mr Orr’s departure” (included in the statement at the link above).

Quigley engages in some self-congratulation in this morning’s statement thus

Which is just an extraordinary claim since (a) delaying tactics are a serious issue in their own right, b) many of their responses never identified (and still have not done so) specific reasons for withholding specific documents, c) some aspects of OIA requests were simply ignored, and d) some are still outstanding. To which I could add that the pro-active statement (and selective document release) of 11 June was clearly designed to mislead, and much light has since been shed by a combination of (a) the apparent insider who leaked to me, b) releases by the Treasury in the wake of that leak, and c) the timeline the Bank has just released. Between all that and Quigley’s own very public obstructionism, open disregard for the intense public interest in this matter, and actively misleading answers to questions dating all the way back to 5 March (probably questions to public officials formally count as Official Information Act requests), Quigley’s claim would be laughable if the situation weren’t so serious. Much is still unanswered.

Anyway, the point of this post is to put in place a rather fuller timeline, drawing on all that we now know, including but not limited to the Bank’s release this morning. In a small number of places I will insert things that must have been so but are not formally confirmed in documents, but where I do that I will explicitly indicate as much. As much as anything, those items point to continuing gaps in the record. A few comments follow below the timeline.

Orr departure timeline as at 28 August (the document might be updated if further information emerges but the current text is below)

Quite a few things are still less than clear, and are deliberately not being disclosed:

• there has been no indication as to what the Minister knew, when she knew it, including what (if any) contact she or her office had with Quigley after that meeting on 24 Feb,
• we have none of the text of emails between Orr and the Board after 24 Feb (despite others, that seem to suit the Bank, being released, and others having been released in the past), or of exchanges among Board members themselves,
• we do not know why the Board agreed to an exit agreement at all (if, as it is described, Orr had lost trust in Treasury, the Board, and the Minister –  and noting that he was the employee –  the simplest thing would be for him to have resigned, under standard contractual conditions)
• or why the exit agreement seems to have provided for Orr to have been paid in full despite being absent from the office for more than a month,
• we do not know the character or general terms of that exit agreement (eg who isn’t allowed to say what –  noting that Quigley has previously attempted to hide behind that agreement, before a lot more later came out),
• we do not have an explanation or apology from Quigley for what was pretty clearly sequential efforts to mislead (and worse) the public, starting from 5 March (and further reinforced by the attempt revealed in full yesterday to squash Treasury’s file note of an important policy meeting),
• we do not know if the other board members knew of the exit agreement terms before they were signed, and
• we are led to believe that MoF, to whom Orr actually resigned, had no knowledge of the terms of the exit agreement.  If not, why not (as the person actually responsible for hiring and firing).
• do those ex gratia payments to seven staff, each made after Orr left, relate to complaints about Orr and his conduct?
• And perhaps someone might ask how much staff/Board time and outside legal expense has been incurred in almost six months of obstruction and coverup, when things could have been set out simply and straightforwardly months ago.